State of Washington v. Bethany B. Wallace-Corff ( 2020 )

FILED
AUGUST 18, 2020
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 36809-2-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
BETHANY B. WALLACE-CORFF, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, A.C.J. — Bethany Wallace-Corff appeals from a conviction for first
degree assault with a firearm (domestic violence). Because her confession was not the
product of coercion and the evidence amply supported the conviction, we affirm.
FACTS
Shooting victim Gordon Whitaker was in a relationship with Ms. Wallace-Corff
and also in a relationship with Darlene Hill. Neither woman knew about the other; both
became pregnant by Whitaker. Wallace-Corff and Whitaker ended their relationship.
Near the end of December 2014, Whitaker drank heavily at a friend’s house and
returned to Hill’s home. The two argued and Whitaker went to bed and fell asleep. Hill
went through the sleeping man’s phone and discovered text messages indicating Wallace-
No. 36809-2-III
State v. Wallace-Corff
Corff’s pregnancy. She contacted Wallace-Corff and the two women decided to meet
and jointly confront Whitaker. Wallace-Corff went to Hill’s residence.
With Hill watching, Wallace-Corff woke Whitaker. When he tried to stand up,
she pulled a gun and told him to sit. He then told jurors:
She said, you fucked with the wrong bitch and looked at me and shot me,
just put it on my leg and shot me. It happened so fast. I just seen smoke
come out of my leg and the most pain I’ve ever felt in my life.
Report of Proceedings at 159. Wallace-Corff fled.
Responding Police Officer Elias Huizer located a .380 handgun shell casing at the
scene, and doctors removed a slug from the leg. Whitaker suffered a fractured distal
femur and underwent three surgeries in addition to physical therapy. He initially declined
to identify his assailant, but ultimately named Wallace-Corff. Two messages that she
exchanged with Whitaker via Facebook were later admitted at trial. In one, she advised
him that he was “lucky” the couple had already broken up, “or [I] woulda gave [you]
worse. I hope you think of me . . . everytime u pull your pants over your knees.” Ex. 14.
She later told him, “I’m not angry with you anymore . . . [I] found closure.” Id.
Officers arrested Wallace-Corff at her home three weeks after the shooting. Her
two children were present, so her ex-husband was called to take custody of them before
she was removed to the jail. He advised officers that he owned two handguns, including
a .380. When the detective visited him later that day, they discovered that the .380 was
missing; the ex-husband believed it had been stolen.
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Upon arrest, officers advised Ms. Wallace-Corff of her Miranda1 warnings. She
asserted her right to counsel. When the detective arrived to transfer her from an
interview room to the jail, Ms. Wallace-Corff advised him that she wanted to make a
statement. After reminding her that she had asserted her right to counsel and re-
advisement of rights, she admitted her participation in the shooting. She explained that
she stole the gun from her ex-husband and brought it with her in case Hill was plotting to
beat her up. When she later confronted Whitaker, he reached for the gun and the weapon
went off accidentally.
The court conducted a CrR 3.5 hearing prior to trial. Ms. Wallace-Corff testified
that between the first and second advice of rights, the detective had come to the interview
room and questioned her about using her ex-husband’s Colt .45 to shoot Whitaker. The
detective denied speaking to her after the initial assertion of the right to consult an
attorney; he only saw her when he came to take her to the jail. He also testified that he
never would have asked about a Colt .45 because he knew that a .380 shell casing had
been recovered at the scene. The recorded interview was also played at the hearing.
There was no discussion about the type of gun used to shoot Whitaker. The trial court
found that the detective had not asked about a Colt weapon unless he did so after the
interview and concluded that the recorded interview was voluntarily given.
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
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After several years of delay, the matter proceeded to trial. Ms. Wallace-Corff
waived her right to a jury and the matter was tried to the Honorable Michael McCarthy.
He concluded that she was guilty of first degree assault while armed with a firearm.
After the court imposed a mitigated sentence, Ms. Wallace-Corff timely appealed
to this court. A panel considered her appeal without conducting oral argument.
ANALYSIS
This appeal presents two issues. Ms. Wallace-Corff argues that her custodial
statement was coerced and that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. We
consider the contentions in that order.
Custodial Statement
The first issue is the voluntariness of the statement. Ms. Wallace-Corff contends
that she only confessed to the crime so that her ex-husband would not be arrested and
leave their children to be placed in foster care. The police did nothing to create a
coercive environment.
Prior to conducting a custodial interrogation, police must first advise a suspect of
her rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to consult with an attorney
prior to answering any questions. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. In addition to whether a
defendant properly waived her right to remain silent, a confession can still be involuntary
due to the process by which it was obtained. Massey v. Rhay, 76 Wash. 2d 78, 79, 455 P.2d
367 (1969). Courts apply a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine if an
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individual knowingly and voluntarily confessed or instead confessed as product of police
coercion. State v. Unga, 165 Wash. 2d 95, 101, 196 P.3d 645 (2008). The defendant is
entitled to raise the issue of voluntariness to the jury even if the court has admitted the
statement. 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
CRIMINAL 6.41, at 208 (4th ed. 2016); State v. Huston, 71 Wash. 2d 226, 236-237, 428 P.2d
547 (1967). The question of voluntariness only arises when there has been coercion by
the police. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473
(1986).
This appeal fails due to that last observation. The detective did nothing to coerce
the confession. He did not threaten to arrest the ex-husband or investigate him for a
crime merely by asking her about the ex-husband’s guns. Only in Ms. Wallace-Corff’s
imagination could that be viewed as an implied threat. Additionally, as the trial court
properly noted, nothing in the recorded interview suggested that some factor was at work
other than the defendant’s voluntary decision to set forth an exculpatory theory of the
case.
In the analogous situation of a defendant challenging a guilty plea due to coercion,
courts treat the defendant’s denial of being coerced or promised anything during the plea
hearing as highly persuasive evidence against a later claim of coercion and false
promises. A somewhat factually similar arising in that context is State v. Osborne, 102
Wash. 2d 87, 684 P.2d 683 (1984). There both the husband and wife were in jail; each
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entered into separate plea agreements. Id. at 90-91. When he pleaded guilty, the husband
stated that his plea was voluntary. Later he moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming
he had been coerced by his wife’s threat of suicide. Id. at 92. The Washington Supreme
Court concluded that the “‘highly persuasive’” statements in court were not overcome by
the “bare allegation” of the husband’s subsequent affidavit; more was required. Id. at 97.
Here, too, there is nothing more than a “bare allegation” of coercion to dispute Ms.
Wallace-Corff’s statement in the interview that no threats or promises impacted her
decision to give a statement to the detective. For both reasons, the coercion claim fails.
The trial court did not err in concluding that Ms. Wallace-Corff’s statement was
voluntary.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant also argues that there was insufficient evidence that she intended to
inflict great bodily harm when she shot Whitaker. However, the evidence supports the
bench verdict.
Familiar standards guide our review here. “[F]ollowing a bench trial, appellate
review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the findings of
fact and, if so, whether the findings support the conclusions of law.” State v. Homan, 181
Wash. 2d 102, 105-106, 330 P.3d 182 (2014). “‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence
sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the asserted premise.” Id. at
106. Unchallenged factual findings are verities on appeal. State v. Baker, 136 Wash. App.
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878, 880, 151 P.3d 237 (2007). In reviewing insufficiency claims, the appellant
necessarily admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom. State v. Salinas, 119 Wash. 2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Finally, this
court must defer to the finder of fact in resolving conflicting evidence and credibility
determinations. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wash. 2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990).
A person is guilty of first degree assault if “with intent to inflict great bodily
harm,” she assaults “[a]nother with a firearm.” RCW 9A.36.011(1)(a). “‘Great bodily
harm’” includes injury that “causes a significant permanent loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily part.” RCW 9A.04.110(4)(c).
While Ms. Wallace-Corff argues that the evidence was insufficient to show she
intended to inflict great bodily harm, she does not challenge any of the findings of fact
entered by the trial court. The unchallenged findings alone doom her argument on this
point. Nonetheless, the findings also are amply supported by the evidence. The trial
court relied on the Facebook message that Wallace-Corff hoped Whitaker would think of
her every time he pulled his pants up to determine that she “intended to inflict great
bodily harm by the practice known as kneecapping.” Clerk’s Papers at 80.
The trial court understandably reached that conclusion. A reasonable person
would recognize that great bodily harm would ensure from placing a gun on another’s leg
and firing the weapon. Injury is guaranteed in such a circumstance. Disabling another
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person’s leg for any length of time easily meets the definition of “great bodily harm.”
The evidence was sufficient to support the bench verdict.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
_________________________________
Korsmo, J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________
Siddoway, J.
______________________________
Pennell, C.J.
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