State Of Washington v. James H. Manuel ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 80405-7
)
Respondent, )
) DIVISION ONE
v. )
)
JAMES H. MANUEL, ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
)
ANDRUS, A.C.J. — James Manuel challenges an order from King County
Superior Court restoring his right to possess a firearm under RCW 9.41.040(4) as
to his conviction from that court and refusing to do so as to convictions from Pierce
County Superior Court and Lakewood Municipal Court.
We hold RCW 9.41.040(4)(b) is not a jurisdictional limit on a superior court’s
authority to restore a defendant’s firearm rights. The statute gives a petitioner two
venue options, one of which is any superior court of conviction and the other is the
superior court in the county of the petitioner’s residence. King County Superior
Court, as a superior court of conviction, was an appropriate venue for Manuel to
obtain a full restoration of his firearm rights. We reverse and remand for entry of
an order restoring Manuel’s firearm rights.
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FACTS
Manuel has nine convictions that led to the entry of orders prohibiting him
from possessing firearms under RCW 9.41.040. Manuel, a Pierce County resident,
was convicted in Pierce County Superior Court of seven felony offenses between
1998 and 2004. On July 13, 2006, the King County Superior Court convicted
Manuel of burglary and revoked his right to possess firearms. In 2010, Manuel
was convicted of a separate, domestic violence misdemeanor offense in Lakewood
Municipal Court.
On April 21, 2019, Manuel filed a petition to restore his right to possess
firearms with the King County Superior Court under the same cause number as
his 2006 felony conviction. The State agreed that Manuel is statutorily eligible to
have his firearm rights restored but argued that King County Superior Court “lacks
jurisdiction to grant the petitioner’s request on the eight Pierce County Convictions”
under RCW 9.41.040(4)(b).
The trial court found Manuel was eligible for restoration under the conditions
set forth by RCW 9.41.040(4)(a). The court additionally found that it was the court
of record that ordered Manuel’s prohibition on possession of a firearm for his 2006
prohibition, but was neither the court of record that ordered the prohibition on
possession of a firearm on the remaining convictions nor the superior court in the
county in which Manuel resides. The trial court entered an order restoring
Manuel’s firearm rights only relating to the King County conviction. Manuel
appeals the denial of a full restoration of his firearm rights.
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ANALYSIS
A. RCW 9.41.040(b) does not limit superior court jurisdiction
Manuel contends King County Superior Court has the authority to restore
his firearm rights as to any and all of his convictions under RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(i).
RCW 9.41.040(4)(b) provides:
(b) An individual may petition a court of record to have his or her right
to possess a firearm restored under (a) of this subsection (4) only at:
(i) The court of record that ordered the petitioner’s prohibition
on possession of a firearm; or
(ii) The superior court in the county in which the petitioner
resides.
The State does not dispute that King County Superior Court is a “court of
record” and it was a court that ordered Manuel’s prohibition on the possession of
a firearm. But it argues King County Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to fully
restore Manuel’s firearm rights because it was not “the” court of record that
prohibited Manuel’s possession of firearms as to his Pierce County and Lakewood
convictions. We conclude the statute cannot be read to limit King County Superior
Court’s jurisdiction.
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed
de novo. Crosby v. Spokane County, 137 Wn.2d 296, 301, 971 P.2d 32 (1999).
Jurisdiction refers to the court’s power and authority to act. ZDI Gaming, Inc. v.
Wash. State Gambling Comm’n, 173 Wn.2d 608, 616, 268 P.3d 929 (2012). Article
IV, section 6 of the Washington State Constitution defines the superior court’s
jurisdiction and grants to it original jurisdiction over a broad category of cases. Id.The legislature may not change that jurisdiction without amending the constitution.
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Id. And while the legislature may specify the appropriate venue for a particular
dispute to be resolved, they may not pass legislation to limit the subject matter
jurisdiction of superior courts county by county. 1 See, e.g., id.; Dougherty v. Dep’t
of Labor & Indus., 150 Wn.2d 310, 317, 76 P.3d 1183 (2003); Young v. Clark, 149
Wn.2d 130, 133, 65 P.3d 1192 (2003); Shoop v. Kittitas County, 149 Wn.2d 29,
37, 65 P.3d 1194 (2003); J.A. v. State, 120 Wn. App. 654, 657-58, 86 P.3d 202(2004).
In ZDI Gaming, the supplier of pull-tab machines filed a petition in Pierce
County Superior Court, challenging Gaming Commission regulations and its
decision that ZDI’s machines violated those regulations. 173 Wn.2d at 614. The
State contended that RCW 9.46.095, which provided that “[n]o court of the state of
Washington other than the superior court of Thurston county shall have jurisdiction
over any action or proceeding against the commission,” granted exclusive
jurisdiction to only that superior court. Id. at 616.
The Supreme Court rejected the State’s interpretation because it would
result in the statute being unconstitutional under article IV, section 6. Id. at 619.
Just as our constitution does not allow the legislature to decree that
only King County judges have subject matter jurisdiction to hear child
dependency actions or that only Pend Oreille County judges have
subject matter jurisdiction to hear shareholder derivative actions, our
constitution does not allow the legislature to decree that only
Thurston County judges have subject matter jurisdiction to hear
cases involving the Gaming Commission.
Id. The Supreme Court concluded it could interpret the statute as constitutional by
deeming it to be a venue provision, rather than a jurisdictional limit. Id.
1
A jurisdictional restriction limits the “type of controversy” that the court has authority to hear; a
venue provision requires a litigant to adjudicate a dispute in a particular setting, location, or place.
ZDI Gaming, 173 Wn.2d at 617-18.
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Under the reasoning of ZDI Gaming, we cannot interpret RCW 9.41.040(b)
as a jurisdictional restriction and must, instead, interpret it as a venue provision.
As a result, King County Superior Court had the jurisdiction to adjudicate Manuel’s
petition. The sole question before us is whether venue was proper in King County
Superior Court.
B. RCW 9.41.040(b)(i) makes King County Superior Court a proper venue for
Manuel’s restoration petition
Manuel contends that, under RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(i), he had the right to file
his petition in King County Superior Court and nothing in the language of the
statute suggests he must travel around the state and file petitions in separate
jurisdictions to obtain a full restoration of his firearm rights. We agree with Manuel.
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. State v.
Swanson, 116 Wn. App. 67, 70, 65 P.3d 343 (2003). The purpose of statutory
interpretation is to give effect to the legislature’s intent, which is derived solely from
the statute’s plain language. State v. Dennis, 191 Wn.2d 169, 172, 421 P.3d 944(2018). Courts discern plain language by considering the text of the provision in
question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related
provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Id. at 172-73.
If there is more than one reasonable interpretation of a statute’s plain
language, then it is ambiguous. Swanson, 116 Wn. App. at 70. If a statute is
ambiguous, then the court relies on principles of statutory construction, legislative
history, and relevant case law to determine legislative intent. Payseno v. Kitsap
County, 186 Wn. App. 465, 469, 346 P.3d 784 (2015). After such analysis, if a
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criminal statute still remains ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires courts to
construe the statute strictly in favor of the defendant. Id. at 470.
We conclude King County Superior Court is an appropriate venue for
Manuel to petition for the full restoration of his firearm possession rights. First, the
statute is ambiguous and can be reasonably read as both Manuel and the State
propose. The plain language of RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(i) does not answer whether
one superior court of conviction may fully restore firearm rights lost as the result of
convictions in two or more counties. Second, the duty to restore firearm rights is
ministerial and there is no basis for deferring to a Pierce County judge as to
whether Manuel is eligible for the restoration of his gun rights. Finally, the rule of
lenity supports construing the statute in Manuel’s favor.
1. RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(i) is ambiguous
Manuel and the State both contend RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(i) is unambiguous
and not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. We disagree.
In State v. Swanson, this court had the opportunity to interpret RCW
9.41.040 to determine if it gives a superior court the discretion to deny a restoration
petition. 116 Wn. App. at 70. In resolving this question, the court recognized that
the statute was “not a model of clarity” and found its plain language “unhelpful.”
Id. at 70-71. The court noted that while the statute enumerated requirements for
restoration, it did not “espouse any procedure to be followed,” did not set time limits
for filing such a petition, did not refer to any applicable burden of proof, and did not
expressly confer or refer to the court's discretion. Id. at 71.
Here, the venue provision is similarly ambiguous because it does not
address the situation presented here—a petitioner with convictions from multiple
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superior courts. While the legislature added the venue provision at issue here in
2011, after our decision in Swanson, the language is still “not a model of clarity.”
The State contends the legislature’s use of the definite article “the” in the
phrases “the court of record” and “the petitioner’s prohibition” suggests that Manuel
can only file a petition in the particular court that entered the gun rights order. See
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Island Rail Terminal, Inc., 879 F.3d 462, 471 (2d Cir. 2018)
(“The use of the definite article ‘the’ indicates a singular court.”); Am. Bus. Ass’n v.
Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is a rule of law well established that
the definite article ‘the’ particularizes the subject which it precedes. It is a word of
limitation as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of ‘a’ or ‘an’.”). Under
this reasonable interpretation, a petitioner could only ask the court that convicted
him to modify the judgment and sentence entered by that particular court. The
effect would be a partial, rather than full, restoration of firearm rights.
Under another reasonable interpretation, and the one advanced by Manuel,
the statute grants the same unconditional restoration authority to any superior
court that has convicted the petitioner. The phrase “the court of record” in
paragraph (b)(i) follows and modifies the more general phrase “a court of record”
in the immediately preceding clause. We could read the entire sentence together
and conclude that a petitioner may file with any court of record for a full restoration
of gun rights as long as the one chosen actually entered an order prohibiting
Manuel from possessing a firearm. Under this reasonable interpretation, King
County Superior Court would be an appropriate venue to address Manuel’s petition
for any and all of his convictions.
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Because the plain language of RCW 9.41.040(4)(b) does not
unambiguously determine whether a convicting superior court can fully restore the
gun rights of a petitioner with multiple convictions from multiple superior courts, the
statute’s language “is unhelpful due to various omissions.” See Swanson, 116 Wn.
App. at 70. We conclude the language of the venue provision of RCW
9.41.040(4)(b)(i) is ambiguous.
2. The legislative history supports Manuel’s interpretation
The State argues the legislative history supports its narrow, restrictive
interpretation of RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(i). We disagree with this contention as well
because the legislative history actually supports Manuel’s interpretation.
First, no superior court—wherever located—has the discretion to deny an
eligible petitioner the restoration of this civil right. In Swanson, the trial court found
that Swanson, despite meeting the three eligibility requirements of RCW
9.41.040(4)(a), was not safe to possess firearms and denied his petition. 116 Wn.
App. at 70. This court reversed, concluding the legislature did not give superior
courts the discretion to deny firearm rights if a petitioner met the statutory eligibility
requirements. Id. at 69. We held that RCW 9.41.040(4) imparts a non-
discretionary, ministerial duty to restoring courts. Id.
After this court’s 2003 decision in Swanson, the legislature added the venue
provision at issue here. See H.B. REP. ON H.B. 1455, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2011). The legislature, however, did not amend RCW 9.41.040(4)(a) to give
discretion to superior courts to deny restoration to someone a local judge deems
unsafe. See H.B. 1455, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011); RCW 9.41.040(4).
The legislature is presumed to know how courts have construed and applied the
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statute they choose to amend. State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 614, 629, 106
P.3d 196 (2005). Because we presume the legislature was aware of our holding
in Swanson and chose not to modify RCW 9.41.040(4)(a) to grant discretion where
we concluded none existed, we can only conclude from this legislative history that
a court’s duty to restore firearm rights remains purely ministerial in nature. We will
construe the venue provision in light of that duty. See Swanson, 116 Wn. App. at
78; Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d at 629.
The State relies on the following excerpt from a 2011 bill report as evidence
of the legislature’s intent to restrict the places where a petitioner may seek the
restoration of firearm rights:
The petitioner should go back to the county where the person
lost the right because that is the jurisdiction that knows the person
and his or her past behavior. Some individuals are filing in
jurisdictions that they have no connection with because they are
trying to find a court that is more favorable to restoring firearm rights.
These petitions should be filed in the jurisdiction where the person
lives or where the loss of firearms rights occurred so that all relevant
information that may be contained in local databases, such as gang
databases, is available to the court making the determination of
whether the person should have his or her firearm rights restored.
H.B. REP. ON H.B. 1455, 62d Leg. Sess. (Wash. 2011). We find this bill report
excerpt less than persuasive of any intent relevant here. In making a restoration
determination, superior courts of different counties are not permitted to deny a
petition simply because of information a judge may find in a “local database” or
“gang database.” 2 See Swanson, 116 Wn. App. at 78; RCW 9.41.040(4)(a)
(requiring individuals to complete the conditions of their sentence while avoiding
2
We also note that the reference to “gang databases” in this bill report evidences stereotypes that
are inconsistent with the eligibility criteria set out in the statute. Suspected gang affiliation is not a
basis for refusing to restore a petitioner’s gun rights.
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certain charges and convictions). In fact, both King County Superior Court and
Pierce County Superior Court have equal access to the facts necessary to make
a determination on Manuel’s petition. See chapter 2.68 RCW (establishing the
Judicial Information System which contains information about an individual’s
criminal activity to any court in the state).
Because restoring courts have no discretion to deny a petition if statutory
eligibility criteria are met, we can see no basis for concluding that Pierce County
Superior Court is a more appropriate venue than King County Superior Court to
fully restore Manuel’s gun rights lost because of his Pierce County convictions.
Restoration is a yes-or-no question, so if the convicting court is eligible to restore
his right as to one conviction, there is no reason why it cannot restore his right
prohibited by other convictions. See Dennis, 191 Wn.2d at 177 (“Given that a
court’s role in the restoration process is purely ministerial, the precipitating event
for eligibility for restoration is when the statutory requirements are met, not when
the petition is filed.”).
Moreover, because the issue is ministerial and there can be no room for
discretion between courts, the statute itself would obviate the need for any
petitioner to forum shop for a court they deem more favorable to them or to the
restoration of firearm rights. See Swanson, 116 Wn. App. at 78; H.B. 1455
(mentioning elimination of forum shopping as a goal of the venue provision).
Second, the State’s interpretation would impose requirements that do not
exist in the statute. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a common principle of
statutory construction, holds that “[w]here a statute specifically designates the
things or classes of things upon which it operates, an inference arises in law that
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all things or classes of things omitted from it were intentionally omitted by the
legislature.” Swanson, 116 Wn. App. at 67, 75 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Wash. Nat. Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 77 Wn.2d 94, 98, 459 P.2d
633 (1969)).
It is undisputed that under RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(ii), Pierce County Superior
Court has full authority to perform the ministerial function of fully restoring Manuel’s
rights as to any convictions regardless where imposed. Under the State’s
interpretation of RCW 9.41.040(b)(i), if Manuel chose not to file in Pierce County
Superior Court, he would have to petition each court that convicted him, which
would not only be unnecessarily duplicative and a waste of judicial resources, but
would also impose requirements that are not spelled out in the statute. For many
individuals seeking the restoration of civil rights after a felony conviction, such a
requirement would be prohibitively time-consuming and expensive. 3 “Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius commands that RCW 9.41.040(4) imposes no burden
beyond the three enumerated” in subsection (a), id. at 76, and consequently
supports the proposition that both venues have full authority to restore Manuel’s
right to possess a firearm.
The legislature unambiguously intended to create some nexus between a
petitioner and the restoring court, whether that nexus is based on their conviction
history or residency. See H.B. 1455 (contrasting venue before and after the
amendment and confirming that previously petitioners could restore their rights in
any court in the state). Before the legislature passed the 2011 venue provision,
3
When this court has two competing interpretations of an ambiguous statute and one of these
interpretations would lead to a disproportionate impact on historically marginalized communities,
we cannot blithely accept that the legislature intended any such a result.
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Manuel could have petitioned in 39 different courts; now he must choose between
the superior court of the county in which he lives or the superior court in any county
in which he was convicted of a qualifying crime. In either case, there is a nexus
between Manuel and the restoring court. There is no evidence that the legislature
intended to impose further burdens. We therefore conclude the legislative history
supports Manuel’s contention that King County Superior Court, as a court of record
that imposed a firearm prohibition, is an appropriate venue for the restoration of
Manuel’s firearm rights.
3. The rule of lenity also supports our conclusion
Finally, even if the legislative history were inconclusive, Manuel argues the
rule of lenity requires us to adopt his interpretation. We agree. If a criminal
statute’s plain language is ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires courts to strictly
construe the statute in favor of the defendant. Payseno, 186 Wn. App. at 473. The
rule of lenity applies in post-conviction contexts. Id. In Payseno, the court was
asked to interpret RCW 9.41.040(4)(a)(ii)(A), which required a petitioner to prove
he had avoided conviction or charges for a consecutive five-year period. Id. At
issue was whether the time period applied to any five year period or to the five
years immediately preceding the petition. Id. Applying the rule of lenity, the court
held that the statutory period could be any consecutive five years, id., an
interpretation the Supreme Court confirmed in Dennis, 191 Wn.2d at 178.
Here, the rule of lenity supports an interpretation of the statute that does not
arbitrarily require Manuel to travel to multiple different jurisdictions in order to
reclaim his rights post-conviction. The State argues that Manuel could have
avoided any procedural burdens by initially filing in Pierce County Superior Court.
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While this may be true, both parties agree that King County Superior Court is an
appropriate venue. Accordingly, since the statute grants to Manuel the right to
choose the venue in which he files, an interpretation that strictly requires Manuel
to seek restoration in a piecemeal process from multiple courts disfavors the
criminal defendant. The rule of lenity supports construing RCW 9.41.040(4)(b) in
Manuel’s favor.
We thus conclude that the text, legislative history, and the rule of lenity
support an interpretation of RCW 9.41.040(4)(b) that allows a petitioner to seek
the full restoration of firearm rights from any superior court in which that petitioner
was convicted of a felony and in which an order prohibiting the possession of
firearms was entered, even when that petitioner has prior felony convictions from
other superior courts.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
WE CONCUR:
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