State Of Washington v. Jorge Javier Zayas Lopez ( 2016 )

i. :•' i U U I. '-' L. f
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,
DIVISION ONE
Respondent,
No. 74056-3-1
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JORGE JAVIER ZAYAS-LOPEZ,
Appellant. FILED: December 27, 2016
Dwyer, J. — Jorge Zayas-Lopez appeals from the judgment entered on a
jury's verdicts finding him guilty of three counts of rape of a child in the first
degree, one count of child molestation in the first degree, and one count of
communication with a minor for immoral purposes. He contends that the trial
court abused its discretion by allowing the State to present evidence of hand and
head gestures made by A.R.B., the child victim, that tended to show her
precocious knowledge of explicit sexual matters; by denying his motion for a
mistrial in response to testimony by an advanced registered nurse practitioner
who, he claims, improperly vouched for A.R.B.'s credibility; and by rejecting his
request for a lower offender score because, he asserts, two of the rape of a child
in the first degree convictions were based upon the "same criminal conduct."
Concluding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion as to all three
rulings, we affirm.
No. 74056-3-1/2
Jorge Zayas-Lopez was introduced to A.R.B. during his romantic
relationship with her mother, Armida Castro, which began in 2011. Castro
became pregnant with Zayas-Lopez's child. Zayas-Lopez and Castro became
engaged in early 2012. In addition to A.R.B., Castro had two younger daughters
from a prior relationship. After the engagement, Zayas-Lopez, Castro, and her
daughters moved together into a large three-bedroom apartment. At the time,
A.R.B. was eleven years old. Her younger sisters were nine and five years old.
By the fall of 2013, Castro's relationship with Zayas-Lopez had
deteriorated. On one day in particular, Zayas-Lopez took Castro's car without
her permission and did not reply to calls or text messages to his cell phone or
return to the apartment. Zayas-Lopez did not return the next day and, that
evening, A.R.B., who was then 12 years old, asked her mother if she could speak
to her in private. During this conversation, A.R.B. told her mother that, while
living in their apartment, Zayas-Lopez had repeatedly raped and molested her.
Castro called the police.
Officer Melvin Partido was dispatched to meet with Castro and A.R.B.
Partido asked A.R.B. what had happened. In the course of responding, A.R.B.
made an up-and-down gesture with her hand, mimicking the motion made by a
hand stroking a penis. She also pointed to her vaginal and buttocks areas.
The following day, Castro took A.R.B. to an appointment with a
pediatrician. The pediatrician conducted an external physical examination of
A.R.B. but did not note any injury to her genitalia.
No. 74056-3-1/3
A few days later, Carolyn Webster, a forensic child interview specialist,
conducted a video-recorded interview of A.R.B. Webster asked A.R.B. what
brought her in for the appointment that day and A.R.B. responded in part by
gesturing with her hand in the same way as she had gestured when talking with
Officer Partido and by moving her head forward and backward, mimicking fellatio.
Nearly a week later, Joanne Mettler, an advanced registered nurse
practitioner, interviewed and conducted a head-to-toe physical examination of
A.R.B. The results of Mettler's examination were inconclusive, determining that
A.R.B. was not then suffering from physical injuries arising from sexual abuse,
but not ruling out the possibility that any prior injury had healed or that A.R.B. had
been abused without any physical injury arising therefrom.
Zayas-Lopez was subsequently charged with three counts of rape of a
child in the first degree, one count of child molestation in the first degree, and
one count of communication with a minor for immoral purposes.
Prior to trial, Zayas-Lopez sought to exclude evidence of A.R.B.'s hand
and head gestures—testimony by Partido and Webster about A.R.B.'s gestures
and a video recording showing A.R.B. making the gestures during her interview
with Webster—claiming that the evidence constituted inadmissible hearsay. The
trial court denied the motion, ruling that evidence of the gestures was admissible
to show A.R.B.'s precocious knowledge of explicit sexual matters and thus not
hearsay. The trial court further ruled that, with regard to the gestures, the State
was limited to presenting evidence only of the gestures themselves. In addition,
No. 74056-3-1/4
the trial court offered to give an instruction at trial limiting the jury's use of the
evidence of the gestures but Zayas-Lopez's counsel declined the offer.
At trial, the State called one of A.R.B.'s sisters, Mettler, Partido, Webster,
Castro, and A.R.B to testify. Mettler testified to her background as an advanced
registered nurse practitioner specializing in conducting physical examinations of
children who may have been sexually abused. She further testified that her
examination appointments consist of a conversation with the parent, a
conversation with the child, and then a physical examination of the child.
Later in her testimony, because she did not specifically recall A.R.B.,
Mettler read from a report that she authored in 2013 shortly after her appointment
with A.R.B., memorializing her preexamination conversation with A.R.B. and her
physical examination of A.R.B. Mettler further testified that she concluded that
the results of her examination were inconclusive and that A.R.B. did not present
then-existing symptoms of physical injuries consistent with sexual abuse.
On cross-examination, defense counsel repeatedly highlighted Mettler's
conclusion that the results of her examination of A.R.B. were inconclusive,
pressing Mettler on the possibility that the results could be interpreted to mean
that any injuries arising from sexual abuse had healed, that the alleged abuse did
not cause injury to A.R.B., or even that the alleged abuse never occurred. At the
end of her cross-examination, Zayas-Lopez's counsel obtained Mettler's
agreement that she had written in her examination report that "a possibility is that
no sexual abuse happened."
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No. 74056-3-1/5
After a four-day recess that included the Memorial Day holiday, Zayas-
Lopez moved for a mistrial, claiming that certain statements that Mettler read
from her report regarding her preexamination conversation with A.R.B.
improperly vouched for A.R.B.'s credibility and opined on Zayas-Lopez's guilt.
Zayas-Lopez pointed to Mettler's statements in which she read that A.R.B. asked
her if "this has happened to other kids," that she responded, "I told her. . . about
how I see kids every day and this has happened to other kids" and that she said
to A.R.B., "it was very brave that she told about it."1 The trial court denied Zayas-
Lopez's motion, concluding that "[tjhere was no indication from this witness that
she was making any valuation about whether this child was credible or not."
The trial continued. On the day that Webster was to testify, a colloquy
took place regarding the video recording to be played of A.R.B. making the hand
and head gestures during her interview with Webster. The trial court again
offered to give a limiting instruction regarding this evidence. Defense counsel
again declined the offer.
The jury convicted Zayas-Lopez on all counts.
At sentencing, Zayas-Lopez argued for a lower offender score calculation,
claiming that only two of his three convictions of rape of a child in the first degree
should count toward calculating his offender score because evidence presented
of one incident involving two acts—penile-anal rape and penile-oral rape—
constituted the "same criminal conduct." The State responded that it had elected
1 Zayas-Lopez's counsel had contemporaneously objected to these statements on the
grounds that the statements were not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and that the
State had not established the proper foundation for the "recorded recollection" exception to the
hearsay bar. The trial court overruled the objections.
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No. 74056-3-1/6
at trial which events corresponded to which charges and that it had presented
sufficient evidence of separate and distinct acts of rape of A.R.B. to support each
conviction. The State noted that it had specifically highlighted, in its closing
argument, the incident involving the two acts cited by Zayas-Lopez, indicating
that those acts supported conviction as to only one count of rape of a child in the
first degree. The trial court rejected Zayas-Lopez's claim, adopted the offender
score proposed by the State, and sentenced Zayas-Lopez to a standard range
indeterminate sentence of 250 months to life in prison.
II
A
Zayas-Lopez first contends that the trial court erred by admitting testimony
and video evidence concerning the sexual gestures made by A.R.B. He asserts
that this evidence was hearsay or, alternatively, unfairly prejudicial. We
disagree.
Evidence offered for the purpose of showing precocious knowledge of
explicit sexual matters is reviewed for its relevance and potential for prejudice.
The evidence regarding A.R.B.'s gestures was offered to show that A.R.B.
possessed explicit sexual knowledge atypical for her age, maturity, and
experience. The evidence was properly admitted for that purpose. No trial court
error is established.
1
Zayas-Lopez first contends that the trial court erred by not excluding
evidence of A.R.B.'s gestures as inadmissible hearsay. Because evidence of
No. 74056-3-1/7
A.R.B.'s gestures was offered to show her precocious knowledge of explicit
sexual matters, rather than for the truth of any assertion that the gestures
conveyed, Zayas-Lopez is wrong.
Evidence of precocious knowledge of explicit sexual matters is evidence
indicating that a child has knowledge of explicit sexual matters at an earlier age
than is typical for a child of that maturity and experience. See, e.g., State v.
Swan, 114 Wash. 2d 613, 633, 790 P.2d 610 (1990) (three-year-old children's
description of fellatio, ejaculation, and intercourse); State v. Jones, 112 Wash. 2d
488, 497, 772 P.2d 496 (1989) (four-year-old child's descriptions of urolagnia); In
re Dependency of Penelope B.. 104 Wash. 2d 643, 654-55, 709 P.2d 1185 (1985)
(five-year-old child's gestures with anatomically correct male doll indicating her
familiarity with male genitalia and the act of fellatio); State v. Bishop, 63 Wash. App.
15, 28, 816 P.2d 738 (1991).
Evidence offered to show a child's precocious knowledge of explicit sexual
matters is not hearsay.2 Penelope B.. 104 Wash. 2d at 654-55. "[B]y definition, an
utterance, writing or nonverbal conduct that is not assertive is not hearsay."
Penelope B., 104 Wash. 2d at 652. Evidence offered to show that a child has
precocious knowledge of explicit sexual matters is not offered for the truth of any
assertion that it conveys—that, for instance, a specific episode of sexual abuse
actually occurred. Penelope B.. 104 Wash. 2d at 654-55.
2"'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." ER 801(c). "A
'statement' is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conductof a person, if itis intended
by the person as an assertion." ER 801(a).
No. 74056-3-1/8
Rather, the evidence is offered as circumstantial evidence that the child
possesses explicit sexual knowledge incongruent with his or her age, maturity,
and experience. Consequently, evidence offered to show precocious knowledge
of explicit sexual matters is reviewed for its relevance and potential for prejudice
pursuant to ER 402 and ER 403. State v. Stevens. 58 Wash. App. 478, 490-91 n.5,
794 P.2d 38 (1990); accord Penelope B.. 104 Wash. 2d at 652-53. In a matter
involving child sexual abuse, evidence of a child's precocious knowledge of
explicit sexual matters tends to create an inference that the child had gained
such knowledge through prior episodes of sexual abuse. Swan, 114 Wash. 2d at
648-49 ("'A young child is unlikely to fabricate a graphic account of sexual activity
because such activity is beyond the realm of [her] experience.'" (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Comment, The Sexually
Abused Infant Hearsay Exception: A Constitutional Analysis, 8 J. Juv. L. 59, 67
(1984))).
Prior to trial, Zayas-Lopez moved to exclude testimony about—and the
video recording of—A.R.B.'s hand and head gestures. Zayas-Lopez contended
that evidence concerning the gestures was offered as a nonverbal assertion and
thus constituted inadmissible hearsay. The State responded that it was not
offering evidence of the gestures for the truth of any assertions that the gestures
conveyed. Rather, the State argued, evidence of the gestures was proffered to
show A.R.B.'s circumstantial knowledge of explicit sexual matters that, due to her
age, would ordinarily be beyond her ken.
No. 74056-3-1/9
The trial court denied Zayas-Lopez's motion, ruling that evidence of the
gestures themselves was not hearsay because the gestures were offered "for the
purpose of showing sexual knowledge beyond the normal understanding of a
child of her age." However, the trial court limited evidence concerning the
gestures to evidence of the gestures themselves, restricting the testimony of
Webster and Partido regarding the gestures and excluding the audio portion of
the video recording.
Evidence of A.R.B's gestures, as admitted, was not hearsay. The
evidence was not offered for the truth of any assertion that the gestures
conveyed. Rather, the evidence was properly admitted to show her precocious
knowledge of explicit sexual matters, specifically her knowledge of both fellatio
and a method of male masturbation and/or female-hand-to-male-genital eroticism
that a child of A.R.B.'s age, maturity, and experience typically does not possess.
The trial court did not err.
2
Zayas-Lopez next asserts that the trial court erred by not excluding
evidence of A.R.B's gestures because the evidence was unfairly prejudicial to
him. We disagree.
The trial court has broad discretion in balancing the probative value of
evidence against its prejudicial impact. State v. Rivers, 129 Wash. 2d 697, 710, 921
P.2d 495 (1996). We will not disturb an evidentiary ruling absent a manifest
abuse of discretion. State v. Russell. 125 Wash. 2d 24, 78, 882 P.2d 747 (1994).
No. 74056-3-1/10
Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial. ER 402. Relevant evidence
is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." ER 401. Relevant evidence must be
excluded where "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice." ER 403.
Prior to trial, counsel for Zayas-Lopez argued that evidence of A.R.B.'s
gestures was inadmissible hearsay. During a pretrial hearing, the State replied
that it was offering evidence of—and eliciting testimony regarding—the gestures
only to show that the gestures were made, for the purpose of showing A.R.B.'s
precocious knowledge of explicit sexual matters. The trial court ruled that the
evidence was admissible for that purpose.
Let me say that, if, as I understand the State's -- what they're going
to be doing is that they would be asking the forensic interviewer
and Officer Parido -
[PROSECUTOR]: Partido.
THE COURT: - Partido: During your conversations or
during your interview of her, did she make any gestures? And
Partido would have to describe them, because there is no video of
that. The forensic investigator has a video. Yes, she made certain
gestures. And the State would propose to show without sound
those gestures. Is that what the State - that's my understanding of
what the State is proposing.
[PROSECUTOR]: That's correct.
THE COURT: And they would be offering for the purpose of
showing sexual knowledge beyond the normal understanding of a
child of her age. I believe that would be allowed and that the
defense would be entitled to a limiting instruction ifthey requested
that.
I'm always open to -- ifyou come up with something, some
briefing that addresses that issue. You can always give that to me
and ask me to change my mind. But that's my ruling at this point.
So -- unless you come up with - unless you want to do further
briefing and I change my mind, that's my ruling.
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No. 74056-3-1/11
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay?
So, any other motions in limine that we need to deal with
other than jury-related?
[PROSECUTOR]: Not from the State, no.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I believe that's it from the defense
as well.
On the day that Webster was to testify, counsel for Zayas-Lopez objected
to the admission of evidence of the video recording ostensibly on the ground that
the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. Zayas-Lopez's counsel asserted that,
because the evidence to be presented of the video recording constituted only a
segment of A.R.B.'s 40 minute interview with Webster, the jury was likely to
speculate as to the content of the rest of the video recording. Rather than
proving that the gestures were made by showing the video recording, defense
counsel argued, the State should be limited to presenting evidence of A.R.B.'s
gestures through Webster's testimony.
The trial court reaffirmed its prior ruling and, later, offered to give a limiting
instruction:
I think the video can be shown. If you can -- the problem I've had
with, as you know, with the showing the gestures is that I'm not
quite sure how it is relevant. And how do you plan on bringing it in?
Because I don't think that, if - if she - if the child was saying, this is
what I did, this is what I saw, then that is -- that is a statement,
hearsay statement. This is what I did. Right? Is that what she's
saying?
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes. But I'm - I plan to do just like I did
with the officer, not asking Miss Webster to provide any context for
the question being asked or the answer being given, only that, you
know, you were the interviewer. In conducting your interview of
[A.R.B.] at times did she use gestures? If I were to show you one,
would you recognize it? Play. And not provide the context for what
the discussion was or even who [A.R.B.]'s talking about. And the
purpose of it isn't for the truth; it's to show that she's familiar with
this adult male masturbatory gesture.
11
No. 74056-3-1/12
THE COURT: So, if you can present it just that way, yes.
THE COURT: And in this case would you want a limiting
instruction? It's a tough one.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We'll decline, depending on what I
see here. I assume it's going to be the same video, just no audio.
THE COURT: Anything else, now that you've seen it?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Just that you can see her mouthing
words during it. If somebody can lip read, they can tell what they're
saying. So, if there's a way to cut it off before she starts -
[PROSECUTOR]: She's talking for the duration of it. I
mean, her mouth is constantly moving.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Do you mind if I see it one more
time?
THE COURT: I can ask the - we can ask the jury if anyone
can lip read.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Hold on. Yeah. I don't know that -
I mean, it's the last portion where I think you can see what she's
saying.
THE COURT: I can ask the jury if anyone can lip read. I will
tell you that I can and from this distance I could not read her lips.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. I would - I don't want to
highlight that issue.
On appeal, Zayas-Lopez asserts that evidence of A.R.B.'s gestures
should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial because A.R.B. made the
gestures while being questioned about his alleged acts of rape and molestation
against her and thus could not be separated from the investigative context in
which they were made.
There was no error. The evidence of A.R.B.'s hand and head gestures
was highly probative because it tended to prove that A.R.B. had been exposed to
such matters in the past. The related inference was that she gained such
familiarity as a result of being molested and raped. Stevens. 58 Wash. App. at 491.
While the investigatory context in which the gestures were made would
have been apparent to the jury, there was no danger of unfair prejudice to Zayas-
-12
No. 74056-3-1/13
Lopez. ER 403. The trial court limited evidence of the gestures to the gestures
themselves, excluding the audio portion of the video recording and limiting
testimony pertaining to the gestures to only statements concerning the gestures
themselves. Moreover, the trial court twice offered to give an instruction limiting
the jury's use of the evidence, but Zayas-Lopez's counsel declined both offers.
Thus, in this way, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err by
admitting evidence of A.R.B's gestures to demonstrate her precocious
knowledge of explicit sexual matters.
B
Zayas-Lopez next asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion
for a mistrial arising from nurse practitioner Mettler's testimony. He claims that
her testimony included statements that improperly vouched for A.R.B.'s
credibility. To the contrary, by the time that Zayas-Lopez moved for a mistrial
four days after Mettler's testimony ended, it was clear (and repeatedly
emphasized by defense counsel during Mettler's cross-examination) that her
actual opinion was derived from her conclusion that her physical examination of
A.R.B. was inconclusive.
"A trial court's decision to deny a motion for a mistrial is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion." State v. Williams. 159 Wash. App. 298, 321, 244 P.3d 1018
(2011) (citing State v. Allen. 159 Wash. 2d 1, 10, 147 P.3d 581 (2006)). We review
a motion for a mistrial as of the time that the motion was made. State v. Russell,
62 Wash. 2d 635, 639, 384 P.2d 334 (1963).
13
No. 74056-3-1/14
The trial court "should grant a mistrial only when the defendant has been
so prejudiced that nothing short of a new trial can insure that the defendant will
be tried fairly." State v. Lewis. 130 Wash. 2d 700, 707, 927 P.2d 235 (1996) (citing
State v. Johnson. 124 Wash. 2d 57, 76, 873 P.2d 514 (1994)). "A mistrial should be
granted only when 'nothing the trial court could have said or done would have
remedied the harm done to the defendant.'" State v. Gilcrist. 91 Wash. 2d 603, 612,
590 P.2d 809 (1979) (quoting State v. Swenson. 62 Wash. 2d 259, 280, 382 P.2d
614(1963)).
A witness's expression of personal belief about the veracity of another
witness is inappropriate opinion testimony. State v. Kirkman. 159 Wash. 2d 918,
927, 155 P.3d 125 (2007).
Mettler's testimony involved four topics: (1) her background as an
advanced registered nurse practitioner specializing in conducting head-to-toe
physical examinations of children who may have been sexually abused; (2) her
procedure for interviewing a child before beginning the physical examination in
order to establish the child's medical history and the procedure for the
examination; (3) her report of her conversation with A.R.B. prior to the
examination; and (4) her conclusion that the results of A.R.B.'s examination were
inconclusive.
At trial, because Mettler did not specifically recall meeting A.R.B. (due to
the large volume of children with whom she worked), she was provided with the
report that she authored soon after her appointment with A.R.B. in 2013. Mettler
then testified to her conversation with A.R.B. as she had recorded it in that
14
No. 74056-3-1/15
report, discussing her questions regarding—and A.R.B.'s descriptions of—the
touching that happened to her. In this manner, Mettler testified that,
I then told her that I did not have any other questions. Did she
have any questions?
And she said, no. And then she said that she really did not
want to talk about it too much, because she starts crying and it is
painful.
I said, that is fine, I did not want her to cry, that she did a
really good job talking to me. I asked her if she had any other
questions.
And then she asked me if this has happened to other kids. I
told her and talked with her a little bit about how I see kids every
day and this has happened to other kids --
Zayas-Lopez objected at this point, asserting that Mettler's statements
were not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and that the State had not
laid the foundation to qualify the report pursuant to the "recorded recollection"
exception to the hearsay rule. The trial court overruled the objection.
When Mettler's testimony resumed, she continued reading from her report,
stating,
I told her and talked with her a little bit about how I see kids
every day and that this has happened to other kids and that it was
very brave that she told about it.
And she told me about how he told her to keep it a secret but
now her and her mom have talked about how they cannot keep
secrets and cannot keep any sexual secrets.
And then we proceeded to the physical exam.
Mettler then read from her report regarding her examination of A.R.B. and
the results that she had found. She read that she had examined A.R.B. for
symptoms of physical injury arising from sexual abuse. However, based on the
results of the examination, Mettler concluded that she was unable to reach any
conclusion as to whether sexual abuse had occurred.
15
No. 74056-3-1/16
Immediately thereafter, on cross-examination, Zayas-Lopez's counsel
highlighted Mettler's conclusion that the results of her physical examination of
A.R.B. were inconclusive.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. You wrote in your report that your
physical examination of [A.R.B.] cannot prove or disprove whether
or not sexual abuse occurred. Correct?
[METTLER]. That is correct.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. According to your report there are
three possible explanations.
[METTLER]. That's correct.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. One explanation is that there was
sexual abuse and that the trauma healed.
[METTLER]. That's correct.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. Now, you've already testified that
you didn't see any scarring anywhere. Correct?
[METTLER]. That's correct.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. And you didn't see any scar tissue.
[METTLER]. That's correct.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. And you didn't see anything else
suggesting that there was prior injuries to any part of her genital
area.
[METTLER]. That's correct.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. And, when you were looking at her
genital area, you were specifically looking for signs of healing or
prior trauma. Correct?
[METTLER]. That's correct.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. The second possibility is that there
was -- that there were multiple acts of penetration in the vaginal
area and the anus and yet no injury arose from it; so, basically
there was sexual abuse and no evidence of an injury.
[METTLER]. Correct.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. And, of course, when you were
making that statement you weren't taking into consideration the
size of the penis or vagina in this case.
[METTLER]. That's correct.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. And third -- the third possible
conclusion, of course, is that, based on the examination that you
did and the examination that was done on October 21st, that one
could conclude that there simply wasn't any sexual abuse.
[METTLER]. That's possible, yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. In fact, based on your examination
and based on the lack of any medical evidence, it would be
16
No. 74056-3-1/17
reasonable - a reasonable person could conclude that there was
no sexual abuse.
[METTLER]. No. I wouldn't agree with that.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. So, you're saying that a person -
so, based on the lack of medical evidence, a person could conclude
that there was no sexual abuse.
[METTLER]. So, there can be no medical evidence and no
sexual abuse happen, if that's what you're saying.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]. And I'm not trying to put words in
your mouth. I guess I would just direct you to your report. In your
report didn't you write that a possibility is that no sexual abuse
happened?
[METTLER]. That's correct.
After a four-day recess, trial recommenced and Zayas-Lopez moved for a
mistrial, claiming that, by stating that A.R.B. "was very brave" and that she had
seen sexual abuse "happen[ ] to other children," Mettler had improperly vouched
for A.R.B.'s credibility. The trial court denied the motion, noting that Zayas-Lopez
had not objected on the basis of improper vouching at the time that Mettler's
testimony was given3 and stating that
I don't think that... when she told the child you're brave,
this happened to other people is vouching for the child. There was
no indication from this witness that she was making any valuation
about whether this child was credible or not. ... It's just something
you say so that a child will talk, not that she was vouching. So, I
don't think that was vouching at all.
3Zayas-Lopez asserts that his counsel did not interpose further objections to Mettler's
testimony because his counsel's initial objections were overruled. To object again, Zayas-Lopez
claims, would have been a "useless endeavor." We disagree.
The grounds on which Zayas-Lopez's counsel first interposed an objection to Mettler's
testimony—that the State did not satisfythe exceptions to the hearsay rule for either statements
made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or for "recorded recollections"—are wholly separate
grounds to that on which Zayas-Lopez now claims he would have objected—that Mettler's
statements constituted improper opinion testimony. "When, as here, an objection does not call
the trial court's attention to the real reason for the testimony's inadmissibility, 'error may not be
based upon the overruling of the objection.'" State v. Smith, 67 Wash. App. 838, 846, 841 P.2d 76
(1992) (quoting State v. Boast. 87 Wash. 2d 447, 451, 553 P.2d 1322 (1976)). The trial courtis
entitled to a contemporaneous objection on the proper basis in order to have, if the objection is
sustained, the array of possibilities for a remedy and the ability to exercise its discretion as to
which remedy may best cure the error. Kirkman, 159 Wash. 2d at 935. Zayas-Lopez never
presented the trial court with the opportunity to correct any claimed error through a timely and
proper objection.
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No. 74056-3-1/18
No trial irregularity arose from Mettler's testimony. At best, the challenged
statements were ambiguous. Mettler testified that she was an advanced
registered nurse practitioner who specialized in conducting physical
examinations of children for signs of sexual abuse. At the time that she made
the statements, Mettler had yet to examine A.R.B. and thus had no physical
evidence upon which to determine whether A.R.B. had been sexually abused.
Furthermore, the statements were consistent with Mettler's earlier testimony that,
when speaking with a child before conducting a physical examination, she uses
certain interview techniques in order to induce the child to talk about the alleged
abuse.
Moreover, Mettler's actual opinion, as testified to, was derived from the
conclusion she reached after examining A.R.B. for signs of physical injury arising
from sexual abuse. Indeed, Mettler's ultimate conclusion, made clear by her
testimony on direct and cross-examination and based upon her expertise as an
advanced registered nurse practitioner, was that the results of her examination of
A.R.B. were inconclusive—that A.R.B. at that time presented with no symptoms
of physical injury associated with sexual abuse and that there was a possibility
that no sexual abuse had occurred. These statements neither supported nor
undercut A.R.B.'s credibility.4 See, e.g.. Kirkman. 159 Wash. 2d at 929-30 ("Dr.
4 Zayas-Lopez relies on two cases in an attempt to establish that Mettler improperly
vouched for A.R.B.. State v. Alexander. 64 Wn. App. 147,822 P.2d 1250 (1992). and State v.
Carlson, 80 Wash. App. 116, 906 P.2d 999 (1995). In those cases, the witnesses at issue were
asked about and explicitly testified to their belief in a child witness's credibility. Alexander, 64
Wash. App. at 154; Carlson, 80 Wash. App. at 119-21. Here, Mettlerwas asked neither for her
opinion regarding A.R.B.'s credibility nor as to whether the rapes and molestation actually
occurred. Thus, Alexander and Carlson are inapposite.
18
No. 74056-3-1/19
Stirling was not 'clearly' commenting on A.D.'s credibility and actually testified
that his findings neither corroborated nor undercut A.D.'s account.... Dr.
Stirling's statement that A.D.'s account was 'clear and consistent' does not
constitute an opinion on her credibility.").
Consequently, at the time Zayas-Lopez moved for a mistrial (four days
after Mettler testified), it was clear that Mettler's ultimate opinion was that it was
uncertain whether sexual abuse had occurred. This was not an opinion that
vouched for A.R.B.'s credibility. No trial irregularity occurred.5 Accordingly, the
trial court did not err by denying Zayas-Lopez's request for a mistrial.
C
Zayas-Lopez also asserts that the sentencing court abused its discretion
by scoring two of his rape convictions as separate convictions for the purpose of
calculating his offender score because, he claims, two of the acts of rape that
formed the basis of his convictions constituted the "same criminal conduct."
Because ample evidence in the record supports the sentencing court's
determination, there was no abuse of discretion.
A sentencing court's determination regarding "same criminal conduct will
not be disturbed unless the sentencing court abuses its discretion or misapplies
the law." State v. Aldana Graciano. 176 Wash. 2d 531, 536, 295 P.3d 219 (2013).
A sentencing court abuses its discretion "when the record supports only one
5Zayas-Lopez also asserts that Mettler's statements during her conversation with A.R.B.
constituted an improper opinion on Zayas-Lopez's guilt. We disagree. By the timethat Zayas-
Lopez moved for a mistrial (four days after Mettler's testimony ended), it was clearthat Mettler's
expertopinion was notthat Zayas-Lopez was guilty but, rather, that she was unable to reach a
conclusion as to whether A.R.B. had been sexually abused. Indeed, priorto the mistrial motion,
Mettler had testified that it was possible that "no sexual abuse happened."
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No. 74056-3-1/20
conclusion on whether crimes constitute the 'same criminal conduct.'" Aldana
Graciano, 176 Wash. 2d at 537-38. "But where the record adequately supports
either conclusion, the matter lies in the court's discretion." Aldana Graciano. 176
Wash. 2d at 538. The burden is on the defendant to establish that the crimes
underlying the convictions constitute the same criminal conduct. Aldana
Graciano. 176 Wash. 2d at 539.
Our Supreme Court explained the interplay between determinations of
"same criminal conduct" for current offenses and the offender score:
A determination of "same criminal conduct" at sentencing
affects the standard range sentence by altering the offender score,
which is calculated by adding a specified number of points for each
prior offense. RCW 9.94A.525. For purposes of this calculation,
current offenses are treated as prior convictions. RCW
9.94A.589(1)(a). However, "ifthe court enters a finding that some
or all of the current offenses encompass the same criminal conduct
then those current offenses shall be counted as one crime." [RCW
9.94A.589(1)(a)].
Crimes constitute the "same criminal conduct" when they
"require the same criminal intent, are committed at the same time
and place, and involve the same victim." [RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a)].
Aldana Graciano. 176 Wash. 2d at 535-36.
At trial, A.R.B. testified to numerous instances in which Zayas-Lopez had
raped and molested her while he was living in the apartment with A.R.B., her
mother, and her sisters. Although A.R.B. was unable to recall specific dates on
which the rapes and molestation occurred, she testified to several of Zayas-
Lopez's acts of vaginal, oral, and anal rape occurring in the apartment's
bathroom, bedroom, and living room. She further testified that the rapes and
molestation occurred at times when her mother and sisters were not at home, in
a different room of the apartment, or asleep. A.R.B. also testified to specific
20
No. 74056-3-1/21
instances of rape and molestation by Zayas-Lopez that stood out in her memory,
including when he was smoking a pipe while penetrating her mouth with his
penis, when he committed penile-oral rape upon her while she was on the living
room couch (waking up her one-year-old sister who then attempted to touch his
penis), and when he raped her in her mother's bedroom (after locking the door
behind him) by sequentially penetrating her anus and her mouth with his penis.
In closing argument, the State discussed the acts of rape that were
presented and how evidence of those acts would suffice to establish separate
and distinct acts for the charged counts II through IV (rape of a child in the first
degree):
Now, the law is going -- the law requires you and it's in your
instructions that you have to - ifyou're going to convict him of any
of the counts of rape, that you must agree unanimously as to
separate and distinct acts, all twelve of you.
So, for example, the State would argue to you that a
separate and distinct act of rape was what [A.R.B.] described on
her mother's bed when she said that he put his penis into her butt
hole where the poop comes out and that it hurt, that he told her to
bend over on her knees on the bed, that she told him that it hurt,
that he wouldn't stop, and that it continued to hurt and that it hurt
later on and that she then performed oral sex on him when he told
her to turn and to face him.
That is a separate and distinct act. And that's important
because in cases like this, when kids are abused over and over and
over again -
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor.
[COURT]: Sustained. Rephrase, please.
[PROSECUTOR]: For [A.R.B.] these things happened to her
repeatedly in different rooms on different occasions and, as Isaid,
they became interwoven into the fabric of her life. So, she can't
articulate every time he made her suck on his penis or that he
raped her.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor.
[COURT]: Overruled. You can go ahead.
[PROSECUTOR]: Butshe was able to articulate some that
stood out in her mind, for example, the anal rape that I just
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No. 74056-3-1/22
described. It stood out in her mind because it hurt, and that's what
prompted her to remember when I asked her: Did he ever do
anything to you that hurt?
So, you could consider that act as count two. But you have
to unanimously agree that it occurred.
Count three could be the vaginal intercourse that she
described on her mother's bed. She told you that her pants were
off, her underwear off, her legs were spread, and she was on her
back, and then she remembered turning over onto her knees.
Count four, there was a moment in this trial when I asked
[A.R.B.] about drug use. I asked: Did you ever see him using
drugs?
And she said, yes, that it was in the bathroom, and that she
looked up and she saw smoke coming out of his mouth.
And I asked her: Why did you look up?
And she said, because I was on my knees. And I was
sucking - his thing was in my mouth, I believe were her words.
That is a separate and distinct act that she was able to
describe with such detail, how she saw the smoke going up, her
vantage point. That could be the basis for one of these specific
counts of rape.
[A.R.B.] described other counts, other acts that you could
rely on. For example, the time in her mother's bathroom when he
used his cell phone to show her videos of oral sex to ask her if she
could do it that way. She told you that he wanted her to move her
head around as she was going in and out of his penis and that he
showed her videos of how he wanted her to do it. And she told you
that she did perform oral sex on that occasion in that room. That
could also be the basis for one of these separate and distinct acts
of rape.
And your notes and your recollection of the testimony will
likely reveal that there are more.
(Emphasis added.)
At sentencing, Zayas-Lopez argued for a lower offender score, asserting
that the jury may have separately convicted him of two acts of rape that
constituted the same criminal conduct. This was so, Zayas-Lopez claimed,
because the jury may have based two convictions upon one episode of rape
during which (in her mother's bedroom) Zayas-Lopez committed both penile-anal
rape and penile-oral rape upon A.R.B. The State replied that it had taken
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No. 74056-3-1/23
precautions in its closing argument by electing to treat evidence of the anal and
oral rape in the bedroom as supporting a conviction on only a single count of
rape of a child in the first degree. Upon review of the parties' briefs and the
transcript of the closing argument, the sentencing court concluded:
[T]hese are separate and distinct acts. The State actually was very
clear in their argument that the one act that defense says is the
same criminal conduct, the State argued probably was the same
criminal conduct. And I read the testimony of the witness, and
there's a description of many different acts in different rooms on
different days. And the jury was instructed that they had to be
unanimous in finding that an act occurred.
The sentencing court denied Zayas-Lopez's request for a lower offender score.
The sentencing court's reasoning was tenable. The evidence in the
record supports the jury's determination that Zayas-Lopez committed three acts
of rape of a child in the first degree upon A.R.B. while he was living with her.
Indeed, in its closing argument, the State delineated several separate and
distinct acts in the record that the jury could rely upon to convict Zayas-Lopez of
three counts of rape of a child in the first degree and informed the jurors that they
should treat the incident involving penile-anal rape followed by penile-oral rape
as proving a single count of rape of a child in the first degree.
Zayas-Lopez failed to meet his burden of proof on this issue. Aldana
Graciano. 176 Wash. 2d at 539. There was no error.6 7
6Zayas-Lopez relies on State v. Tili. 139 Wash. 2d 107, 985 P.2d 365 (1999), in claimed
support of his argument that the acts of penile-oral rape and penile-anal rape of A.R.B. by Zayas-
Lopez (occurring in the bedroom of A.R.B.'s mother) were the "same criminal conduct." Because
these two acts were argued to the jury as supporting only one conviction, Jjli is inapposite.
7To the extent that Zayas-Lopez relies on the double jeopardy clause for relief from his
sentence, he is wrong.
A double jeopardy violation claim is distinct from a "same criminal
conduct" claim and requires a separate analysis. The double jeopardy violation
focuses on the allowable unit of prosecution and involves the charging and trial
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No. 74056-3-1/24
D
Zayas-Lopez requests that no costs associated with his appeal be
assessed against him because he was found indigent by the trial court and
because no order indicates that his financial situation has improved or is likely to
improve.
Unless good cause shows otherwise, the trial court is entrusted with the
determination of indigency. State v. Sinclair. 192 Wash. App. 380, 393, 367 P.3d
612. review denied. 185Wn.2d 1034(2016). When a trial court finds that a
defendant is indigent, a presumption of continued indigency continues throughout
appellate review. Sinclair. 192 Wash. App. at 393 (citing RAP 15.2(f)). Ifthe State
prevails on appeal, we may exercise our discretion and not impose appellate
costs against the defendant. Sinclair. 192 Wash. App. at 388-90.
The trial court found that Zayas-Lopez was indigent. No trial court order
finding that Zayas-Lopez's financial condition has improved or is likely to improve
is before us. He is serving a 250 month prison sentence. Accordingly, "we now
choose to exercise our discretion and direct the clerk of the court not to award
appellate costs even though the State has substantially prevailed." In re Pers.
Restraint of Flippo. No. 92616-6 (Wash. Dec. 8, 2016), at 8, http://www.courts.
wa.qov/opinions/pdf/926166.pdf.
stages. The "same criminal conduct" claim involves the sentencing phase and
focuses instead on the defendant's criminal intent, whether the crimes were
committed at the same time and at the same place, and whether they involved
the same victim.
State v. French. 157 Wash. 2d 593, 611-12, 141 P.3d 54 (2006).
An assignment of error as to the sentencing phase of a criminal matter is properly
analyzed pursuant to the "same criminal conduct" analysis, not the double jeopardy clause.
24
No. 74056-3-1/25
Affirmed.
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We concur:
!Lifc^L-$Y ^