Dameas Duranzan v. Seattle Housing And Resource Effort ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DAMEAS DURANZAN,
No. 79700-0-I
Appellant,
DIVISION ONE
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SEATTLE HOUSING and
RESOURCE EFFORT,
a Washington Corporation,
Respondent.
LEACH, J. —Dameas Duranzan appeals a trial court order ejecting him from
housing provided through a housing-for-work program. Finding no error in the trial
court’s conclusions that Duranzan was a tenant at will and not covered by the
Seattle Just Cause Eviction Ordinance, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Seattle Housing and Resource Effort (SHARE) is a non-profit homeless
shelter and a housing-for-work program. Bunkhouse SHARE 2 (BHS2) is an 8-
unit single family duplex that houses low-income and homeless tenants. Residents
of BHS2 resided there in exchange for work performed with SHARE. Residents
paid monthly utility co-payments.
Between July and August 2018, SHARE agents terminated Dameas
Duranzan, Brett Gaspard, Emily Walker, and Joshua Dennard (residents) from
employment and housing with SHARE. The residents refused to vacate and sued
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
No. 79700-0-I/2
for declarative and injunctive relief to prevent their eviction. The trial court
consolidated their cases.
SHARE asked the court to dismiss the residents’ claims on summary
judgment. The trial court denied this request but stated SHARE could bring a later
summary judgment on the issue of ejectment “as long as the legal basis is
something other than one of the exemptions under RCW 59.18.040 that was
argued” previously. SHARE later filed another summary judgment request. The
trial court granted SHARE’s request in part finding the residents were “tenants at
will” and not periodic tenants, and the residents’ housing with SHARE was not
subject to Seattle’s Just Cause Eviction Ordinance. It denied SHARE’s request
based on unjust enrichment and denied the residents’ request for summary
judgment.
SHARE made a third request for summary judgment. Before the court
hearing on this request, Duranzan’s court appointed counsel Paul Gill asked the
court to let him withdraw as Duranzan’s counsel. On March 4, 2019, the trial court
granted SHARE’s third summary judgment request and ordered entry of final
judgment on the ejectment claim only. The trial court then allowed Gill to withdraw
as counsel.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Duranzan appeals the trial court's summary judgment decisions granting
SHARE’s requests and denying his own request. We review an order
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granting summary judgment de novo. 1 Summary judgment is appropriate when
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” 2 We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. 3
ANALYSIS
Residential Landlord-Tenant Act
Duranzan first challenges the trial court’s conclusion that he was a tenant
at will. The State of Washington’s Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973 (RLTA)
outlines requirements and duties a landlord owes a residential tenant. 4 The duties
owed depend on the tenant’s classification. 5
In Turner v. White, an employer allowed its employee to live rent free on
employer owned property in exchange for his work. 6 The court there held the
employee was a tenant at will where “the tenant had come upon the premises with
the permission of the owner, the tenancy was terminable without notice and
provided for no monthly or periodic payments.” 7 Just as in Turner, the residents
here had permission to be on the premises in exchange for services provided, the
1Loeffelholz v. University of Washington, 175 Wn.2d 264, 271, 285 P.3d
854 (2012).
2 CR 56(c); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192
P.3d 886 (2008).
3 Loeffelholz, 175 Wn.2d at 271.
4 RCW 59.18.020.
5 Turner v. White, 20 Wn. App. 290, 292, 579 P.2d 410 (1978).
6 Turner, 20 Wn. App. at 292.
7 Turner, 20 Wn. App. at 292.
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tenancy was terminable without notice, and the residents provided no periodic rent
payments. So, the trial court correctly decided Duranzan was a tenant at will.
SHARE required Duranzan to pay a utility co-payment. Duranzan also
asserts “[u]nder the RLTA utility payments are rent.” But, the RLTA does not say
this.
RCW 59.18.030(28) states,” ‘[r]ent’ or ‘rental amount’ means recurring and
periodic charges identified in the rental agreement for the use and occupancy of
the premises, which may include charges for utilities.” This means rent may
include utilities but does not mean a charge for only utilities is rent. Duranzan’s
assertion fails.
Seattle Just Cause Eviction Ordinance
Duranzan next claims his ejection violated the Seattle Just Cause Eviction
Ordinance. In his complaint he alleges,
4.2 Respondent has intentionally or negligently failed to
comply with landlord duties outlined in SMC 22.206.160. They have
failed to remedy defective issues reported within 10 days as
prescribed by law.
4.3 As a result of the violations of SMC 22.206, any notices
and actions that Respondent has implemented or intends to
implement since Ferbuary (sic), 2018 violate SMC22.206.180 and
are unlawful.
In his declaration of opposing summary judgment he states SHARE told him
he was terminated because he interfered with its daily operations. He contends
his termination was a retaliation for his earlier complaints about facilities and
program participants.
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MC 22.206.160(C)(1)(g) provides:
The reasons for termination of tenancy listed below, and no others,
shall constitute just cause under this Section 22.206.160:
(g) The tenant's occupancy is conditioned upon employment on
the property and the employment relationship is terminated ….
SHARE presented unchallenged evidence that Duranzan’s occupancy of its
property was conditioned on his employment by SHARE and that this occupancy
right terminated upon the termination of his employment. In his complaint,
Duranzan admitted that previously SHARE employed him, terminated him on July
13, 2018, and required him to vacate its property. So, SHARE presented
unchallenged evidence satisfing the requirements of SMC 22.206.160(C)(1)(g) as
just cause for terminating a tenancy. Not stated in Duranzan’s appellate briefing,
but implicit in his trial court pleadings, is a claim that the termination of his
employment does not provide just cause to terminate until any claim that he was
wrongfully terminated is resolved. Duranzan points to nothing in the Seattle Just
Cause Eviction Ordinance that supports this claim. Without any persuasive reason
for delaying an eviction to allow resolution of wrongful employment termination
claims, for which the law provides other remedies, we reject Duranzan’s claim.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Duranzan next claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his attorney failed to respond to SHARE’s third summary judgment
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motion. He makes this claim in the context of an accommodation provided to him
by the trial court appointed counsel at public expense.
We do not need to decide whether this claim is available to Duranzan in an
ejectment proceeding or the correct test to apply. Duranzan cannot satisfy the
most stringent test that could apply, the standard courts use in criminal cases. To
establish an ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal case, a defendant must
show (1) counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and (2) that a reasonable possibility exists that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the outcome of his trial would have been different. 8 Our scrutiny of
counsel's performance is highly deferential, and we employ a strong presumption
of reasonableness. 9 Failure to satisfy either prong of the test defeats an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. 10
Duranzan complains his counsel did not file a response to the third
summary judgment request. But, the trial court received written responses to this
request from counsel for other residents. Duranzan does not question the
adequacy of this briefing. He does not explain how the outcome would have been
any different had his counsel also responded to the third summary judgment
request. He simply states the case was “fatally compromised” by his counsel’s
inaction. He does not show that any response from his counsel would have
changed the outcome.
8State v. Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 130, 101 P.3d 80(2004) (citing State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 225-26, 743 P.2d 816 (1987)).
9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 205, 280 L. Ed. 2d
674 (1984); State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335-36, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
10 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
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Duranzan also claims the trial court abused its discretion by failing to inquire
why his counsel did not respond to the third summary judgment request. Because
Duranzan fails to show how the lack of response prejudiced him, he also fails to
show how any inquiry by the court would have changed the result. 11
Finally, Duranzan claims the trial court should have allowed him to speak at
the hearing on the third request. But, because Duranzan’s counsel was present
until after the third summary judgment request, and the trial court clarified this was
why he could not speak, Duranzan’s claim fails.
CONCLUSION
We affirm. Duranzan fails to show the trial court erred when it found he and
other residents were tenants at will, and because the Seattle Just Cause Eviction
Ordinance does not apply to the residents housed by SHARE.
WE CONCUR:
11
RAP 10.3(a)(6); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d
801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).
7