State Of Washington v. Jeannene L. Ramos ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 80308-5-I
)
Respondent, ) DIVISION ONE
)
v. )
)
RAMOS, JEANNENE LEE, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DOB: 10/03/1980, )
)
Appellant. )
BOWMAN, J. — Jeannene Lee Ramos appeals her conviction for one count
of possession of a controlled substance. Ramos argues that the court should
have suppressed evidence supporting her conviction as fruit of a pretextual traffic
stop and that her statements to police resulted from unlawful custodial
interrogation. Because the totality of circumstances shows a valid warrantless
traffic stop and timely advisement of Miranda1 warnings, we affirm her conviction.
FACTS
On February 17, 2017, Monroe Police Department Officer Scott Kornish
was assigned to the crime prevention unit. While patrolling the Walmart parking
lot in his unmarked SUV,2 Officer Kornish noticed a passenger sitting alone in a
car. Officer Kornish was about 100 yards from the car so he used binoculars to
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
2
Sport utility vehicle.
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
No. 80308-5-I/2
read its license plate. As a person with bags returned to the car, Officer Kornish
looked up the license plate number and discovered a person named Mitchell
Havens bought the car about four months earlier but did not transfer the car’s title
with the Department of Licensing. Because failure to transfer a title within 45
days of purchase is a misdemeanor crime, Officer Kornish decided to stop the
car and investigate the failure to transfer title.
The car began driving out of the parking lot and onto the public road.
Officer Kornish tried to catch up with the car. He testified that he had to drive up
to 50 miles per hour in a 25-mile-per-hour zone to gain distance on the car. He
estimated the car was travelling about 45 miles per hour while he pursued it.
Once behind the car, Officer Kornish activated his emergency lights and the
driver pulled over and stopped.
Officer Kornish contacted the driver, who identified himself as Steven
Packer. Officer Kornish realized that he had previous contact with Packer in
2016. At that encounter, Packer’s girlfriend was present and she had an active
warrant for her arrest.
Officer Kornish told Packer that he did not transfer the title to the car within
45 days and that he was speeding. Packer said that the car was not his and that
his girlfriend Ramos recently bought the car. Ramos was sitting in the passenger
seat. Officer Kornish asked Packer for his driver’s license. Packer told Officer
Kornish that it was suspended.
Officer Kornish returned to his SUV to confirm that Packer’s license was
suspended. He also called for another officer as backup. After confirming the
2
No. 80308-5-I/3
suspended license, Officer Kornish returned to the car and placed Packer under
arrest. He handcuffed Packer and read him his Miranda warnings. After asking
Packer a few questions, Officer Kornish contacted Ramos in the passenger seat.
As Officer Kornish approached the passenger side of the car, he saw that
Ramos had opened the door and angled her legs toward him. He questioned
Ramos about the car title. Ramos confirmed she had recently bought the car but
could not produce a title, bill of sale, or the name of the person who sold it to her.
Officer Kornish obtained Ramos’ identification and returned to his SUV to “run”
her information.
As Officer Kornish was inputting Ramos’ name into his computer, the
backup officer arrived and walked to the passenger side of the car where Ramos
sat. Officer Kornish heard the backup officer yell and saw the officer grab a gun
out of the passenger side of the car. The backup officer told Officer Kornish that
Ramos was concealing the weapon underneath her leg, “between her leg and
the [car’s] seat.” The gun had a fully loaded magazine but did not have a bullet
in the chamber. Officer Kornish removed Ramos from the car, placed her in
handcuffs, and read her Miranda warnings. Officer Kornish then questioned
Ramos about the gun. Ramos claimed she did not know the gun was on the
seat.
Officer Kornish returned to his SUV to finish checking Ramos’ information
in the police computer system and learned Ramos had a prior felony drug
conviction and a current nonextraditable warrant. Officer Kornish told Ramos
she had a felony conviction and could not possess a firearm. Ramos repeated
3
No. 80308-5-I/4
that she did not know the gun was in the car. Officer Kornish challenged her
story and Packer claimed the gun was his. Officer Kornish arrested Ramos for
unlawful possession of a firearm and again read her Miranda warnings.
Officer Kornish saw drug paraphernalia in the car and asked Ramos
whether she uses drugs. Ramos admitted that she used methamphetamine and
that she had a pipe with methamphetamine residue in her purse. Ramos said
that Packer sometimes used methamphetamine as well.
Officer Kornish eventually released Packer and Ramos but impounded the
car and applied for a search warrant. A search of the car pursuant to a warrant
yielded methamphetamine paraphernalia with drug residue, a scale with drug
residue, and “baggies and bindles” of suspected methamphetamine inside a
sunglasses case under the driver’s seat. In a purse found inside the car near the
front passenger seat, officers found a loaded gun, three baggies with suspected
methamphetamine, a glass pipe, and a digital scale.
The State charged Ramos with one count of possession of a controlled
substance. The trial court held CrR 3.5 and CrR 3.6 hearings to determine the
admissibility of Ramos’ statements to police and the evidence found in the car.
The trial court found the statements and evidence admissible and entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Ramos submitted her case to the court as a stipulated bench trial. The
court convicted her as charged and entered findings of fact and conclusions of
law. Ramos appeals.
4
No. 80308-5-I/5
ANALYSIS
Ramos argues that the trial court erred in admitting her statements to
police and the evidence recovered after her unlawful seizure. We review a trial
court’s conclusions of law pertaining to suppression of evidence de novo. State
v. Carneh, 153 Wash. 2d 274, 281, 103 P.3d 743 (2004). We review a trial court’s
findings of fact for substantial evidence. State v. Levy, 156 Wash. 2d 709, 733, 132
P.3d 1076 (2006). But because Ramos does not challenge the trial court’s
findings of fact, we treat them as verities on appeal. State v. Hill, 123 Wash. 2d
641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994).
Pretextual Stop
Ramos argues the initial seizure of her car was pretextual because Officer
Kornish initiated the traffic stop based on the belief that the people in the car
were involved in drug-related activity. We disagree.
A traffic stop, no matter how brief, constitutes a seizure under
constitutional analysis. State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 350, 979 P.2d 833
(1999). That seizure extends to everyone in the vehicle. State v. Marcum, 149
Wash. App. 894, 910, 205 P.3d 969 (2009). The Washington Constitution prohibits
warrantless seizures unless they fall within narrowly drawn exceptions. Art. I, §
7; State v. Arreola, 176 Wash. 2d 284, 292, 290 P.3d 983 (2012). But warrantless
“investigative” traffic stops are constitutional if they are “based upon at least a
reasonable articulable suspicion of either criminal activity or a traffic infraction”
and only if they are “reasonably limited in scope.” Arreola, 176 Wash. 2d at 292-93
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). The
5
No. 80308-5-I/6
reasonable articulable suspicion of unlawful activity must be individualized. State
v. Thompson, 93 Wash. 2d 838, 841, 613 P.2d 525 (1980). A Terry stop is
permissible “only because such stops are reasonably necessary to enforce the
traffic regulations suspected of being violated, in order to further the
governmental interest in traffic safety and the general welfare.” Arreola, 176
Wash. 2d at 295.
Pretextual traffic stops are unconstitutional under article I, section 7. See
Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d at 358. An investigative Terry stop is pretextual when used
as “a mere pretext to dispense with [a] warrant when the true reason for the
seizure is not exempt from the warrant requirement.” Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d at 358.
Pretextual stops are seizures without the authority of law, and any resulting
evidence is inadmissible. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d at 358, 360. When considering
whether a stop is pretextual, courts must examine the totality of the
circumstances, including the subjective intent of the officer and the objective
reasonableness of the officer’s behavior. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d at 358-59. We
recognize that officers may have mixed motives in initiating traffic stops. But
even a mixed-motive stop does not violate article I, section 7, “so long as the
police officer making the stop exercises discretion appropriately.” Arreola, 176
Wash. 2d at 298. If the officer “makes an independent and conscious determination
that a traffic stop to address a suspected traffic infraction is reasonably
necessary in furtherance of traffic safety and the general welfare, the stop is not
pretextual.” Arreola, 176 Wash. 2d at 298-99.
6
No. 80308-5-I/7
Ramos claims that Officer Kornish’s seizure of her car was pretextual
because his role in the crime prevention unit was solely to investigate drug-
related crimes. She argues that Officer Kornish “was not a traffic enforcement
officer“ and that “[h]is interest in the car was not because he was concerned
about a traffic violation, but because he believed the occupants of the vehicle
were involved in drug related criminal activity.” The record does not support her
argument.
Officer Kornish testified that his “[p]roactive patrol unit” does “directed
patrol,” including working parking lots, “problem houses,” and other areas of high
theft and high crime. He explained that most “street crimes” such as vehicle
prowls, burglaries, shoplifting, and organized retail theft “revolve around illegal
drug use.” As a result, much of the crime prevention unit’s work eventually
circles back to illegal drugs. However, this does not mean that every contact
made by members of the unit is solely to investigate drug-related crimes.
Here, Officer Kornish was on routine patrol, watching parking lots for
evidence of organized retail theft. While in the Walmart parking lot, he noticed
the car with a lone occupant. He testified that “[g]enerally[,] people go shopping
together,” so “[i]t’s usually peculiar when people are left in a car.” He ran the
license plate on the car and discovered that it had been sold but the title had not
been transferred. Although the car drew Officer Kornish’s attention as part of his
proactive unit duties, the unchallenged findings of fact show that Officer Kornish
decided to stop the car to investigate the crime of failing to transfer the title within
45 days. Once on the public roadway, Officer Kornish also had reasonable
7
No. 80308-5-I/8
grounds to stop the car for excessive speed. Ramos fails to show that Officer
Kornish subjectively intended to stop her car for any reason other than to
investigate those potential law violations or that his actions were objectively
unreasonable. The trial court did not err in denying Ramos’ motion to suppress
evidence under CrR 3.6.
Custodial Interrogation
Ramos contends Officer Kornish should have read her Miranda warnings
before questioning her about the status of the car’s title “[b]ecause her seizure
within the car was custodial” at that point. She argues the questions put to her
“before the officer warned her against self-incrimination must be suppressed.”
She also argues that the court should have suppressed the statements she made
after Officer Kornish read her Miranda warnings as the product of an
unconstitutional “two-step” interrogation. We disagree.
The federal and Washington State constitutions guarantee the right
against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST. amends V, VI, XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, §
9. Miranda warnings were developed to protect the right against self-
incrimination “while in the coercive environment of police custody.” State v.
Heritage, 152 Wash. 2d 210, 214, 95 P.3d 345 (2004). To serve this purpose,
Miranda warnings must be given before custodial interrogation of a criminal
suspect by an agent of the state. Heritage, 152 Wash. 2d at 214. We presume
statements obtained in violation of Miranda requirements are involuntary.
Heritage, 152 Wash. 2d at 214.
8
No. 80308-5-I/9
For purposes of Miranda, “custodial” refers to “whether a defendant’s
movement was restricted at the time of questioning.” State v. Lorenz, 152 Wash. 2d
22, 36, 93 P.3d 133 (2004). The objective measure of custody is whether a
reasonable person would believe they are in custody “to a degree associated
with formal arrest.” Lorenz, 152 Wash. 2d 36-37.
Ramos cites State v. Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d 689, 92 P.3d 202 (2004), and
State v. Young, 167 Wash. App. 922, 275 P.3d 1150 (2012), in support of her
argument that she was seized while in the car and should have been read
Miranda warnings before she was questioned about the car’s title. Rankin
addressed whether a request for a passenger’s driver’s license is a seizure that
must be supported by a “reasonable basis” for the inquiry. See Rankin, 151
Wash. 2d at 699, 697. Similarly, Young considered whether the actions of officers
rose to the level of an investigative detention requiring reasonable articulable
suspicion. Young, 167 Wash. App. at 931.
In relying on Rankin and Young, Ramos conflates seizure for the purpose
of an investigatory detention with custody for the purpose of Miranda warnings.
While a Terry stop constitutes a seizure under constitutional analysis, it is
“ ‘substantially less “police dominated” ’ ” than police interrogations contemplated
by Miranda. Heritage, 152 Wash. 2d at 218 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 439, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984)). An investigatory
detention does not convert into a custodial arrest requiring a Miranda warning
just because the suspect is not free to leave. Marcum, 149 Wash. App. at 910.
[A] detaining officer may ask a moderate number of questions
during a Terry stop to determine the identity of the suspect and to
9
No. 80308-5-I/10
confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions without rendering the
suspect “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda.
Heritage, 152 Wash. 2d at 218.
Here, after seizing the car, Officer Kornish told Packer that he did not
timely transfer the title for the car. Packer told Officer Kornish that Ramos owned
the car. Thus, Officer Kornish had individualized, reasonable, articulable
suspicion to detain Ramos to investigate the crime of failure to transfer title.
Officer Kornish questioned Ramos only about whether she owned the car and
the status of the car’s title. Ramos remained in the car during the conversation.
Officer Kornish did not handcuff her or place her under arrest. Officer Kornish’s
questions to Ramos about the purchase of the car and the status of its title fell
under a Terry investigation and did not amount to custodial interrogation. A
Miranda warning was unnecessary. See Heritage, 152 Wash. 2d at 219.
Ramos cites State v. Rhoden, 189 Wash. App. 193, 356 P.3d 242 (2015), to
contend she was subject to an unconstitutional “two-step interrogation.” In
Rhoden, the police interrogated and handcuffed a group of suspects without
reading them Miranda warnings. Rhoden, 189 Wash. App. at 196. Based on the
defendant’s answers, police removed only him to a different room, read him
Miranda warnings, and asked the same questions again. Rhoden, 189 Wash. App.
at 196. The court held that both the pre- and post-Miranda statements were
inadmissible because of the deliberate procedure used by the police to
undermine the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings. Rhoden, 189 Wash. App. at
200-02.
10
No. 80308-5-I/11
Ramos’ reliance on Rhoden is misplaced. Officer Kornish lawfully
questioned Ramos about her car title as part of a noncustodial Terry
investigation. The discovery of the gun hidden underneath Ramos’ leg and her
subsequent removal from the car and restraint in handcuffs elevated the seizure
to one associated with custodial arrest. Officer Kornish then immediately read
Ramos her Miranda warnings. Ramos said that she understood the warnings
and freely answered questions.
Officer Kornish’s questions post-Miranda focused on a different topic—the
gun and eventually the drug paraphernalia in her car. Officer Kornish did not
deliberately subject Ramos to a two-step procedure to undermine the
effectiveness of her Miranda warnings. The trial court did not err in concluding
that Ramos’ statements both pre- and post-Miranda were admissible.
We affirm Ramos’ conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
WE CONCUR:
11