Boualem Habib v. Matson Navigation Co. ( 2018 )

iLEO
COURT U AHEM-SOW I
STATE OF WASHINGTON
2018 JUN 18 All 8:37
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
BOUALEM HABIB, ) No. 76098-0-1
)
Appellant, )
)
V. )
)
MATSON NAVIGATION COMPANY, )
INC., a Hawaii corporation; AMERICAN )
CORPORATE SECURITY, INC., a ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
California corporation, )
) FILED: June 18, 2018
Respondents. )
)
VERELLEN, J. —The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing
Boualem Habib's defamation and false light claims against his former employer
and a provider of security services. Because Habib's claims are barred by the
two-year statute of limitations, we affirm.
FACTS
The undisputed factual background is set forth in the unpublished decision
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
dismissing Boualem Habib's claim for wrongful termination.1
1 Habib v. Matson Navigation Company, Inc., 2014 WL 4243703(U.S. Dist.
Ct. W.D. Aug 26, 2014).
No. 76098-0-1/2
Matson Navigation Company, Inc. operates container vessels transporting
goods between the West Coast of the United States and Hawaii. Matson hired
Boualem Habib, who is of Arabic descent and a Muslim, in 2011 to work as a chief
cook on the SS Maui. At the time of these events, the SS Maui was berthed at
Terminal 18 in Seattle.
On June 25, 2011, Habib left the vessel to take a "trip off" as vacation time
as permitted by his collective bargaining agreement. During a trip off, an
employee such as Habib is not considered to be a member of the ship's crew or
an employee of Matson because the employee is not a party to a contract for a
specific voyage.
On August 6, 2011, while still on vacation, Habib boarded the SS Maui
twice. First, he boarded the vessel at 3:00 a.m. to take a shipmate to the airport.
Later the same day, Habib boarded the vessel to retrieve fishing gear he left
aboard the ship. The same day, the ship's master received a report that Habib
boarded the vessel without permission and that he had verbally assaulted a
member of the ship's crew. Habib denied the alleged altercation.
Security at Terminal 18 is provided to Matson and other operators by
American Corporate Security(ACS). Individuals gain access to the terminal by
possessing a valid transportation worker identification credential (TVV1C card)
bearing the maritime worker's photograph. However, in order to gain access to a
particular vessel, one must also be on the vessel's current crew list, on its
approved visitor list, or have express permission from the vessel's master. Habib
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No. 76098-0-1/3
did not deny boarding the ship at a time when he was not a crew member, was not
on the visitor's list, and did not have express permission.
On August 11, 2011, Matson terminated Habib's employment based on its
conclusion that his actions violated provisions of his collective bargaining
agreement.
Habib later filed a union grievance. The union conducted its own
investigation and concluded that Habib violated policy and security protocols by
boarding the vessel.
Habib filed a lawsuit against Matson in federal court, alleging that his
termination was discriminatory under federal law. In August 2014, the federal
court granted Matson's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Habib's
action. The court concluded that Matson had nondiscriminatory business reasons
for the termination and that Habib failed present evidence to rebut the employer's
legitimate reasons.
On July 31, 2015, Habib filed this case against Matson and ACS in King
County Superior Court. Habib alleged that when Matson terminated his
employment, it also directed ACS to post copies of his TWIC card in security posts
at Terminal 18. He alleged this dissemination informed staff and visitors that
Habib was "considered a security threat to the safety of the crew members and the
vessel" and that he was prohibited from gaining access to the terminal.2 Habib
claimed that neither Matson nor ACS conducted adequate investigation in order to
2 Clerk's Papers(CP)at 865.
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No. 76098-0-1/4
determine whether he was in fact a security threat. Habib further alleged that, as
of May 2015, ACS continued to display his TVVIC card at Terminal 18. Habib
stated that neither Matson nor ACS had responded to his request to cease
displaying his card. Habib sought injunctive relief, raising several causes of
action, including defamation, invasion of privacy, false light, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Both Matson and ACS filed motions for summary judgment. At the hearing
on the motions, Habib voluntarily dismissed his invasion of privacy claim. The trial
court granted the defendants' motions and dismissed Habib's claims for
defamation and false light as barred by the statute of limitations. The court also
dismissed Habib's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, concluding
there was no triable fact. The court initially reserved ruling on Habib's claim for a
permanent injunction but later entered an order disposing of that claim as well.
Habib appeals.3
3 Because Habib appended materials to his opening brief that were not part
of the record before the trial court and he fails to properly cite to the record, ACS
asks this court to strike Habib's opening brief. See RAP 10.3(8)(appendix to
appellate brief may not contain materials not in the record on review without
permission of the appellate court); RAP 10.3(a)(5)(reference to the record
required for each factual statement). While Habib's brief is noncompliant with the
rules in these respects, we are able to address his appeal on the merits and
decline to strike the brief. Nevertheless, we do not consider any materials not
included in the appellate record. See RAP 9.12 (appellate review of an order
granting summary judgment is limited to those materials properly before the trial
court).
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No. 76098-0-1/5
ANALYSIS
Habib challenges dismissal of his "defamation related" claims.4 Specifically,
Habib claims the trial court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations bars
his claims for defamation and false light.
We review summary judgment orders de novo, engaging in the same
inquiry as the trial court.5 Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, when
viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows no genuine issue
of material fact remains and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.6
After the moving party has met the initial burden, the nonmoving party must
set forth specific facts sufficiently rebutting the moving party's contentions and
establishing the existence of a material issue of fact.7 The nonmoving party may
not rely on speculation, argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues
4 Although Habib mentions the dismissal of his claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy and his request for
permanent injunctive relief, mere reference to these claims is insufficient to
warrant judicial review. RAP 10.3(6) directs each party to supply in its brief,
"argument in support of the issues presented for review, together with citations to
legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record." "'Passing treatment
of an issue or lack of reasoned argument does not merit our consideration." West
v. Thurston County, 168 Wash. App. 162, 187, 275 P.3d 1200(2012)(quoting
Holland v. City of Tacoma,90 Wn. App. 533, 538, 954 P.2d 290(1998)). We
therefore address only the dismissal of Habib's defamation and false light causes
of action.
5 Mohr v. Grant, 153 Wash. 2d 812, 821, 108 P.3d 768(2005)(quoting
Mulcahy v. Farmers Ins. of Wash., 152 Wash. 2d 92, 98, 95 P.3d 313(2004)).
6 CR 56(c).
7 Graff V. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Wash. App. 799, 802, 54 P.3d 1266 (2002).
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No. 76098-0-1/6
remain, or having its affidavits considered at face value.8 The trial court should
grant a summary judgment motion only if, from all the evidence, reasonable
persons could reach but one conclusion.8
Both defamation and false light claims have a two-year limitations period."
Habib acknowledged in his deposition testimony that a copy of his TVVIC card was
posted at Terminal 18 in August 2011 and remained on display until January
2016.11
The general rule in a personal injury case is that a cause of action accrues
at the time the act or omission occurs.12 Matson and ACS argue that Habib's
cause of action accrued when ACS displayed the TVVIC card in 2011. Therefore,
according to respondents, Habib's claims, filed approximately four years later on
July 31, 2015,
, are barred by the statute of limitations.
Habib advances several arguments in opposition. First, Habib contends
that the discovery rule applies because he did not know, and could not have
known, about the posting of his TVVIC card in 2011. The discovery rule is an
8 Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm't Co., 106 Wash. 2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1
(1986).
9 Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030(1982).
10 RCW 4.16.100(1); Eastwood v. Cascade Broad. Co., 106 Wash. 2d 466,
474, 722 P.2d 1295(1986)(false light claim governed by RCW 4.16.100(1))
11 Prior to a second hearing on Habib's motion for a preliminary injunction,
the defendants agreed to cease displaying Habib's TWIC card at all Terminal 18
locations by January 29, 2016.
12 See
White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 344, 348,693 P.2d 687
(1985)(addressing whether discovery rule may apply in wrongful death action).
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No. 76098-0-1/7
exception to the general rule and postpones the accrual of an action until the
injured party knows, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.13
Even assuming, arguendo, that the discovery rule applies to his defamation
and false light claims, the rule does not help Habib in this instance.14 Habib
acknowledges he knew about the posted document at Terminal 18 by May 2013,
when he received his case file from his attorney in the employment discrimination
case.15 Habib filed a declaration on May 31, 2013 in the federal case that
demonstrates his knowledge of the 2011 distribution and display of his TWIC card.
Nevertheless, giving Habib the benefit of the discovery rule and a May 2013 date
of discovery, the statute of limitations expired in May 2015, before Habib filed his
complaint.
Next, Habib argues that a new cause of action accrued each time a
different viewer was exposed to the image of his TV/IC card. While he points to no
evidence in the record about the timing and identity of people who may have been
exposed to the copy of his TVVIC card inside the terminal security post, he asserts
13 See id.
14 See Kittinger v. Boeing Co., 21 Wash. App. 484, 487-88, 585 P.2d 812
(1978)(applying the discovery rule to a libel claim involving confidential business
memoranda).
15 In his 2016 deposition, Habib testified that he learned about the posting in
early 2012. However, the context of Habib's testimony suggests that the reference
to a 2012 discovery date was a mistake. Habib has consistently maintained that
he became aware of this when he read the file he received from his attorney in the
federal case. The federal case was not filed until October 2012. Habib also stated
in his declaration opposing summary judgment that he became aware of the
posting in July 2013. Habib's May 2013 declaration in his wrongful termination
case proves this assertion to be inaccurate.
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No. 76098-0-1/8
that there is "at least a factual issue on the scope of the new audience that may
have been exposed to the posting in the requisite time period."16
Habib cites no Washington authority that supports his position, and his
argument is inconsistent with the "single publication rule" that Washington courts
adopted in 1987.17 Under this rule, one edition of a book or newspaper or any one
broadcast is a single publication and may give rise to only a single cause of
action.18 Statements are generally considered to be "published" for purposes of
the rule when they are first made available to the public.19 Under the single
publication rule, a new cause of action stems from a separate and distinct
communication, but it is irrelevant whether the same person or a new person
received the communication.2°
Habib's argument suggests the defendants committed a continuing tort by
displaying his TWIC card for a period of time. But again, this argument is at odds
with the single publication rule and does not apply in defamation cases.21
Numerous courts have likewise rejected similar arguments in the context of
website postings, recognizing that despite distinctions between the Internet and
16 Appellant's Br. at 29.
17 Herron v. KING Broadcasting Co., 109 Wash. 2d 514, 521, 746 P.2d 295
(1987).
18 Momah v. Bharti, 144 Wash. App. 731, 752, 182 P.3d 455 (2008).
19 Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., 660 F.3d 1156, 1167 (9th Cir.2011).
20 See Momah, 144 Wash. App. at 753.
21See Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002)(defamation
action accrues when tortious conduct occurs, such as when a book is published).
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No. 76098-0-1/9
traditional media, publication on websites is also subject to the single publication
rule.22
Finally, Habib contends "there is at least an issue of fact about whether and
to what extent[the defendants] may have republished" the alleged defamatory
statements in February 2015 when Matson and/or ACS modified a copy of his
TVVIC card by adding the handwritten words,"DO NOT ALLOW ENTRY" and
language about his current appearance, stating,"Now wears glasses and a thin
goatee."23
The statute of limitations resets with any republication.24 However,
republication does not occur so long as the content is not substantively altered or
directed to a new audience.25 Habib did not rely on the alleged 2015 additions to
the posted document below. In his declaration opposing summary judgment,
Habib merely stated that it was his "understanding" that following an incident
where he attempted to access and photograph the inside of a security structure at
the terminal in February 2015, ACS issued a statement and "produced a
document" containing an image of his TVVIC photograph with "handwriting on the
22 See e.g. Firth v. New York, 98 N.Y.2d 365, 747 N.Y.S.2d 69, 775 N.E.2d
463(2002)(single publication rule applies to the Internet); Oia v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 440 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2006)(rejecting argument that a
defendant continuously republished information by posting the information on a
website); Van Buskirk v. New York Times Co., 325 F.3d 87(2nd Cir. 2003)(statute
of limitations began to accrue on date letter was posted on the Internet).
23 Appellant's Br. at 31, 40.
24 Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012).
25 Id. (addressing publication of statements on website).
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No. 76098-0-1/10
bottom of the image."26 And Habib does not now contend that the modifications
were substantive or that they altered the alleged defamatory content.
There is no genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment as
to whether Habib's defamation and false light claims are barred by the statute of
limitations.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
414fri
26 CP at 99.
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