Tom Lyth And Mara-liisa Lyth v. Christian Hatch And Stacie Hatch ( 2019 )

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2OI9J~NI~ ~H9:3I
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
TOM LYTH and MARJA-LIISA LYTH,
husband and wife, No. 76946-4-I
Respondents, DIVISION ONE
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHRISTIAN LEE HATCH and JANE
DOE HATCH, husband and wife and the
marital community thereof,
Appellants,
LYNN MOSER and JOHN DOE
MOSER, husband and wife and the
marital community thereof,
Defendants. FILED: January 14, 2019
CHUN, J. — Tom and Marja-LUsa Lyth sued Christian (Chris) and Stacie
Hatch, and their marital community, for trespass and damages. On the day of
trial, Stacie failed to appear but Chris appeared, and agreed to a stipulated
judgment against both defendants. Stacie did not sign the judgment. More than
three years later, the Hatches filed a motion to vacate the judgment as void
under CR 60(b). They claimed lack of jurisdiction, arguing a lack of compliance
with CR 2A for the stipulated judgment. The trial court denied the motion to
vacate. We affirm.
This opnion refers to the part es by first names where necessary to prevent confusion
We do not ntend any d srespect.
No. 76946-4-I12
BACKGROUND
In March 2011, the Lyths filed a lawsuit for trespass and damages against
Chris and Stacie, as husband and wife, and their marital community based on
Chris’s unauthorized logging activity on the Lyths’ recreational property.2 Soon
after, counsel filed a notice of appearance on behalf of both Chris and Stacie.
Chris and Stacie answered the complaint through counsel in April 2011.
Defense counsel requested a protective order under CR 26(c) on behalf of
both Chris and Stacie to allow them to designate personal identifying information
as confidential. Chris’s role in logging a former green belt property had already
exposed them to harassment and litigation. The trial court issued the protective
order.
The Lyths filed a motion for summary judgment against Chris and Stacie
on December 21, 2011. The Hatches’ counsel withdrew from representation in
January 2012. Chris filed a written “DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION” to the motion
for summary judgment and a demand for a jury trial on behalf of the defendants.
In February 2012, the trial court granted the Lyths’ motion for summary
judgment on the fact that 14 trees had been damaged or removed from their
property, but reserved the determination of damages for trial.
Stacie filed a petition for marital dissolution in March 2012.
The Lyths filed another motion for summary judgment on November 15,
2012. On January 11,2013, the trial court granted this motion, awarding the
2 The complaint identified Stacie as Jane Doe Hatch. The Lyths also named Lynn Moser,
John Doe Moser, and their marital community, as defendants in the lawsuit but they play no role
in this appeal.
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Lyths a judgment of $53,665, plus attorney fees and costs.3 The trial court noted
Chris and Stacie were pro se. The court stayed enforcement of the judgment
until January 18, 2013, and allowed for vacation of the judgment if the Hatches
paid $1,000 in terms.
Soon after, new defense counsel entered a limited notice of appearance to
notify the court of the Hatches’ compliance with the order to pay terms and to
respond to the motion for summary judgment. Counsel then submitted a
response to the motion for summary judgment on behalf of both Chris and
Stacie. In February 2013, the trial court vacated the summary judgment order for
damages.
On March 6, 2013, the trial court granted partial summary judgment for the
Lyths, establishing the value of the removed trees, but reserving the issues of
liability, treble damages, and attorney fees and costs for trial. Counsel signed on
behalf of “Defendants Hatch.” Counsel withdrew from representation in April
2013.
Chris subsequently signed an order setting a trial date for “Christian Lee
Hatch and Stacie Hatch, Husband and Wife.” Stacie did not sign.
Meanwhile, Whatcom County Superior Court dismissed Stacie’s petition
for marital dissolution for want of prosecution on August 29, 2013.
The parties proceeded to trial on December 3, 2013. Chris appeared
without counsel. Stacie did not appear. Before commencement of trial, Chris
~ The judgment is incorrectly dated 2012, but the trial court’s notation and filing date
reflect the 2013 date.
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arrived at a settlement agreement with the Lyths. They appeared before the trial
court and submitted a signed, stipulated judgment awarding the Lyths $69,459 in
treble damages, emotional distress, and court costs from “Christian and Stacie
Hatch, husband and wife, jointly and severally, and the marriage community
thereof.” Counsel for the Lyths noted Chris’s presence and informed the court
the judgment was “signed by everybody.” Chris stated his agreement on the
record. Stacie neither signed the stipulated agreement nor entered her
agreement on the record in court.
In May 2014, counsel for the Lyths sent a writ of garnishment to the
Hatches for the ongoing judgment debt. The paperwork arrived from the Lyths’
counsel by certified mail addressed to Chris. Stacie signed for the document.
The Lyths’ counsel sent garnishment papers again in August 2014, in a certified
mail envelope addressed to “Christian Lee Hatch and Stacie Hatch, husband and
wife.” The envelope also identified the sender as the Lyths’ counsel and included
a notation, “(Lyth).” Stacie signed for these documents as well. Similar letters
from the Lyths’ counsel were delivered and signed for by Stacie in
November 2014, March 2015, and September2015.
Through counsel, Stacie filed a notice of appeal of the judgment with this
court on March 18, 2016 — over two years after entry of the stipulated judgment.
She requested an extension of time to file an appeal, claiming she had no
knowledge of the lawsuit or judgment until recent supplemental proceedings in
the matter. On June 17, 2016, the commissioner dismissed review because
Stacie filed the appeal “more than two years late,” and “has not demonstrated the
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extraordinary circumstances required by RAP 18.8(b) to grant an extension to file
the notice of appeal.”
In December 2016 over three years after the entry of the stipulated
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judgment the Hatches’ counsel filed a motion to vacate the judgment as to
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Stacie’s community property interest and separate property. Stacie claimed she
“was never personally served or otherwise made aware of the litigation at issue
until well after the Judgment was entered.” Specifically, Stacie stated she was
“completely unaware of our community involvement in this action until late
February 2016.” She further claimed she had not authorized Chris to enter any
judgment on her behalf.
The trial court denied the motion to vacate. The Hatches moved for
reconsideration, which the trial court also denied. The Hatches subsequently
brought a motion for CR 11 sanctions against the Lyths and their counsel for
misrepresentations by counsel. The trial court denied this motion as well.
The Hatches timely appeal the trial court’s orders denying the motion to
vacate, the motion to reconsider, and the motion for CR 11 sanctions.
ANALYSIS
A. CR 60(b) Motion to Vacate
Under CR 60(b), a trial court may vacate a judgment in cases where the
ground alleged pertains to something extraneous to the action of the court or the
regularity of its proceedings. Burlingame v. Consol. Mines and Smelting Co.,
Ltd., 106 Wash. 2d 328, 336, 722 P.2d 67(1986). An appeal from denial of a
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CR 60(b) motion is limited to the propriety of the denial, not the underlying
judgment. Biurstrom v. Campbell, 27 Wash. App. 449, 450-51, 618 P.2d 533
(1980). “Errors of law are not correctable through CR 60(b); rather, direct appeal
is the proper means of remedying legal errors.” Burlingame, 106 Wash. 2d at 336.
For relief under CR 60(b), a party must bring a motion within “a
reasonable time.” “The critical period is between when the moving party became
aware of the judgment and when it filed the motion to vacate.” Ha v. Signal
Elec., Inc., 182 Wash. App. 436, 454, 332 P.3d 991 (2014). What constitutes a
reasonable time depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. Ha, 182
Wash. App. at 454. Major factors include prejudice to the nonmoving party and
whether the moving party had good reasons for the delay. Luckett v. Boeing, 98
Wash. App. 307, 312-13, 989 P.2d 1144 (1999). However, a motion to vacate a
judgment as void under CR 60(b)(5) may be brought at any time after entry of
judgment. Ahten v. Barnes, 158 Wash. App. 343, 350, 242 P.3d 35 (2010). Courts
have a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty to vacate a void judgment. Ahten, 158
Wash. App. at 350.
On appeal, the Hatches fail to cite specific grounds for CR 60(b) relief
from judgment. Below, the Hatches requested relief under CR 60(b)(4), (5),
and (11). An appellate court will not overturn a trial court’s decision on a motion
to vacate a judgment under CR 60(b)(4) or (11) absent an abuse of discretion.
Scanlon v. Witrak, 110 Wash. App. 682, 686, 42 P.3d 447 (2002). Discretion is
abused when exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.
Scanlon, 110 Wash. App. at 686. We review de novo a CR 60(b)(5) motion to
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vacate a judgment as void for lack of jurisdiction. Brown v. Garrett, 175 Wash. App.
357, 367, 306 P.3d 1014 (2013).
In this case, any request for relief under CR 60(b)(4) and (11) is untimely.
The stipulated judgment was entered in December 2013. The Hatches filed the
motion to vacate in December 2016. Stacie attributes this lapse of more than
three years to her claim that she did not know about the litigation or judgment
until supplemental proceedings in 2016. The record contradicts this claim.
Counsel represented bath Chris and Stacie at the outset of the litigation,
as shown by the notice of appearance filed for both defendants. Counsel filed for
an order of protection on behalf of bath Chris and Stacie. Subsequent counsel
responded to the motion for summary judgment for both Chris and Stacie. All
pleadings indicate counsel’s representation of Chris, Stacie, and their marital
community. Furthermore, Stacie signed for acceptance of four separate letters of
garnishment addressed to herself and Chris, clearly marked as sent by the
attorney for the Lyths. This involvement clearly demonstrates Stacie’s
knowledge of the lawsuit.
Stacie’s claim of ignorance of the lawsuit and judgment strains credulity
and does not provide an adequate reason for the excessive delay in filing a
motion to vacate. Therefore, the Hatches did not timely file for relief under
CR 60(b)(4) and (11). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing
the motion to vacate on these grounds.
As noted above, a party may bring a motion to vacate a void judgment
under CR 60(b)(5) at anytime. See Ahten, 158 Wash. App. at 350. A void
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judgment is a judgment entered by a court that lacks jurisdiction of the parties or
the subject matter, or lacks the inherent power to enter the order. State ex re.
Turnerv. Brigcjs, 94 Wn. App 299, 302, 971 P.2d 581 (1999). “If the
requirements of CR 2A are not followed, the resulting judgment is void and may
be challenged and vacated at any time.” Turner, 94 Wn. App 299 at 304. The
Hatches contend the trial court abused its discretion by failing to vacate the
judgment as void. Specifically, the Hatches claim the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the stipulated agreement because Stacie did not appear in
court or sign the agreement as required by CR 2A. We disagree.
Washington law allows for one spouse to defend a lawsuit on behalf of the
other:
If the spouses or the domestic partners are sued together, either or
both spouses or either or both domestic partners may defend, and
if one spouse or one domestic partner neglects to defend, the other
spouse or other domestic partner may defend for the nonacting
spouse or nonacting domestic partner also.
RCW4.08.040. In this case, the lawsuit named both Chris and Stacie, as
husband and wife, and their marital community. Because Stacie neglected to
defend by failing to appear for trial, Chris was statutorily permitted to defend the
lawsuit on her behalf and on behalf of their marital community. Furthermore,
outside of certain exceptions inapplicable in this case, either spouse may
manage and control community property. ~ RCW 26.16.030. Therefore, Chris
had the authority to obligate the marital community to the judgment.
The parties do not dispute that Chris complied with CR 2A to enter the
stipulated judgment. Therefore, in defending himself and his nonacting spouse in
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the lawsuit, Chris fulfilled the requirements of CR 2A and entered into a valid and
enforceable stipulated judgment. The stipulated judgment is not void of lack of
jurisdiction and the trial court did not err by denying the motion to vacate.
Finally, Stacie claims the judgment is void because the court lacked
authority to enter a judgment against her share of the community property and
herseparate property. RCW2S.16.190 provides, “Forall injuries committed bya
married person or domestic partner, there shall be no recovery against the
separate property of the other spouse or other domestic partner except in cases
where there would be joint responsibility if the marriage or the state registered
domestic partnership did not exist.” This generally exempts a non-tortfeasor
spouse’s separate property from collection for the torts of the tortfeasor. Haley v.
Highland, 142 Wash. 2d 135, 148, 12 P.3d 119 (2000). While Stacie correctly notes
that her separate property is not liable for Chris’s intentional tort, CR 60(b)
cannot provide relief for this error of law. CR 60(b) orily provides relief for
irregularities pertaining to the procedure or issues extraneous to the action. See
Burlingame, 106 Wash. 2d at 336. Errors of law must be corrected on appeal of the
original judgment. ~ Burlingame, 106 Wash. 2d at 336.
The Hatches fail to demonstrate an extraneous or procedural irregularity
producing a void judgment for the purposes of CR 60(b)(5). The trial court did
not err in denying the motion to vacate.4
~ Because we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to vacate1 we also affirm the
denial of the reconsideration of the decision.
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B. Motion for CR 11 Sanctions
In addition to the motion to vacate, the Hatches moved for CR 11
sanctions against the Lyths and their attorney, based on the attorney’s alleged
misrepresentation that the CR 2A agreement was stipulated and fully executed.
The trial court denied the motion.
CR 11 establishes that “an attorneys signature is his or her certification
that the pleading, brief, or motion is ‘(1) . . . well grounded in fact; [and] (2)
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.” Ames
v. Pierce County, 194 Wash. App. 93, 120, 374 P.3d 228 (2016) (quoting
CR 11(a)). A trial court may award sanctions if a party’s filing does not comply
with CR11. Lee v. Kennard, 176Wn. App. 678, 690, 310 P.3d 845 (2013).
“Normally. . . late entry of a CR 11 motion would be impermissible, since without
prompt notice regarding a potential violation of the rule, the offending party is
given no opportunity to mitigate the sanction by amending or withdrawing the
offending paper.” Biggs v. Vail, 124 Wash. 2d 193, 198, 876 P.2d 448 (1994).
Parties must provide notice of possible CR 11 violations as soon as possible.
Biqqs, 124 Wash. 2d at 198.
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision on CR 11 sanctions for
abuse of discretion. Marina Condo. Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Stratford at Marina,
LLC, 161 Wash. App. 249, 263, 254 P.3d 827 (2011). A trial court abuses its
discretion if its order is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.
Marina Condo., 161 Wash. App. at 263.
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The Hatches moved for CR 11 sanctions in April 2017, more than three
years after counsel’s statements at entry of the stipulated judgment. A delay of
more than three years is not prompt notification of a potential rule violation.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying this untimely
request.
Furthermore, the Hatches base their claim for CR 11 sanctions on
counsel’s alleged misrepresentation that the CR 2A was properly executed. As
discussed above, Washington statute permitted Chris to defend the suit on
Stacie’s behalf. Therefore, counsel made no misrepresentations as to the
validity of the CR 2A agreement. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the motion for CR 11 sanctions.
C. Attorney Fees
The Lyths contend the Hatches filed a frivolous appeal and request fees.
RAP 18.1(b) requires a party to devote a separate section of the brief to the
request for fees. “The rule requires more than a bald request for attorney fees on
appeal. Argument and citation to authority are required under the rule to advise
the court of the appropriate grounds for an award of attorney fees as costs.”
Stiles v. Kearney, 168 Wash. App. 250, 267, 277 P.3d 9 (2012) (citation omitted).
In requesting attorney fees, the Lyths cite RAP 18.1 and RCW4.84.185
and argue, “Stacie Hatch’s appeal is frivolous as an appeal of an order denying a
Motion to Vacate a judgment was entered by almost four years ago is frivolous.”
This statement lacks citation to authority or argument in support of the request
and fails to satisfy the requirements of RAP 18.1. Furthermore, RAP 18.1 does
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not provide a substantive legal basis for any fee award here; nor does
RCW 4.84.185, which applies to trial court proceedings. Therefore, we deny the
Lyths’ request.
We affirm.
cc
WE CONCUR:
*1~’A ___________