State of Washington v. Thomas Joseph Corkery ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                  FILED
    MAY 3, 2018
    In the Office of the Clerk of Court
    WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION THREE
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                         )         No. 35129-7-III
    )
    Respondent,              )
    )
    v.                              )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    )
    THOMAS JOSEPH CORKERY,                       )
    )
    Appellant.               )
    LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Thomas Corkery appeals after his conviction for
    attempted second degree robbery. He argues there was insufficient evidence to support
    his conviction. We disagree and affirm.
    FACTS
    Annette McEachren, the general manager of the Plato’s Closet in Spokane, saw the
    appellant, Thomas Corkery, leave the clothing store carrying a pair of jeans he had not
    paid for. She followed Corkery and saw him toss the stolen jeans into the passenger seat
    of his car. McEachren reached through the passenger window to retrieve the jeans.
    Corkery told her she could not have the jeans and he began to drive away. As he drove
    No. 35129-7-III
    State v. Corkery
    away, McEachren was lifted off the ground and was taken away with the vehicle. After a
    short while, she pulled herself into the passenger seat.
    McEachren repeatedly told him to stop the car. She reached for the gear shift and
    the keys in an effort to stop the car. Corkery slapped at her hands to prevent this.
    Corkery told McEachren that she could not have the jeans, and she needed to get out of
    the car. After driving through a portion of the mall parking lot, Corkery changed his
    mind and stopped the car. McEachren then got out of the car with the jeans.
    Another employee took down the license plate number, and McEachren later
    identified Corkery in a photo lineup.
    The State charged Corkery with second degree robbery. McEachren testified to
    the above facts and the fear she had during the encounter. She testified she was
    concerned with her physical safety while she hung from the car window and thought that
    Corkery might try to run her against the side of one of the objects along the walkway.
    A jury found Corkery guilty of attempted second degree robbery, and the trial
    court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced him. Corkery appeals.
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    No. 35129-7-III
    State v. Corkery
    ANALYSIS
    Corkery challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction. Specifically,
    he argues there was insufficient evidence that he attempted to retain the jeans by use or
    threatened use of force.
    SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO PROVE ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE ROBBERY
    The State must provide sufficient evidence to prove each element of the charged
    offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 316, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 
    61 L. Ed. 2d 560
     (1979). When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
    evidence, the proper inquiry is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” State v. Salinas, 
    119 Wn.2d 192
    , 201, 
    829 P.2d 1068
     (1992). “[A]ll
    reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and
    interpreted most strongly against the defendant.” 
    Id.
     Furthermore, “[a] claim of
    insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all inferences that reasonably
    can be drawn therefrom.” 
    Id.
     In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
    circumstantial evidence and direct evidence carry equal weight. State v. Goodman, 
    150 Wn.2d 774
    , 781, 
    83 P.3d 410
     (2004).
    A person commits second degree robbery
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    No. 35129-7-III
    State v. Corkery
    when he or she unlawfully takes the personal property from the person of
    another or in his or her presence against his or her will by the use or
    threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person
    or to his or her property or the person or property of anyone. . . . [T]he
    degree of force is immaterial.
    RCW 9A.56.190. “Any force or threat, no matter how slight, which induces an owner[1]
    to part with his property is sufficient to sustain a robbery conviction.” State v.
    Handburgh, 
    119 Wn.2d 284
    , 293, 
    830 P.2d 641
     (1992).
    Under RCW 9A.28.020(1), a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
    with intent to commit a specific crime, he or she does any act that is a substantial step
    toward the commission of that crime. The intent required is the intent to accomplish the
    criminal result of the base crime. State v. Johnson, 
    173 Wn.2d 895
    , 899, 
    270 P.3d 591
    (2012). A substantial step is an act that is “‘strongly corroborative’” of the actor’s
    criminal purpose. 
    Id.
     (quoting State v. Luther, 
    157 Wn.2d 63
    , 78, 
    134 P.3d 205
     (2006)).
    Here, when Corkery put his car in drive, the force lifted McEachren off the
    ground. McEachren testified that she was afraid of being injured before she pulled
    herself into the car. Corkery’s act of driving away with McEachren dangling from the
    1
    Corkery does not challenge his conviction on the basis that the general manager
    had an insufficient interest in the jeans for his taking to constitute robbery. Such a
    challenge would have been unsuccessful. See State v. Richie, 
    191 Wn. App. 916
    , 926,
    
    365 P.3d 770
     (2015) (off-duty sales clerk had sufficient representative capacity over store
    items so that defendant’s taking of such items from the clerk constituted robbery).
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    State v. Corkery
    side window constituted a use of force to retain the jeans. Later, Corkery slapped at
    McEachren’s hands when she reached for the keys in an effort to stop the car. This act
    also constituted a use of force to retain the jeans. Corkery’s acts of driving away with the
    jeans and preventing McEachren from stopping his car were both substantial steps toward
    accomplishing his purpose of retaining the jeans by force. We conclude that the State
    presented sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt
    that Corkery took a substantial step toward retaining the jeans by the use of force.
    APPELLATE COSTS
    If the State substantially prevails, Corkery requests that this court decline to award
    appellate costs. We deem the State to be the substantially prevailing party. The trial
    court found that Corkery was entitled to appellate review at public expense due to his
    indigency. The State admits it is unaware of any change to Corkery’s financial
    circumstances. Consistent with RAP 14.2, we defer the award of appellate costs to our
    commissioner or clerk/administrator.
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    No. 35129-7-III
    State v. Corkery
    Affirmed.
    A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
    RCW 2.06.040.
    Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.
    WE CONCUR:
    Fearing, J. ~ '                          Pennell, J.
    6