State Of Washington v. Jahad Hill ( 2014 )

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 70426-5-I
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JAHADV.D. HILL,
B.D. 4/18/95,
FILED: July 21, 2014
Appellant.
Leach, J. — Jahad Hill appeals his juvenile adjudication for criminal
trespass in the first degree. He argues that the State's evidence was insufficient
and that the admission of testimonial hearsay violated his right of confrontation.
We affirm.
FACTS
On September 22, 2012, a security guard at The Commons, a Federal
Way shopping mall, received information that Hill and three other juveniles were
suspected of shoplifting from the American Eagle store. The guard followed the
juveniles as they left the mall and used his radio to notify Federal Way Police
Officer Richard Adams, who is assigned to patrol the mall. Officer Adams
approached the group and told them to stop. Hill immediately began to run.
Officer Adams placed Hill under arrest for obstruction. After Officer Adams read
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Hill his Miranda1 rights, Hill admitted that he had been inside the mall but denied
stealing from the American Eagle store. Officer Adams checked the police
department's computer system and discovered that Hill had been issued a
"permanent trespass notice" on two prior occasions, once in 2009 and once in
2011, prohibiting him from entering the mall. Hill then admitted that he knew that
he was prohibited from entering the mall. He also admitted to giving a false
name when he received the trespass notice in 2011. The State charged Hill with
one count of criminal trespass in the first degree.
At trial, Officer Adams testified that he had issued Hill the trespass notice
in 2009 for "stealing at Sears and several other stores." When asked whether he
remembered the circumstances surrounding the 2009 trespass notice, Officer
Adams stated that he did not have any personal recollection "[ojther than that he
was arrested for theft and that he had been identified as stealing from several
stores." Hill did not object to this testimony. Officer Adams did not issue the
2011 trespass notice and did not have personal knowledge of the underlying
circumstances.
Following a fact-finding hearing, the trial court found Hill guilty as charged.
Hill appeals.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
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No. 70426-5-1 / 3
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Sufficient evidence supports an adjudication of guilt in a juvenile
proceeding if, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it permits any
rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.2 All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn
in favor of the State and against the defendant.3 We defer to the trier of fact on
issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of
the evidence.4
"In reviewing a juvenile court adjudication, we must decide whether
substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and, in turn,
whether the findings support the conclusions of law."5 We review conclusions of
law de novo.6
A person commits criminal trespass in the first degree if the person
knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building.7 A person "enters or
remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when he or she is not licensed, invited,
2 State v. Echeverria, 85 Wn. App. 777, 782, 934 P.2d 1214(1997).
3 State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
4 State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).
5State v. B.J.S., 140 Wn. App. 91, 97, 169 P.3d 34 (2007).
6 State v. Lew, 156 Wn.2d 709, 733, 132 P.3d 1076 (2006).
7 RCW 9A.52.070.
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or otherwise privileged to so enter or remain.8 However, it is a defense to
criminal trespass if "[t]he premises were at the time open to members of the
public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or
remaining in the premises."9 "Once a defendant has offered some evidence that
the entry was permissible under a statutory defense, the State bears the burden
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant lacked license to enter."10
Because this defense challenges the sufficiency of the State's evidence, a
defendant may raise it for the first time on appeal.11
Here, the record includes evidence sufficient to support the trial court's
adjudication. Hill had been notified on two separate occasions that he was
permanently prohibited from entering the mall. Following a valid waiver of his
Miranda rights, Hill admitted that he had entered the mall in violation of the
trespass notices. Because the trespass notices revoked Hill's license to enter
the mall, his entry to the mall was unlawful.
Citing State v. Green12 and State v. R.H.,13 Hill contends that the State
must prove more than the defendant's exclusion from the property; rather, it must
8RCW9A.52.010(5).
9 RCW 9A.52.090(2).
10 State v. Green, 157 Wn. App. 833, 844, 239 P.3d 1130 (2010) (citing City
of Bremerton v. Widell, 146 Wn.2d 561, 570, 51 P.3d 733 (2002)).
11 State v. R.H., 86 Wn. App. 807, 811, 939 P.2d 217 (1997).
12 157 Wn. App. 833, 239 P.3d 1130 (2010).
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No. 70426-5-1 / 5
prove that the exclusion was lawful. In other words, argues Hill, the State must
prove that he stole from mall stores in 2009.
In Green, a school district issued the defendant a trespass notice
prohibiting her from going to her child's elementary school except under very
limited circumstances.14 The district asserted as the basis for the trespass notice
the defendant's alleged disruptive behavior at the school's curriculum night and
disregard of a staff member's instructions in the school parking lot.15 At trial, an
attorney for the school district testified to the reasons for the trespass notice but
admitted he had no personal knowledge of the underlying events.16 Over the
defendant's hearsay objection, the trial court admitted this testimony to explain
the school's reason for issuing the trespass notice but not to prove the alleged
disruptions occurred.17 The defendant testified that she had not been
disruptive.18 Because there was no competent testimony to establish that the
school district had any factual basis for revoking the defendant's statutory right to
access her child's school, this court held that the State failed to prove the
lawfulness of the trespass notice.19 This court reversed the trespass conviction.20
13 86 Wn. App. 807, 939 P.2d 217 (1997).
14 Green, 157 Wn. App. at 838-40.
15 Green, 157 Wn. App. at 842.
16 Green, 157 Wn. App. at 852.
17 Green, 157 Wn. App. at 852.
18 Green, 157 Wn. App. at 842-43.
19 Green, 157 Wn. App. at 852.
No. 70426-5-1 / 6
In R.H., a restaurant manager told several youths skateboarding and
loitering in the restaurant parking lot to leave, but they did not comply.21 R.H.
was not part of this group; he arrived at the restaurant later by skateboard to wait
for a friend and eat at the restaurant.22 At the manager's request, a police officer
told all of the youths, including R.H., that they would be arrested for criminal
trespass if they did not leave.23 R.H. did not believe he was required to leave
because he planned to be a customer at the restaurant.24 When he did not
leave, he was arrested and charged with criminal trespass.25 The evidence at
trial established that R.H. repeatedly told the arresting officer he was waiting for
another customer and that if R.H. had been planning to eat at the restaurant, he
had permission to be on the premises.26 This court held that the State failed to
prove R.H.'s presence was unlawful because he had complied with "'all lawful
conditions imposed on access.'"27
Green and R.H. are distinguishable. To require the State to prove a lawful
basis for the trespass notice, Hill must present "some evidence" that he complied
20 Green, 157 Wn. App. at 853.
21 RJ±, 86 Wn. App. at 808.
22 RJ±, 86 Wn. App. at 808-09.
23 RJ±, 86 Wn. App. at 809.
24 RJ±, 86 Wn. App. at 809.
25R.H.,86Wn.App.at810.
26RJ±, 86 Wn. App. at 811.
27 RJ±, 86 Wn. App. at 812 (quoting RCW 9A.52.090(2)).
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No. 70426-5-1 / 7
with lawful conditions imposed on his access to the mall. The defendants in
Green and R.H. both asserted that they had not engaged in the behavior alleged
as the basis for the trespass notice. In contrast, Hill presented no such evidence.
The burden did not shift to the State to establish a lawful basis for the trespass
notice.
Moreover, Officer Adams testified that Hill "was arrested for theft
and . . . had been identified as stealing from several stores." Hill did not object to
the statement. The record is unclear whether Officer Adams had personal
knowledge of these events. But, by challenging the sufficiency of the State's
evidence, Hill has necessarily admitted the truth of Officer Adams's testimony.
Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found a lawful basis for
the trespass notice.
Confrontation Clause
The confrontation clauses of the state and federal constitutions guarantee
the right of an accused to confront witnesses against him or her.28 Admission of
testimonial hearsay violates a defendant's right of confrontation unless the
witness is unavailable and the defendant had an earlier opportunity to cross-
28 U.S. Const, amend. VI; Wash. Const, art. I, § 22.
No. 70426-5-1 / 8
examine about the statement.29 Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."30 This court reviews confrontation clause
challenges de novo.31
Hill argues that Officer Adams provided testimonial hearsay when he
testified that Hill received a trespass notice in 2009 for stealing from mall stores.
But Hill does not show that Officer Adams repeated any out-of-court statements
of others. Neither the State nor Hill questioned Officer Adams as to the basis of
his knowledge that Hill had stolen merchandise or was arrested. Testimony
based on one's personal knowledge is not hearsay.32 Thus, because Hill does
not show that Officer Adams testified to something about which he lacked
personal knowledge, Hill fails to show a violation of his confrontation right.
Moreover, Hill did not object to the testimony or assert his right to
confrontation below. A defendant must raise a confrontation clause claim at or
29 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed.
2d 177(2004).
30 ER 801(c).
31 State v. Koslowski, 166 Wn.2d 409, 417, 209 P.3d 479 (2009).
32 State v. Simmons, 63 Wn.2d 17, 22, 385 P.2d 389 (1963).
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No. 70426-5-1 / 9
before trial to preserve this issue for appellate review. Hill waived any right of
confrontation by failing to timely assert it.
Affirmed.
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WE CONCUR:
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