State Of Washington v. Eddie Trice ( 2014 )

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGT
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 44808 -4 -II
Respondent,
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
EDDIE LEE TRICE,
Appellant.
MAXA, J. — Eddie Lee Trice appeals the calculation of his offender score for sentencing,
alleging that the trial court erred by ( 1) counting two points for his 1989 Arkansas aggravated
robbery conviction and ( 2) counting one point for his 1996 Florida sexual battery conviction.
We hold that Trice' s Arkansas aggravated robbery conviction was factually comparable to a
conviction in Washington for attempted first degree robbery, and therefore was properly
included in his offender score. But we accept the State' s concession that Trice' s Florida
conviction should not have been included in his offender score. Therefore, we affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
In 2008, a jury found Trice guilty of three counts of first degree child rape, one count of
first degree child molestation, and one count of first degree burglary – all committed on May 8,
2006. At sentencing, for purposes of calculating the offender score, Trice stipulated to and the
trial court found four prior felony convictions. These included a 1989 aggravated robbery
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conviction in.Arkansas and a 1996 sexual battery conviction in Florida. The trial court ruled that
the 1996 Florida conviction for sexual battery was comparable to a Washington crime for
Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) purposes. State v. Trice, noted at 168 Wn. App.
1009, 2012 WL 1699858, at * 4. Therefore, the trial court sentenced Trice as a " two strikes"
offender to life confinement without the possibility of release for the three rape convictions. The
trial court also ruled that the 1989 Arkansas aggravated robbery conviction was not comparable to
a Washington " strike" offense for POAA purposes, but included the conviction in calculating
Trice' s offender score. Trice, 2012 WL 1699858, at * 4, * 14.
Trice appealed, and we accepted the State' s concession that it had failed to prove that the
Florida statute was legally or factually comparable to the Washington statute. Trice, 2012 WL
1699858, at * 11. We did not consider whether the Arkansas aggravated robbery conviction could
be included in the offender score because Trice did not support the argument with legal authority.
Trice, 2012 WL 1699858, at * 14. We remanded for resentencing, but noted that the trial court
was required to determine Trice' s offender score anew and that both parties could submit
additional evidence regarding criminal history. Trice, 2012 WL 1699858, at * 14.
At the resentencing hearing, Trice again stipulated to the four prior felony convictions.
The trial court ruled that the 1989 Arkansas aggravated robbery conviction was comparable to first
degree attempted robbery in Washington and counted that conviction as two points on his offender
score. The trial court ruled that Trice' s 1996 Florida sexual battery conviction was not legally or
factually comparable to a Washington crime, but counted that conviction as a point on Trice' s
offender score anyway because it was a felony.
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Following the trial court' s rulings on comparability, Trice' s calculated offender score was
five: two points for the Arkansas aggravated robbery conviction, one point for the Florida sexual
battery conviction, and two points for the current offense. Trice appeals.
ANALYSIS
Trice argues that the trial court miscalculated his offender score by including his 1989
Arkansas conviction for aggravated robbery and his 1996 Florida conviction for sexual battery in
his offender score. The State argues that the Arkansas conviction was comparable to a
Washington conviction, but concedes that the Florida conviction should not have been included
in the offender score. We hold that the trial court properly included the Arkansas conviction in
calculating Trice' s offender score, and we accept the State' s concession that the Florida
conviction should not have been included.
A. CALCULATING OFFENDER SCORE - OUT -OF -STATE CONVICTIONS
Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981( SRA), chapter 9. 94A RCW, the sentencing
court uses the defendant' s prior convictions to determine an offender score which, along with the
seriousness level of the current offense, establishes his or her presumptive standard sentencing
range. State v. Olsen, 180 Wn.2d 468, 472, 325 P. 3d 187 ( 2014). A defendant' s sentence is
determined based on the law in effect when the defendant committed the current offense. RCW
9. 94A.345; see also In re Pers. Restraint of Carrier, 173 Wn.2d 791, 809, 272 P. 3d 209 ( 2012).
We review a sentencing court' s calculation of an offender score de novo. Olsen, 180
Wn.2d at 472. In addition, we review underlying factual determinations under an abuse of
discretion standard. In re Pers. Restraint ofToledo- Sotelo, 176 Wn.2d 759, 764, 297 P. 3d 512013).
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The State must prove the existence of prior felony convictions used to calculate an
offender score by a preponderance of the evidence. RCW 9. 94A. 500( 1); see also Olsen, 180
Wn.2d at 472. If the convictions are from another jurisdiction, the State also must prove that the
underlying offense would have been a felony under Washington law. RCW 9. 94A.525( 3); State
v. Ford, 137 Wn.2d 472, 480, 973 P. 2d 452 ( 1999). The existence of a prior conviction is a
question of fact. In re Pers. Restraint ofAdolph, 170 Wn.2d 556, 566, 243 P. 3d 540 ( 2010).
Where the defendant' s offenses resulted in out -of -state convictions, RCW 9. 94A.525( 3)
provides that such offenses " shall be classified according to the comparable offense definitions
and sentences provided by Washington law." This statute requires the sentencing court to make
a determination of whether the out -of -state conviction is comparable to a Washington conviction.
State v. Morley, 134 Wn.2d 588, 601, 952 P. 2d 167 ( 1998). Only if the convictions are
comparable can the out -of -state conviction be included in the offender score. State v. Thiefault,
160 Wn.2d 409, 415, 158 P. 3d 580 ( 2007).
Our Supreme Court has adopted a two -part analysis for determining whether an out -of-
state conviction is comparable to a Washington conviction. Olsen, 180 Wn.2d at 472. First, the
comparable —whether the elements
sentencing court determines whether the offenses are legally
of the out -of -state offense are substantially similar to the elements of the Washington offense.
Olsen, 180 Wn.2d at 472 -73. If the elements of the out -of s
- tate offense are broader than the
elements of the Washington offense, they are not legally comparable. Olsen, 180 Wn.2d at 473;
In re Pers. Restraint ofLavery, 154 Wn.2d 249, 258, 111 P. 3d 837 ( 2005).
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Second, even if the offenses are not legally comparable, the sentencing court still can
include the out -of s- tate conviction in the offender score if the offense is factually comparable.
Olsen, 180 Wn.2d at 473. Determining factual comparability involves analyzing whether the
defendant' s conduct underlying the out -of -state conviction would have violated the comparable
Washington statute. Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d at 415. In making this factual comparison, the
sentencing court cannot consider evidence not presented in the out -of -state proceeding. State v.
Arndt, 179 Wn. App 373, 379, 320 P. 3d 104 ( 2014). And the sentencing court may rely on facts
in the out -of s-tate record only if they are admitted, stipulated to, or proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. Olsen, 180 Wn.2d at 474 -45; Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d at 415.
If an out -of s- tate conviction involves an offense that is neither legally or factually
comparable to a Washington offense, the sentencing court may not include the conviction in the
defendant' s offender score. Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d at 415. If a defendant has been erroneously
sentenced, we remand the defendant' s case to the sentencing court for resentencing. State v.
Wilson, 170 Wn.2d 682, 691, 244 P. 3d 950 ( 2010).
B. ARKANSAS AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CONVICTION
Trice argues that his 1989 Arkansas conviction for aggravated robbery is not legally or
factually comparable to any Washington crime, and therefore was improperly included in the
calculation of his offender score. We hold that the elements of Arkansas' aggravated robbery
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statute are not legally comparable to Washington' s attempted first degree robbery offense, but
that the offenses are factually comparable.'
1. Legal Comparability
Trice argues that the Arkansas robbery statute is not legally comparable to attempted first
degree robbery in Washington because the statutes require differing intents. We agree.
At the time Trice committed the offense of aggravated robbery in 1987, 2 Arkansas'
robbery statute stated: " A person commits robbery if, with the purpose of committing a felony or
misdemeanor theft or resisting apprehension immediately thereafter, he employs or threatens to
immediately employ physical force upon another." Former Ark. Code § 5- 12- 102( a) ( 1987).
Washington' s 1987 definition of robbery stated in part: " A person commits robbery when he
unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another or in his presence against his will
by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person or his
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property or the person or property of anyone." Former RCW 9A.56. 190 ( 1975).
1 The State also argues that the Arkansas aggravated robbery offense is legally and factually
comparable to Washington' s crimes of first degree and second degree robbery. We need not
address these arguments because we affirm on an alternate basis.
2 Trice committed the Arkansas crime in 1987 and was convicted in 1989. Under the
comparability analysis, we address the statutes in effect at the time the crime was committed.
See RCW 9. 94A.345.
3
RCW 9A.56. 190 was amended in 2011. However, there were no substantive changes other
than the addition of gender neutral references.
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In 1987, Washington' s attempt statute stated: " A person is guilty of an attempt to
commit a crime if, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which is a substantial
that Former RCW 9A. 28. 020( 1) ( 1981). And to have
step toward the commission of crime."
committed attempted first degree robbery a person must have: ( 1) intended to commit the crime
of (2) unlawfully taking " personal property from the person of another" ( 3) while armed with a
deadly weapon and ( 4) have actually taken a substantial step toward the commission of that
crime. See former RCW 9A.56. 190; former RCW 9A.56. 200 ( 1975); former RCW 9A.28. 020( 1)
1981).
Here, the elements of an Arkansas aggravated robbery conviction are broader than the
elements of a conviction in Washington for attempted first degree robbery. An Arkansas
conviction requires a person to act with " the purpose of committing a felony or misdemeanor
theft." Former Ark. Code § 5- 12- 102( a) ( 1987) ( emphasis added). Conversely, a Washington
conviction requires a person to intend to commit first degree robbery, which in 1987 did not
encompass the category of misdemeanor thefts. See RCW 9A.20. 010( 2)( a) & former RCW
9A.56. 200 ( robbery in the first degree was categorized as a class A felony). As a result, the
elements for Arkansas' aggravated robbery are broader than Washington' s attempted first degree
robbery, and we hold the two offenses are not legally comparable.
2. Factual Comparability
Trice' s conviction based on Arkansas' 1987 aggravated robbery statute still can be
included in his offender score if the facts underlying the conviction are factually comparable to
an attempted first degree robbery conviction in Washington. See Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d at 415.
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The State argues that Trice' s guilty plea admitted sufficient facts for his Arkansas conviction to
constitute a conviction in Washington for attempted first degree robbery. We agree.
The sentencing court may rely on facts in the out -of s- tate record if the defendant has
admitted those facts. Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d at 415. Such an admission may occur in a guilty
plea. Arndt, 179 Wn. App. at 381 ( stating "[ a] sentencing court properly can consider facts
conceded by the defendant in a guilty plea as an admitted fact "); State v. Tewee, 176 Wn. App.
964, 970, 309 P. 3d 791 ( 2013), review denied, 179 Wn.2d 1016 ( 2014) ( considering admission in
guilty plea). Here, Trice voluntarily entered into a guilty plea. Washington courts treat an out-
of-state guilty plea as an admission of a crime' s elements if the convicting state also does. See,
e. g., Olsen, 180 Wn.2d at 478 -479 ( treating California nolo contendere plea as a plea of guilty
for all purposes when California law would have given it such treatment).
In Arkansas courts, a voluntary guilty plea is the defendant' s trial. Graham v. State, 188
S. W. 3d 893, 895 ( Ark. 2004). " A guilty plea is inherently an admission of all of the elements of
the charges and constitutes a waiver of any defense that might have been raised at the trial of the
charges." Standridge v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 563, 423 S. W.3d 677, 681. As a result, Arkansas
case law requires us to treat Trice' s voluntary guilty plea as an admission of the charges in his
1987 charging document.
Count 1 of Trice' s charging document accused him of "unlawfully, feloniously,
employ[ ing] physical force upon BETTY GRIFFIN and CLARENCE GRIFFIN, with the
purpose of a theft while armed with a deadly weapon, to -wit: a shotgun." Clerk' s
committing
Papers at 146. Accordingly, we treat Trice' s guilty plea as an admission that Trice unlawfully
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employed physical force against two people, while armed with a shotgun, with the purpose of
committing a theft. See Standridge, 423 S. W.3d at 681.
These admitted facts are sufficient to show that Trice' s conduct underlying his Arkansas
conviction would have supported a Washington conviction of attempted first degree robbery. By
admitted —at a minimum —that it was his purpose to take
pleading guilty in Arkansas, Trice
personal property from another, i.e. a theft, while armed with a deadly weapon. Because Trice' s
charging document also contended that Trice employed " physical force" upon two people in the
commission of his crime, these facts also support a finding that Trice' s conduct would have
constituted a " substantial step" towards the commission of first degree robbery in Washington.
Therefore, we hold that Trice' s 1989 conviction of aggravated robbery in Arkansas was factually
comparable to a conviction in Washington of attempted first degree robbery.
Because Trice' s 1989 Arkansas conviction for aggravated robbery was factually
comparable to Washington' s crime of attempted first degree robbery, we hold that the trial court
properly included that conviction in Trice' s offender score. We affirm the trial court on this
issue.
C. FLORIDA SEXUAL BATTERY CONVICTION
Trice argues that the 1996 Florida conviction is not comparable to a Washington felony,
and therefore the trial court erred by including that in his offender score. The State agrees that
Trice' s 1996 Florida conviction was not legally or factually comparable to a Washington felony
and concedes that the conviction should not have been included in his offender score. We accept
the State' s concession.
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At Trice' s 2013 sentencing hearing, the State contended that Florida' s sexual battery
statute was legally comparable to Washington' s former third degree rape statute. However, the
elements of the Florida statute are broader than Washington' s former third degree rape statute
because the Florida statute does not impose a requirement that the perpetrator and victim not be
married. Compare former Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794. 001( 3) ( 1996) with former RCW 9A.44. 060( 1)
1979). Accordingly, the Florida conviction is not legally comparable to a Washington third
degree rape conviction. And there were no facts in the record that were admitted, stipulated to,
or proved beyond a reasonable doubt that could establish factual comparability.
Despite finding that Trice' s Florida sexual battery conviction was not legally or factually
comparable to Washington' s definition of third degree rape, the trial court reasoned that because
Trice' s sexual battery conviction was a Florida felony, Trice' s sexual battery conviction should
count as one point in Trice' s offender score. This ruling was incorrect. If an out -of -state
conviction involves an offense that is neither legally nor factually comparable to a Washington
offense, the sentencing court may not include the conviction in the defendant' s offender score.
Olsen, 180 Wn.2d at 478; Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d at 415.
Because Florida' s 1996 sexual battery statute is neither legally nor factually comparable
to a Washington statute, Trice' s conviction under the Florida sexual battery statute cannot be
used in computing his sentencing offender score. Accordingly, we hold that the sentencing court
erred by allocating Trice one point for his 1996 sexual battery conviction and we remand for
resentencing.
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We hold that the trial court did not err in including Trice' s 1989 Arkansas conviction in
his offender score, but did err in including Trice' s 1996 Florida conviction in his offender score.
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2. 06. 040, it is
so ordered.
We concur:
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