Sears, Armaud ( 2018 )


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  •             IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    OF TEXAS
    NO. PD-0264-17
    ARMAUD SEARS, Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    FROM THE NINTH COURT OF APPEALS
    JEFFERSON COUNTY
    K EEL, J., filed a concurring opinion in which W ALKER, J., joined.
    CONCURRING OPINION
    I join the majority opinion. I write separately for two reasons. First, I want to
    point out that under Texas Penal Code Section 7.02(a)(2), a person cannot be a party to an
    offense that he only learned of after the fact because a person cannot act with intent to
    promote or assist the commission of a completed offense. To the extent that Wyatt v.
    State, 
    367 S.W.3d 337
    (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet dism’d), the opinion
    below and other opinions suggest otherwise, they are in error. Second, this kind of
    Sears Concurrence–Page 2
    sufficiency issue could largely be avoided by use of Section 7.02(b), the conspiracy
    theory of party liability.
    Appellant’s jury charge authorized his conviction as a party under Section
    7.02(a)(2). That statute imposes criminal responsibility for conduct of another if, “acting
    with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, [the actor] solicits,
    encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.” It
    requires intentional participation in the crime. Cary v. State, 
    507 S.W.3d 750
    , 758 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2016). A person acts intentionally “when it is his conscious objective or
    desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” T EX. P ENAL C ODE § 6.03(a). Thus,
    to be criminally responsible as a party under Section 7.02(a)(2), a person must act with
    the conscious objective or desire to promote or assist the commission of the offense and
    do something to help its commission. It would be impossible to act with the conscious
    objective or desire to commit an offense or help with its commission if it already had
    been committed.
    The opinion below, however, implies that the evidence could have been sufficient
    to convict Sears as a party to aggravated robbery if he had learned of the use of firearms
    after the fact. Sears v. State, 
    2017 WL 444366
    *10 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, pet. granted)
    (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting lack of evidence “to show that after the
    robbery, Sears became aware that the masked men had used or exhibited firearms during
    the commission of the offense.”). The court relied on Wyatt in which the Fourteenth
    Sears Concurrence–Page 3
    Court of Appeals held that “there must be direct or circumstantial evidence that [the
    defendant] not only participated in the robbery before, while, or after a [deadly weapon]
    was displayed, but did so while being aware that the [deadly weapon] would be, was
    being, or had been, used or exhibited during the 
    offense.” 367 S.W.3d at 341
    (internal
    quotes omitted). That formulation of Section 7.02(a)(2) party liability is mistaken to the
    extent that it suggests that a person can participate in a crime that already has been
    committed and that after-the-fact awareness of the crime will suffice for intentional
    participation. It is true that we look to events occurring before, during or after the
    commission of the offense to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence to show intent,
    
    Cary, 507 S.W.3d at 758
    , but party liability cannot be imposed solely on the basis of
    after-the-fact intent or efforts.
    Moreover, Section 7.02(b), the conspiracy parties theory, obviates the kind of
    sufficiency issue posed in this case because it does not require intent to commit the
    offense actually committed:
    If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another
    felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of
    the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the
    offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one
    that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the
    conspiracy.
    Sections 7.02(b) and 7.02(a)(2) are not mutually exclusive, and a jury charge could
    include both.
    With these comments I join the majority.
    Sears Concurrence–Page 4
    Filed: September 12, 2018
    Do Not Publish
    

Document Info

Docket Number: PD-0264-17

Filed Date: 9/12/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/13/2018