Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison ( 2017 )


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    2017 WI 19
    SUPREME COURT                OF     WISCONSIN
    CASE NO.:                2015AP146
    COMPLETE TITLE:          Wisconsin Carry, Inc. and Thomas Waltz,
    Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners,
    v.
    City of Madison,
    Respondent-Respondent.
    REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
    
    2015 WI App 74
                                   Reported at: 
    365 Wis. 2d 71
    , 
    870 N.W.2d 675
    OPINION FILED:           March 7, 2017
    SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
    ORAL ARGUMENT:           September 9, 2016
    SOURCE OF APPEAL:
    COURT:                Circuit
    COUNTY:               Dane
    JUDGE:                Ellen K. Berz
    JUSTICES:
    CONCURRED:
    DISSENTED:            BRADLEY, A. W., J. joined by Abrahamson, J.
    dissent (Opinion filed).
    NOT PARTICIPATING:
    ATTORNEYS:
    For      the    petitioners-appellants-petitioners,           there    was   a
    brief by John R. Monroe and John Monroe Law PC, Rosewell, GA,
    and oral argument by John Monroe
    For the respondent-respondent, the cause was argued by John
    Walter Strange Jr., assistant city attorney, with whom on the
    brief was Michael P. May, city attorney.
    For the amicus curiae, there was an amicus curiae brief by
    Misha        Tseytlin,        solicitor   general,     Brad   Schimel,       attorney
    general,        and    oral    argument   by   Ryan   J.   Walsh,   Lake    Mills   on
    behalf of the Wisconsin Department of Justice.
    
    2017 WI 19
    NOTICE
    This opinion is subject to further
    editing and modification.   The final
    version will appear in the bound
    volume of the official reports.
    No. 2015AP146
    (L.C. No.   2014CV61)
    STATE OF WISCONSIN                      :             IN SUPREME COURT
    Wisconsin Carry, Inc. and Thomas Waltz,
    Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioner,
    FILED
    v.                                                       MAR 7, 2017
    City of Madison,                                              Diane M. Fremgen
    Clerk of Supreme Court
    Respondent-Respondent-Respondent.
    REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.             Reversed and
    the cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    ¶1    DANIEL KELLY, J.     The question before the court is
    whether the City of Madison (the "City"), through its Transit
    and     Parking   Commission   (the   "Commission"),         may      prohibit
    passengers from bearing weapons on          the   buses    it operates as
    "Metro Transit."1
    1
    This is a review of a published decision of the court of
    appeals, Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 
    2015 WI App 74
    , 
    365 Wis. 2d 71
    , 
    870 N.W.2d 675
    , affirming the circuit
    court's dismissal of a complaint seeking declaratory relief
    against Respondent.
    No.     2015AP146
    I.     BACKGROUND
    ¶2   The Commission adopted a rule on July 12, 2005, to
    address the conduct of passengers using Metro Transit's public
    transportation   services   (the    "Rule").2   The   Rule    identifies
    several types of unacceptable conduct, any one of which subjects
    the offending individual to potential expulsion from city buses.
    As relevant here, the Rule says:
    The following conduct is prohibited in all Metro
    facilities,    including   but    not   limited    to,
    buses . . . . Any individual observed engaging in the
    conduct may be told by a Bus Operator or Supervisor or
    other authorized individual to leave the facilities
    immediately and may be subject to arrest by proper
    authorities[:]
    . . . .
       Bringing any items of a dangerous nature on-
    board   buses   including:   weapons (pistols,
    rifles, knives or swords) . . . .3
    2
    Although the Rule's terms provide the impetus for this
    case, neither party ever identified the operative language we
    are supposed to be considering. Nor does the Rule appear
    anywhere in the record.     Inasmuch as the City does not deny
    enforcing a policy against carrying weapons on city buses, we
    take notice of the Rule as found on the City's website
    (http://www.cityofmadison.com/metro/documents/
    RulesofConduct.pdf) and include relevant portions as Appendix A.
    The same prohibition appears in the City's "Ride Guide"
    (relevant portions of which we reproduce as Appendix B) and we
    take notice of it as well. We may take notice of this material
    pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 902.01(2)(b) & (3) (2013–14).
    3
    Rule at 4; Appendix A at 2. The Ride Guide is similar:
    "For the safety and comfort of all riders: . . . No weapons
    allowed of any kind." Ride Guide at 6; Appendix B at 2.
    2
    No.         2015AP146
    ¶3     Petitioners, Wisconsin Carry, Inc. and Thomas Waltz
    ("Wisconsin Carry"), contacted Metro Transit4 and asked that it
    amend the Rule to harmonize it with 2011 Wisconsin Act 35 ("Act
    35"),      which     (amongst     other        things)    authorized         Wisconsin
    residents to carry concealed weapons upon obtaining the required
    license.         Wisconsin      Carry     also    asserted     that     Wis.        Stat.
    § 66.0409 (2013–14)5 deprived the City of its erstwhile authority
    to   enforce     the   Rule's    prohibition       of    weapons   on       the    City's
    buses.       This    statute,    which    imposes       restrictions        on    certain
    local regulations, states that:
    Except as provided in subs. (3) and (4), no political
    subdivision may enact or enforce an ordinance or adopt
    a resolution that regulates       the . . . possession,
    bearing, [or] transportation . . . of any knife or any
    firearm . . . unless the ordinance or resolution is
    the same as or similar to, and no more stringent than,
    a state statute.
    Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(2).6 We will refer to this statute as the
    "Local Regulation Statute".
    ¶4     Metro Transit declined Wisconsin Carry's invitation to
    amend      the     Rule.     Wisconsin         Carry     subsequently            filed   a
    4
    "Metro Transit" is a sub-unit of the City of Madison.
    See infra part III.B.1.b.
    5
    All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
    the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated.
    6
    This statute defines "political subdivision" as "a city,
    village, town or county." Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(1)(b).
    3
    No.    2015AP146
    complaint7    seeking     a    declaration    that   the   City    of    Madison's
    authority to enforce the Rule has been preempted by state law.
    The City moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to
    state a claim upon which relief could be granted.                    Petitioners
    filed an amended complaint that, as relevant here, identified
    Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances § 3.14(4)(h), as the legislation
    offending the Local Regulation Statute.
    ¶5      That    ordinance     created     the   City's       Department    of
    Transportation,      as   well    as   the   Commission.      It    charges    the
    Commission with the responsibility to
    develop and recommend to the Common Council policies
    on the various elements of transit and parking and
    transit and parking facilities for the purpose of
    providing for the safe, efficient and economical
    movement of persons and goods in the City of Madison
    and   the  metropolitan   area   consistent  with the
    Commission's mission to support the City's distinct
    and quality neighborhoods where people will want to
    live, work, do business, learn and play by providing
    comfortable, safe and efficient transportation.
    Madison,     Wis.,      Gen.     Ordinances     § 3.14(4)(g)       (2007)      (the
    "Ordinance").       In pursuit of those ends, the Ordinance empowers
    the Commission to adopt certain written requirements:
    To accomplish these objectives the Transit and Parking
    Commission   shall  adopt   and  publish   in  writing
    7
    Petitioners styled their pleading as a "petition"; except
    in circumstances not present here, however, our rules identify
    the initial pleading as a "complaint."          See Wis. Stat.
    § 802.01(1). For the sake of uniformity across our opinions, we
    will   refer   to  the   petitioners'  initial  pleading  as   a
    "complaint."
    4
    No.    2015AP146
    standards, warrants, objectives and criteria for
    transit, parking and paratransit operations, services
    and facilities in order that such operations, services
    and   facilities  function   as   an  integrated   and
    coordinated part of the overall adopted transportation
    policy.
    
    Id. It may
    also establish rules and procedures as necessary to
    implement its duties: "The Transit and Parking Commission shall
    be empowered to establish such rules and procedures as may be
    necessary     to    carry   out   the   purpose     and   provisions        of    this
    ordinance."        
    Id., § 3.14(4)(h).
    ¶6     After Wisconsin Carry filed its amended complaint, the
    City renewed its motion to dismiss, which the circuit court8
    granted.     Wisconsin Carry appealed and the court of appeals, in
    a published opinion, affirmed.              We granted Wisconsin Carry's
    petition for review, and now reverse.
    II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶7     A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a
    complaint,     which    a   court   will    grant      only   if    there   are    no
    conditions under which a plaintiff may recover.                    Kaloti Enters.,
    Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 
    2005 WI 111
    , ¶11, 
    283 Wis. 2d 555
    ,
    
    699 N.W.2d 205
    .        Such a motion requires a court to accept all of
    the   complaint's      factual    assertions      as   true,   along       with   the
    reasonable inferences one may take from them.                  
    Id. Resolving a
    8
    The Honorable Ellen K. Berz presiding.
    5
    No.     2015AP146
    motion to dismiss, therefore, involves only a question of law.
    John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
    2007 WI 95
    , ¶12, 
    303 Wis. 2d 34
    , 
    734 N.W.2d 827
    .         We review questions of law de novo;
    we do not defer to the circuit court or the court of appeals,
    but we benefit from their analyses.                State v. Popenhagen, 
    2008 WI 55
    , ¶32, 
    309 Wis. 2d 601
    , 
    749 N.W.2d 611
    .
    III. ANALYSIS
    A.    Constitutional Background
    ¶8     Wisconsin Carry claims the Rule abridges the right to
    possess    weapons    on   the   City's       buses,9    so   we   will    begin   our
    analysis with a brief rehearsal of the nature of the right at
    issue.10   The United States Constitution commands that "[a] well
    regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
    State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
    be infringed."       U.S. Const. amend. II.             More recently (less than
    twenty years ago, in fact), the people of Wisconsin enshrined
    9
    Wisconsin Carry, in its complaint, said it instituted this
    action to "determine the legality of the policies and practices
    of [the City] from prohibiting possession of weapons by persons
    riding Madison Metro buses . . . ."    Wisconsin Carry also says
    that it "[has] an interest in [its] rights to carry firearms on
    Madison Metro buses," and that "[The City's] policies and
    practices prohibit persons from riding Madison Metro buses while
    armed . . . ."
    10
    We address the constitutional provisions regarding the
    right to keep and bear arms to provide background and context
    for our application of the statutes and ordinances Wisconsin
    Carry puts at issue.
    6
    No.     2015AP146
    the   protection      of   this      right       in    our   own    constitution:         "The
    people     have   the   right       to     keep    and    bear     arms     for   security,
    defense, hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose."                                Wis.
    Const. art. I, § 25.
    ¶9     This     is      a    species        of     right      we    denominate        as
    "fundamental," reflecting our understanding that it finds its
    protection, but not its source, in our constitutions.11                                    The
    right's      existence        precedes,          and    is   independent          of,    such
    documents.          Bearing       arms     "is    not    a   right       granted    by    the
    Constitution.         Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that
    instrument for its existence."                    United States v. Cruikshank, 
    92 U.S. 542
    , 553 (1875); see also District of Columbia v. Heller,
    
    554 U.S. 570
    ,     592       (2008)     ("[I]t      has       always    been       widely
    understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth
    Amendments, codified a pre-existing right.                         The very text of the
    11
    See District of Columbia v. Heller, 
    554 U.S. 570
    , 593–94
    (2008) ("By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had
    become fundamental for English subjects.     See [J. Malcolm, To
    Keep and Bear Arms 122–134 (1994)]. Blackstone, whose works, we
    have said, 'constituted the preeminent authority on English law
    for the founding generation,' Alden v. Maine, 
    527 U.S. 706
    , 715
    (1999), cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of
    the fundamental rights of Englishmen.           See   [1 William
    Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 136, 139–140
    (1765)]."); State v. Cole, 
    2003 WI 112
    , ¶20, 
    264 Wis. 2d 520
    ,
    
    605 N.W.2d 328
    (Wilcox, J.) (plurality opinion) ("We find that
    the state constitutional right to bear arms is fundamental.").
    Notwithstanding Heller's careful demonstration that this
    right has been fundamental since before our Nation's founding,
    (continued)
    7
    No.      2015AP146
    Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the
    right        and         declares         only       that       it     'shall           not     be
    infringed . . . .'").
    ¶10     Whether the Second Amendment protects this right only
    when    corporately         exercised       in       the    context    of   a     militia,      as
    opposed      to    a     person     exercising        it     individually,        has    been    a
    source    of       contention.            That   question,          however,     received       an
    authoritative answer in Heller.                            After extensive textual and
    historical         analysis,        the    Supreme          Court    concluded        that    the
    purpose of the amendment is to "guarantee the individual right
    to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation."                                  
    Heller, 544 U.S. at 592
    (emphasis added).                            Wisconsin's protection of
    this    right       does    not     contain      the        grammatical     and       linguistic
    oddities that necessitated Heller's exhaustive treatment of the
    question.          It is, instead, a straightforward declaration of an
    individual right to keep and bear arms for any lawful purpose.
    ¶11     One way in which people in Wisconsin may exercise this
    individual right is by obtaining a license to carry concealed
    weapons.           The    genesis     of    this      opportunity       was     Act     35,   now
    codified (in part) as Wis. Stat. § 175.60.                            Upon obtaining such
    a   license,        the    "licensee        or . . . out-of-state               licensee      may
    the dissent says it is something less.                         But it does not say when
    or how it was demoted.
    8
    No.       2015AP146
    carry      a    concealed   weapon12       anywhere      in    this   state      except        as
    provided under subs. (15m) and (16) and ss. 943.13(1m)(c) and
    948.605(2)(b)1r."           Wis. Stat. § 175.60(2g).                  We will refer to
    this statute as the "Concealed-Carry Statute".
    ¶12       Act   35    also      eliminated         the     prohibition         against
    carrying a loaded handgun in a vehicle.                       The statutory provision
    governing the interaction between weapons and vehicles now says:
    "Except as provided in sub. (4), no person may place, possess,
    or transport a firearm . . . in or on a vehicle, unless one of
    the   following       applies:       1.    The     firearm     is   unloaded        or    is    a
    handgun."         Wis. Stat. § 167.31(2)(b).                   We will refer to this
    statute as the "Vehicle Statute."                   A "firearm" is "a weapon that
    acts by force of gunpowder."                     Wis. Stat. § 167.31(1)(c).                For
    the purpose of this statute, "vehicle" means "every device in,
    upon,      or    by   which    any        person    or   property         is   or    may       be
    transported or drawn upon a highway, except railroad trains."
    Wis. Stat. §§ 167.31(1)(h), 340.01(74).
    ¶13       With that brief refresher, we turn now to the Rule.
    B.   Effect of the Local Regulation Statute
    ¶14       Wisconsin     Carry       tells     us   that       the    City's        Common
    Council, and all of its subordinate entities, may regulate the
    12
    A "weapon" is "a handgun, an electric weapon, as defined
    in   s.   941.295(1c)(a),  or  a   billy  club."     Wis.  Stat.
    § 175.60(1)(j).
    9
    No.       2015AP146
    possession,       bearing,      and    transportation            of   arms      only     to    the
    extent allowed by the Local Regulation Statute.                             One of the key
    limitations        imposed      by     that     statute,         they       say,       is     that
    regulations       on     this   subject        may    be    no    more      stringent         than
    analogous state statutes.              They argue that, inasmuch as the Rule
    entirely forbids the possession, bearing, and transportation of
    arms on city buses, the City may no longer enforce it because
    there is no state statute so stringent.
    ¶15    The City responds that the Local Regulation Statute
    has nothing to say about the Rule.                     First, it asserts that the
    Rule is no more stringent than state statutes.                               Additionally,
    because     it    owns    the    buses,       the    City   says      it    may    keep       them
    weapon-free just as readily as a private individual may prohibit
    weapons     in    his    own    vehicle.        Second,      even      if    it    were       more
    stringent        than    state       statutes,        the    City        says      the      Local
    Regulation       Statute's       plain        terms    express        the    legislature's
    decision to leave municipal regulations like the Rule alone.
    The   statute      applies      only     to    "political         subdivisions,"            which
    (according to the internal definitions) comprise only cities,
    villages, towns and counties.                  Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(1)(b).                     The
    Commission is none of those and so, according to the City, it is
    10
    No.     2015AP146
    unencumbered by the statute.13           Further, the statute's strictures
    apply      to    a    political     subdivision's             "ordinances"        and
    "resolutions."       Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(2).           The City says a "rule"
    is different from ordinances and resolutions, and therefore lies
    beyond the statute's reach.
    ¶16    Resolving    this    case    will     therefore    require     that   we
    determine whether the Local Regulation Statute applies to the
    Commission and the rules it adopts, and (if so) whether the Rule
    is impermissibly more stringent than analogous state statutes.14
    We must also compare the Rule to the Concealed-Carry Statute to
    determine whether the latter preempts the former.
    1.     Applicability to the Commission
    ¶17    We   will    begin    with        whether   the    Local     Regulation
    Statute affects rules adopted by the Commission.                       If it does
    not, there is no need to determine whether the Rule is more
    stringent than a state statute.
    13
    The City made this argument explicitly before the Circuit
    Court.   Here, it is an implicit part of its argument that the
    Local Regulation Statute does not apply because it addresses
    only ordinances and resolutions (which are the legislative
    devices of political subdivisions).
    14
    We express no opinion on the City's authority to regulate
    the possession of weapons on its buses prior to enactment of the
    Local Regulation Statute, the Concealed-Carry Statute, and the
    current version of the Vehicle Statute.
    11
    No.     2015AP146
    ¶18    With its frequent reference to the "plain text" of the
    Local Regulation Statute, the City urges us (sotto voce, to be
    sure) to engage the "plain meaning" rule as we consider the
    statute's relationship to the Commission and its Rule.                                 This
    axiom, which is the bedrock of the judiciary's methodology, says
    that "[i]f the plain meaning of the statute is clear, a court
    need    not    look    to    rules    of     statutory     construction         or    other
    extrinsic aids.            Instead, a court should simply apply the clear
    meaning of the statute to the facts before it."                           UFE Inc. v.
    Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 
    201 Wis. 2d 274
    , 281–82, 
    548 N.W.2d 57
    (1996) (citation omitted).
    ¶19    We must, however, keep in mind that this axiom does
    not reduce the judicial function to mechanically comparing the
    words of a statute to the name given a legislative enactment, or
    the    body    enacting      it.      We    are   not    merely      arbiters    of    word
    choice.       If we were, we would need do nothing more than confirm
    that    "rule"        is     a     word     different      from      "ordinance"        and
    "resolution," and that "commission" is etymologically distinct
    from "city," "village," "town," and "county."
    ¶20    It is, instead, the "plain meaning" of a statute we
    must    apply.        We    find     that    meaning      in   the    statute's       text,
    context, and structure: "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with
    the language of the statute.' . . .                     [It] is interpreted in the
    context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a
    12
    No.   2015AP146
    whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
    related statutes . . . ."                 State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for
    Dane Cty., 
    2004 WI 58
    , ¶¶45-46, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , 
    681 N.W.2d 110
    (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 
    2000 WI 76
    , ¶43, 
    236 Wis. 2d 211
    ,
    
    612 N.W.2d 659
    ).            We examine the statute's contextualized words,
    put them into operation, and observe the results to ensure we do
    not arrive at an unreasonable or absurd conclusion.                               
    Id., ¶46 ("[S]tatutory
    language is interpreted . . . reasonably, to avoid
    absurd or unreasonable results.").15                     Here, the process requires
    us to survey how a city's legislative authority is affected by a
    statute forbidding it from enacting or enforcing an ordinance or
    resolution       on    a    given    subject.       If    a   city's   governing        body
    thereby loses authority to legislate on that subject, we must
    then        consider       whether    a    city's    sub-unit         can     nonetheless
    legislate       on     that   subject      when   authority      is    denied      to    the
    governing body itself.
    a.     Municipal Authority
    ¶21     It is true, and ever has been, that cities exercise
    only such authority as they receive from our constitution and
    15
    The dissent faults us for emphasizing that the "plain
    meaning" doctrine focuses on the statute's meaning.     We think
    discovering the meaning of a statute is not just a worthy
    endeavor, but also an exhaustive recitation of the judiciary's
    authority when interpreting a statute.     We find the statute's
    meaning in its words, context, and interaction with closely-
    related statutes, just as Kalal describes.
    13
    No.         2015AP146
    statutes.       "[C]ities are creatures of the state legislature that
    have    no     inherent    right    of   self-government      beyond      the    powers
    expressly granted to them."              Black v. City of Milwaukee, 
    2016 WI 47
    ,     ¶23,    
    369 Wis. 2d 272
    ,      
    882 N.W.2d 333
       (quoting         Madison
    Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 
    2014 WI 99
    , ¶89, 
    358 Wis. 2d 1
    , 
    851 N.W.2d 337
    (citing Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 
    222 Wis. 58
    ,
    72–73, 
    267 N.W. 25
    (1936) (citing City of Trenton v. New Jersey,
    
    262 U.S. 182
    , 187 (1923)))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    And if a statute may confer authority on a city, a statute may
    take it away.         City of 
    Trenton, 262 U.S. at 187
    ("A municipality
    is merely a department of the state, and the state may withhold,
    grant, or withdraw power and privileges as it sees fit.").
    ¶22     One necessary corollary to this principle is that a
    city may not create authority ex nihilo, either for itself or
    its divisions.          Were it otherwise, the ability of a constitution
    and legislature to control a city's quantum of authority would
    come to naught——upon the loss of some measure of authority, an
    enterprising city could simply declare it reinstated.                       But this
    is not part of a city's remit, and so there is no mechanism by
    which    it     may   regain      withdrawn     authority   but   by   legislative
    decree or constitutional amendment.
    ¶23     In light of these principles, we must determine what
    the Local Regulation Statute means when it says "no political
    subdivision       may     enact    or    enforce   an   ordinance      or   adopt      a
    14
    No.     2015AP146
    resolution          that      regulates        the . . . possession,         bearing,       [or]
    transportation . . . of any knife or any firearm . . . ."                                   Wis.
    Stat. § 66.0409(2).                 The City acknowledges that this provision
    eliminates the common council's authority to enact or enforce an
    ordinance or resolution on the identified subject (unless it
    falls within the saving clause).                        Therefore, the question (at
    this        stage     of      the     analysis)        is     whether      ordinances       and
    resolutions          comprise        a    municipal         governing      body's    complete
    legislative authority.                   If they do, then losing the ability to
    adopt       an    ordinance         or    resolution         on   a   particular      subject
    represents the complete withdrawal of authority to legislate on
    that subject.            And if the City has no legislative authority with
    respect to that subject, it necessarily has nothing to delegate
    to its divisions.16
    ¶24       With      respect        to     the    nature        of   ordinances        and
    resolutions,            the    City      directs       our    attention      to     Cross     v.
    Soderbeck, 
    94 Wis. 2d 331
    , 
    288 N.W.2d 779
    (1980).                                   There, we
    said:
    16
    This proposition follows by necessary implication from
    the fact that municipalities have no authority but what they are
    given.   Willow Creek Ranch, LLC v. Town of Shelby, 
    2000 WI 56
    ,
    ¶17, 
    235 Wis. 2d 409
    , 
    611 N.W.2d 693
    (citing First Wis. Nat'l
    Bank of Milwaukee v. Town of Catawba, 
    183 Wis. 220
    , 224, 
    197 N.W. 1013
    (1924) ("Municipal bodies have only such powers as are
    expressly conferred upon them by the legislature or are
    necessarily implied from the powers conferred.")).
    15
    No.      2015AP146
    A municipal ordinance or by-law is a regulation of a
    general, permanent nature, enacted by the governing
    council   of   a   municipal   corporation. . . .      A
    resolution, or order as it is sometimes called, is an
    informal enactment of a temporary nature, providing
    for   the  disposition   of  a    particular  piece   of
    administrative      business     of      a     municipal
    corporation. . . .    And it has been held that even
    where the statute or municipal charter requires the
    municipality to act by ordinance, if a resolution is
    passed in the manner and with the statutory formality
    required in the enactment of an ordinance, it will be
    binding and effective as an ordinance.
    
    Id. at 342
    (citing Wis. Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Ft. Atkinson,
    
    193 Wis. 232
    , 243-44, 
    213 N.W. 873
    (quoting 19 Ruling Case Law
    895, § 194 (1917)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    ¶25    From this we may derive three principles useful to our
    inquiry.     First, ordinances are municipal legislative devices,
    formally enacted, that address general subjects in a permanent
    fashion.        Second,       resolutions     are    those    informal       municipal
    legislative       acts         that    address        particular         pieces      of
    administrative business in a temporary fashion.                     And third, the
    label   given    to    a   legislative      device    is     not   dispositive——one
    identifies the device's taxonomy functionally.
    ¶26    The        scope     of    legislative       activity         covered     by
    ordinances    and     resolutions,     therefore,       extends     to      formal   and
    informal     enactments        that   address       matters    both      general     and
    specific, in a manner meant to be either temporary or permanent,
    and which can be characterized as administrative or otherwise.
    And we will treat a municipality's legislative device as an
    16
    No.   2015AP146
    ordinance       or   resolution,   regardless      of    how    it   may   be
    denominated, so long as it functions within the scope of this
    definition.17
    ¶27   It is apparent from this that there is no legislative
    action a municipality could take, either in form or function,
    that    would    not    come   within    the   ambit    of   "ordinance"   or
    "resolution."        Consequently, if a statute removes the authority
    of a municipality's governing body to adopt an ordinance or
    resolution on a particular subject, the governing body loses all
    legislative authority on that subject.
    17
    This generality comports well with the dictionary
    definition of "ordinance":    "An authoritative law or decree;
    specif., a municipal regulation, esp. one that forbids or
    restricts an activity." Ordinance, Black's Law Dictionary (10th
    ed. 2014). It also compares favorably with Doe v. Medford Sch.
    Dist. 549C, 
    221 P.3d 787
    (Or. App. 2009), a case the City cited
    in its discussion about the nature of ordinances.    There, the
    court said:
    The term "ordinance," as it is used in ordinary
    communications, has both a narrow and a broader
    meaning. [In its narrow meaning] [i]t can refer to "a
    public   enactment,   rule,   or  law   promulgated by
    governmental   authority:   as . . . a  local   law or
    regulation enacted by a city council or other similar
    body under powers delegated to it by the state." . . .
    The word "ordinance" also has a broader common
    meaning, however. At least in some contexts, the term
    may not be limited to enactments of law but, more
    generally   to   an  "established   rule,   policy, or
    practice."
    
    Id. at 793
    (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary
    1588 (unabridged ed. 1993)).
    17
    No.        2015AP146
    ¶28     Thus,      the    plain        meaning          of    the       Local       Regulation
    Statute      is      that      the    legislature           withdrew           from     the      City's
    governing body all authority to legislate on the subjects it
    identifies,           including             the         "possession,            bearing,             [or]
    transportation . . . of               any     knife       or     any     firearm"          unless     the
    legislation is "the same as or similar to, and no more stringent
    than, a state statute."                     Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(2).                        Because a
    municipality cannot delegate what it does not have, the City is
    entirely       powerless         to    authorize           any      of       its      sub-units        to
    legislate on this subject.18
    ¶29     The    City      notes,       and        properly       so,     that        it   has   no
    ordinance         addressing,          in     explicit           terms,        the      possession,
    bearing,       or    transportation           of        knives      or   firearms.              In    the
    absence of such an ordinance, the City says there is nothing on
    which the Local Regulation Statute may operate.
    ¶30     But       the    City        itself        necessarily              identifies         the
    Ordinance as the legislation that authorizes the regulation of
    firearms.         This is so because the City must appeal to it for the
    Rule's      efficacy.           Unless      the     Commission           has    some        source     of
    authority independent of the City, its authority to adopt the
    Rule    must      flow    from       the    City    to     the      Commission         through        the
    Ordinance.          By claiming the Rule is authoritative, the City is
    18
    See supra n.16.
    18
    No.      2015AP146
    itself   telling        us    that   the    Ordinance         contains       a     firearms-
    regulating grant of authority.                   And that is how the Ordinance
    comes within the Local Regulation Statute's purview.
    ¶31     Put    another       way,      the   City        may    not    simultaneously
    maintain    that       the    Commission     has       the    authority      to     regulate
    firearms while denying that any of its ordinances authorize the
    regulation of firearms.                 Cities may, and often do, delegate
    authority to their sub-units without explicitly describing each
    and every subject the sub-unit may address.                               The broader the
    grant of authority, the more general the language.                           That is true
    here——the Ordinance is a very generalized grant of authority to
    the Commission to address mass transit issues.
    ¶32     But    the       generalization       does       not    mean    the    grant   of
    authority to regulate firearms is not there; it just means it is
    not explicit.          It is the Ordinance's implicit grant of firearm-
    regulating    authority         on   which       the    Local       Regulation       Statute
    performs its work.             And that work consists of restricting the
    Ordinance's grant of firearm-regulating authority.                                So, if the
    Commission       has     the     authority        to     regulate          firearms      more
    stringently than state statutes, it must find the source of that
    authority somewhere other than the City.
    b.      Potential Alternative Sources of Commission Authority
    ¶33     To     discover       the    full      scope       of    the     Commission's
    authority, we must determine what manner of entity it is, and
    19
    No.     2015AP146
    whether it draws regulatory authority from some source other
    than the City.           The City's ordinances say a "commission" is "a
    Sub-unit      of     the       City."        Madison,         Wis.,    Gen.        Ordinances
    § 33.01(3)(c).           The City creates "standing" sub-units (which are
    those      meant    to     exist    permanently)         by    ordinance.            See    
    id. § 33.01(3)(e)
    & (4)(b).                 The Ordinance makes the Commission a
    standing sub-unit.
    ¶34     The Ordinance provides that the Commission is a public
    utility     within       the     meaning    of    Wis.       Stat.    § 66.0805.           This
    statute       grants        municipalities             the     authority       to      create
    commissions        to    govern     public     utilities,        but    it    contains          no
    independent        grant    of     authority      to    such    commissions.19             As    a
    public utility, the Commission exercises its authority under the
    supervision of the City: "The board of commissioners, under the
    general control and supervision of the governing body, shall be
    responsible for the entire management of and shall supervise the
    operation of the utility."                 Wis. Stat. § 66.0805(1).                 The City
    exercises      its        supervisory        authority         via     ordinance:          "The
    governing body shall exercise general control and supervision of
    the commission by enacting ordinances governing the commission's
    operation."        
    Id. 19 "[T]he
    governing body of a city shall . . . provide for
    the   nonpartisan management of a municipal public utility by
    (continued)
    20
    No.       2015AP146
    ¶35   The Ordinance says the Commission is also a transit
    commission within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 66.1021.                                This
    section      grants     municipalities             the    authority         to    create
    transportation systems as well as commissions to govern them: "A
    city . . . may        enact       an     ordinance       for   the     establishment,
    maintenance    and     operation         of    a   comprehensive       unified      local
    transportation        system . . . .                 'Transit        commission'         or
    'commission' means the local transit commission created under
    this section."        Wis. Stat. § 66.1021(1), (3)(b).                   The statute
    does not directly grant the Commission any authority, but it
    does   identify      some    of    the    authority      the   Commission        must   be
    furnished by the municipality's enacting ordinance,20                            none of
    which is at issue here.
    ¶36   The   Ordinance        contains       its   own   description       of     the
    authority the Commission is to exercise.                       So, for example, it
    has the authority to recommend transit-related policies to the
    common council for its consideration: "The Transit and Parking
    Commission    shall     make       recommendations        to   the    Common     Council
    regarding policies on all transit and parking matters . . . ."
    Madison,     Wis.,    Gen.        Ordinances       § 3.14(4)(a);      see    also       
    id. creating a
    commission under this section."           Wis. Stat.
    § 66.0805(1).
    20
    For example, the statute says a transit commission may
    appoint certain employees, conduct hearings, hold regular
    meetings, adopt a seal, etc. Wis. Stat. § 66.1021(6) & (7).
    21
    No.        2015AP146
    § 3.14(4)(g) ("It shall be the general duty of the Transit and
    Parking      Commission     to    develop,       and    recommend         to    the    Common
    Council policies on the various elements of transit and parking
    and transit and parking facilities for the purpose of providing
    for the safe, efficient and economical movement of persons and
    goods     in     the      City      of     Madison       and        the        metropolitan
    area . . . .").
    ¶37     Finally,     the        Commission        may     adopt          "standards,
    warrants,      objectives        and     criteria      for    transit,         parking     and
    paratransit      operations"       pursuant       to    its    authority         under     the
    Ordinance.       
    Id. It may
    also establish rules and procedures as
    necessary to implement its duties.                       
    Id. § 3.14(4)(h).
                 With
    respect to transit, the Commission's duty is to "provide overall
    management, operation and control of the assets of the City of
    Madison transit and paratransit transportation system to ensure
    that    it     functions     as    an      integrated        part    of        the    overall
    transportation system."            
    Id. § 3.14(4)(h)2.
    ¶38     The City has not identified, and we have not found,
    any authority for the Commission's existence apart from what we
    just described.        It is apparent from these provisions that the
    Commission is entirely a creature of the City and exercises only
    that amount and type of authority it receives from the City.
    The Ordinance, by its express terms, created the Commission and
    22
    No.    2015AP146
    infused      it    with   enumerated        responsibilities.21           Although     the
    statutes relating to public utilities and transit commissions
    describe certain attributes the governing commissions must have,
    they    do   not,    by     their    own    force,    call    the    Commission      into
    existence or endow it with authority independent of what they
    confer on the City.            Instead, they simply grant municipalities
    the authority to create the commissions in the manner and with
    the attributes the statutes prescribe.
    ¶39    The    Commission       has    no     authority      but   for    what   it
    received      from    the    City,    and     the    City    has    no   authority     to
    legislate contrary to the boundaries established by the Local
    Regulation        Statute.      This       means    that    if     the   Rule   is   more
    stringent than a state statute, then to that extent the City no
    longer has authority to enforce it.
    c.     Purpose of the Local Regulation Statute
    ¶40    Before we measure the Rule's stringency, we pause to
    address the City's argument that this result would frustrate the
    21
    Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances § 3.14(4)(a) ("There is
    hereby created a Transit and Parking Commission charged with the
    duties and responsibilities contained herein.").
    23
    No.   2015AP146
    statute's purpose.22      The City speculates that the legislature
    wished to limit a city's authority to regulate firearms, but
    only when the city's governing body acts qua governing body.           It
    says    the   statute's   plain   reference   to   only   ordinances   and
    resolutions demonstrates that the legislature intended to leave
    intact a municipal sub-unit's authority to regulate firearms.23
    22
    We may consider the statute's purpose while conducting a
    "plain meaning" analysis, so long as we refer only to the
    statute's text and structure.   State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct.
    for Dane Cty., 
    2004 WI 58
    , ¶48, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , 
    681 N.W.2d 110
    ("[S]cope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a
    plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute as long
    as the scope, context, and purpose are ascertainable from the
    text and structure of the statute itself, rather than extrinsic
    sources, such as legislative history.").
    23
    The dissent wishes we had consulted legislative history
    on this question, and suggests we did not do so because it would
    contradict our interpretation of the Local Regulation Statute.
    We did not address legislative history for two reasons. First,
    we had no difficulty finding the statute's meaning without it
    (as Kalal contemplates).    And second, the history the dissent
    identified has no instructive merit.    The two failed municipal
    gun-control   referenda  mentioned   in   State   v.   Cole,   
    264 Wis. 2d 520
    ,   ¶¶62–63  (Prosser,   J.,   concurring),   and   the
    statements of one assemblyman, might be able to tell us what
    motivated the legislature to enact the Local Regulation Statute.
    But motivation and meaning are not necessarily the same thing.
    Even if every legislator publicly announced the intent behind
    the way he or she voted, that knowledge would give us no aid in
    understanding the Local Regulation Statute.          We find the
    legislature's intent in the words it adopts, not the expressed
    (or unexpressed) subjective reasons the 132 legislators had for
    adopting those words.    Kalal, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , ¶52.      Cherry-
    picking the statements of one such legislator, as the dissent
    does, just gives us 1/132 of a body of information that tells us
    nothing about the meaning of the statute.
    24
    No.        2015AP146
    ¶41   In the City's reading of the statute, the legislature
    made    a    conscious         decision   to    withdraw     firearms-regulating
    authority      from       a     municipality's     democratically-accountable
    governing      body,          while   leaving     that      authority           entirely
    undiminished            when      exercised      by        the       municipality's
    democratically-unaccountable sub-units.24                  The only explanation
    offered for why the legislature would trust firearms-regulating
    authority to a municipal sub-unit, but not the governing body to
    which it owes its existence and power, is that the latter's
    legislative authority is broader than that of the former.                             The
    implication        is    that     municipalities      are        eager     to    impose
    aggressive firearms regulations, and that impulse must be curbed
    by ensuring that any such regulations could be adopted                                only
    piecemeal, within the limited portfolio of each democratically-
    unaccountable sub-unit.
    ¶42   But    if    the    City's   speculation       is    correct,       if   the
    legislature really did adopt the Local Regulation Statute to
    restrict the scope of any given municipal firearms regulation,
    24
    The Commission's members are appointed, not elected: "The
    Transit and Parking Commission shall consist of nine (9) voting
    members to serve without compensation consisting of three (3)
    members of the Common Council, six (6) citizens and two (2)
    alternates . . . at least one (1) of whom shall be a citizen."
    Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances § 3.14(4)(b). "Citizen members of
    the Transit and Parking Commission shall be appointed by the
    Mayor subject to confirmation by the Common Council."        
    Id. § 3.14(4)(d).
    25
    No.     2015AP146
    it chose a singularly ineffective means of doing so.                               It does
    not     require     mastery       of      three-dimensional          chess,      nor     even
    checkers, to devise a strategy for defeating such an objective.
    ¶43     Deprived of native authority to regulate firearms, a
    city might simply create a "public-safety commission" with a
    mandate      to    secure   the     public's         well-being      in    all   publicly-
    accessible spaces. The enabling ordinance would make no specific
    reference to firearms, so (under the City's theory) it would
    escape the Local Regulation Statute's attention.                              The public-
    safety commission would then adopt the same city-wide firearms
    regulation the city's governing body could not itself adopt.
    The scope of the resulting regulation would not have suffered
    the least restriction by virtue of the Local Regulation Statute.
    Alternatively,        a   municipality          bent       on   adopting   comprehensive
    firearms regulations could simply create a number of limited-
    portfolio sub-units whose cumulative scope of authority would
    equal that of the municipality.                     The sub-units could then adopt
    firearms regulations that would differ in no meaningful way from
    a   single    regulation      adopted          by    the    municipality's        governing
    body.        Functionally,         this    imputed         purpose   would       leave    the
    statute with neither meaning nor effect.
    ¶44     In    light     of       these        obvious     workarounds,       we     are
    unwilling to join the City's speculation that the legislature
    chose to entrust firearms-regulating authority to municipal sub-
    26
    No.     2015AP146
    units,    but     not   their   democratically-accountable       progenitors.25
    If the legislature actually intended such an easily thwarted
    purpose, it gave us no textual clues by which to discern it.
    ¶45    Finally, the City asserts that if the legislature had
    intended     to     include     "rules"     in   the   realm    of     prohibited
    legislative acts, it would have said so.               It observes that other
    states, when they restricted local firearms regulations, listed
    other types of legislative devices in their prohibitions.                     For
    instance, it notes that Idaho's statute applies to "any law,
    rule, regulation, or ordinance."                 Idaho Code Ann. § 18-3302J
    (2016).26       And Florida's statute refers not just to ordinances,
    but also administrative regulations and rules.                 Fla. Stat. Ann.
    25
    The City argued that this conclusion would "deprive the
    people of Wisconsin [of] the right to democratically decide if
    public buses are an appropriate place for loaded handguns."
    Actually, it protects that very thing. The people of Wisconsin,
    through their duly-elected legislators, have had their say on
    this issue.    Allowing an unelected body like the Commission to
    overrule   the   people's  decision  would   not   protect their
    democratically-expressed will, it would thwart it.
    26
    The relevant portion of the Idaho statute says:
    (2) Except as expressly authorized by state statute,
    no county, city, agency, board or any other political
    subdivision of this state may adopt or enforce any
    law, rule, regulation, or ordinance which regulates in
    any manner the sale, acquisition, transfer, ownership,
    possession, transportation, carrying or storage of
    firearms or any element relating to firearms and
    components thereof, including ammunition.
    Idaho Code Ann. § 18-3302J(2) (2016).
    27
    No.    2015AP146
    § 790.33 (West 2007 & Supp. 2016).27        And Kansas's statute covers
    "administrative actions."        Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-16,124 (Supp.
    2015).28    And so on. But if the label of a legislative act is
    dispositive, then Idaho's local communities are vulnerable to
    local "policies" regulating firearms, Florida would presumably
    allow      "resolutions"      restricting    firearms,    and    Kansas
    (apparently) is willing to countenance local regulations in the
    form of an     "ordinance."      Here in Wisconsin, the     legislature
    27
    The relevant portion of the Florida Statute says:
    (1) Preemption.--Except as expressly provided by the
    State Constitution or general law, the Legislature
    hereby declares that it is occupying the whole field
    of regulation of firearms and ammunition, including
    the purchase, sale, transfer, taxation, manufacture,
    ownership, possession, storage, and transportation
    thereof, to the exclusion of all existing and future
    county, city, town, or municipal ordinances or any
    administrative regulations or rules adopted by local
    or state government relating thereto. Any such
    existing ordinances, rules, or regulations are hereby
    declared null and void.
    Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.33(1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2016).
    28
    The relevant portion of the Kansas statute says:
    (a) No city or county shall adopt or enforce any
    ordinance, resolution or regulation, and no agent of
    any city or county shall take any administrative
    action, governing the requirement of fees, licenses or
    permits for, the commerce in or the sale, purchase,
    transfer, ownership, storage, carrying, transporting
    or taxation of firearms or ammunition, or any
    component or combination thereof.
    Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-16,124(a) (Supp. 2015).
    28
    No.    2015AP146
    would       need   to        be     even     more    cognizant         of     the    labels    a
    municipality might attach to its legislation: The Ordinance, for
    example,      authorizes            the    Commission         to    adopt,    amongst     other
    things, rules, procedures, standards, warrants, and objectives.
    ¶46    Accepting            the     City's    argument         would     require       the
    legislature to list every possible label for a legislative act
    before we could conclude that its intention was to withdraw from
    a municipality the authority to regulate a particular subject.
    And it       would further require that the legislature amend the
    statute every time a municipality conceived of a new label for
    its legislative acts.                   But this is law-making as comedy, with a
    hapless      legislature           chasing    about       a   wily    municipality      as     it
    first enacts an ordinance on a forbidden subject, and then a
    policy, then a rule, then a standard, and on and on until one of
    them    wearies         of        the     pursuit    or       the    other     exhausts       the
    thesaurus.29       The City advocated its interests in a competent and
    29
    As an alternative to listing a multitude of labels for
    prohibited legislation, some states instead use a catch-all
    phrase to describe the method by which the legislative act is
    adopted.   Arkansas, for example, states that local governments
    "shall not enact any ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or
    regulate in any other manner" the identified subjects.      Ark.
    Code. Ann. § 14-16-504(b)(1)(A) (2013) (emphasis added). Kansas,
    on the other hand, forbids local "administrative action" related
    to firearms.    Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-16,124 (Supp. 2015).    But
    this does not end the lexical chase, it just shifts it to the
    label given to the municipal action that produces the
    legislation.
    29
    No.     2015AP146
    professional manner, so we are confident it does not really
    intend    that   we    understand   the      legislative   process    in    this
    fashion.30    Thus, in the absence of any discernible reason to do
    so, we will not.31
    2.    Stringency
    ¶47     Because    we   conclude     that   the   City——acting        either
    through its governing body or sub-units——has no authority to
    "regulate[] the . . . possession, bearing, [or] transportation
    . . . of any knife or any firearm . . . unless the ordinance or
    resolution is the same as or similar to, and no more stringent
    than, a state statute,"32 we must now determine whether the Rule
    30
    Under the guise of "judicial restraint," however, this is
    how the dissent would have us understand the Local Regulation
    Statute. Its two-sentence statutory analysis comprises, in its
    entirety, this:   "The bus rule is neither an 'ordinance' nor a
    'resolution,' and it was not enacted by the city. That should be
    the end of the analysis."      Dissent at ¶73.     But "judicial
    restraint" does not mean superficial or incomplete. The dissent
    is curiously incurious about whether municipalities have
    legislative authority outside of "ordinances" and "resolutions."
    Instead, without analysis, it simply assumes they do, and
    further assumes the Commission's authority to adopt the Rule
    flows from that phantom authority.      While that analysis is
    certainly original, it has nothing to do with judicial
    restraint.
    31
    Kalal, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , ¶46 ("[S]tatutory language is
    interpreted . . . reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable
    results.").
    32
    Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(2).
    30
    No.     2015AP146
    satisfies     the      stringency      standard.33         It      is     the     City's
    prerogative      to    choose    the   legislation       against    which       we   will
    compare the Rule (at least initially), and it has chosen the
    Vehicle Statute.
    ¶48     The       Vehicle     Statute     governs      the     safe       use     and
    transportation of firearms.            The specific portion of the statute
    the City recommends for our consideration prohibits the placing,
    possession, or transportation of a firearm in a vehicle unless
    it is unloaded or a handgun.             Wis. Stat. § 167.31(2)(b)1.                 That
    is to say, the Vehicle Statute allows a person to carry a loaded
    handgun,    or    an   unloaded     firearm    of    a   different        type,      in   a
    vehicle.      A vehicle (for purposes of this statute) includes
    "every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or
    may be transported or drawn upon a highway,                        except railroad
    trains,"    as    well    as     snowmobiles,       all-terrain         vehicles      and
    electric      personal          assistive     mobility          devices.              
    Id. §§ 167.31(1)(h),
    340.01(74).            We trust it is beyond cavil that a
    bus is a vehicle within the scope of this definition.
    33
    The Local Regulation Statute authorizes local legislation
    so long as it is both the "same as or similar to" and "no more
    stringent than" a state statute.        Because the stringency
    analysis resolves this matter, we need not inquire into whether
    the Rule or Ordinance is the same as or similar to a state
    statute.
    31
    No.     2015AP146
    ¶49   So in choosing the Vehicle Statute for comparison, the
    City asserts that a total ban on carrying any firearm on a bus
    is no more stringent than a statute that bans only loaded non-
    handguns     on    a   bus.    These     provisions    occupy      almost   perfect
    legislative antipodes.          Unless the City has a method by which it
    can explain how the distance between the two is more apparent
    than   real,      we   must   conclude    the   Rule   is   impermissibly         more
    stringent than the Vehicle Statute.
    ¶50   The City says it can harmonize the Vehicle Statute and
    the Rule by observing that the former allows an individual to
    carry a firearm only in "a" vehicle, not "any" vehicle or "all"
    vehicles.         The City does not explain what difference it would
    make if the legislature had chosen "any" or "all" instead of
    "a."     Instead, it skips almost immediately to the conclusion
    that the legislature's word choice created maneuvering room for
    restrictive        municipal    firearms      regulations.          There    is    no
    readily-apparent         principle       that    would      link     the     City's
    32
    No.      2015AP146
    proposition to its conclusion, and we will not further explore
    this argument when the City has chosen to remain silent.34
    ¶51   The City also says it can harmonize the two provisions
    because the Vehicle Statute does not say a person must carry a
    firearm on a bus.   It is true the Vehicle Statute is prohibitory
    (as the City pointed out), and it is also true that an exception
    from a prohibition is not the same thing as a mandate.           This
    means that although the Vehicle Statute does not prohibit a
    person from carrying a firearm in a vehicle (except as described
    above), it also does not require a person to carry such a weapon
    in a vehicle.   But this can give the City no succor.     The City
    bans the carrying of all firearms on its buses.     So its burden
    is not to find a statute that neither bans nor requires carrying
    firearms, its burden is to identify a statute that does ban, and
    does so at least as restrictively as the Rule.        As relevant
    here, the Vehicle Statute prohibits only the carrying of loaded
    non-handguns in a vehicle.     Consequently, the Vehicle Statute
    justifies the Rule only in that regard.      By also banning the
    34
    As an entirely practical matter, an individual can carry
    a weapon in only one vehicle at a time, so there is no need to
    use "any" or "all" in the statute.      "Any" bus in the City's
    fleet becomes "a" bus within the meaning of this statute the
    instant an individual boards it with a permissible firearm. The
    same is true of "all" city buses.      So there is no point in
    distinguishing between "a" bus, on the one hand, and on the
    other "any" or "all" buses.
    33
    No.     2015AP146
    carrying   of   knives,   handguns    (whether   loaded   or    not),   and
    unloaded non-handguns, the Rule is dramatically more restrictive
    than the Vehicle Statute.
    ¶52    The City also says the Rule is no more restrictive
    than Wisconsin's Statutes because, as owner of its buses, it has
    the same authority to ban the carrying of weapons as individuals
    have in banning weapons from their private vehicles.            There are
    two reasons this cannot justify the Rule.          The first, and most
    obvious, is that an individual's right to ban weapons from his
    vehicle is not statutory, and so cannot serve as the point of
    comparison.     He may keep weapons from his vehicle because he has
    the right to exclude others from his property.             He needs no
    statutory grant, and he has received none; his authority is
    incident to his property right in the vehicle.             He can keep
    weapons out of his car because he can deny a person entry for
    any reason he may choose.35      So if he does not want weapons in
    35
    "Property rights in a physical thing have been described
    as the rights to possess, use and dispose of it . . . .      The
    power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the
    most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights."
    Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
    458 U.S. 419
    , 435
    (1982) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Rakas v.
    Illinois, 
    439 U.S. 128
    , 143 (1978) ("One of the main rights
    attaching to property is the right to exclude others . . . ."
    (citing W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 2, ch. 1")); Jacque v.
    Steenberg Homes, Inc., 
    209 Wis. 2d 605
    , 618, 
    563 N.W.2d 154
    (1997) ("[T]he private landowner's right to exclude others from
    his or her land is 'one of the most essential sticks in the
    (continued)
    34
    No.     2015AP146
    his vehicle, he may simply deny the person carriage unless he
    first divests himself of his weapons.                 Thus, there is no sense
    in which the Rule can be described as "the same as or similar
    to, and no more stringent than, a state statute."36
    ¶53    Second, the City's ownership rights in its buses are
    not the same as an individual's ownership rights in his private
    vehicle.       It is possible the City means its argument to assert
    that    the    Local   Regulation     Statute's       reference       to     "a   state
    statute" as the point of comparison is meant to be longhand for
    "law," thereby giving us leave to compare the Rule's stringency
    against      non-statutory   sources     of    law.       If   that    is    what    the
    reference means——and we do not believe it is——the City would
    still be unable to justify the Rule.                     The City's argument is
    dependent      on   demonstrating       that    its      authority      to    exclude
    passengers from its buses is coextensive with an individual's
    authority      to   deny   carriage    to     another.         For    the    following
    reasons, it is not.
    ¶54    Governments,    whether       great   or    small,      exercise      only
    that amount of authority they rightfully receive from those they
    bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'"
    (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
    512 U.S. 374
    , 384 (1994))).
    36
    Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(2) (emphasis added).
    35
    No.   2015AP146
    represent.37   And they must use that authority only in ways that
    are appropriate to achieve the ends for which they were granted
    the authority.38
    ¶55   With respect to property entrusted to its care, the
    City notes that "[t]he State, no less than a private owner of
    37
    "[T]he people of the several States are the only
    true source of power . . . .   All powers that the Constitution
    neither delegates to the Federal Government nor prohibits to the
    States are controlled by the people of each State."    U.S. Term
    Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 
    514 U.S. 779
    , 847-48 (1995); see also
    W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
    319 U.S. 624
    , 641 (1943)
    ("There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or
    of the nature or origin of its authority. We set up government
    by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those
    in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent.
    Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public
    opinion by authority."); Halter v. Nebraska, 
    205 U.S. 34
    , 43
    (1907) ("It is not extravagant to say that to all lovers of the
    country [the American flag] signifies government resting on the
    consent of the governed . . . ."); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7
    Wall.) 700 (1868) ("A State, in the ordinary sense of the
    Constitution, is a political community of free citizens,
    occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and organized under
    a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution,
    and established by the consent of the governed."); Goodall v.
    City of Milwaukee, 
    5 Wis. 32
    , 38 (1856) ("In England, the
    Parliament is said to be supreme, omnipotent, and to its
    mandates the highest, as well as the lowest, in all their rights
    and acquisitions must yield. Not so here; all departments of
    government derive their powers from the prescribed consent of
    the people who are governed".
    38
    "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
    the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
    plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
    consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
    constitutional." M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
    421, (1819).    Johnston v. City of Sheboygan, 
    30 Wis. 2d 179
    ,
    186, 
    140 N.W.2d 247
    (1966) (quoting M'Culloch).
    36
    No.     2015AP146
    property, has power to preserve the property under its control
    for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."                       Adderley v.
    Florida, 
    385 U.S. 39
    , 47 (1966).              The City lawfully dedicated
    its buses to providing "safe, efficient and economical movement
    of persons and goods in the City of Madison and the metropolitan
    area consistent with the Commission's mission to support the
    City's distinct and quality neighborhoods where people will want
    to live, work, do business, learn and play by providing safe and
    efficient      transportation."         Madison,     Wis.,    Gen.        Ordinances
    § 3.14(4)(g).       Thus, the City says, Adderley gives it authority
    to   exercise     over   its    buses   the    rights    typical      of     private
    ownership in pursuit of those enumerated purposes.                        So we must
    determine      whether   Adderley    allows    the   City     to    pursue       these
    purposes by banning weapons on the same basis that a private
    individual bans weapons from his private vehicle.                     We conclude
    it does not.
    ¶56   An individual may ban weapons because he has unlimited
    discretion to bar anyone and everyone from his vehicle for any
    reason, or even no reason at all.                  The City enjoys no such
    latitude with respect to bus passengers.                 Indeed, the City's
    ability      to   exclude      passengers     is   subject     to     significant
    circumscription. The most significant is that, whatever property
    rights it might have, it may not use them in derogation of the
    law:    "[A]      municipality     cannot     lawfully       forbid       what    the
    37
    No.    2015AP146
    legislature has expressly licensed, authorized or required, or
    authorize what the legislature has expressly forbidden."                          Fox v.
    City of Racine, 
    225 Wis. 542
    , 545, 
    275 N.W. 513
    (1937).
    ¶57     Adderley      is    entirely       incapable        of    pushing      that
    principle aside.         Adderley is a First Amendment case (as are the
    other     cases    the   City    cited     in   support     of    its      "ownership"
    argument), in which the Court analogized public ownership of
    property to private ownership as an aid in determining whether
    the property in question constituted a public forum for speech
    purposes.         This case, of course, has nothing to do with the
    First     Amendment.       Thus,     the   City's    argument         on   this    point
    consists     entirely     of    an   analogy    to   free    speech        cases,    the
    foremost of which (Adderley) tangentially employed an analogy
    between public and private ownership as part of a much broader
    constitutional analysis.39            Analogies are sometimes helpful in
    contextualizing an issue, but an analogy on top of an analogy
    rarely conveys useful information.              Such is the case here.
    39
    The other First Amendment cases the City cited rely, at
    least in part, on Adderley. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of
    Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 
    453 U.S. 114
    , 129 (1981) (citing
    Adderley in the process of analyzing First Amendment challenge
    to Postal Service's right to restrict access to mailboxes);
    Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 
    418 U.S. 298
    , 303 (1974)
    (citing Adderley in the process of analyzing First Amendment
    challenge to City's right to deny advertising request on public
    buses).
    38
    No.      2015AP146
    ¶58    Adderley can teach us nothing about the question at
    hand because the City's recursive analogies left no room for the
    Local Regulation Statute.                 To conclude that the City's property
    rights allow it to exclude law-abiding members of the public
    from    its   buses,         we   would   first    have    to     conclude     that   those
    property rights enjoy a permanence so profound that they are
    immune      from    statutory       alteration.           Those    analogized     rights,
    however, are not untouchable.                 The scope and nature of property
    rights are defined by our laws.40                 If the law modifies a property
    right, therefore, one may not assert the previous version of the
    property right to trump the very law that changed the right.
    The Local Regulation Statute (as discussed above) forbids the
    City from forbidding weapons on its buses when otherwise carried
    in conformance with the law.                      Thus, to the extent the City
    previously         had   a    property-based       right     to    exclude     riders   in
    possession of weapons, that right ceased with the advent of the
    Local Regulation Statute.                 To claim a property right to exclude
    40
    "Property interests, of course, are not created by the
    Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are
    defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
    independent source such as state law——rules or understandings
    that secure certain benefits and that support claims of
    entitlement to those benefits."     Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 
    408 U.S. 564
    , 577 (1972); see also, Penterman v. Wis. Elec. Power
    Co., 
    211 Wis. 2d 458
    , 480, 
    565 N.W.2d 521
    (1997) (quoting Roth's
    
    proposition, supra
    , that property interests are created and
    defined by independent sources such as state law).
    39
    No.     2015AP146
    weapons-carrying passengers from its buses is to invoke a right
    that no longer exists (if it ever did).
    ¶59    From     all     of   this    we     may      deduce    that      the    City's
    ownership interest in its buses does not allow it to arbitrarily
    exclude      potential       passengers      a    la       private      vehicle      owners.
    Instead, any decision to exclude must be tied to a lawful basis.
    With respect to a prospective passenger who is complying with
    the Vehicle Statute, state law offers no such basis.                                 And the
    Local Regulation Statute says the City (and its sub-units) may
    not   create    such     a    basis.       Because         the   City    cannot      exclude
    passengers     from    its     buses      without      a    lawful      basis,     and   none
    exists with respect to passengers who comply with state weapons
    laws, the City's ownership interest in its buses gives it no
    authority to promulgate or enforce the Rule.
    3.      The Concealed-Carry Statute
    ¶60    Thus far we have considered only the Local Regulation
    Statute's     impact     on    the   Rule's       proscription          of   "knives"     and
    "firearms" on the City's buses.                  We addressed only those weapons
    in that analysis because those are the types of weapons included
    in the statute's mandate.              But there are other types of weapons,
    and other statutes that speak to their regulation.                                   Amongst
    these   is    the   Concealed-Carry         Statute,         which      covers     not   just
    40
    No.     2015AP146
    handguns but electric weapons and billy clubs as well.41                                  So we
    now     determine        whether     the     Rule       may    lawfully      prohibit       the
    carrying of these types of concealed weapons.42
    ¶61     In relevant part, the Concealed-Carry Statute says a
    "licensee     or     an    out-of-state       licensee         may   carry    a    concealed
    weapon anywhere in this state except as provided under subs.
    (15m) and (16) and ss. 943.13(1m)(c) and 948.605(2)(b)1r."                                 Wis.
    Stat.      § 175.60(2g)(a).            The    exceptions        need    not    detain       us,
    because      none    address        buses.         So,    because      we    have    already
    concluded      that        the      City     cannot       regulate          firearms       more
    stringently than state statutes, all we must do here is decide
    whether city buses are mobile negations of "anywhere in this
    state."
    ¶62     The City's argument did not engage the language of the
    Concealed-Carry           Statute    other     than      to    assert       that    the    word
    "anywhere" cannot really mean anywhere.                         There are, of course,
    two limitations on this right to carry                          concealed weapons in
    Wisconsin.          We    find   the   first       in    the   statute       itself,      which
    contains a list of situations and places to which the statute's
    41
    "'Weapon' means a handgun, an electric weapon, as defined
    in   s. 941.295(1c)(a),   or   a  billy   club."     Wis.   Stat.
    § 175.60(1)(j).
    42
    The City's authority to ban handguns has been withdrawn
    by the Local Regulation Statute, as described above.
    41
    No.    2015AP146
    mandate does not apply.43    The second lies in the principle that
    the legislature is aware of the state's existing laws, and that
    43
    The exceptions cover only the following:
        Certain restrictions imposed by employers on their
    employees (Wis. Stat. § 175.60(15m);
        Certain types of buildings, consisting of (Wis. Stat.
    § 175.60(16)):
    1.   Any portion of a building that is a police
    station, sheriff's office, state patrol station, or
    the office of a division of criminal investigation
    special agent of the department;
    2.   Any portion of a building that is a prison, jail,
    house of correction, or secured correctional facility;
    3.   The facility established under § 46.055 [secure
    mental health facility for sexually violent persons];
    4.   The   center  established   under  § 46.056 [the
    Wisconsin Resource Center located on the grounds of
    the Winnebago Mental Health Institute];
    5.   Any secured unit or secured portion of a mental
    health institute under § 51.05, including a facility
    designated as the Maximum Security Facility at Mendota
    Mental Health Institute;
    6.   Any portion of a building          that   is   a    county,
    state, or federal courthouse;
    7.   Any portion of a building that is a municipal
    courtroom if court is in session;
    8.   A place   beyond    a   security    checkpoint       in   an
    airport;
        Restrictions imposed by authorized persons on lands,
    residences, commercial buildings, special event locations,
    buildings that are owned, occupied, or controlled by state or
    local governmental units, and university or college grounds or
    buildings      (Wis.      Stat.      § 943.13(1m)(c));     and
        School grounds (Wis. Stat. § 948.605(2)(b)1r).
    42
    No.      2015AP146
    it adopts new legislation against that backdrop, leaving the
    present law undisturbed except so far as necessary to make room
    for the new.44       As significant here, the Concealed-Carry Statute
    contains no text suggesting that "anywhere" includes a place the
    licensee has no permission or right to be.                   That is to say, a
    concealed-carry license is not a writ authorizing the licensee
    to force his way into a place he may not lawfully occupy.                       Thus,
    when the Concealed-Carry Statute speaks of "anywhere," it refers
    to anywhere the licensee may lawfully be, exclusive only of the
    exceptions contained in the statute itself.
    ¶63    Whether the Rule's prohibition of concealed weapons
    survives      enactment     of    the   Concealed-Carry     Statute     depends    on
    whether      the   latter   has    preempted   the    former.     We     begin    our
    analysis by recognizing that cities enjoy both constitutional
    and statutory grants of authority.                  The Wisconsin Constitution
    provides that "[c]ities and villages organized pursuant to state
    law may determine their local affairs and government, subject
    only    to    this   constitution        and   to    such   enactments     of     the
    44
    Town of Madison v. City of Madison, 
    269 Wis. 609
    , 614, 
    70 N.W.2d 249
    (1955) ("All statutes are presumed to be enacted by
    the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of
    the law and with reference to it, . . . they are therefore to be
    construed in connection with and in harmony with the existing
    law, and as a part of a general and uniform system of
    jurisprudence, that is, they are to be construed with a
    reference to the whole system of law of which they form a
    part.").
    43
    No.     2015AP146
    legislature of statewide concern as with uniformity shall affect
    every city or every village."                Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3.             Our
    legislature describes a city's authority broadly:
    Except as elsewhere in the statutes specifically
    provided, the council shall have the management and
    control of the city property, finances, highways,
    navigable waters, and the public service, and shall
    have power to act for the government and good order of
    the city, for its commercial benefit, and for the
    health, safety, and welfare of the public, and may
    carry   out   its   powers  by   license,   regulation,
    suppression,    borrowing   of    money,   tax    levy,
    appropriation, fine, imprisonment, confiscation, and
    other necessary or convenient means.        The powers
    hereby conferred shall be in addition to all other
    grants, and shall be limited only by express language.
    Wis. Stat. § 62.11(5).
    ¶64   Consequently, just because a municipal legislative act
    treats a subject also addressed by the legislature does not mean
    the    former   has    been     preempted:     "[M]unicipalities        may    enact
    ordinances in the same field and on the same subject covered by
    state     legislation        where    such    ordinances   do     not     conflict
    with . . . the state legislation."              City of Milwaukee v. Childs
    Co., 
    195 Wis. 148
    , 151, 
    217 N.W. 703
    (1928).                 We have developed
    a     disjunctive     list    of     considerations   that      assists       us   in
    determining whether a local legislative act must defer to state
    legislation:
    The tests for determining whether such a legislatively
    intended withdrawal of power which would necessarily
    nullify the local ordinance has occurred are:
    44
    No.     2015AP146
    (1)   whether   the  legislature   has   expressly
    withdrawn the power of municipalities to act;
    (2) whether the ordinance                 logically        conflicts
    with the state legislation;
    (3) whether the ordinance defeats the purpose of
    the state legislation; or
    (4) whether the ordinance goes against the spirit
    of the state legislation.
    Anchor Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Equal Opportunities Comm'n, 
    120 Wis. 2d 391
    , 397, 
    355 N.W.2d 234
    (1984).                         The Concealed-Carry
    Statute does not mention local regulation at all, so it does not
    represent an express withdrawal of a municipality's power to
    regulate     concealed      weapons       within     the    meaning     of       the    first
    Anchor test.        The parties have not expounded on the "spirit" of
    the    Concealed-Carry          Statute,        so     there       is       insufficient
    information    available       to    us    to   make       the   fourth      Anchor      test
    instructive.        We will, therefore, concentrate on the second and
    third tests.
    ¶65   The second test inquires into whether the Rule (as an
    expression     of     the     legislative       authority        contained         in     the
    Ordinance) logically conflicts with the Concealed-Carry Statute.
    That   statute      creates    a    singularly       expansive      right         to    carry
    concealed    weapons.         It    extends     to    "anywhere       in    this       state"
    except as described above.                It is difficult to imagine a more
    comprehensive description of where the right may be exercised
    45
    No.       2015AP146
    than "anywhere."           But the legislature did not have to create the
    right    in   this    manner.         If    its     paramount        concern      was     not
    comprehensiveness,          it   could     have    instead     provided       a   list    of
    places in which the right to carry a concealed weapon could be
    exercised.          This     would    almost      necessarily        have     led    to    a
    patchwork      "carry"       landscape       in     which      one    would       need      a
    constantly-updated, GPS-enabled smartphone app to determine from
    instant to instant whether one was complying with the Concealed-
    Carry Statute.
    ¶66    The logic inherent in the legislature's decision to
    define the right as all-encompassing, subject only to carefully
    delimited exceptions, is that the right is meant to extend as
    far     as    is    not     inconsistent          with   its     internally-defined
    limitations.        There is no room in the Concealed-Carry Statute
    for a municipality to define "anywhere" as something other than
    the comprehensive expanse it was meant to be.                           If there were
    such room, Wisconsin's municipalities could instantly create the
    patchwork     landscape       the    text    of    the   Concealed-Carry            Statute
    indicates the legislature meant to avoid.
    ¶67    This analysis also indicates the Rule fails the third
    Anchor test.         The Concealed-Carry Statute's evident purpose is
    to    allow   the    carrying        of   concealed      weapons      as    broadly       as
    possible, subject only to limited exceptions identified by the
    statute itself.           This breadth, coupled with the assurance that
    46
    No.      2015AP146
    only        the     legislature       can       add        new     restrictions,           allows
    individuals to move about the entire state with confidence they
    are    not        violating    the   law.        If        it    were    otherwise,        people
    traveling         the   interstate       with    a    concealed         weapon      might    find
    themselves compliant as they drive through a carry-philic town,
    only to find themselves law-breakers a moment later as they pass
    into    an    adjacent        carry-phobic       community.             In   practice,       this
    would       mean     (for     example)      that      the        municipality       along     the
    Madison-Milwaukee             corridor    with        the       most    restrictive        weapon
    regulation would effectively set the concealed-carry standard
    for    everyone         traveling    between         the    two    cities.          This    would
    certainly          defeat     the    Concealed-Carry              Statute's      purpose       in
    creating a uniform standard for the entire state.45
    ¶68        In sum, the City may not enforce the Rule against
    concealed-carry             licensees     who        are    in     compliance        with    the
    Concealed-Carry Statute.
    45
    There are, of course, certain and well-defined places one
    may not carry a concealed weapon, e.g., jails, mental health
    institutions, courthouses, etc. See Wis. Stat. § 175.60(16)(a).
    The nature of these exceptions reinforces the uniformity
    inherent in the Concealed-Carry Statute.      The common thread
    running through each is that they describe places where there
    are obvious and elevated security concerns.      This statute is
    exactly what one would expect of a law aimed at maximizing
    statewide   uniformity  while  simultaneously   controlling  for
    legitimate security concerns.
    47
    No.       2015AP146
    IV.     CONCLUSION
    ¶69       We hold today that the Local Regulation Statute, Wis.
    Stat.    § 66.0409,        has   withdrawn      authority         from    the       City    to
    regulate, either through its governing body or its sub-units
    (and without regard to the label it affixes to its regulation or
    manner   of    regulating),       the   subjects      identified          in     the     Local
    Regulation Statute in a manner that is more stringent than an
    analogous state statute.           We also hold that the Concealed-Carry
    Statute, Wis. Stat. § 175.60, preempts the City's authority to
    restrict a licensee's right to carry concealed weapons on the
    City's buses so long as the licensee complies with the statute's
    requirements.       Finally, we hold that neither the City nor any of
    its sub-units or employees may enforce the Rule to the extent it
    purports to prohibit carrying any knife or firearm (as defined
    by the Local Regulation Statute) or weapon (as defined by the
    Concealed-Carry       Statute),      so    long      as    such    carrying         is     not
    forbidden     by    (and    is   done     in    compliance        with)       the   Vehicle
    Statute, Wis. Stat. § 167.30, the Concealed-Carry Statute, and
    all other statutes that may from time to time become applicable.
    By    the      Court.—The     decision      of   the    court        of     appeals     is
    reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    48
    Appendix A
    1
    Appendix A       No. 2015AP149
    2
    Appendix A       No. 2015AP149
    3
    Appendix B       No. 2015AP149
    1
    Appendix B       No. 2015AP149
    2
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    ¶70    ANN   WALSH    BRADLEY,      J.     (dissenting).           The   public
    policy and safety considerations involved in allowing weapons on
    a city bus may be hotly debated, but those issues are not before
    the court.      Nor is the complexity of the constitutional right to
    bear arms at issue here.             This case presents a straightforward
    question of statutory interpretation.
    ¶71    The   issue     here    is       whether   Wis.     Stat.    § 66.0409
    preempts a rule adopted by the City of Madison's Transit and
    Parking Commission that prohibits a person from traveling on a
    city bus with a weapon (the "bus rule").
    ¶72    Judicial restraint requires that courts "assume that
    the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language"
    chosen by the legislature.            State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for
    Dane Cty., 
    2004 WI 58
    , ¶44, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , 
    681 N.W.2d 110
    .
    And that is exactly what the circuit court and a unanimous court
    of appeals did here.
    ¶73    Applying a plain meaning interpretation, both courts
    determined that the bus rule is not preempted by state statute.
    They concluded that the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 66.0409
    (the       "Preemption      Statute")      clearly       limits    preemption       to
    municipal "ordinances" and "resolutions" enacted or adopted by a
    "city, village, town or county."                See Wis. Stat. § 66.0409(1)(b)
    & (2).1       Further they determined the bus rule is neither an
    1
    The majority opinion refers to this same statute as the
    "Local Regulation Statute."    Like the court of appeals, I use
    the term "Preemption Statute."
    1
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    "ordinance" nor a "resolution," and it was not enacted by the
    city.   That should be the end of the analysis.
    ¶74    A majority of this court, however, fails to exercise
    the   same    restraint.        Discarding      seminal     rules      of    statutory
    interpretation, the majority slips into legislative mode, and
    ignores      the    plain   meaning    of       the    words      chosen       by   the
    legislature.        It rewrites the statute in a manner it wishes the
    legislature had chosen, a manner chosen by several other states—
    —but not Wisconsin.
    ¶75    The    majority    evinces     a    further       lack     of     judicial
    restraint when it reaches out to address constitutional issues
    not raised or briefed by the parties.
    ¶76    Contrary to the majority, I agree with the circuit
    court and the court of appeals that the legislature meant what
    the words of the statute clearly provide.                   The rule adopted by
    the   City    of    Madison's    Transit     and      Parking     Commission        that
    prohibits a person from traveling on a city bus with a weapon is
    not preempted by state statute.
    ¶77    Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
    I
    ¶78    As a harbinger of things to come, the majority begins
    its analysis not with the statute to be examined, but with a
    discussion     of     the   Second    Amendment        of   the       United    States
    Constitution, examining the constitutional right to bear arms.
    Majority op., ¶¶8-12.
    ¶79    Cases that turn on statutory interpretation generally
    begin the analysis by setting forth the text of the statute.
    2
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    For   example,     in    the   first   paragraph            of    its    analysis,        the
    petitioner's     brief     sets    forth       the   relevant      statute        in   full.
    Following suit, the City likewise presents front and center the
    statute to be examined, setting it forth in full in the second
    paragraph of the brief's analysis.                   But where is the Preemption
    Statute set forth in full in the majority's analysis?                           Nowhere.
    ¶80   This        omission    underscores             that        the     majority's
    statutory interpretation is less about the text of the statute
    and more about lengthy and intertwining legal arguments.                                  The
    absence obscures the ability to compare the plain text of the
    statute with the majority's interpretation of it.                              Wisconsin's
    Preemption Statute, Wis. Stat § 66.0409(2), provides:
    [With exceptions not relevant here], no political
    subdivision may enact or enforce an ordinance or adopt
    a resolution that regulates the sale, purchase,
    purchase delay, transfer, ownership, use, keeping,
    possession,    bearing,   transportation,   licensing,
    permitting, registration or taxation of any knife or
    any firearm or part of a firearm, including ammunition
    and reloader components, unless the ordinance or
    resolution is the same as or similar to, and no more
    stringent than, a state statute.
    Additionally,      Wis.     Stat.    § 66.0409(1)(b)              defines       "political
    subdivision" as "a city, village, town or county."
    ¶81   It is noteworthy that when the majority does reach the
    issue actually before this court, it claims to be engaging in a
    plain   meaning         interpretation.              Yet,        its     plain       meaning
    interpretation does not come close to tracking the words of the
    statute it is examining.
    ¶82   The majority determines that "the plain meaning of the
    [Preemption] Statute is that the legislature withdrew from the
    3
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    City's       governing        body     all       authority           to     legislate        on
    the . . . 'possession, bearing [or] transportation . . . of any
    knife or any firearm' unless the legislation is 'the same as or
    similar      to,   and   no    more    stringent     than,          a     state    statute.'"
    Majority op., ¶28 (citation omitted).
    ¶83    In reaching this "plain meaning" interpretation of the
    statute      the    majority      discards        seminal       rules        of     statutory
    interpretation, slips into legislative mode, and re-writes the
    statute the way it wishes the legislature would have written it.
    I address each in turn.
    A
    ¶84    Although    it    pays    lip      service       to       seminal     rules    of
    statutory interpretation set forth in Kalal, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    ,
    one wonders what is left of those rules after reviewing the
    majority's         truncated         exposition          of      a         plain      meaning
    interpretation.
    ¶85    When Kalal was decided, essentially two approaches to
    statutory interpretation had evolved.                         One approach was more
    holistic and inquired what was meant by the statute.                                  Another
    focused on the words of the statute chosen by the legislature
    and instructed that the words be given their plain meaning.                                 The
    majority in Kalal adopted the latter textual approach.
    ¶86    Curiously,       the    majority      in        this      case      appears    to
    backtrack from the majority's approach in Kalal.                                  Rather than
    inquire what the text does provide, the majority here asks what
    does   the     statute    mean.        It    even    supplies             emphasis    in    the
    original, underlying "meaning" as an apparent shorthand signal
    4
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    of a reinvigorated holistic approach.                        Majority op., ¶20.               After
    explaining that to be bound by the words of the statute chosen
    by   the    legislature         would    render         it    a    mechanical           and    mere
    "arbiter[] of word choice," the majority emphasizes "[i]t is,
    instead, the 'plain meaning' of a statute we must apply."                                      
    Id., ¶¶19-20. ¶87
       In     the   majority's          search     for      meaning,        it    discards
    seminal     rules    of   statutory       interpretation                that    emphasize       the
    primacy of the words chosen by the legislature.                                 Brushed aside
    are rules that require an interpretation using the statutory
    common and ordinary meaning of those chosen words as well as an
    examination of those words in the statutory context in which
    they are used.            The majority's departure from these seminal
    rules includes those set forth below.
    ¶88    First,       "Judicial       deference          to     the        policy     choices
    enacted     into    law    by   the     legislature          requires          that     statutory
    interpretation focus primarily on the language of the statute."
    Kalal,     
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    ,        ¶44.         As   noted      above,        the     majority
    asserts     that    it    is    not     the    words     of       the    statute        that   are
    significant, but the "plain meaning" of a statute that must be
    applied.     Majority op., ¶20.
        "We must, however, keep in mind that this axiom [to apply
    the plain meaning of the statute] does not reduce the
    judicial function to mechanically comparing the words of
    a statute to the name given a legislative enactment, or
    the body enacting it." Majority op., ¶19.
        "We are not merely arbiters of word choice. If we were,
    we would need do nothing more than confirm that 'rule' is
    a word different from 'ordinance' and 'resolution,' and
    5
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    that 'commission' is etymologically distinct from 'city,'
    'village,' 'town,' and 'county.'" 
    Id., ¶19. ¶89
       Second,       "statutory      interpretation            begins        with   the
    language of the statute."            Kalal, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , ¶45 (internal
    quotations and citations omitted).                      The majority opinion does
    not set forth the full text of the statute anywhere in its
    statutory analysis, which obscures a comparison to the text of
    the statute with the majority's "plain meaning" interpretation
    of it.      Rather than beginning its analysis with the language of
    the   statute,       it    begins     with     a    discussion          of     the    Second
    Amendment.        Majority op., ¶¶8-12.
    ¶90    Third,       "[s]tatutory       language      is       given     its     common,
    ordinary,     and     accepted       meaning,       except       that        technical      or
    specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or
    special     definitional      meaning."         Kalal,        
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    ,         ¶45.
    Although the majority accurately quotes Cross v. Soderbeck, 
    94 Wis. 2d 331
    ,       342,    
    288 N.W.2d 779
            (1980),         which     defines     the
    common      and     ordinary        meaning        of     both       "ordinance"          and
    "resolution,"       it    declines    to     apply      the     common       and     ordinary
    meaning to those terms.2            Majority op., ¶¶24-28.
    2
    Cross v. Soderbeck, 
    94 Wis. 2d 331
    , 342, 
    288 N.W.2d 449
    (1980) (citations omitted) provides:
    A municipal ordinance or by-law is a regulation of a
    general, permanent nature, enacted by the governing
    council    of    a    municipal    corporation. . . . A
    resolution, or order as it is sometimes called, is an
    informal enactment of a temporary nature, providing
    for the disposition of a particular piece of the
    administrative     business     of      a     municipal
    corporation. . . . And it has been held that even
    where the statute or municipal charter requires the
    municipality to act by ordinance, if a resolution is
    (continued)
    6
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    ¶91     Instead,     the     majority   superimposes   on    Kalal    a   new
    approach.         It   creates    alternative     interpretive    principles,
    including       examining   the    ordinance's    "taxonomy     functionally."
    Majority op., ¶25.          Ultimately, it arrives at a plain meaning
    interpretation based on these principles.
        The majority "derive[s] three principles useful to
    our inquiry":       (1) "ordinances are municipal
    legislative devices, formally enacted, that address
    general subjects in a permanent fashion"; (2)
    "resolutions    are    those   informal    municipal
    legislative acts that address particular pieces of
    administrative business in a temporary fashion"; and
    (3) "the label given to a legislative device is not
    dispositive——one identifies the device's taxonomy
    functionally." Majority op., ¶25.
        "Thus, the plain meaning of the [Preemption] Statute
    is that the legislature withdrew from the City's
    governing body all authority to legislate on the
    subjects it identifies . . ." 
    Id., ¶28. ¶92
        Fourth,     "statutory     language    is   interpreted      in   the
    context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a
    whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
    related     statutes;       and    reasonably,     to    avoid     absurd      or
    unreasonable       results."       Kalal,   
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    ,     ¶46.       The
    majority does not analyze the statutory context or language of
    closely-related statutes.           Instead, it analyzes the result and
    reasons that the result is not what the legislature intended.
        "We examine the statute's contextualized words, put
    them into operation, and observe the results to
    passed in the manner and with the statutory formality
    required in the enactment of an ordinance, it will be
    binding and effective as an ordinance.
    7
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    ensure we do not arrive at an unreasonable or absurd
    conclusion." Majority op., ¶20.
    ¶93     The process that the majority employs in its plain
    meaning     interpretation          is     one     that     is     almost      entirely
    disconnected        from    the     actual        language       of    the     statute.
    Ultimately, it is apparent that in abandoning or reconfiguring
    seminal rules of statutory interpretation, the majority fails to
    honor the words chosen by the legislature.
    B
    ¶94     Instead the majority dons its collective legislative
    hat and rewrites the Preemption Statute in a manner chosen by
    several     other     states——but         not     Wisconsin.          The     Wisconsin
    legislature    could       have,   but     did    not,    use    expansive     language
    intended to more broadly prohibit local agency regulation of
    firearms.     In re Incorporation of Portion of Town of Sheboygan,
    
    2001 WI App 279
    , ¶9, 
    248 Wis. 2d 904
    , 
    637 N.W.2d 770
    ("It is
    presumed that the legislature is cognizant of what language to
    include or omit when it enacts laws.").
    ¶95     Other     jurisdictions          provide      examples      of     how   the
    Wisconsin     legislature      could       have    more     broadly     written      its
    preemption    statute.        For    example,       in    Kansas,     the    preemption
    statute prohibits the adoption of ordinances and resolutions,
    but also says that "no agent of any city or county shall take
    any administrative action" to regulate firearms.                             Kan. Stat.
    Ann. § 12-16,124(a) (2013).
    ¶96     A multitude of other states have done exactly what the
    Wisconsin legislature did not do, but what the majority wishes
    this legislature had done.               See Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-915A (2012)
    8
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    (no     agent    of      any     locality     "shall       take    any     administrative
    action . . . "); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(a) (2014) (no city
    "shall    occupy       any     part    of   the    field    of    regulation . . . ");
    Mich.     Comp.        Laws       §    123.1102          (2015)     (no         city     shall
    "enact . . . any             ordinance . . . or           regulate       in       any    other
    manner");       Ark.     Code     Ann.      § 14-16-504(b)(1)(A)           (2011)       (local
    governments        "shall        not   enact       any    ordinance        or     regulation
    pertaining to, or regulate in any other manner . . . "); Fla.
    Stat.     § 790.33(1)            (2011)      (preempting          "any     administrative
    regulations or rules"); Idaho Code § 18-3302J(2) (2014) ("no []
    city, agency, board or any other political subdivision . . . may
    adopt or enforce any law, rule, regulation, or ordinance, which
    regulates       in       any     manner . . . ");           Ky.     Rev.        Stat.      Ann.
    § 65.870(1) (West 2012) (prohibiting a ban by "any person acting
    under the authority of any . . . organization[] . . . ").
    ¶97    The       majority        ultimately         justifies        its       creative
    approach to statutory interpretation by emphasizing a desire to
    avoid an absurd result.                Majority op., ¶46 n.31.                  However, it
    appears that the majority may be confusing a desire to avoid an
    absurd      result       with    reaching      a    statutory       interpretation            it
    desires.
    II
    ¶98    Contrary to the majority, I begin as our case law
    instructs, with the plain language of the statute.                                Kalal, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , ¶45 ("[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the
    language of the statute.") (internal quotations and citations
    omitted).          "If     the    meaning      of    the    statute        is     plain,      we
    9
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    ordinarily stop the inquiry."                   
    Id. We give
    statutory language
    its    common,    ordinary,          and    accepted     meaning.           
    Id. (citations omitted).
           Technical or specially-defined words or phrases are
    given their definitional meaning.                      
    Id. "[L]egislative history
    is    sometimes    consulted          to    confirm     or    verify    a    plain-meaning
    interpretation."          
    Id., ¶51 (citation
    omitted).
    ¶99   I    agree     with         the   City,    the    circuit       court    and    a
    unanimous court of appeals that the statute plainly preempts
    only    "ordinances"           and       "resolutions."             Wisconsin      Stat.     §
    66.0409(2) provides that "no political subdivision may enact or
    enforce an ordinance or adopt a resolution" that regulates the
    bearing of any firearm unless it is no more stringent than a
    statute:
    [With   exceptions   not   relevant   here], no   political
    subdivision may enact or enforce an ordinance or adopt a
    resolution that regulates the sale, purchase, purchase
    delay, transfer, ownership, use, keeping, possession,
    bearing,      transportation,     licensing,    permitting,
    registration, or taxation of any knife or any firearm or
    part of a firearm, including ammunition and reloader
    components, unless the ordinance or resolution is the same
    as or similar to, and no more stringent than, a state
    statute.
    ¶100 The bus rule is not an "ordinance" or "resolution."                              A
    municipal "ordinance" is "a regulation of a general, permanent
    nature,      enacted      by       the     governing     council       of     a   municipal
    corporation . . . "            
    Cross, 94 Wis. 2d at 342
    .                    A "resolution"
    is an "informal enactment of a temporary nature, providing for
    the    disposition     of      a     particular       piece    of    the    administrative
    business of a municipal corporation."                    
    Id. 10 No.
    2015AP146.awb
    ¶101 The meaning of the statute is plain and our inquiry
    may stop here.           See Kalal, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , ¶45.                           However, we
    also look to legislative history to confirm our plain meaning
    interpretation.          
    Id., ¶51. Absent
    from the majority opinion is
    any    discussion        of   the     legislative         history     of      the    Preemption
    Statute.             Likely     it     is    absent       because        it     supports      an
    interpretation completely at odds with the majority's statutory
    interpretation.
    ¶102 As        Justice    Prosser's         concurrence      in     State      v.   Cole,
    
    2003 WI 112
    ,     ¶¶60-64,          
    264 Wis. 2d 520
    ,         
    665 N.W.2d 328
    ,
    explained, the Preemption Statute was enacted in 1995 to address
    gun    control       ordinances       proposed       by   the   cities        of     Milwaukee,
    Kenosha, and Madison.                In response to these proposed ordinances,
    Representative          DuWayne        Johnsrud       introduced           legislation       "to
    preempt municipalities from enacting gun control ordinances that
    were stricter than state law."                    
    Id., ¶64 (emphasis
    added).
    ¶103 Looking at how other states have interpreted similar
    statutory            language        also         confirms      our        plain        meaning
    interpretation.          The Oregon court of appeals decision in Doe v.
    Medford Sch. Dist. 549C, 
    221 P.3d 787
    (2009) is instructive
    because         of    Oregon's        analogous        Preemption          Statute,        which
    prohibits only ordinances.3                 The Medford court reasoned that "the
    3
    Oregon's Preemption Statute, Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.170(2)
    (2016), provides:
    Except as expressly authorized by state statute, no
    county, city or other municipal corporation or
    district may enact civil or criminal ordinances,
    including but not limited to zoning ordinances, to
    regulate, restrict or prohibit the sale, acquisition,
    (continued)
    11
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    legislature        intended           the    term       'ordinance'       to       refer    to    the
    equivalent       of    a        law     or       other    enactment           of     a   municipal
    corporation that carries the force of law and is enforceable
    against    the      public       generally."             
    Id. at 792.
           Thus,    Medford
    determined that a school district could issue a policy barring
    district employees from bearing arms on school district property
    despite its preemption statute, because it was not enforceable
    against the general public.                      
    Id. at 799.
    ¶104 Similar to the school district policy in Medford, the
    bus    rule   is    not     a    generally-applicable                 legislative          enactment
    like an ordinance.              Bus policies are limited in scope and apply
    only to members of the public who choose to ride a Madison Metro
    bus.      See also John E.D. Larkin, Guns in Government Parks &
    Buildings——Municipal Enforcement of Safety Rules Without Running
    Afoul of State Preemption, 86 Pa. B. Ass'n Q. 128, 137 (July
    2015)    ("government            conduct         does     not    rise     to       the   level        of
    'regulation'        when     the       government         acts    in    its        capacity      as    a
    private owner."); Wolfe v. Twp. of Salisbury, 
    880 A.2d 62
    , 69
    (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (township could ban hunting, despite a
    statewide     preemption           statute,         in    township       parks       because      the
    township      did     not       act         to    regulate       hunting       throughout         the
    municipality, but only on its own property).                                  Like in Medford,
    the bus rule here is appropriately based on the agency's limited
    transfer,      ownership,     possession,      storage,
    transportation or use of firearms . . . Ordinances
    that are contrary to this subsection are void.
    12
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    authority because it applies only to persons who choose to ride
    a Madison Metro bus, rather than to the general public.
    ¶105 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that the plain
    meaning         of     Wisconsin's     Preemption    Statute       does     not    clearly
    preempt the bus rule.                  This plain meaning interpretation is
    confirmed by the legislative history and informed by examining
    the interpretation given to similar language.
    ¶106 Additionally,             the    plain   meaning   interpretation           set
    forth       in       this   dissent     is    consistent    with     that       previously
    rendered by the Wisconsin Attorney General.                        It is conspicuous
    by its absence from the majority's analysis.                       After the Vehicle
    Statute was amended, see 2011 Wis. Act 35, § 31, the Attorney
    General opined that "public and private entities may prohibit or
    restrict the possession and transport of weapons."4                        I agree.
    III
    ¶107 Having determined that the legislature meant what it
    said       in    the    text   of     the    Preemption    Statute,       the    statutory
    interpretation exercise may come to an end.                        Accordingly, there
    is no need to address whether the bus rule is more stringent
    than state law, when it is not preempted by state law.                            I pause,
    however, to briefly comment on the observation set forth at the
    outset of this dissent.
    4
    Wisconsin Department of Justice, Wisconsin's Carrying
    Concealed Weapon Law Questions and Answers 45 (June 1, 2013),
    https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/dles/ccw/ccw-
    faq.pdf.
    13
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    ¶108 The majority strays far afield from the question of
    statutory       interpretation            presented          here       by        beginning        its
    analysis with a discussion about the right to bear arms under
    the    Second        Amendment       to     the        United       States         Constitution.
    Majority op., ¶¶8-12.               It contends that this summary discussion
    of the Second Amendment provides context and background for the
    statutory analysis.            
    Id., ¶8 n.10.
    ¶109 However,       both      parties          repeatedly         advised        the   court
    that    this    case,     as    presented,            has    nothing         to    do    with      the
    constitutional right to bear arms.                           The parties intentionally
    and    strategically       framed         this        case   as     a    case      of    statutory
    interpretation         only.         Nevertheless,            the       majority        evinces      a
    further       lack   of   judicial        restraint          when       it   reaches         out    to
    address       constitutional        issues        not    raised         or   briefed         by    the
    parties.
    ¶110 A     litany       of   refrains          makes     clear        that       it   is    the
    position of the parties that the constitutional right to bear
    arms is not implicated here, either under the United States
    Constitution         or   the       Wisconsin          Constitution.                Counsel        for
    Wisconsin Carry repeatedly stated:
        " . . . We       could       have         brought         that       issue         (the
    constitutional right to bear arms on a city bus), we
    didn't.     I am not here today to argue it."
        "We did not raise any constitutional issues in this
    case."
        "No, we did not raise any constitutional issues."
    14
    No. 2015AP146.awb
        "We did not bring any state or federal constitutional
    issues in th[is] case."
    Counsel for the City agreed:
        "Well there's a reason the petitioners didn't raise
    any constitutional issues in this case.                    And one of
    them is [that] the Vehicle Statute has been in play
    since before Act 35."
        "There [have] been no constitutional issues in this
    case."
    ¶111 Undaunted by counsel's protestations to the contrary,
    the majority embarks on a discussion of the Second Amendment.
    It   observes        the   "extensive      textual   and     historical    analysis"
    employed by the court in D.C. v. Heller, 
    554 U.S. 570
    , 592
    (2008),       and    notes   that    the     Wisconsin   Constitution      has   very
    distinctive language from that contained in the United States
    Constitution.           Majority op., ¶10.           Without any analysis, the
    majority then declares that the Wisconsin right to bear arms is
    also fundamental and is an "individual right."                  
    Id. ¶112 The
           lack   of     nuance    in   the   majority's    declaration
    underscores the folly in reaching out to discuss constitutional
    issues    not       presented,    briefed     or   argued.      For   example,    the
    majority's discussion of a "pre-existing" fundamental right may
    suggest that such a right is absolute.                     See majority op., ¶9.
    However, as counsel for the City stated at oral argument, the
    Second Amendment right to bear arms "is not an absolute right.
    It's subject to reasonable restrictions.                      And for years, the
    State had a restriction against carrying guns in vehicles and
    15
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    it's been articulated in cases what the safety reasons for that
    [are]."
    ¶113 In Heller, the United States Supreme Court explained
    "[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment
    is not 
    unlimited." 554 U.S. at 626
    .              The Heller court further
    observed that "[f]rom Blackstone through the 19th-century cases,
    commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was
    not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any
    manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose."                            
    Id. (citations omitted).
    ¶114 This is the same lack of nuance that Justice Prosser
    warned against in Cole, 
    264 Wis. 2d 520
    , ¶¶60-79, (Prosser, J.,
    concurring), which was the first time our court interpreted the
    new   Wisconsin     Constitutional      Amendment           on   the    right      to   bear
    arms.     Justice Prosser explained that the amendment requires a
    "nuanced interpretation."             
    Id., ¶60. Tracing
    the legislative
    history and changes in the text of the proposed amendment as it
    worked its way through the initial legislative process, he made
    clear     that     merely    labelling           the     right   "fundamental"          was
    insufficient.       
    Id., ¶¶60-79. ¶115
    Justice Prosser's concurrence in Cole cautioned that
    the   Second     Amendment    right     to        bear    arms     in   the     Wisconsin
    Constitution "is not a fundamental right in the same sense that
    freedom    of    speech,    freedom    of        worship,    the    right     to     remain
    silent, and the right to a jury trial are fundamental rights."
    
    Id., ¶79. Additionally,
    the concurrence emphasized the need for
    nuance      when     examining        the        individual        nature       of       the
    16
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    constitutional      right.      It   clarified        that    the   choice   of   the
    wording "the people" at the beginning of the amendment to the
    Wisconsin Constitution was intended to de-emphasize the nature
    of the individual right:
    First, although the legislature wanted to establish a
    right that would benefit hundreds of thousands of
    individual gun owners, it wanted to deemphasize the
    'individual' nature of this right. The original
    amendment provided that 'Every individual, except an
    individual restricted in accordance with federal law,
    has the right to keep and bear arms . . . but the
    manner of bearing arms may be regulated []' . . . By
    removing this limiting clutter from the draft, the
    legislature removed any impediment to a reasonable
    exercise of the police power.   By shifting the right
    from 'Every individual' to 'The people,' the amendment
    underlined the fact that the police power in Wisconsin
    may reasonably restrict specific individuals and
    classifications of people (e.g., domestic abusers,
    minors) in ways that it may not restrict the people as
    a whole.
    
    Id., ¶77. ¶116
    The majority's far reaching constitutional discussion
    also tackles the Wisconsin Home Rule Amendment, art. XI, § 3,
    although neither party briefed or argued the issue.5                         In fact
    neither     party   even     cites   it        in   passing    in   their    briefs.
    5
    Wisconsin's Home Rule Amendment provides in relevant part:
    Cities and villages organized pursuant to state law
    may determine their local affairs and government,
    subject only to this constitution and to such
    enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as
    with uniformity shall affect every city or every
    village.   The method of such determination shall be
    prescribed by the legislature.
    Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1).
    17
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    Admittedly,        the     non-party          amicus       does        cite        to     this
    constitutional provision, but then clarifies that "[i]n creating
    the    [bus]     Rule,    Madison      did    not       rely    upon        the   Home   Rule
    Amendment, so the issue is whether the Rule is preempted under
    statutory [not constitutional] home-rule analysis."
    ¶117 Having raised the Home Rule Amendment, the majority
    then fails to consider the amendment when analyzing the scope of
    municipal authority.            Perhaps as a result, the majority makes
    some     broad     statements       about         the    scope        of     authority      of
    municipalities without nuance or substantiation.
    ¶118 The majority's broad statements appear to sub silentio
    eviscerate       the     constitutional            potency      of     the        Home   Rule
    Amendment.       For example, it proclaims that "if the City has no
    legislative        authority     with        respect       to        that     subject,      it
    necessarily has nothing to delegate to its divisions."                              Majority
    op., ¶23;       see also    
    id., ¶28 ("Because
    a municipality cannot
    delegate what it does not have, the City is entirely powerless
    to     authorize    any    of    its     sub-units         to    legislate          on   this
    subject.").
    ¶119 Adopted in 1924, the Home Rule Amendment was meant to
    give    local    government     significant          powers      separate         from   those
    bestowed    through       legislative        enactments.             Because      Home   Rule
    powers derive from the Wisconsin Constitution and not from the
    Wisconsin      legislature,      there       are    limits      on    the     legislature's
    ability to circumscribe municipal authority through legislative
    enactments.        Yet, the majority's analysis fails to account for
    such possible limitations.
    18
    No. 2015AP146.awb
    IV
    ¶120 For the reasons set forth above, I conclude that the
    Preemption Statute does not apply to the bus rule because it is
    not an ordinance or resolution enacted by the City.                         Judicial
    restraint        requires    that     this       court       "assume     that      the
    legislature's      intent    is   expressed      in    the   statutory     language"
    chosen by the legislature.               See Kalal, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , ¶44.
    "It   is   the    enacted    law,   not    the    unenacted     intent,     that     is
    binding. . . . "       
    Id. ¶121 Accordingly,
    I respectfully dissent.
    ¶122 I     am   authorized    to    state       that   Justice    SHIRLEY      S.
    ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.
    19
    No. 2015AP146.awb
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