Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Michael M. Krill ( 2020 )

2020 WI 20
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2017AP2435-D
COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Michael M. Krill, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation,
Complainant,
v.
Michael M. Krill,
Respondent.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KRILL
OPINION FILED: February 20, 2020
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:
COUNTY:
JUDGE:
JUSTICES:
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
2020 WI 20
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2017AP2435-D
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Michael M. Krill, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation, FILED
Complainant, FEB 20, 2020
v. Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Supreme Court
Michael M. Krill,
Respondent.
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license
suspended.
¶1 PER CURIAM. This case is before us pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule (SCR) 22.14(2) and SCR 22.17(2) on a stipulation between
the parties, Attorney Michael M. Krill and the Office of Lawyer
Regulation (OLR). In the stipulation, Attorney Krill pled no
contest to 24 counts of misconduct as alleged in the OLR's third
amended complaint. The referee issued a report recommending,
consistent with the stipulation, that the court suspend Attorney
Krill's license to practice law for three years, retroactive to
August 23, 2017, order Attorney Krill to pay restitution to two
No. 2017AP2435-D
clients, make satisfaction of a judgment as a condition of any
future reinstatement, and order Attorney Krill to pay the full
costs of this proceeding, which total $21,247.90 as of October 23,
2019.
¶2 We approve the referee's recommendations with respect to
the stipulated findings of fact and conclusions of law and we adopt
those findings and conclusions. We determine that a three-year
suspension is insufficient given the extremely serious nature of
the misconduct. We suspend Attorney Krill's license to practice
law for four and one-half years, retroactive to August 23, 2017.
We agree with the other recommended sanctions.
¶3 Attorney Krill was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin
in 1991. He practiced in Milwaukee and, until this matter, had
not been the subject of professional discipline. This court
temporarily suspended Attorney Krill's law license on August 23,
2017, pursuant to SCR 22.21, on the grounds that his continued
practice of law posed a risk to the public and to the
administration of justice. OLR v. Krill, No. 2017XX955,
unpublished order (S. Ct. August 23, 2017). His law license
remains suspended. The reasons for the temporary suspension are
reflected in this opinion, namely, Attorney Krill was implicated
in a financial scam conducted by one of his clients.
¶4 On December 14, 2017, the OLR filed a disciplinary
complaint against Attorney Krill. Initially, the OLR sought
revocation of Attorney Krill's law license. The complaint was
amended several times; the third and final amended complaint was
filed September 5, 2019. It contains some 166 separately numbered
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No. 2017AP2435-D
paragraphs describing 24 counts of misconduct in connection with
Attorney Krill's representation of several clients. In the amended
complaint the OLR sought a three-year suspension.
¶5 Shortly before the scheduled three-day evidentiary
hearing, Attorney Krill and the OLR entered into a stipulation in
which Attorney Krill pled no contest to all the allegations of
misconduct, and the parties also agreed on the sanctions they
considered appropriate.
¶6 The referee, Jonathan V. Goodman, reviewed the
stipulation and accepted the factual allegations of the third
amended complaint as his findings of fact. Based on those facts,
the referee concluded that Attorney Krill had engaged in 24
separate acts of professional misconduct. Given the extensive
nature of the allegations set forth in the stipulation and accepted
by the referee, we provide a summary of each client matter,
followed by summary information concerning Attorney Krill's
misconduct.
AMSAH, LLC Matter (Counts 1-8)
¶7 In October 2014, Attorney Krill was hired to represent
S.A. and Z.H. and their business, AMSAH, LLC. Attorney Krill
represented these parties in two Racine County cases, each a
dispute over the entitlement to insurance proceeds received from
the settlement of a lawsuit.
¶8 In January 2015, $75,000 in settlement proceeds was
deposited in Attorney Krill's IOLTA trust account. By the end of
March 2015, Attorney Krill had disbursed all the funds without
court or client authorization, and without accounting to the
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No. 2017AP2435-D
clients for his disbursement of the funds. In November 2016,
$226,412.41 in settlement proceeds was deposited in Attorney
Krill's trust account. By February 15, 2017, Attorney Krill had
disbursed all the funds without court or client authorization and
without accounting to the clients for his disbursement of the
funds.
¶9 By the end of 2016, due to a conflict, Attorney Krill
ceased representing S.A. and Z.H., but continued as counsel for
AMSAH. In February 2017, the circuit court ordered Attorney Krill
to provide an accounting of the $301,412.41 he was supposed to be
holding in trust. In March 2017, the circuit court ordered
Attorney Krill to transfer these funds from his trust account to
the trust account of Z.H.'s successor counsel.
¶10 Attorney Krill failed to comply with any of the court's
orders and was held in contempt. The circuit court ordered that
Attorney Krill could purge the contempt by delivering the proceeds
and providing a full accounting. In May 2017, Attorney Krill told
the circuit court that he had "invested" the settlement money in
bonds. Attorney Krill was not authorized to do this. Moreover,
this representation was untrue. In fact, Attorney Krill had
transferred the funds from his trust account to banks in the United
Kingdom and China, and had issued thousands of dollars in checks
drawn on the trust account, payable to himself.
¶11 At a status conference in August 2017, Attorney Krill
promised the circuit court that he would deliver the proceeds
"within two weeks." The circuit court issued an order providing
that if the proceeds were not repaid within two weeks, the circuit
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No. 2017AP2435-D
court would order Attorney Krill to be jailed as a contempt
sanction.
¶12 On September 6, 2017, the circuit court entered judgment
against Attorney Krill in the sum of $301,412.41. City of Racine
v. AMSAH, LLC, Racine County Circuit Court, case no. 2015CV1289.
Attorney Krill did not deliver the proceeds by the circuit court
imposed deadline and, on September 14, 2017, the circuit court
ordered Attorney Krill jailed. On September 26, 2017, the circuit
court ordered judgment against Attorney Krill in the sum of $48,000
as the accumulated contempt sanction for his failure to return the
proceeds as ordered by the circuit court.
¶13 Meanwhile, by March 2017, S.A. had filed a grievance
against Attorney Krill and the OLR asked Attorney Krill to provide
information related to the AMSAH matters. Attorney Krill did not
timely cooperate, failed to provide requested file materials,
failed to provide business and trust account records, and still
has not provided an accounting of the AMSAH proceeds.
R.G. Matter (Counts 9-11)
¶14 In 2013, Attorney Krill was retained to represent Eric
Murray ("Murray"). Many of the remaining allegations of misconduct
relate to an "advance fee scheme" conducted by Murray.1 The
complaint alleges that Attorney Krill provided services to Murray
1 An advance fee scheme occurs when the victim pays money to
someone in anticipation of receiving something of greater value –
such as a loan, contract, investment of a gift – then receives
little or nothing in return. See https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-
safety/common-fraud-schemes/advance-fee-schemes.
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No. 2017AP2435-D
in connection with this scheme, with reckless disregard for whether
Murray's transactions were fraudulent.
¶15 In September 2015, Murray offered R.G. an "investment
opportunity" and provided R.G. with a Non-Disclosure Agreement
("NDA") form that Attorney Krill had prepared for Murray. Attorney
Krill then made changes to a draft agreement between Murray and
R.G. The parties agreed and the documents provided that R.G. would
loan Murray $17,500 "to immediately close-out [a] Private Banking
Transaction." In exchange, Murray would pay R.G. $72,000 within
14 days after execution of the agreement. R.G. was to wire the
funds to Attorney Krill's trust account, then Attorney Krill would
wire the funds to Murray's representative in England. Murray
promised to deliver copies of various documents that would
substantiate the transaction. The NDA prohibited R.G. from
contacting any of the institutions or related parties to determine
the legitimacy of the private banking transaction due to its
"sensitive" nature.
¶16 All the documents purporting to substantiate the private
banking transaction were forged and fraudulent. Relying on the
forged and fraudulent documents provided to him by Attorney Krill,
and the false and fraudulent representations regarding the
purported private banking transaction contained in both the NDA
and the agreement, R.G. wired $17,500 to Attorney Krill's trust
account on September 25, 2015.
¶17 On September 29, 2015, Attorney Krill in turn wired
$30,000 from his trust account pursuant to an international wire
transfer to Lloyds Bank Plc, London, U.K., for deposit to the
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No. 2017AP2435-D
account of "Optra Sales and Services." This transaction included
R.G.'s funds. Attorney Krill provided no written accounting to
R.G. regarding his distribution of R.G.'s funds. To date, R.G.
has not been repaid the sum invested or any other monies due him
under the agreement.
¶18 In November 2016, the OLR asked Attorney Krill to detail,
among other things, the sources of certain documents used in the
transaction, to disclose where R.G.'s funds were deposited or held,
to disclose the identity of "independent sources" that he told the
OLR had confirmed that the funds for the purported private banking
transaction were in place, and to explain how he certified that
the documents he provided to R.G. were not fraudulent.
¶19 Attorney Krill provided a partial response to the OLR
but did not respond to the OLR's questions regarding the location
of R.G.'s funds or the identity of the "independent sources" who
could confirm various aspects of the transaction. Attorney Krill
denied the transaction was fraudulent and provided a letter dated
January 26, 2017, purportedly from a London, U.K., solicitor,
Harvey Graham ("Graham Letter"), denying that Attorney Krill
engaged in any kind of fraudulent transaction. The Graham Letter
is printed on what purports to be letterhead stationery of "HARVEY
GRAHAM SOLICITORS & CO." in Holborn, London, U.K.
¶20 The OLR determined that the Graham Letter was false and
fraudulent. To date, Attorney Krill has not provided an accounting
of R.G.'s funds or other details regarding the purported private
banking transaction.
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No. 2017AP2435-D
D.R. Matters (Counts 12–17)
¶21 From May 2014 to March 2016, Attorney Krill represented
D.R. in several legal matters. In May 2014, Attorney Krill and
D.R. discussed whether D.R. might participate in one of Murray's
"investment opportunities." Attorney Krill did not disclose to
D.R. that his simultaneous representation of them created a
concurrent conflict of interest and he neither sought nor obtained
written informed consent of each client to the representation.
¶22 In June 2014, Attorney Krill sent D.R. an email stating:
Please find attached a copy of the Inland Revenue
Certificate which requires a payment of $16,500 to
release the $10,500,000.00 and a confirmation of the
wire. [Murray] has $2,500 to invest in this transaction.
He needs $14,000 to complete. For this investment you
will be paid $500,000.00. My investment to date is
$30,000.00. I have been working on this transaction for
two months. Paulinus Blair is the banker in London that
[Murray] is working with to get this transaction
completed. I just got off the phone with him. Mr.
Paulinus confirmed that the $10,500,000.00 wire will be
released by Suntrust Bank in the US within 24 hours of
receipt of the certificate.
¶23 Attorney Krill then forwarded to D.R. a series of
purportedly authentic documents he had received from Murray,
including:
 A letter from the "Home Office Inland Revenue Services"
dated May 20, 2014 allegedly serving as a "letter of
guarantee" for IRS Tax Clearance;
 An undated "Swift Telegraphic Transfer" allegedly
showing a transfer of $10,500,000 to Murray.
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No. 2017AP2435-D
 A certification from a Chinese entity showing indemnity
or bonding coverage in the sum of $16,200,000
benefitting Murray's company, Unite2Jam, Inc.;
 A letter from the Bank of China (Hong Kong) to Natwest
Bank, requesting payment of $78,400 for release of what
was described as a hand over certificate of bond for
the benefit of Murray;
 A "Letter of Guarantee" from the Bank of England to the
Director of the "Foreign Operations Department" of the
Saudi British Bank, seeking the "Final Funds Release
Order" documents;
 A Certified Statement Invoice from HM Revenue and
Customs; and
 A letter from Harvey Graham to Murray stating that upon
receipt of $47,000 we will "immediately proceed to the
H.R.M.C. OFFICE to obtain the required F.D.I.C.C.
Digital signature and complete the transaction without
any further delay."
All these documents were forged and fraudulent. In forwarding the
email and documents to D.R., Attorney Krill recklessly disregarded
whether the documents were forged and fraudulent.
¶24 Relying on Attorney Krill's representations and the
documents Attorney Krill provided him, D.R. gave Attorney Krill
$107,000 to invest with Murray, which Attorney Krill deposited in
his trust account. These funds were the property of J.A. J.A.
had agreed to transfer funds to Attorney Krill based on an
understanding that the funds would be retained in Attorney Krill's
9
No. 2017AP2435-D
trust account until J.A. had sufficient funds to purchase a
building. Attorney Krill wired the funds from his trust account
to foreign banks for deposit in foreign bank accounts within days
after their receipt. Attorney Krill provided no accounting.
¶25 In November 2016, the OLR asked Attorney Krill to detail
the source of certain documents used in connection with these
transactions, the basis for the promises described in the
agreements, the identity of every individual who received the
funds, and where the funds were deposited or held, along with
supporting documentation. Attorney Krill's lawyer sent the OLR a
letter stating that Attorney Krill was in litigation with D.R. and
that while Attorney Krill sought to cooperate with the OLR,
"providing information to your office places Krill at a
disadvantage in the civil lawsuit." The letter contained no
substantive response and included no documentation. Attorney
Krill has not responded to the OLR's requests for information
regarding this matter, and has not provided an accounting of the
funds or other details regarding the transactions.
¶26 Meanwhile, in 2013, a judgment of foreclosure and sale
was entered against a Milwaukee condominium owned by Attorney
Krill. D.R. and Attorney Krill entered into an oral agreement
whereby D.R. agreed to serve as a "straw man" on Attorney Krill's
behalf and to purchase the condominium at the sheriff sale. In
return, Attorney Krill agreed to stay in the condominium, pay
property taxes, and the parties would renegotiate ownership of the
property at a later date.
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No. 2017AP2435-D
¶27 Attorney Krill did not prepare a writing enumerating the
details of the straw man transaction with D.R. D.R. performed the
agreement and purchased the property at the sheriff's sale. On
February 3, 2014, the court confirmed the sale.
¶28 D.R. later asserted that Attorney Krill promised D.R.
that he could keep Attorney Krill's condominium if Murray failed
to repay monies advanced by his entities. In November 2016, D.R.
sued Attorney Krill in Milwaukee County Circuit Court over the
ownership of the condominium.
¶29 In December 2017, the OLR asked Attorney Krill to provide
copies of documents associated with the condominium transaction as
well as details regarding the money provided to Attorney Krill as
part of the Murray transaction. Attorney Krill's lawyer sent the
OLR a letter stating that Attorney Krill was in litigation with
D.R. and that while Attorney Krill sought to cooperate with the
OLR, "providing information to your office places Krill at a
disadvantage in the civil lawsuit." The letter contained no
substantive response and included no documentation.
J.S. Matter (Counts 18-20)
¶30 J.S. sought financing to launch a new business venture.
In late April or early May 2015, Attorney Krill and J.S. discussed
J.S.'s involvement in one of Murray's "investment opportunities."
J.S. loaned $5,400 to Murray. Attorney Krill agreed to guaranty
the return of the loan by executing a promissory note payable to
J.S.
¶31 In May 2015, consistent with the "agreement," J.S. wired
$5,400 to Attorney Krill's trust account in consideration of
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No. 2017AP2435-D
Attorney Krill executing a promissory note payable in 30 days to
J.S. for $5,400 principal and $5,400 interest. The note stated
that "proceeds from this loan shall be used to finalize the release
of funding from Echo Bank, South Africa in the amount of
$1,800,000.00." The note also stated that "[a]s additional
consideration for this loan [J.S.] shall be entitled to a payment
of $300,000.00 from said tranche of funds which will be
incorporated into a total equity investment" in J.S.'s business
venture for which she sought financing. In May 2015, Attorney
Krill issued a check payable to himself from the trust account in
the sum of $5,800.
¶32 The statements in the promissory note regarding the
"release" of funding from Echo Bank in South Africa and the
purported deposit of "$l6.2 million" at the Federal Reserve were
false and fraudulent. Attorney Krill recklessly disregarded
whether the transactions described were false and fraudulent.
¶33 In November 2016, the OLR asked Attorney Krill to respond
to J.S.'s grievance. Attorney Krill responded, but failed to
provide requested information and denied the transaction was
fraudulent. He attached a letter purportedly from the London,
U.K., solicitor, Harvey Graham, denying that Attorney Krill
engaged in any kind of fraudulent transaction. The OLR determined
that the Graham Letter was false and fraudulent. Attorney Krill
has neither repaid J.S. nor provided an accounting.
L.P. Matter (Count 21)
¶34 In response to an inquiry from the OLR, L.P. told the
OLR that Attorney Krill had solicited him to participate in one of
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No. 2017AP2435-D
Murray's "investment opportunities." In May 2015, L.P. gave
Attorney Krill $25,000. Attorney Krill deposited the funds into
his trust account and used the funds to wire transfer $24,600 to
an account in the United Kingdom. The OLR asked Attorney Krill to
detail the various aspects of the transactions. Attorney Krill
received several extensions of time but did not respond to the
OLR.
J.A. Matter (Counts 22-24)
¶35 In November 2014, a fire destroyed commercial property
owned by J.A. With the assistance of D.R. (whose interactions
with Attorney Krill were discussed supra at ¶¶21-29), J.A.
submitted an insurance claim. The parties settled and the insurer
issued a check in the sum of $235,721.32 payable to J.A. The check
was endorsed and D.R. deposited the check into a business account
pending purchase of new property.
¶36 J.A. then retained Attorney Krill for assistance with a
second insurance claim. After the insurance proceeds described
above had been deposited, D.R. told J.A. that Attorney Krill should
hold certain of J.A.'s funds in trust until J.A. found another
property to purchase. During the summer of 2015, D.R. transferred
$107,000 of J.A.'s money into Attorney Krill's trust account for
purposes of investing the funds with one of Murray's "investment
opportunities."
¶37 In January 2016, Attorney Krill prepared an agreement
pursuant to which J.A. agreed to loan funds for a "Private Banking"
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No. 2017AP2435-D
transaction.2 Pursuant to the agreement, J.A. was to be repaid
$235,721 within 30 days after release of the funds from the private
banking transaction and was to receive $500,000 within 60 days of
the release of the funds from the private banking transaction.
J.A. has not received either the entire $235,721 or the $500,000
investment funds that was to be paid under the agreement.
¶38 In September 2017, J.A. filed a grievance against
Attorney Krill with the OLR. The OLR asked Attorney Krill to
detail the various aspects of the transactions and to identify the
transfers of funds made by D.R. Attorney Krill requested follow-
up information and sought several extensions of time, but never
provided the requested information and has not provided J.A. any
accounting for the use of the funds deposited in Attorney Krill's
trust account.3
¶39 Attorney Krill's misconduct violated a number of the
Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys. The stipulation
provided and the referee concluded that by failing to hold client
2 The agreement refers to the sum of $147,000, but the OLR
could only verify the transfer of $107,000 from accounts controlled
by D.R. to Attorney Krill's trust account. Again, these funds
belonged to J.A.
3 On or about October 10, 2017, J.A. filed a claim with the
Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection ("Fund") seeking
reimbursement from the Fund in the sum of $235,721 for the loss
incurred due to Attorney Krill's misconduct in relation to the
insurance proceeds. On or about March 27, 2017, the Fund paid
J.A. the sum of $147,000.
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No. 2017AP2435-D
funds in trust, Attorney Krill violated SCR 20:1.l5(b)(l)4 in the
AMSAH matter (Count 1).
¶40 The stipulation provided and the referee concluded that
by disbursing proceeds without providing his clients or any other
interested party an accounting, Attorney Krill violated former
SCR 20:1.l5(d)(2) and/or SCR 20:1.15(e)(2)5 in the following
client matters: AMSAH (Count 2), R.G (Count 9), D.R. (Count 13)
J.S. (Count 18) and J.A. (Count 22).
4 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provides:
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 3rd
parties that is in the lawyer's possession in connection
with a representation. All funds of clients and 3rd
parties paid to a lawyer or law firm in connection with
a representation shall be deposited in one or more
identifiable trust accounts.
5 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule." See S. Ct.
Order 14-07, 2016 WI 21 (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016).
Because the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1,
2016, unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme
court rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016.
Former SCR 20:1.15(d)(2) was renumbered as
SCR 20:1.15(e)(2). The text of the rule was not changed
and provides:
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a
client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has
received notice that a 3rd party has an interest
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client or
3rd party in writing. Except as stated in this rule or
otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the
client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client
or 3rd party any funds or other property that the client
or 3rd party is entitled to receive.
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No. 2017AP2435-D
¶41 The stipulation provided and the referee concluded that
by making cash withdrawals from his trust account, Attorney Krill
violated former SCR 20:1.l5(j)(3)a. and/or SCR 20:1.15(f)(2)6 in
the AMSAH matter (Counts 3-4).
¶42 The stipulation provided and the referee concluded that
by knowingly making false statements of fact to a tribunal
regarding his purported investment of client funds proceeds,
Attorney Krill violated SCR 20:3.3(a)(l)7 in the AMSAH matter
(Count 5).
¶43 The stipulation provided and the referee concluded that
by knowingly disobeying orders of the court, leading to the court
holding him in contempt, Attorney Krill violated SCR 20:3.4(c)8 in
the AMSAH matter (Count 6).
6Former SCR 20:1.15(j)(3)a. was renumbered as
SCR 20:1.15(f)(2). The text of the rule was not changed and
provides: "No withdrawal of cash shall be made from a trust
account or from a deposit to a trust account. No check shall be
made payable to 'Cash.' No withdrawal shall be made from a trust
account by automated teller or cash dispensing machine."
7SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly
make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made
to the tribunal by the lawyer."
8SCR 20:3.4(c) provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an
open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists."
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No. 2017AP2435-D
¶44 The stipulation provided and the referee concluded that
Attorney Krill violated SCR 20:8.4(c)9 (Misconduct) as follows:
 By disbursing client proceeds without authorization
from his clients or the court, thereby converting the
proceeds (AMSAH Matter, Count 7);
 By drafting and providing R.G. with the NDA and the
agreement while recklessly disregarding whether there
was a non-fraudulent "Private Banking" transaction
(R.G. Matter, Count 10);
 By representing that various documents were legitimate,
while recklessly disregarding whether the documents
were in fact false and/or fraudulent (D.R. Matter, Count
14);
 By making the statements to J.S. in the promissory note
referencing an investment at Echo Bank, South Africa in
the amount of $1,800,000, with a further promise of
payment of $300,000, while recklessly disregarding
whether the statements were false and/or fraudulent
(J.S. Matter, Count 19); and
 By preparing the agreement to ratify the use of J.A's
funds for investment with Attorney Krill's client under
circumstances where he recklessly disregarded
information suggesting that the purported investment
opportunity was fraudulent (J.A. Matter, Count 23).
SCR 20:8.4(c) provides: "It is professional misconduct for
9
a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation."
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No. 2017AP2435-D
¶45 The stipulation further provided and the referee
concluded that by failing to timely respond to the OLR's notice of
formal investigation, failing to provide the OLR information
responsive to the OLR's inquiries, by unilaterally postponing a
scheduled investigative interview, and by providing false and
misleading information to the OLR, Attorney Krill violated
SCR 22.03(2)10 and SCR 22.03(6),11 enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h)12 in
the following matters: AMSAH (Count 8), R.G. (Count 11), D.R.
10 SCR 22.03(2) provides:
Upon commencing an investigation, the director
shall notify the respondent of the matter being
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the
investigation of the matter requires otherwise. The
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts and
circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a
request for a written response. The director may allow
additional time to respond. Following receipt of the
response, the director may conduct further investigation
and may compel the respondent to answer questions,
furnish documents, and present any information deemed
relevant to the investigation.
11SCR 22.03(6) provides: "In the course of the
investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide relevant
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish documents
and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure are
misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted in
the grievance."
12SCR 20:8.4(h) provides: "It is professional misconduct for
a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a grievance
filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required by SCR
21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), or SCR
22.04(1)."
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No. 2017AP2435-D
(Counts 15 and 17), J.S. (Count 20), L.P. (Count 21), and J.A.
(Count 24).
¶46 The stipulation provided and the referee concluded that
by representing Murray in ways that were directly adverse to J.A.
without obtaining the clients' informed consent, Attorney Krill
violated SCR 20:1.7(a)(l)13 (D.R. Matter, Count 12).
¶47 Finally, the stipulation provided and the referee
concluded that by entering into a business transaction regarding
his condominium with his client D.R., without preparing a writing
detailing the terms of the transaction, advising D.R. of the
desirability of seeking counsel, and obtaining D.R.'s informed
consent in writing, Attorney Krill violated SCR 20:1.8(a)14 (D.R.
Matter, Count 16).
13SCR 20:1.7(a)(1) provides: "Except as provided in par.
(b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict
of interest exists if the representation of one client will be
directly adverse to another client."
14 SCR 20:1.8(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not enter into a business
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary
interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the
client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in
writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by
the client;
(2) the client is advised in writing of the
desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable
opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal
counsel on the transaction; and
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No. 2017AP2435-D
¶48 Attorney Krill pled no contest to each of the 24 counts
of misconduct. The parties' stipulation recites that Attorney
Krill understands the allegations of the complaint, that he enters
the stipulation freely, knowingly, and voluntarily, and that he
understands that he had a right to contest the matters and consult
with and be represented by counsel. The parties stipulated that
a three-year suspension was appropriate discipline, to be imposed
retroactive to the date of Attorney Krill's temporary suspension.
The referee agreed, and also recommended restitution and payment
of the judgment entered against Attorney Krill in the AMSAH matter
as a condition of reinstatement, both as stipulated by the parties,
as well as costs.
¶49 No appeal was filed from the referee's report and
recommendation, so our review proceeds pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).
When reviewing a report and recommendation in an attorney
disciplinary proceeding, we affirm a referee's findings of fact
unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740
N.W.2d 125. We review the referee's conclusions of law on a de
novo basis. Id. We determine the appropriate level of discipline
given the particular facts of each case, independent of the
referee's recommendation, but benefitting from it. In Re
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing
signed by the client, to the essential terms of the
transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction,
including whether the lawyer is representing the client
in the transaction.
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No. 2017AP2435-D
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.
¶50 We adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law to
which the parties have stipulated and as adopted by the referee.
We now turn to the appropriate sanction for Attorney Krill's
misconduct.
¶51 A lengthy suspension is clearly required. Indeed, the
OLR initially sought revocation. The parties then stipulated that
a three-year suspension would be appropriate, commencing
retroactive to August 23, 2017, the date when Attorney Krill's
license to practice law was temporarily suspended by this court.
¶52 The referee described this as one of the most serious
cases he has seen. The referee acknowledged that entering into
the stipulation obviated the need for a three-day evidentiary
hearing, but expressed concern that the length of suspension was
insufficient. He noted that Attorney Krill has engaged in delay
tactics throughout these proceedings. Attorney Krill also failed
to cooperate with the OLR's investigation regarding the advance
fee scheme matters. Attorney Krill lied to the circuit court and
was jailed for contempt for failing to comply with the court's
orders to return and account for client money.
¶53 The referee considered three cases involving conversion
in which this court imposed an 18-month license suspension, albeit
for conversion of lesser amounts or where mitigating circumstances
were present. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Jelinske,
2018 WI 94, 383 Wis. 2d 604, 917 N.W.2d 542; In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Voss, 2014 WI 75, 356 Wis. 2d 382, 850
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No. 2017AP2435-D
N.W.2d 190; and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Meisel,
2017 WI 40, 374 Wis. 2d 655, 893 N.W.2d 558. Ultimately, the
referee was persuaded to recommend a three-year suspension,
imposed retroactive to the temporary license suspension.
¶54 After careful deliberation, we conclude that a three-
year suspension, imposed retroactive to the temporary suspension,
is insufficient in light of Attorney Krill’s egregious misconduct.
It is this court's responsibility to determine the appropriate
discipline to be imposed for an attorney's misconduct. In making
that determination, we are free to impose discipline more or less
severe than that recommended by the referee. In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Elliott, 133 Wis. 2d 110, 394 N.W.2d 313
(1986); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz, 2005 WI 39,
279 Wis. 2d 550, 694 N.W.2d 894. In determining discipline we
consider: (1) the seriousness, nature, and extent of the
misconduct; (2) the level of discipline needed to protect the
public, the courts, and the legal system from repetition of the
attorney's misconduct; (3) the need to impress upon the attorney
the seriousness of the misconduct; and (4) the need to deter other
attorneys from committing similar misconduct. In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Mulligan, 2015 WI 96, 365 Wis. 2d 43, 870
N.W.2d 233 (citations omitted).
¶55 We acknowledge the sanctions brief filed with the
referee, in which the OLR provided case law in support of the
recommended three-year suspension. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Gatzke, 2016 WI 37, 368 Wis. 2d 422, 878
N.W.2d 668 (imposing three-year suspension for misconduct
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No. 2017AP2435-D
including the lawyer investing his client's funds in businesses
where Attorney Gatzke was an investor when he did not first obtain
the client's written consent, converting some of these funds, and
then failing to account for the funds); In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against D'Arruda, 2015 WI 62, 362 Wis. 2d 760, 864
N.W.2d 873 (imposing three-year suspension for 42 counts of
misconduct that affected 12 clients, that included violation of
trust account rules, false statements to a tribunal, acts of
dishonesty, and failure to cooperate with the OLR's
investigation).
¶56 However, imposition of a retroactive three-year
suspension would render Attorney Krill eligible to petition for
reinstatement not long after the date of this order, an outcome
the court finds untenable. Moreover, we consider the audacity and
scope of the misconduct extremely troubling. We consider this
case more akin to In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against George,
2008 WI 21, 308 Wis. 2d 50, 746 N.W.2d 236, where we suspended
Attorney George following his conviction in federal court, on entry
of a guilty plea, of one count of conspiracy to commit offenses
against federal program funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 for
his involvement in a plan in which he accepted "kickbacks" in
exchange for exercising his political influence over federal
grants as well as programs financed by state revenues. We have
determined that a four and one-half year suspension is appropriate
in this matter.
¶57 Consistent with our past practice we will make this
suspension retroactive to the date we imposed a temporary
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No. 2017AP2435-D
suspension based on our concern that the misconduct alleged posed
a danger to the public. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Knickmeier, 2004 WI 115, 275 Wis. 2d 69, 683 N.W.2d 445
(attorney's license revocation made effective as of the date of
the court's order temporarily suspending respondent's license).
¶58 We emphasize that Attorney Krill will remained barred
from practicing law in Wisconsin unless and until he proves his
fitness in a formal reinstatement proceeding. Moreover, as a
condition of any future reinstatement, Attorney Krill shall
demonstrate that he has paid the $301,412.41 judgment he owes to
the defendants in City of Racine v. AMSAH, LLC, Racine County
Circuit Court, case no. 2015CV1289.15
¶59 We further agree that Attorney Krill should be ordered
to pay restitution as stipulated by the parties and recommended by
the referee: $17,500 to R.G. and $5,400 to J.S.16
15The referee and the OLR's sanction brief state an amount
of $301.442.41. The complaint and the docket entries from the
Racine County case reflect the amount of the judgment is
$301,412.41. We use this figure. Neither the stipulation nor the
referee specifically required Attorney Krill to satisfy the
$48,000 judgment imposed for contempt sanctions as a condition to
any future reinstatement. However, the question whether this
judgment has been satisfied will be part of the standard
reinstatement inquiry. SCR 22.29(4m).
16With respect to restitution, in its first complaint the OLR
requested the court order Attorney Krill to pay $124,900 in
restitution to D.R. The OLR later determined that these funds
actually belonged to J.A., so it did not pursue this restitution
request.
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No. 2017AP2435-D
¶60 Finally, because this case presents no extraordinary
circumstances and no objection to costs has been filed, we
determine that Attorney Krill should be required to pay the full
costs of this proceeding. See SCR 22.24(1m) (supreme court's
general policy upon a finding of misconduct is to impose all costs
upon the respondent attorney).
¶61 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Michael M. Krill to
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of four and
one-half years, commencing the date of his temporary license
suspension, August 23, 2017.
¶62 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of
this order, Michael M. Krill shall pay as restitution $17,500 to
R.G. and $5,400 to J.S.
¶63 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as a condition of any future
reinstatement, Michael M. Krill shall pay the $301,412.41 judgment
In its first amended complaint, the OLR added a request that
this court award restitution to L.P. in the amount of $25,000.
The OLR later determined that L.P. owed Attorney Krill attorney
fees in excess of this amount. Accordingly, the OLR did not pursue
this restitution request.
In its second amended complaint, the OLR requested the court
direct Attorney Krill to reimburse the Fund for a payment of
$147,000 made to J.A. The OLR later determined that it would not
seek an order directing Attorney Krill to reimburse the Fund with
respect to J.A. The OLR explains, in its restitution statement
filed October 7, 2019, that it has determined that J.A. received
more from the Fund ($124,000) than it could confirm Attorney Krill
transferred from his trust account ($107,000). In addition, in a
related matter, Attorney Krill surrendered his condominium to
D.R., so the OLR has determined that Attorney Krill "gave up more
in the matter than the $107,000 of [J.A.'s] funds actually in his
trust account." We accede to the OLR's recommendation with respect
to restitution in these client matters.
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No. 2017AP2435-D
entered against him in favor of Z.H. and S.A. in City of Racine v.
AMSAH, LLC, Racine County Circuit Court, case no. 2015CV1289.
¶64 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of
this order, Michael M. Krill shall pay to the Office of Lawyer
Regulation the full costs of this proceeding, which are $21,247.90
as of October 23, 2019.
¶65 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the restitution specified
above and satisfaction of the judgment is to be completed prior to
paying costs to the Office of Lawyer Regulation.
¶66 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael M. Krill shall comply
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.
¶67 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement. See
SCR 22.28(2).
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No. 2017AP2435-D
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