Quick Charge Kiosk LLC v. Josh Kaul ( 2020 )


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    2020 WI 54
    SUPREME COURT              OF   WISCONSIN
    CASE NO.:               2018AP947
    COMPLETE TITLE:         Quick Charge Kiosk LLC and Jeremy Hahn,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners,
    v.
    Josh Kaul, in his official capacity as Attorney
    General,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
    Reported at 
    388 Wis. 2d 525
    ,
    934 N.W.2d 18
    PDC No:
    2019 WI App 51
     - Published
    OPINION FILED:          June 12, 2020
    SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
    ORAL ARGUMENT:          April 27, 2020
    SOURCE OF APPEAL:
    COURT:               Circuit
    COUNTY:              Milwaukee
    JUDGE:               John J. DiMotto
    JUSTICES:
    HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous
    Court.
    NOT PARTICIPATING:
    ATTORNEYS:
    For        the   plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners,        there      were
    briefs filed by Ohioma Emil Ovbiagele, Samantha Huddleston, and
    OVB    Law    &      Consulting,    S.C.,   Milwaukee.   There   was    an   oral
    argument by Ohioma Emil Ovbiagele.
    For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by
    Colin T. Roth, assistant attorney general; with whom on the
    brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral
    argument by Colin T. Roth.
    
    2020 WI 54
    NOTICE
    This opinion is subject to further
    editing and modification.   The final
    version will appear in the bound
    volume of the official reports.
    No.    2018AP947
    (L.C. No.   2016CV6655)
    STATE OF WISCONSIN                             :            IN SUPREME COURT
    Quick Charge Kiosk LLC and Jeremy Hahn,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners,
    FILED
    v.
    JUN 12, 2020
    Josh Kaul, in his official capacity as Attorney
    General,                                                             Sheila T. Reiff
    Clerk of Supreme Court
    Defendant-Respondent.
    HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous
    Court.
    REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                  Affirmed.
    ¶1    BRIAN   HAGEDORN,    J.    Quick       Charge    Kiosk     LLC     is   the
    commercial owner of kiosks that enable customers to pay for an
    opportunity to win (or lose) money through a video game based on
    chance.     After its kiosks were deemed illegal gambling machines
    by the attorney general and law enforcement, Quick Charge and
    its owner brought this declaratory judgment action.
    ¶2    Quick Charge asserts that its kiosks are not gambling
    machines     because      they   do   not   satisfy         the      consideration
    No.   2018AP947
    requirement under the gambling machine definition in 
    Wis. Stat. § 945.01
    (3) (2017-18).1             Quick Charge points to the definition of
    consideration for lotteries under § 945.01(5) and an exception
    from that definition for "in-pack chance promotions" under 
    Wis. Stat. § 100.16
    (2).           This same definition and exception should
    apply to gambling machines, Quick Charge contends, suggesting
    its    kiosks       are   legally       compliant     in-pack     chance   promotions.
    Further, Quick Charge argues there is no consideration even if
    the ordinary legal definition of consideration applies because a
    free       play    option    is     available.          We    disagree     with     these
    arguments.
    ¶3        While the lottery statute expressly excludes in-pack
    chance       promotions     from    its    definition        of   consideration,      the
    gambling machine statute does not.                    The logical implication of
    this textual distinction is that meeting the requirements of an
    in-pack chance promotion does not exempt a mechanical device
    from       the    consequences     of    being   an    illegal     gambling      machine.
    Moreover, consideration is present here because the kiosks can
    be used exactly like a standard gambling machine notwithstanding
    a free play option also being available.                     That is, customers can
    pay for an opportunity to obtain something of value by chance.
    We therefore hold that Quick Charge's kiosks meet the definition
    of a gambling machine under 
    Wis. Stat. § 945.01
    (3).
    All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
    1
    the 2017-18 version.
    2
    No.   2018AP947
    I.   BACKGROUND
    ¶4       Jeremy Hahn owns Quick Charge Kiosk LLC, a company
    that places what Quick Charge describes as cellphone charging
    kiosks in various convenience stores and gas stations throughout
    the state.           Resembling in Hahn's words a "penny video poker
    game," Quick Charge constructs the kiosks by modifying standard
    gambling       machine    equipment          purchased           from    third      parties    to
    enable a cellphone charging functionality.
    ¶5       A customer who puts money into a Quick Charge kiosk
    receives two potential benefits.                           First, the kiosk gives the
    customer credits to play a video game on the kiosk's screen with
    a chance to win a cash prize.                         For every dollar inserted, a
    customer       receives    100    credits.                Customers     wager    the    credits
    throughout different rounds and either win or lose those credits
    based on the game's results.                     These results are determined by a
    random     number     generator.            If    all      credits      are   not    lost,     the
    customer       can    print      out    a    ticket         representing         his   or      her
    winnings.        That ticket is redeemable for cash from the store
    where    the    kiosk     is   located.              If    all   credits      are    lost,     the
    customer receives no cash prize and cannot continue playing the
    video game without inserting more money.                          The kiosks' video game
    pays out around 65% of all money inserted.
    ¶6       Inserting money into a kiosk also allows a customer to
    charge a cellphone using the kiosk's attached charging cord.
    Charging time is based on the amount deposited——$1 earns you one
    minute of charging time.                Quick Charge has two different styles
    of   kiosks,     and     their    cellphone           charging       functionalities          work
    3
    No.   2018AP947
    differently.         If customers use a "Quick Charge" kiosk only for
    charging a phone, they can redeem the unused video game credits
    for cash after the charging time expires——100 unused credits
    equals $1.         In other words, charging can be done at no net cost.
    A "Pow'R Up" kiosk, on the other hand, requires the customer to
    play       the   video    game    at   least     once   in    order      to   redeem     any
    credits.
    ¶7        Soon after these kiosks debuted in retail locations,
    the    Attorney      General      opined    that   they      were    illegal        gambling
    machines as defined by 
    Wis. Stat. § 945.01
    (3).                           Several kiosks
    were then seized by law enforcement for violating the statutory
    prohibition on gambling machines.
    ¶8        Quick Charge, along with its owner, responded with a
    declaratory judgment action naming the Attorney General in his
    official capacity.               It sought a declaration that the kiosks
    complied with the in-pack chance promotion exception under 
    Wis. Stat. § 100.16
    (2) and thus were not in violation of any gambling
    laws       under   Wis.   Stat.    ch.     945.     The      circuit     court      granted
    summary judgment in the Attorney General's favor, declaring the
    kiosks illegal gambling machines.2                 The court of appeals affirmed
    that decision, Quick Charge Kiosk LLC v. Kaul, 
    2019 WI App 51
    ,
    ¶1,    
    388 Wis. 2d 525
    ,      
    934 N.W.2d 18
    ,     and       we   granted      Quick
    Charge's petition for review.
    The Honorable John J. DiMotto, Milwaukee County Circuit
    2
    Court, presided.
    4
    No.   2018AP947
    II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶9         We    review       a    summary       judgment       decision    de     novo,
    applying       the     same       methodology         as    the     circuit    court     but
    benefitting from the analyses of both courts below.                             Eichenseer
    v. Madison-Dane Cty. Tavern League, Inc., 
    2008 WI 38
    , ¶30, 
    308 Wis. 2d 684
    , 
    748 N.W.2d 154
    .                    Summary judgment is appropriate
    when there is no genuine issue of material fact and "the moving
    party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."                             
    Wis. Stat. § 802.08
    (2).           The    parties        agree    on    the   material     facts,    but
    dispute questions of statutory interpretation and application.
    These    are    issues       of   law    we    review       independently.          Heritage
    Farms,     Inc.      v.      Markel      Ins.        Co.,    
    2012 WI 26
    ,     ¶24,     
    339 Wis. 2d 125
    , 
    810 N.W.2d 465
    .
    III.    DISCUSSION
    ¶10        Quick    Charge        disputes       that   its     kiosks    are    illegal
    gambling machines under 
    Wis. Stat. § 945.01
    (3)(a).                             The statute
    defines a gambling machine as "[1] a contrivance [2] which for a
    consideration [3] affords the player an opportunity to obtain
    something of value, [4] the award of which is determined by
    chance, even though accompanied by some skill and whether or not
    5
    No.    2018AP947
    the       prize         is     automatically        paid        by         the         machine."
    § 945.01(3)(a).3
    ¶11    Of these four criteria, Quick Charge contests only the
    consideration requirement.4              It does so on two grounds.                        First,
    Quick Charge looks to the lottery subsection which, along with
    the   gambling          machine     definition,         is   found         in       
    Wis. Stat. § 945.01
    .           The        lottery   subsection          contains           a      statutory
    definition of consideration, and includes an exception from that
    definition        for    "in-pack    chance       promotions"        under          
    Wis. Stat. § 100.16
    (2).        § 945.01(5)(b)2.g.            Quick Charge argues that this
    same definition and exception should apply to the consideration
    requirement for gambling machines and that its kiosks are in-
    pack chance promotions under § 100.16(2).                       Second, Quick Charge
    asserts      that        its    kiosks   do       not    meet        the        consideration
    requirement for gambling machines anyway because a free play
    option is available.
    3While 
    Wis. Stat. § 945.01
    (3) defines a gambling machine,
    other statutes set forth the applicable criminal penalties. For
    example, 
    Wis. Stat. § 945.03
    (1m)(e) dictates that anyone who
    "[s]ets up for use for the purpose of gambling or collects the
    proceeds of any gambling machine" is guilty of a felony.     And
    anyone who "[p]ermits a gambling machine to be set up for use
    for the purpose of gambling in a place under his or her control"
    is guilty of a misdemeanor under 
    Wis. Stat. § 945.04
    (1m)(b).
    4As for the other elements, it is clear that Quick Charge's
    kiosks are contrivances (mechanical devices) that afford an
    opportunity to obtain something of value by chance.
    Wisconsin   Stat.   § 945.01(3)(b)   also   provides  three
    exceptions to the gambling machine definition.      Quick Charge
    does not argue that its kiosks meet any of them.
    6
    No.    2018AP947
    ¶12      Wisconsin Stat. § 945.01(5)(a) defines a lottery                         as
    "[1]       an   enterprise       [2]   wherein    for    a   consideration        [3]   the
    participants are given an opportunity to win a prize, [4] the
    award of which is determined by chance, even though accompanied
    by   some       skill."      On    its    face,   this    definition    is       virtually
    identical        to   the    gambling     machine     definition     except       for   its
    application to an "enterprise" rather than to a "contrivance."
    However,        the   different        subsections    contain     one   other      notable
    distinction.            Unlike gambling machines under § 945.01(3), the
    lottery         subsection       specifically      defines       "consideration"        and
    expressly contains nine exceptions from that definition.                                See
    § 945.01(5)(b).5            One of those exceptions is "[u]sing a chance
    promotion exempt under s. 100.16(2)."                    § 945.01(5)(b)2.g.
    ¶13      Wisconsin        Stat.    § 100.16,      found    within     a     chapter
    addressing marketing and trade practices, sets forth a separate
    albeit related prohibition.                  Subsection (1) prohibits selling
    items with the representation or pretense that a prize might be
    included with the purchase (i.e., a prize sale).                           § 100.16(1).
    Subsection        (2)     then    states    that     "[t]his      section"——that        is,
    § 100.16 and its proscription of prize sales——"does not apply to
    5   Wisconsin Stat. § 945.01(5)(b)1. provides:
    "Consideration" in this subsection means anything
    which is a commercial or financial advantage to the
    promoter or a disadvantage to any participant, but
    does not include any advantage to the promoter or
    disadvantage to any participant caused when any
    participant learns from newspapers, magazines and
    other periodicals, radio or television where to send
    the participant's name and address to the promoter.
    7
    No.   2018AP947
    an in-pack chance promotion," followed by seven criteria that
    must be met to qualify for this exception.   § 100.16(2).6    Thus,
    6   Wisconsin Stat. § 100.16 provides:
    (1) No person shall sell or offer to sell anything by
    the representation or pretense that a sum of money or
    something of value, which is uncertain or concealed,
    is enclosed within or may be found with or named upon
    the thing sold, or that will be given to the purchaser
    in   addition   to   the  thing   sold,  or   by   any
    representation, pretense or device by which the
    purchaser is informed or induced to believe that money
    or something else of value may be won or drawn by
    chance by reason of the sale.
    (2) This section does not apply to an in-pack chance
    promotion if all of the following are met:
    (a) Participation is available, free and without
    purchase of the package, from the retailer or by mail
    or toll-free telephone request to the sponsor for
    entry or for a game piece.
    (b) The label of the promotional package and any
    related advertising clearly states any method of
    participation and the scheduled termination date of
    the promotion.
    (c) The sponsor on request provides a retailer with a
    supply of entry forms or game pieces adequate to
    permit free participation in the promotion by the
    retailer's customers.
    (d) The sponsor does not misrepresent a participant's
    chances of winning any prize.
    (e) The sponsor randomly distributes all game pieces
    and maintains records of random distribution for at
    least one year after the termination date of the
    promotion.
    (f) All prizes are randomly awarded if game pieces are
    not used in the promotion.
    (g) The sponsor provides on request of a state agency
    a record of the names and addresses of all winners of
    8
    No.    2018AP947
    an in-pack chance promotion is not a standalone provision.                               It
    is   a    statutory        exception      to    an    illegal    prize     sale.       And,
    connecting          this    with     Quick         Charge's     argument       here,    the
    legislature has also provided that an in-pack chance promotion
    is an exception to what might otherwise be considered an illegal
    lottery.       
    Wis. Stat. § 945.01
    (5)(b)2.g.
    ¶14   Quick Charge contends its kiosks are in-pack chance
    promotions      under      
    Wis. Stat. § 100.16
    (2).       If     so,    they    lack
    consideration         as   defined     for     lotteries.        The     crux     of   Quick
    Charge's       theory        is     that       the       statutory     definition        of
    consideration for lotteries should also be used for gambling
    machines.       If the same definition is used and the kiosks are in-
    pack chance promotions, then the kiosks are not illegal gambling
    machines.       While creative, this theory runs headlong into basic
    principles of statutory interpretation.
    ¶15   It    is    true    that    when      a    particular     term     is    used
    throughout a chapter, we usually understand it to carry the same
    meaning each time.           Bank Mut. v. S.J. Constr., Inc., 
    2010 WI 74
    ,
    ¶31, 
    326 Wis. 2d 521
    , 
    785 N.W.2d 462
    .                       But this principle only
    applies "absent textual or structural clues to the contrary."
    State v. Cox, 
    2018 WI 67
    , ¶17, 
    382 Wis. 2d 338
    , 
    913 N.W.2d 780
    (citation omitted).           Here, contrary clues abound.
    ¶16   While         the          legislature           expressly          defined
    "consideration" for purposes of a lottery, exceptions and all,
    prizes valued at $100 or more, if the request is made
    within one year after the termination date of the
    promotion.
    9
    No.   2018AP947
    it did not do the same for gambling machines.                     And the separate
    gambling provisions are found in the exact same section of the
    Wisconsin       Statutes.        To   make   its    point    crystal   clear,     the
    legislature provided that the lottery provision's definition of
    consideration,         including      its    exclusion       of    in-pack    chance
    promotions, applies only to "this subsection," meaning lotteries
    under 
    Wis. Stat. § 945.01
    (5).                Nothing in the gambling machine
    provision cross-references             lotteries     under § 945.01(5) or         in-
    pack chance promotions under 
    Wis. Stat. § 100.16
    (2).
    ¶17     This textual language is far more than a tip; it is a
    dead       giveaway.      The    legislature      explicitly      excluded   in-pack
    chance promotions from the definition of an illegal lottery, but
    not    an    illegal   gambling       machine.      The     natural   reading,    and
    indeed the only reasonable one, is that the legislature meant
    the exception to apply to lotteries, and not gambling machines.
    Therefore, even if the kiosks met the requirements for in-pack
    chance       promotions     as   defined     in    
    Wis. Stat. § 100.16
    (2),     a
    question we do not need to answer here,7 nothing in any of the
    relevant statutes exempts the kiosks from the consequences of
    In granting the Attorney General summary judgment, the
    7
    circuit court rejected Quick Charge's argument that its kiosks
    met the seven criteria of an in-pack chance promotion under 
    Wis. Stat. § 100.16
    (2).    Below, the court of appeals declined to
    consider those criteria after determining the exception has no
    application under 
    Wis. Stat. § 945.01
    (3).    Quick Charge Kiosk
    LLC v. Kaul, 
    2019 WI App 51
    , ¶¶22, 35 n.9, 
    388 Wis. 2d 525
    , 
    934 N.W.2d 18
    . We do the same here.
    10
    No.    2018AP947
    the legislature's decision to prohibit and criminalize gambling
    machines.8
    ¶18       This brings us to Quick Charge's argument that its
    kiosks otherwise fail to satisfy the consideration requirement
    of the gambling machine definition, which 
    Wis. Stat. § 945.01
    (3)
    does       not   further    define.         When       statutory       language    is    not
    specially         defined    or    technical,       it    is     given    its     "common,
    ordinary, and accepted meaning."                  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit
    Court      for    Dane    Cty.,    
    2004 WI 58
    ,      ¶45,     
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    ,       
    681 N.W.2d 110
    .         And if a word has a distinct meaning in the law——as
    "consideration"          does——it    should       be    given    its     accepted       legal
    meaning.          See    Mueller   v.     TL90108,      LLC,    
    2020 WI 7
    ,     ¶19,   
    390 Wis. 2d 34
    ,        
    938 N.W.2d 566
    .        Black's       Law     Dictionary      defines
    consideration as "[s]omething (such as an act, a forbearance, or
    a return promise) bargained for and received by a promisor from
    a promisee."            Consideration, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed.
    2019).       We apply this definition here as it is consistent with
    Quick Charge offers hypothetical in-pack chance promotions
    8
    facilitated by a machine and wonders whether those too would
    constitute prohibited gambling machines——for example, a bottle-
    cap promotion in which a soda is purchased in a vending machine
    or a fast-food promotion conducted online or through a
    smartphone app.     We need not determine the scope of what
    constitutes a "contrivance" or might otherwise meet the
    definition of a gambling machine or an in-pack chance promotion
    to conclude that the kiosks here meet the gambling machine
    definition in 
    Wis. Stat. § 945.01
    (3).
    11
    No.   2018AP947
    the meaning of consideration in our common law.9                           See, e.g.,
    Story v. Menzies, 
    3 Pin. 329
    , 330-31 (1851) (explaining money
    paid in exchange for credit and a receipt was consideration);
    DOR v. River City Refuse Removal, Inc., 
    2007 WI 27
    , ¶¶50-51, 
    299 Wis. 2d 561
    , 
    729 N.W.2d 396
     (discussing various formulations for
    how Wisconsin courts have defined consideration, notably as a
    benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee, and
    mutual promises for future performance).
    ¶19     The kiosks' video game function wherein customers pay
    for an opportunity to obtain a cash prize falls within this
    understanding of consideration.                 For customers who pay money to
    play the game, consideration occurs in two ways:                         The customer
    first inserts money to receive video game credits.                              Then the
    customer    risks    those      credits    in    the    video    game.      Each      step
    involves    the     customer     trading    something       of    value     (money      or
    credits)    to    obtain   an    opportunity       to    play    the   game     and     win
    something    of      value.        This     bargained-for          exchange        is     a
    paradigmatic example of consideration.
    ¶20     Quick Charge does not really argue otherwise.                        Rather,
    it focuses on the fact that this is not always the case because
    9  The  definition   of  consideration   under the   lottery
    subsection is merely a lottery-focused gloss on this ordinary
    definition of consideration.    See 
    Wis. Stat. § 945.01
    (5)(b)1.
    ("anything which is a commercial or financial advantage to the
    promoter or a disadvantage to any participant").     That's not
    surprising.    Quick Charge's argument that the same word
    generally has the same meaning is usually correct.       But as
    explained above, that does not mean an exception written into
    one subsection should be copied and pasted into a different
    subsection where the exception does not appear.
    12
    No.    2018AP947
    customers   can    play    the       kiosk's   video   game    without       inserting
    their own money.          Although neither has ever been used, Quick
    Charge offers two methods of free play.                  Customers can mail a
    form and self-addressed envelope to Quick Charge, and receive in
    return a certificate that can be exchanged at a retail location
    for one dollar to insert into a kiosk.                        Customers can also
    request a Quick Charge employee play a dollar's worth of credits
    on their behalf and mail out any resulting winnings.
    ¶21     Free play option or not, Quick Charge's argument does
    not overcome the reality that its kiosks can be used as gambling
    machines.        Wisconsin       Stat.    § 945.01(3)     does    not        define   a
    gambling machine as a contrivance whose sole use is gambling.
    It says the opposite, namely, that a "gambling machine is a
    contrivance      which    for    a    consideration    affords    the    player       an
    opportunity to obtain something of value, the award of which is
    determined by chance."               § 945.01(3) (emphasis added).               Quick
    Charge's kiosks afford such an opportunity when a customer pays
    to play the video game.              And when paying for the chance to win
    something   of    value,    the      consideration     element    is    undoubtedly
    13
    No.    2018AP947
    met.        Simply   because     a    kiosk     has   uses   other   than    illegal
    gambling does not negate that reality.10
    ¶22    In sum, because customers can pay to play a video game
    that awards cash prizes based on chance, Quick Charges' kiosks
    are gambling machines under 
    Wis. Stat. § 945.01
    (3)(a).                           This
    conclusion is not affected by the definition of consideration
    for lotteries under § 945.01(5), or that subsection's exclusion
    of   in-pack     chance   promotions          under   
    Wis. Stat. § 100.16
    (2).
    Likewise, the kiosks are no less gambling machines just because
    they    can   also   be   used       for   non-gambling      purposes,      including
    Other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that a free
    10
    play option alone is not decisive evidence regarding whether
    something constitutes a form of illegal gambling.     See, e.g.,
    Barber v. Jefferson Cty. Racing Ass'n, 
    960 So. 2d 599
    , 612-15
    (Ala. 2006) ("Thus, the readers are slot machines as to those
    who pay to play them.      Are they any less so because a few
    patrons play for free? We think not. . . . Gratuitous entries
    obtained by mail or at the race track do not legitimize the
    high-stakes MegaSweeps any more than some opportunity for free
    plays could render innocuous a conventional slot machine."); see
    also 38 Am. Jur. 2d Gambling § 2 ("The opportunity for free
    plays does not negate the element of 'consideration' or obviate
    an inquiry into the purpose and effect of the operation as the
    final proof of consideration.").
    The case Quick Charge cites for countervailing free play
    authority did not actually find a lack of consideration based on
    the availability of such an option.       See Mid-Atl. Coca-Cola
    Bottling Co., Inc. v. Chen, Walsh & Tecler, 
    460 A.2d 44
     (Md.
    1983). At issue there was a Coca-Cola promotion based on bottle
    caps that could be obtained for free or through the purchase of
    various Coca-Cola products.    
    Id. at 104
    .    The Maryland court
    concluded the promotion was not an illegal lottery because there
    was no consideration for the chance to win a prize. 
    Id. at 108
    .
    But that was so because no one paid for a chance as the price of
    Coca-Cola products stayed constant before, during, and after the
    promotion——i.e., every chance to win was a gift. 
    Id.
     The same
    cannot be said for Quick Charge's kiosks.
    14
    No.   2018AP947
    cellphone charging and limited gratuitous use of their video
    game   function.       Therefore,   Quick      Charge's   action     seeking    a
    declaration that its kiosks are not illegal gambling machines
    was correctly denied, and the circuit court properly granted
    summary judgment in the Attorney General's favor.
    By   the   Court.—The   decision   of    the   court   of    appeals    is
    affirmed.
    15
    No.   2018AP947
    1