Sandra Nze v. Uchenna Nwabueze ( 2016 )


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  • Opinion issued January 7, 2016
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-14-01015-CV
    ———————————
    SANDRA NZE, Appellant
    V.
    UCHENNA NWABUEZE, Appellee
    On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
    Fort Bend County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 14-CCV-053717
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant, Sandra Nze, appeals from the county court’s December 12, 2014
    judgment affirming the justice court’s judgment in a forcible-detainer action and
    ordering appellant and all other occupants to vacate the subject premises by
    December 31, 2014. Appellant did not file a supersedeas bond and appellee
    subsequently took possession of the premises at issue pursuant to a writ of
    possession executed on June 22, 2015. Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the
    appeal as moot on the basis that appellant is no longer in possession of the premises
    at issue. We grant appellee’s motion and dismiss the appeal as moot.
    An action for forcible detainer is intended to be a speedy, simple, and
    inexpensive means to obtain immediate possession of property. Marshall v. Hous.
    Auth. of City of San Antonio, 
    198 S.W.3d 782
    , 787 (Tex. 2006) (citation omitted).
    Judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is not intended to be a final
    determination of whether the eviction is wrongful; rather, it is a determination of the
    right to immediate possession. 
    Id. (citing TEX.
    PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.008 (West
    Supp. 2015) (providing that a suit for forcible detainer “does not bar a suit for
    trespass, damages, waste, rent, or mesne profits”)); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e)
    (stating that the only issue before a justice court in eviction cases is “right to actual
    possession and not title”). Accordingly, the only issue in a forcible detainer action is
    the right to possession of the premises. See Geters v. Baytown Hous. Auth., 
    430 S.W.3d 578
    , 582 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
    Because the only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to possession
    of the premises, an appeal in a forcible detainer action becomes moot when the
    appellant ceases to have actual possession of the property, unless the appellant has a
    potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession. See Marshall,
    
    2 198 S.W.3d at 787
    (holding appeal in forcible detainer action was moot because
    lease had expired and tenant presented no basis for claiming right to possession after
    expiration date); 
    Geters, 430 S.W.3d at 582
    . We lack jurisdiction to entertain moot
    controversies. See 
    Geters, 430 S.W.3d at 582
    .
    The record demonstrates that appellant did not supersede the judgment, a writ
    of possession has been executed, and appellant no longer has possession of the
    property at issue in the underlying forcible detainer action. Accordingly, we grant
    the motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction because the appeal is moot.
    See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a); Bey v. ASD Fin., Inc., No. 05-14-00534-CV, 
    2014 WL 4180933
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2014, no pet.) (dismissing appeal of
    forcible detainer action as moot because appellant no longer possessed property at
    issue); McDonald v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 03-13-00770-CV, 
    2014 WL 1433061
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 10, 2014, no pet.) (same). We dismiss all
    other pending motions as moot.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Massengale and Brown.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-14-01015-CV

Filed Date: 1/7/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/7/2016