State of West Virginia v. Rickie L. Greenfield, Jr. , 237 W. Va. 773 ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
September 2016 Term
FILED
September 28, 2016
No. 15-0535 released at 3:00 p.m.
RORY L. PERRY, II CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent
v.
RICKIE L. GREENFIELD JR.,
Defendant Below, Petitioner
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Berkeley County
Honorable Michael D. Lorensen, Judge
Criminal Action No. 13-F-233
AFFIRMED
Submitted: September 13, 2016
Filed: September 28, 2016
B. Craig Manford, Esq. Cheryl K. Saville,
Martinsburg, West Virginia Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Counsel for Petitioner Martinsburg, West Virginia
Counsel for Respondent
JUSTICE LOUGHRY delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “A jury verdict may not ordinarily be impeached based on matters that occur
during the jury’s deliberative process which matters relate to the manner or means the jury
uses to arrive at its verdict.” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Scotchel, 168 W.Va. 545, 285 S.E.2d 384
(1981).
2. “The extent to which prior convictions may be introduced to impeach the
credibility of a witness other than the defendant in a criminal trial rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Syl. Pt. 9, State v. Davis, 176 W.Va. 454, 345 S.E.2d 549
(1986).
3. “A trial court’s evidentiary rulings, as well as its application of the Rules
of Evidence, are subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard.” Syl. Pt. 4, State
v. Rodoussakis, 204 W.Va. 58, 511 S.E.2d 469 (1998).
4. “‘A trial court is afforded wide discretion in determining the admissibility
of videotapes and motion pictures.’ Syllabus Point 1, Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hospital, Inc.,
176 W.Va. 492, 345 S.E.2d 791 (1986).” Syl. Pt. 9, State v. Rodoussakis, 204 W.Va. 58, 511
S.E.2d 469 (1998).
i
5. “The admissibility of photographs over a gruesome objection must be
determined on a case-by-case basis pursuant to Rules 401 through 403 of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence.” Syl. Pt. 8, State v. Derr, 192 W.Va. 165, 451 S.E.2d 731 (1994).
6. “Rule 401 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence requires the trial court
to determine the relevancy of the exhibit on the basis of whether the photograph is probative
as to a fact of consequence in the case. The trial court then must consider whether the
probative value of the exhibit is substantially outweighed by the counterfactors listed in Rule
403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. As to the balancing under Rule 403, the trial
court enjoys broad discretion. The Rule 403 balancing test is essentially a matter of trial
conduct, and the trial court’s discretion will not be overturned absent a showing of clear
abuse.” Syl. Pt. 10, State v. Derr, 192 W.Va. 165, 451 S.E.2d 731 (1994).
7. “To trigger application of the ‘plain error’ doctrine, there must be (1) an
error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Syl. Pt. 7, State v. Miller, 194
W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995).
8. “The function of an appellate court when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
ii
determine whether such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable person
of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).
9. “A criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support
a conviction takes on a heavy burden. An appellate court must review all the evidence,
whether direct or circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must
credit all inferences and credibility assessments that the jury might have drawn in favor of
the prosecution. The evidence need not be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of
guilt so long as the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility determinations
are for a jury and not an appellate court. Finally, a jury verdict should be set aside only when
the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent our prior cases are inconsistent, they are
expressly overruled.” Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).
iii
LOUGHRY, Justice:
The petitioner, Rickie L. Greenfield Jr.,1 appeals the May 4, 2015, order of the
Circuit Court of Berkeley County denying his post-trial motions for a judgment of acquittal
or, alternatively, a new trial. He was convicted of first degree murder for killing his wife by
striking her multiple times in the head with a hammer. The jury did not recommend mercy.
In this appeal of his conviction, the petitioner raises seven assignments of error pertaining
to the following trial issues: length of the jury deliberations, limitation of impeachment
evidence concerning a witness’s prior conviction, allowing the jury to view a witness’s
videotaped statement, admission of a color photograph of the victim, admission of
correspondence the petitioner signed with the nickname “Hammer,” sufficiency of the
evidence to support the conviction, and cumulative error. After a thorough review of the
record on appeal, the parties’ arguments, and the relevant law, we find no error and,
accordingly, affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was indicted for first degree murder for the death of his wife,
Jill Greenfield, in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-2-1 (2014). The case went to trial
in January of 2015, where the State of West Virginia presented the following evidence.
1
The petitioner’s first name is sometimes spelled “Ricky” in the appendix record. The
record does not specify which spelling is correct.
1
After separating from the petitioner, in August of 2013, Ms. Greenfield
continued to live in the former marital residence, an apartment in Martinsburg, West
Virginia. The petitioner moved into the home of his girlfriend, Kristin Strong. At some
point Ms. Strong told the petitioner’s father, Rickie “Rick” Greenfield Sr.,2 that she was
concerned about the petitioner. Rick knew the petitioner and Jill could really “push each
other’s buttons” and that the petitioner had previously threatened to harm or kill Jill, although
Rick had not taken his son’s threat seriously. Acting on Ms. Strong’s concern, Rick spoke
with the petitioner and determined that the petitioner was feeling hurt and wanted his wife
back. When they spoke on the evening of August 21, 2013, Rick and the petitioner discussed
that the petitioner was going to Jill’s apartment that night to drop off his young children.3
Concerned about what his son might do, Rick urged the petitioner to remain calm and not
bring a gun to the apartment. Ms. Strong confirmed that the petitioner and his children left
her home on the night of August 21 for the purpose of taking the children to Jill’s apartment.
At 9:47 p.m. that same night, the petitioner telephoned his father and confessed
that he had just killed Jill by hitting her in the head with a hammer. The petitioner told his
father he had tried to talk to Jill, but he “went crazy” when she said she would “screw” other
2
To avoid confusion, the petitioner Rickie Greenfield Jr. is referred to herein as “the
petitioner,” while his father, Rickie Greenfield Sr., is identified as “Rick Greenfield” or
“Rick.”
3
The petitioner and Jill Greenfield had two daughters together. In August of 2013, the
children were one and three years old.
2
people and she no longer wanted a relationship with him. Rick Greenfield could hear his
grandchildren in the background of the telephone call. Although the petitioner initially told
his father he was “running from the law” and was suicidal, he then agreed not to harm
himself or the children and to turn himself over to the authorities.
The petitioner sent a text message to his sister, Amanda Kellett, at 9:55 p.m.
that night. The message read, “call me 911 emergency.” When Ms. Kellett called him a few
minutes later, the petitioner was crying and confessed that he had just killed Jill with a
hammer. The petitioner stated he had struck Jill “at least fifty times” and “she doesn’t have
a face” anymore. According to Ms. Kellett’s trial testimony, the petitioner said he “snapped”
when Jill told him she would “screw anybody [she] want[ed] to in front of our girls.” Ms.
Kellett also recounted her knowledge of troubles in the petitioner and Jill’s marriage.
Although the petitioner and Jill were separated and the petitioner was in a relationship with
Ms. Strong, Ms. Kellett explained that the petitioner had “a really hard time” when Jill told
him of her relationships with other people. Ms. Kellett testified, “what really made it hard
[was] when Jill no longer wanted him.”
Ms. Strong testified that the petitioner and the children returned to her home
on the night of August 21st. According to Ms. Strong, the petitioner appeared to be scared
and worried, and he told her that Jill had died. Upon being confronted at trial with a written
3
transcript of the videotaped statement she gave to police, Ms. Strong then admitted that the
petitioner had also told her that he had argued with his wife and had killed her by beating
her in the face with a hammer.
Meanwhile, Rick Greenfield was unsure of whether Jill Greenfield was really
dead, as his son had declared over the telephone. Rick and his brother-in-law drove to Jill’s
apartment, found the door locked, and knocked but received no answer. The brother-in-law
called 911 at 10:15 p.m., and the responding police officers broke in the apartment door to
discover the crime scene.
Jill Greenfield’s deceased body was found lying near the edge of the bed in her
bedroom, with her feet on the floor, her pants partly unzipped, and her head covered with a
blanket. When the blanket was removed, police observed that she was covered in blood and
had severe head trauma. There was blood splatter in the bedroom, but no signs of a struggle
anywhere in the apartment. A weathered ball peen hammer, covered in what was later
confirmed to be the victim’s blood, was found on the bed near the body.
The victim’s next-door neighbors, Kaitlin and Colin Shanahan, testified that
on the night of the murder, they left their apartment at 8:30 p.m. and returned at 9:00 p.m.
or shortly thereafter. They did not hear any signs of an attack, but at approximately 9:15 or
4
9:30 p.m.4 they were sitting in their living room when they heard the sounds of heavy
footsteps and of children descending the wooden staircase shared by their apartment and the
Greenfield apartment. The Shanahans recognized these sounds as being made by the
Greenfield children and by the petitioner descending the stairs in his work boots.5
At 10:32 p.m. that night, the petitioner called Rick Greenfield and revealed that
he was at Ms. Strong’s residence. The police immediately went to Ms. Strong’s home and
arrested the petitioner. When he was taken into custody, the petitioner had blood on his shirt
and pants. Subsequent testing by experts at the State Police Laboratory confirmed that this
blood belonged to the victim. Moreover, the police found boxes of miscellaneous tools in
the petitioner’s truck.6
While in a police cruiser being transported to the police station, the petitioner
overheard a radio report about the presence of a coroner at his wife’s address. He asked
Patrolman Scott Shelton whether “they had saved” his wife. The officer disclosed that she
4
The Shanahans were able to recall the time when they heard the footsteps and the
children descending the stairs because Ms. Shanahan had remarked to her husband that the
children should have been in bed at that hour.
5
The petitioner had resided in the apartment next to the Shanahans until his recent
separation.
6
The petitioner was employed as a machine operator. When arrested, he was wearing
his work clothes and boots.
5
was deceased. The petitioner then told the officer that he and his wife had been experiencing
marital problems, they had argued while inside the apartment, and he had “snapped.”7
Dr. Vernard Adams, the expert pathologist who performed an autopsy on the
victim, reported that she had multiple lacerations on her head and face accompanied by
fractures of the underlying bones in several places. The doctor determined that seven or
eight blows had been inflicted, mostly to the front part of the head. The victim’s injuries
included an open fracture over the bridge of her nose that went through the skull and the dura
matter of the brain. Dr. Adams testified that “from all of these wounds of the face, the
contour of the face was depressed. That is[,] it was pushed in and did not rebound.” The
cause of death was determined to be multiple blows inflicted by a small, hard, blunt object,
such as a hammer.
After hearing and deliberating on the evidence presented at the January 2015
trial, the jury found the petitioner guilty of first degree murder and did not recommend
mercy.8 By order entered on May 4, 2015, the circuit court denied the petitioner’s post-trial
7
The circuit court granted a pre-trial motion to suppress the petitioner’s statements
made in the police car. However, as a matter of trial strategy, the petitioner elicited this
evidence during his case-in-chief.
8
The trial was not bifurcated into separate guilt and mercy phases.
6
motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial and sentenced him to life in prison without
the possibility of parole.
II. Standards of Review
The petitioner appeals the circuit court’s order denying his post-trial motions
for a new trial or judgment of acquittal. We apply the following standards when reviewing
a circuit court’s decision to deny a motion for new trial:
In reviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by
a circuit court, we apply a two-pronged deferential standard of
review. We review the rulings of the circuit court concerning a
new trial and its conclusion as to the existence of reversible
error under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the
circuit court’s underlying factual findings under a clearly
erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo
review.
Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Vance, 207 W.Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000). Furthermore, “[t]he Court
applies a de novo standard of review to the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based
upon the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Juntilla, 227 W.Va. 492, 497, 711 S.E.2d 562,
567 (2011) (citing State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 304, 470 S.E.2d 613, 623 (1996)).
Where more particularized standards of review apply to specific assignments of error, they
are set forth below. Accordingly, we proceed to consider whether the petitioner is entitled
to the reversal of his conviction.
7
III. Discussion
A. Length of Jury Deliberations
The petitioner contends it was error for the circuit court to have denied his
motion for a new trial when the jury returned its verdict after deliberating “only seventy
minutes.” He argues that seventy minutes was an insufficient period of time for the jury to
adequately consider the court’s instructions, the witness testimony, and what he reports was
“voluminous” documentary evidence presented during the four-day trial. He suggests the
jury must have been swayed by an emotional response to the brutal nature of the crime.
Arguing there was no error, the State responds that only two days of the trial were devoted
to the admission of evidence; all of the documentary evidence was explained or summarized
by the witness testimony; several of the documents were duplicative;9 and there was
extensive proof of the petitioner’s guilt.
When determining whether a verdict may be impeached based on matters of
jury conduct, we first ascertain whether the challenge is intrinsic or extrinsic to the
deliberative process. For intrinsic matters, we have held that “[a] jury verdict may not
ordinarily be impeached based on matters that occur during the jury’s deliberative process
9
The trial transcript reflects that the exhibits included multiple photocopies of cellular
telephone records and of text messages forensically recovered from cellular telephones. The
information in these documents was summarized and, where relevant, read into the record
by witnesses.
8
which matters relate to the manner or means the jury uses to arrive at its verdict.” Syl. Pt.
1, State v. Scotchel, 168 W.Va. 545, 285 S.E.2d 384 (1981). However, “a jury verdict may
be impeached for matters of misconduct extrinsic to the jury’s deliberative process.” Id. at
545, 285 S.E.2d at 385, syl. pt. 2, in part. There are several reasons for precluding
impeachment of a jury’s verdict based on matters intrinsic to the deliberations:
The reason traditionally advanced to preclude impeachment of
the jury verdict based on what occurred during the jury’s
deliberations is primarily grounded on public policy protecting
the privacy of the jurors. This policy prevents both litigants and
the public from being able to gain access to the jury’s
deliberative process. Inherent in this proposition is the
recognition that ensuring the privacy of the jury’s deliberations
will promote a full, frank and free discussion of all the issues
submitted to the jury. It is also recognized that the very nature
of the deliberative process, which requires the jurors to arrive at
a unanimous verdict, must of necessity require accommodation
of individual views. This process of accommodation should not
be utilized as a means to attack the general verdict. The rule
against impeachment of the verdict also serves to prevent
litigants from attempting to influence or tamper with individual
jurors after the verdict has been rendered. There is also
recognition that limiting impeachment promotes finality of jury
verdicts.
Id. at 548, 285 S.E.2d at 387 (citations omitted).
Elaborating on Scotchel, we explained in State v. Jenner that a challenge to a
jury’s verdict that is based solely upon the length of the deliberations constitutes an intrinsic
challenge that we will not entertain. State v. Jenner, 236 W.Va. 406, 417, 780 S.E.2d 762,
773 (2015). “The length of jury deliberations is necessarily indeterminate[]” and “could
9
signify that the jury found overwhelming evidence of guilt not justifying the possibility of
parole.” Id.; accord State v. Mayle, No. 13-0437, 2014 WL 2782126, at * 4 (W.Va. June 19,
2014) (memorandum decision) (recognizing that length of jury deliberations constitutes
intrinsic challenge to verdict). Relying solely on the length of the deliberations, without
something more, constitutes nothing other than a presumption of juror misconduct. “[T]he
mere allegation of juror misconduct is insufficient to warrant a new trial . . . there must be
proof that some improper event has occurred. Misconduct on the part of the jury as grounds
for a new trial is not presumed but must be fully proved by the moving party.” State v. Trail,
236 W.Va. 167, 175, 778 S.E.2d 616, 624 (2015) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provided an
illuminating discussion on this topic in United States v. Cunningham, 108 F.3d 120 (7th Cir.
1997). When deciding the appeal of a criminal conviction where the jury deliberations had
lasted just ten minutes, the court reasoned that
the time it takes the jury to decide is not the relevant factor. The
weight of the evidence is [the relevant factor]. . . . If we trust
our jury system, we must trust our jurors. Before attaching great
significance to the short time the jury took for deliberations, we
must have reason to suspect that the jury in some way
disregarded its instructions or otherwise failed in its duty. A
brief deliberation cannot, alone, be a basis for an acquittal.
10
Id. at 123-24 (citations omitted). This conclusion is in line with the decisions of other courts.
See B.K. Carpenter, Annotation, Effect on Verdict in Criminal Case of Haste or Shortness
of Time in Which Jury Reached It, 91 A.L.R. 2d 1238 (1963 & Supp. Feb. 2016) (finding no
criminal case in which abbreviated length of deliberations constituted reversible error).
The record shows that the overwhelming weight of the evidence at trial pointed
to the petitioner’s guilt. He confessed to his father, sister, and girlfriend that he killed Ms.
Greenfield by inflicting hammer blows; the victim’s blood was on his clothing; and he was
placed at the scene of the crime.10 The evidence was straightforward and uncomplicated,
with no challenges made to the scientific evidence or the cause of death. The petitioner has
offered nothing but the bare speculation of juror misconduct, and we have no basis upon
which to conclude that the jury ignored its instructions or failed to consider the evidence.
We therefore find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when rejecting this claim.
B. Limitation of Impeachment Evidence
The petitioner asserts error regarding the circuit court’s limitation of the prior
conviction evidence that he offered to impeach a State’s witness. Additional background
information is necessary to discuss this issue.
10
The sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction is further addressed in
section III-F of this opinion.
11
At the beginning of trial, one theory of the petitioner’s case was that someone
else, perhaps a man named Michael Stotler, had killed the victim. Jill Greenfield had been
in a romantic relationship with Mr. Stotler that she ended shortly before her death. Mr.
Stotler testified at trial that he and Ms. Greenfield remained on good terms, he was not angry
with her, and he did not kill her. Arguing that Mr. Stotler’s testimony downplayed his
motive to commit the murder, the petitioner sought to impeach his credibility with evidence
that Mr. Stotler, a firefighter, had been convicted of arson in Virginia in 1986. Because the
conviction was more than ten years old, the circuit court correctly recognized that the
admissibility of this evidence was limited by West Virginia Rule of Evidence 609(b)
(2016).11 The circuit court, after weighing the probative value of the evidence against its
11
The relevant portion of Rule 609, “Impeachment by Evidence of a Criminal
Conviction,” provides:
(a) General Rule.
. . . .
(2) All Witnesses Other Than Criminal Defendants. For the
purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness other than the
accused
(A) evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which the witness was convicted, and
(B) evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
(b) Limit on Using the Evidence After 10 Years. This
subdivision (b) applies if more than 10 years have passed since
the witness’s conviction or release from confinement for it,
whichever is later. Evidence of the conviction is admissible
12
prejudicial effect, determined that the prior conviction was of limited probative value.
However, in an effort to allow the petitioner reasonable latitude in presenting his defense,
the court permitted defense counsel to elicit that Mr. Stotler had an unspecified felony
conviction without identifying the offense or its particulars.
The petitioner argues the circuit court erred by prohibiting his inquiry into the
nature of the 1986 conviction. We review this issue for abuse of discretion. See Syl. Pt. 9,
State v. Davis, 176 W.Va. 454, 345 S.E.2d 549 (1986) (“The extent to which prior
convictions may be introduced to impeach the credibility of a witness other than the
defendant in a criminal trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.”); Syl. Pt. 4,
State v. Rodoussakis, 204 W.Va. 58, 511 S.E.2d 469 (1998) (“A trial court’s evidentiary
rulings, as well as its application of the Rules of Evidence, are subject to review under an
abuse of discretion standard.”).
The record makes clear that impeaching Mr. Stotler with the particulars of his
conviction would have had no probative value in this case. See W.Va. R. Evid. 609(b)(1)
only if the court determines, in the interests of justice, that:
(1) its probative value, supported by specific facts and
circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and
(2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written
notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair
opportunity to contest its use.
13
(directing trial court to determine whether “probative value, supported by specific facts and
circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect”). The conviction was
approximately twenty-nine years ago and concerned arson, a crime different from the
bludgeoning of someone to death with a hammer. Before Mr. Stotler testified, the State had
already offered a plethora of evidence–including the petitioner’s multiple admissions–to
prove that it was the petitioner who killed Jill Greenfield. Indeed, as the evidence was
developed at trial, the petitioner essentially abandoned his theory that someone else was the
perpetrator, focusing instead on reducing the degree of his own criminal culpability and
seeking mercy.
In light of the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the circuit court
could have properly excluded evidence of Mr. Stotler’s conviction in its entirety pursuant to
Rule 609(b). Instead, the trial court granted the petitioner some leeway. The trial court’s
ruling to allow the limited impeachment evidence did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
C. Admission of Video-Recorded Statement
The petitioner argues that the circuit court’s admission into evidence of a video
recording of the statement Ms. Strong gave to police violated West Virginia Rule of
Evidence 403 (2016). He relies on the portion of this Rule that states, “[t]he court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of
14
one or more of the following: . . . undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” Id., in part. According to the petitioner, the video was cumulative
because the prosecutor had already impeached Ms. Strong using a written transcript of her
recorded statement. The State responds that the probative value of the video substantially
outweighed any danger of undue delay or waste of time, and it was not cumulative of other
evidence. Moreover, the State contends that Ms. Strong, who was the petitioner’s girlfriend,
provided multiple evasive answers during her trial testimony that were contradicted by what
she told police in the recorded statement.
The trial court overruled the petitioner’s cumulative objection and found the
video recording had independent evidentiary value. For example, the circuit court
determined that the video would address an issue that arose during Ms. Strong’s testimony
regarding whether the police told her a hammer was used to commit the murder, or whether
the petitioner gave her this information.
Consistent with our standard of review for other evidentiary rulings, “‘[a] trial
court is afforded wide discretion in determining the admissibility of videotapes and motion
pictures.’ Syllabus Point 1, Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hospital, Inc., 176 W.Va. 492, 345
S.E.2d 791 (1986).” Rodoussakis, 204 W.Va. at 61, 511 S.E.2d at 472, syl. pt. 9. The circuit
court gave a logical reason for why it found the video recording to be relevant and not
15
cumulative, and there is nothing in the appendix record or the petitioner’s argument to
demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence.
D. Admission of Color Photograph
The State offered into evidence a single, color photograph of the deceased
victim taken by police at the crime scene. This photograph showed the victim’s fatal injuries,
open eyes, and blood on and around her head. The trial court admitted the photograph over
the petitioner’s objection that it was gruesome and unduly prejudicial.
The test for admissibility of such photographs was set forth in syllabus point
eight of State v. Derr, 192 W.Va. 165, 451 S.E.2d 731 (1994): “The admissibility of
photographs over a gruesome objection must be determined on a case-by-case basis pursuant
to Rules 401 through 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.”12 The Court further
explained that
12
Rule 401 provides, “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” W.Va. R. Evid. 401 (2016). Rule 402 directs that
relevant evidence is admissible unless a constitutional provision, a different rule of evidence,
or a rule of court provides otherwise. W.Va. R. Evid. 402 (2016). Rule 403 provides, “[t]he
court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” W.Va.
R. Evid. 403 (2016).
16
Rule 401 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence requires
the trial court to determine the relevancy of the exhibit on the
basis of whether the photograph is probative as to a fact of
consequence in the case. The trial court then must consider
whether the probative value of the exhibit is substantially
outweighed by the counterfactors listed in Rule 403 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence. As to the balancing under Rule
403, the trial court enjoys broad discretion. The Rule 403
balancing test is essentially a matter of trial conduct, and the
trial court’s discretion will not be overturned absent a showing
of clear abuse.
Id. at 168, 451 S.E.2d at 734, syl. pt. 10.
The circuit court completed this analysis when admitting the photograph, and
the petitioner concedes the photo was relevant pursuant to Rule 401. However, he argues
that in applying the balancing test of Rule 403, the photo should have been admitted in black
and white instead of in color. The petitioner contends that a black and white photo would
have been just as effective in demonstrating the manner and degree of the injuries, and he
claims that “[n]ot evident in the record was the jury’s gasps of shock and horror” when the
color exhibit was published.
The State responds that the photograph was not unfairly prejudicial because
it accurately depicted the injuries to the victim and the condition in which she was found at
the crime scene. The State argues that it was entitled to present its evidence, and the victim’s
condition was probative of the element of malice and the issue of mercy. Finally,
17
considering the amount of blood on and surrounding the victim, the State argues that it is
questionable whether a black and white photograph would show anything other than a field
of gray. When this issue was raised during the post-trial motions, the circuit court agreed
that a black and white photo would not have adequately depicted the gradations of color
necessary for the jury to understand the nature of the injury.
The petitioner’s sole complaint is that the photo was gruesome because it was
in color. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that a black and white photo would not
have accurately depicted the victim’s condition. The State had a legitimate basis for showing
the nature of the crime, the force used, and the extent of the victim’s injuries. The probative
value of this evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect. Consequently, we find no abuse
of discretion in the admission of this exhibit.
E. Evidence the Petitioner Signed Correspondence as “Hammer”
During the State’s direct examination of the petitioner’s girlfriend, the
prosecutor asked whether the petitioner ever signed his letters to her using a nickname or
anything other than his name, “Rickie.” Ms. Strong answered that he had signed as
“Hammer.” The prosecutor then inquired, “The hammer. Did you find that funny?” Ms.
Strong answered, “At first.” Defense counsel made no objection during this exchange.
18
On appeal, the petitioner contends that “the remark” was unwarranted
information intended to inflame the jury, thus constituting prosecutorial misconduct
warranting a new trial. He references the standard this Court set forth in State v. Sugg, 193
W.Va. 388, 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995), for determining whether to reverse a conviction based
upon improper prosecutorial commentary.13 However, the petitioner’s brief is unclear as to
exactly what he is challenging when he says “the remark.” If the petitioner is referencing
Ms. Strong’s answer, “Hammer,” then, as the State correctly observes, her answer was
witness testimony, not a prosecutorial comment. If, instead, the petitioner is referencing the
prosecutor’s follow-up question of whether the witness thought “Hammer” was funny, the
13
Syllabus points five and six of State v. Sugg provide:
5. A judgment of conviction will not be set aside because
of improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney to a jury
which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest
injustice.
6. Four factors are taken into account in determining
whether improper prosecutorial comment is so damaging as to
require reversal: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor’s
remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the
accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3)
absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced
to establish the guilt of the accused; and (4) whether the
comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert
attention to extraneous matters.
193 W.Va. at 393, 456 S.E.2d at 474.
19
circuit court noted that this was asked because Ms. Strong smiled when answering the prior
question.14
In ruling on the petitioner’s post-trial motion, the circuit court found that the
prosecutor had not made any improper comments but, even if she had, the petitioner would
still not be entitled to relief. Applying the Sugg test,15 the circuit court noted that this
exchange between the prosecutor and Ms. Strong was isolated and, absent the exchange,
there remained compelling evidence to establish the petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
For purposes of this opinion, we assume the petitioner is complaining that the
jury heard something about the “Hammer” signature. Because no objection was raised at
trial, we review this issue for plain error. “To trigger application of the ‘plain error’
doctrine, there must be (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and
(4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.”
Syl. Pt. 7, State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995).
14
The circuit court’s recollection of Ms. Strong’s facial expression was set forth on
the record during the hearing on the post-trial motions.
15
See supra, n. 13.
20
The petitioner claims that “obviously” the State obtained a copy of
correspondence containing the signature in question, but failed to disclose the
correspondence in pre-trial discovery. In its appellate response brief, the State proffers that
the prosecution learned this information by listening to recorded jail telephone calls between
the petitioner and Ms. Strong where they talked about his signature, and that the recordings
of these calls were provided to the defense in pre-trial discovery. The pre-trial discovery is
not included in the appendix record on appeal, thus we are unable to independently confirm
the State’s representation. Nonetheless, we note the petitioner did not exercise his
opportunity to dispute this assertion by filing a reply brief. Given the appellate record before
us, we find the petitioner has not demonstrated a pre-trial discovery violation.
Next, the petitioner complains that information about the “Hammer” signature
was so prejudicial as to have improperly inflamed the jury. He argues that the jurors might
have granted the petitioner mercy, or found the petitioner guilty of a lesser-included offense,
if they had not heard about the moniker. We disagree. To affect the petitioner’s substantial
rights, the exchange between the prosecutor and witness “must have affected the outcome
of the proceedings in the circuit court.” See id. at 18, 459 S.E.2d at 129. Even if this isolated
exchange had not occurred, there was more than sufficient evidence for the jury to find the
21
petitioner guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.16 In addition, the jury’s
denial of mercy is supported by, inter alia, the extremely brutal nature of the murder and the
fact that the crime was committed while the victim’s young children were in the apartment.
F. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Conviction
The petitioner argues the circuit court should have granted his motion for a
judgment of acquittal because the State failed to prove first degree murder beyond a
reasonable doubt. When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we review all
of the evidence and accept all inferences from a vantage point most favorable to the State:
The function of an appellate court when reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to
examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether
such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable
person of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus,
the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).
A criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction takes on a heavy burden. An
appellate court must review all the evidence, whether direct or
circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
must credit all inferences and credibility assessments that the
jury might have drawn in favor of the prosecution. The
16
The sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction is discussed in section III-F
of this opinion.
22
evidence need not be inconsistent with every conclusion save
that of guilt so long as the jury can find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Credibility determinations are for a jury and
not an appellate court. Finally, a jury verdict should be set aside
only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it
is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 663, 461 S.E.2d at 169, syl. pt. 3, in part. The evaluation of a sufficiency of the
evidence argument was also discussed in syllabus point two of State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va.
294, 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996):
When a criminal defendant undertakes a sufficiency
challenge, all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, must be
viewed from the prosecutor’s coign of vantage, and the viewer
must accept all reasonable inferences from it that are consistent
with the verdict. This rule requires the trial court judge to
resolve all evidentiary conflicts and credibility questions in the
prosecution’s favor; moreover, as among competing inferences
of which two or more are plausible, the judge must choose the
inference that best fits the prosecution’s theory of guilt.
Id. Finally, this Court may accept any adequate evidence, including circumstantial evidence,
as support for a conviction:
Circumstantial evidence . . . is intrinsically no different from
testimonial evidence. Admittedly, circumstantial evidence may
in some case point to a wholly incorrect result. Yet this is
equally true of testimonial evidence. In both instances, a jury is
asked to weigh the chances that the evidence correctly points to
guilt against the possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous
inference. In both, the jury must use its experience with people
and events in weighing the probabilities. If the jury is
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no more.
23
Guthrie, 194 W.Va. at 668, 461 S.E.2d at 174 (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S.
121, 139-40 (1954)).
To establish first degree murder, the State was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the petitioner committed the intentional, deliberate, and premeditated
killing of Jill Greenfield. See W.Va. Code § 61-2-1; State v. Browning, 199 W.Va. 417, 420,
485 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1997) (reciting elements of first degree murder); Guthrie, 194 W.Va. at 676,
461 S.E.2d at 182 (discussing first degree murder jury instruction). The evidence presented
at trial overwhelmingly proved that it was the petitioner who killed his wife. The forensic
pathologist testified that the victim died from multiple blows to her head; the petitioner
confessed to his father, sister, and girlfriend that he killed his wife by beating her in the head
with a hammer; a bloody hammer was found near the victim; forensic testing established that
the victim’s blood was on the petitioner’s clothing and on the hammer; and the testimony of
multiple witnesses placed the petitioner at the victim’s apartment at the time of the crime.
The petitioner’s suggestion that someone else committed the crime was soundly defeated by
the State’s evidence.
Regarding the element of intent,17 the Court has explained that
17
For first degree murder, the term “malice” is often used interchangeably with
“specific intent to kill” or “intentional killing.” State v. Hatfield, 169 W.Va. 191, 198, 286
S.E.2d 402, 407 (1982); State v. Davis, 205 W.Va. 569, 583, 519 S.E.2d 852, 866 (1999).
24
“[t]he customary manner of proving malice in a murder case is
the presentation of evidence of circumstances surrounding the
killing. State v. Starkey, 161 W.Va. [517] at 522, 244 S.E.2d
[219] at 223 [1978]. Such circumstances may include, inter alia,
the intentional use of a deadly weapon, State v. Toler, 129
W.Va. 575, 579-80, 41 S.E.2d 850, 852-53 (1946), words and
conduct of the accused, State v. Hamrick, 112 W.Va. [157] at
166-67, 163 S.E. [868] at 873 [1932], and, evidence of ill will
or a source of antagonism between the defendant and the
decedent, State v. Brant, 162 W.Va. 762, 252 S.E.2d 901, 903
(1979).” State v. Evans, 172 W.Va. 810, 813, 310 S.E.2d 877,
879 (1983).
State v. White, 231 W.Va. 270, 283-84, 744 S.E.2d 668, 681-82 (2013). The jury’s finding
of malice is supported by the evidence that the petitioner inflicted multiple, savage hammer
blows to his estranged wife’s head. These blows were so numerous and forceful that they
depressed her face and exposed her brain matter. Moreover, the jury heard how the petitioner
was upset that his wife would not agree to reconcile with him and was instead having
relationships with other people.
The focus of the petitioner’s argument on appeal pertains to the elements of
premeditation and deliberation.18 With regard to these elements, the Court has held:
Although premeditation and deliberation are not
measured by any particular period of time, there must be some
period between the formation of the intent to kill and the actual
killing, which indicates the killing is by prior calculation and
18
In addition to first degree murder with or without mercy, the jury was instructed on
the lesser-included offenses of murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter.
25
design. This means there must be an opportunity for some
reflection on the intention to kill after it is formed.
Guthrie, 194 W.Va. at 664, 461 S.E.2d at 170, syl. pt. 5.
In criminal cases where the State seeks a conviction of
first degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation, a
trial court should instruct the jury that murder in the first degree
consists of an intentional, deliberate, and premeditated killing
which means that the killing is done after a period of time for
prior consideration. The duration of that period cannot be
arbitrarily fixed. The time in which to form a deliberate and
premeditated design varies as the minds and temperaments of
people differ and according to the circumstances in which they
may be placed. Any interval of time between the forming of the
intent to kill and the execution of that intent, which is of
sufficient duration for the accused to be fully conscious of what
he intended, is sufficient to support a conviction for first degree
murder.
Id. at 664, 461 S.E.2d at 170, syl. pt. 6, in part. Moreover,
“[a] jury must consider the circumstances in which the killing
occurred to determine whether it fits into the first degree
category. Relevant factors include the relationship of the
accused and the victim and its condition at the time of the
homicide; whether plan or preparation existed either in terms of
the type of weapon utilized or the place where the killing
occurred; and the presence of a reason or motive to deliberately
take life. No factor is controlling. Any one or all taken together
may indicate actual reflection on the decision to kill. This is
what our statute means by ‘willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing.’” State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 675, [n.23,] 461
S.E.2d 163, 181 n. 23 (1995).
Browning, 199 W.Va. at 421, 485 S.E.2d at 5.
26
The petitioner claims there was no evidence that he contemplated killing his
wife or had any opportunity for reflection. The record contradicts this assertion. The
petitioner was upset that his wife was having relationships with other people, instead of
reconciling with him. He had made prior threats to harm or kill her. The petitioner had been
exhibiting behavior of concern to Ms. Strong, causing her to ask his father to speak with him.
Knowing the petitioner was going to his estranged wife’s apartment that night, Rick
Greenfield was worried enough to caution the petitioner against bringing a firearm.
Moreover, even if the petitioner and the victim had argued about her sexual relations with
other people, as the petitioner told his father and sister, that does not explain why he had the
hammer with him. He was supposed to be dropping off their children that night, not
performing work that would require a ball peen hammer. Because there were multiple tools
in the petitioner’s truck, and the hammer used to kill Mrs. Greenfield was a ball peen
hammer in a weathered condition, the jury could have concluded that the petitioner brought
the hammer with him into the apartment. Finally, the petitioner did not inflict just one blow
to his wife; he brought the hammer down upon her face and head at least seven separate
times. Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the petitioner committed first
degree murder.19
19
In his final assignment of error, the petitioner contends that the cumulative weight
of all of the errors at his trial warrant the granting of a new trial. Because we have found no
error in this appeal, the cumulative error doctrine has no application. See, e.g., State v.
27
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the May 4, 2015, order of the Circuit
Court of Berkeley County denying the petitioner’s motions for a judgment of acquittal or,
alternatively, a new trial. The petitioner’s conviction is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
Knuckles, 196 W.Va. 416, 426, 473 S.E.2d 131, 141 (1996).
28