In re Grandparent Visitation of: Siddy W. v. Gary and Darlene T. ( 2018 )


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  •                                                       STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    In re Grandparent Visitation of:                                                     FILED
    Siddy W.,                                                                         June 15, 2018
    EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
    Petitioner Below, Petitioner                                                     SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    vs.) No. 17-0858 (Wayne County 17-D-071)
    Gary T. and Darlene T.,
    Respondents Below, Respondents
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pro se petitioner and paternal grandmother Siddy W. appeals the Circuit Court of Wayne
    County’s September 5, 2017, order denying her appeal from the Family Court of Wayne
    County’s order transferring her petition for grandparent visitation to the Family Court of Cabell
    County.1 Pro se respondents and maternal grandparents Gary T. and Darlene T. filed a response
    in support of the circuit court’s order. Petitioner filed a reply. On appeal, petitioner argues that
    the family and circuit courts erred in applying the statutes governing grandparent visitation by
    transferring the matter to the Family Court of Cabell County for consolidation with an ongoing
    guardianship proceeding. She further alleges error in the family and circuit courts’ application of
    several of the West Virginia Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Court.
    This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    As early as April of 2015, the Family Court of Cabell County exercised jurisdiction over
    the subject children at issue in this appeal by virtue of a domestic violence petition filed by the
    children’s mother against their father. In re Guardianship of K.W., -- W.Va. --, 
    813 S.E.2d 154
    ,
    1
    Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials
    where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 
    235 W.Va. 254
    , 
    773 S.E.2d 20
     (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 
    230 W.Va. 731
    , 
    742 S.E.2d 419
     (2013);
    State v. Brandon B., 
    218 W.Va. 324
    , 
    624 S.E.2d 761
     (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 
    183 W.Va. 641
    , 
    398 S.E.2d 123
     (1990).
    1
    156 (2018). Attendant to that petition, the Family Court of Cabell County entered a domestic
    violence protective order in November of 2015, in which it set forth certain visitation terms
    regarding the children and their father. 
    Id.
     at --, 813 S.E.2d at 157. Upon appointment, the
    guardian ad litem for the children in the Cabell County matter, Arik Paraschos, met with the
    mother, who “provided a lengthy account, in writing, of the extensive and ongoing physical and
    emotional abuse in their home.” Id. Eventually, additional proceedings in family court
    commenced, including divorce proceedings between the parents and a petition for guardianship
    by the maternal grandparents, respondents herein. Id. at --, 813 S.E.2d at 158. Throughout those
    proceedings, Mr. Paraschos remained the children’s guardian. Id. As these proceedings relate to
    the case before the Court, it is important to note that they continued, either in the Family Court of
    Cabell County or on appeal, at the time petitioner herein filed her petition for grandparent
    visitation with the subject children.2
    In March of 2017, petitioner filed a petition for grandparent visitation with the children in
    the Family Court of Wayne County. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
    petition and a motion to change venue of the matter in order to consolidate it with the ongoing
    guardianship proceeding in the Family Court of Cabell County. In the following months, the
    various parties filed motions related to dismissal and transfer of the grandparent visitation matter
    at issue.3
    In April of 2017, the family court held a hearing on the petition for grandparent
    visitation. Ultimately, the family court found that the matter would more properly be heard in the
    Family Court of Cabell County, due to the fact that the family court there had an extended
    history with the children and respondents by virtue of the guardianship proceeding and related
    matters that occurred there. Specifically, the family court found that proceeding in Cabell County
    was in the children’s best interests, given the Family Court of Cabell County’s familiarity with
    the issues. As such, the family court transferred the matter to the Family Court of Cabell County
    and referred the matter with the civil action number pending in that court at the time. The family
    court eventually instructed the guardian to prepare the final order, to which petitioner later filed
    objections before it was entered on June 8, 2017.4
    In June of 2017, petitioner filed an appeal of the family court’s order to the circuit court.
    Ultimately, the circuit court denied the appeal, in part, upon finding that transfer to the Family
    2
    For a more full recitation of the facts as they relate to the various proceedings in the
    Family Court of Cabell County concerning the subject children at issue in this appeal, see this
    Court’s opinion in Guardianship of K.W., -- W.Va. --, 
    813 S.E.2d 154
    .
    3
    The record shows that petitioner filed a motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem
    for the children. It does not appear that this motion was ever ruled on. However, the record
    further shows that Mr. Paraschos appeared in these proceedings to represent the children therein.
    4
    Following the entry of the family court’s final order, petitioner filed a motion to stay the
    order. The record does not reflect a ruling on this motion.
    2
    Court of Cabell County was in the children’s best interests. It is from this order that petitioner
    appeals.
    We have previously held as follows:
    “In reviewing a final order entered by a circuit court judge upon a review
    of, or upon a refusal to review, a final order of a family court judge, we review the
    findings of fact made by the family court judge under the clearly erroneous
    standard, and the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion
    standard. We review questions of law de novo.” Syl., Carr v. Hancock, 
    216 W.Va. 474
    , 
    607 S.E.2d 803
     (2004).
    Syl. Pt. 1, Zickefoose v. Zickefoose, 
    228 W.Va. 708
    , 
    724 S.E.2d 312
     (2012). Further, we have
    established the following:
    A moot case generally cannot properly be considered on its merits. “Moot
    questions or abstract propositions, the decision of which would avail nothing in
    the determination of controverted rights of persons or of property, are not
    properly cognizable by a court.” Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Lilly v. Carter, 
    63 W.Va. 684
    , 
    60 S.E. 873
     (1908). Accord Syl. pt. 1, Tynes v. Shore, 
    117 W.Va. 355
    , 
    185 S.E. 845
     (1936) (“Courts will not ordinarily decide a moot question.”).
    State ex rel. Bluestone Coal Corp v. Mazzone, 
    226 W.Va. 148
    , 156, 
    697 S.E.2d 740
    , 748 (2010).
    Upon our review, we find that all of petitioner’s assignments of error regarding the rulings of the
    family court and circuit court in her petition for appeal are moot, in light of the fact that the
    Circuit Court of Cabell County now has jurisdiction over the subject children.
    On appeal, petitioner essentially seeks a reversal of the circuit court’s order denying her
    appeal from the family court and a remand of the matter to the Family Court of Wayne County
    for a ruling on the merits of her petition for visitation. However, such relief would be
    inappropriate, given our recent opinion regarding the children. In Guardianship of K.W., --
    W.Va. --, 
    813 S.E.2d 154
    , this Court found that prior to May of 2016, the Family Court of Cabell
    County removed respondents’ guardianship matter to the Circuit Court of Cabell County upon
    allegations of abuse and neglect in accordance with Rule 13 of the Rules of Practice and
    Procedure for Minor Guardianship Proceedings5 and Rule 48a of the Rules of Practice and
    5
    Rule 13 states, in relevant part, as follows:
    (a) Removal by Family Court to Circuit Court of Minor Guardianship Cases
    Involving Child Abuse and Neglect. — If a family court learns that the basis,
    in whole or part, of a petition for minor guardianship brought pursuant to 
    W. Va. Code § 44-10-3
    , is an allegation of child abuse and neglect as defined in
    
    W. Va. Code § 49-1-201
    , then the family court before whom the guardianship
    proceeding is pending shall remove the case to the circuit court for hearing.
    (continued . . . )
    3
    Procedure for Family Court.6 Guardianship of K.W., -- W.Va. --, 813 S.E.2d at 158. Ultimately,
    the circuit court remanded the matter to the family court. Id. at --, 813 S.E.2d at 159. On appeal,
    this Court determined that remand to the family court was improper. Id. at --, 813 S.E.2d at 163.
    Should the family court learn of such allegations of child abuse and neglect
    during the hearing, then the family court shall continue the hearing, subject to
    an appropriate temporary guardianship order, and remove the case to the
    circuit court for hearing to be conducted within 10 days, for determination of
    all issues. Once removed, the case (or any portion) shall not be remanded to
    family court. At the circuit court hearing, allegations of child abuse and
    neglect must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Immediately upon
    removal, the circuit clerk shall forthwith send the removal notice to the circuit
    court. Upon receipt of the removal notice, the circuit court shall forthwith
    cause notice to be served in accordance with 
    W. Va. Code § 44-10-3
     and to
    the Department of Health and Human Resources who shall be served with
    notice of the petition, including a copy of the petition, and of the final hearing
    to be conducted before the circuit court. Such notice to the Department of
    Health and Human Resources shall constitute a report by the family and
    circuit courts pursuant to 
    W. Va. Code § 49-2-803
    .
    6
    Rule 48a states, in relevant part, as follows:
    (a) Removal by family court to circuit court of infant guardianship cases
    involving child abuse and neglect. — If a family court learns that the basis, in
    whole or part, of a petition for infant guardianship brought pursuant to W.Va.
    Code §§ 44-10-3, is an allegation of child abuse and neglect as defined in
    W.Va. Code §§ 49-1-3, then the family court before whom the guardianship
    proceeding is pending shall remove the case to the circuit court for hearing.
    Should the family court learn of such allegations of child abuse and neglect
    during the hearing, then the family court shall continue the hearing, subject to
    an appropriate temporary guardianship order, and remove the case to the
    circuit court for hearing to be conducted within 10 days, for determination of
    all issues. Once removed, the case (or any portion) shall not be remanded to
    family court. At the circuit court hearing, allegations of child abuse and
    neglect must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Immediately upon
    removal, the circuit clerk shall forthwith send the removal notice to the circuit
    court. Upon receipt of the removal notice, the circuit court shall forthwith
    cause notice to be served in accordance with 
    W. Va. Code §§ 44-10-3
     and to
    the Department of Health and Human Resources who shall be served with
    notice of the petition, including a copy of the petition, and of the final hearing
    to be conducted before the circuit court. Such notice to the Department of
    Health and Human Resources shall constitute a report by the family and
    circuit courts pursuant to 
    W. Va. Code §§ 49
    -6A-2.
    4
    In remanding the matter back to the Circuit Court of Cabell County, we specifically directed that
    “the circuit court is instructed to provide DHHR leave to file an abuse and neglect petition
    against the parents, if still judged appropriate, and to proceed according to Chapter 49 of the
    West Virginia Code so as to allow for [Child Protective Services] involvement and development
    of a permanency plan for these children.” 
    Id.
     at --, 813 S.E.2d at 164.
    As petitioner correctly notes, “[t]he Grandparent Visitation Act, W.Va.Code § 48-10-101
    et seq. [2001], is the exclusive means through which a grandparent may seek visitation with a
    grandchild.” Syl. Pt. 1, In re Hunter H., 
    231 W.Va. 118
    , 
    744 S.E.2d 228
     (2013). Under that Act,
    “[a] grandparent of a child residing in this state may, by motion or petition, make application to
    the circuit court or family court of the county in which that child resides for an order granting
    visitation with his or her grandchild.” W.Va. Code § 48-10-301. However, we find under the
    limited circumstances of this case that Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and
    Neglect Proceedings (“Rule 6”) controls in this instance, given the Family Court of Cabell
    County’s transfer of the matter to the circuit court upon allegations of abuse and neglect and our
    recent remand to that court for the purpose of granting leave to file an abuse and neglect petition,
    if warranted.
    Rule 6 states, in relevant part, as follows:
    Each child abuse and neglect proceeding shall be maintained on the circuit court’s
    docket until permanent placement of the child has been achieved. The court
    retains exclusive jurisdiction over placement of the child while the case is
    pending, as well as over any subsequent requests for modification, including, but
    not limited to, changes in permanent placement or visitation. . . .7
    Because this Court previously found that the Circuit Court of Cabell County had jurisdiction to
    proceed on the matters related to the children herein, and because our remand to the circuit court
    contemplated further proceedings under Chapter 49 of the West Virginia Code, if warranted, we
    find that Rule 6 grants the Circuit Court of Cabell County continuing jurisdiction over the
    children. Accordingly, the question of whether the courts of Wayne County erred in transferring
    the petition seeking visitation with the children is moot. We further note that consolidating any
    matters involving issues of visitation with, or custody of, the subject children not only serves the
    interests of judicial economy, but also furthers the children’s best interests by having all such
    decisions made by the court that is most familiar with all the attendant circumstances. See
    Kristopher O. v. Mazzone, 
    227 W.Va. 184
    , 192, 
    706 S.E.2d 381
    , 389 (2011) (“[T]he best
    interests of the child is the polar star by which decisions must be made which affect children.”).
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    7
    Rule 6 goes on to list two scenarios in which the circuit court would not retain
    jurisdiction over children that were the subject of abuse and neglect proceedings, neither of
    which are applicable herein.
    5
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: June 15, 2018
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Robin Jean Davis
    Justice Menis E. Ketchum
    Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
    Justice Allen H. Loughry II, suspended and therefore not participating.
    6