Hiram Lewis v. Jim Samples, Prosecutor of Clay Co. ( 2013 )


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  •                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    Hiram Lewis,
    Third-Party Plaintiff Below, Petitioner                                             FILED
    November 12, 2013
    RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    vs) No. 13-0464 (Clay County 12-C-29)                                        SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    Jim Samples, Prosecutor of Clay County,
    Third-Party Defendant Below, Respondent
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner Hiram Lewis, an attorney proceeding in his own interest, appeals the order of the
    Circuit Court of Clay County, entered April 4, 2013, that dismissed with prejudice his third-party
    complaint against the Prosecuting Attorney of Clay County. Respondent Jim Samples, Prosecuting
    Attorney of Clay County, by counsel Stuart A. McMillian and Jared T. Moore, filed a response.
    The Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal.1 The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate
    Procedure.
    Petitioner shot Steven Bogart in the leg on June 13, 2012, in what petitioner alleged was
    self defense. However, respondent brought criminal charges against petitioner for the shooting.
    Petitioner was subsequently found not guilty.
    Mr. Bogart also filed a civil action against petitioner for damages he allegedly suffered as a
    result of the June 13, 2012 incident. During the course of that action, petitioner filed a third-party
    complaint against respondent.2 Respondent moved to dismiss. Following a hearing on February
    21, 2013, the circuit court dismissed with prejudice petitioner’s third-party complaint against
    respondent based on the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. The circuit court explained
    1
    By an order entered May 30, 2013, this Court ordered a transcript of the February 21,
    2013 hearing on respondent’s motion to dismiss be prepared and then delivered to petitioner.
    However, on August 5, 2013, petitioner wrote the Court that he did not intend to file an appendix.
    Therefore, the Court does not address the February 21, 2013 hearing transcript herein.
    2
    At the time of his third-party complaint, the criminal charges against petitioner were still
    pending. Petitioner also filed his third-party complaint against the West Virginia State Police and
    Randy Holcomb, former Sheriff of Clay County. However, this appeal is concerned only with
    respondent’s dismissal.
    1
    that petitioner’s allegations against the Prosecuting Attorney “were intricately associated with the
    judicial process.” Petitioner now appeals the circuit court’s April 4, 2013, dismissal with prejudice
    of respondent.
    “Appellate review of a circuit court’s order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is de
    novo.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W.Va. 770, 
    461 S.E.2d 516
    (1995).
    On appeal, petitioner argues that in Jarvis v. West Virginia State Police, 227 W.Va. 472,
    
    711 S.E.2d 542
    (2010), this Court ruled that a claim could be pursued against a state actor if an
    indictment was procured by fraud, perjury, or falsified evidence. Respondent counters that Jarvis
    addressed police officers’ qualified immunity, and not the immunity of prosecutors who are
    absolutely immune from suit. This Court finds that respondent’s argument is the more persuasive
    because the Court in Jarvis found that a similar cause of action was better characterized as an
    action for “retaliatory inducement to prosecute” by a non-prosecutor such as a law enforcement
    official who influences the prosecutorial decision. The Court stated that, strictly speaking, there
    would never be a cause of action for “retaliatory prosecution” because “[an] action for retaliatory
    prosecution will not be brought against the prosecutor, who is absolutely immune from liability for
    the decision to prosecute.” 227 W.Va. at 
    478, 711 S.E.2d at 548
    (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 
    547 U.S. 250
    , 261-62, 
    126 S. Ct. 1695
    , 1704, 
    164 L. Ed. 2d 441
    , 454 (2006)). (Footnote omitted.)
    “[A]bsolute prosecutorial immunity cannot be defeated by showing that the prosecutor acted
    wrongfully or even maliciously[.]” 227 W.Va. at 478 n. 
    5, 711 S.E.2d at 548
    n. 5 (quoting Mooney
    v. Frazier, 225 W.Va. 358, 370 n. 12, 
    693 S.E.2d 333
    , 345 n. 12 (2010)). Therefore, this Court
    finds that petitioner’s third-party complaint against respondent failed as a matter of law.
    Because of absolute prosecutorial immunity, any claim petitioner would have against
    respondent in connection with the prosecutorial process would fail as a matter of law.
    Accordingly, this Court further finds that petitioner’s alternative argument, that the dismissal of
    his third-party complaint should be designated “without prejudice,” is totally devoid of merit. This
    Court concludes that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: November 12, 2013
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Brent D. Benjamin
    Justice Robin Jean Davis
    Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Menis E. Ketchum
    Justice Allen H. Loughry II
    2