Patrick Mirandy, Warden v. Gregg D. Smith , 237 W. Va. 363 ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 2016 Term FILED
_______________ June 8, 2016
released at 3:00 p.m.
No. 14-1255 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
_______________ OF WEST VIRGINIA
PATRICK MIRANDY, Warden, St. Mary’s Correctional Center,
Respondent Below, Petitioner
v.
GREGG D. SMITH,
Petitioner Below, Respondent
____________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Ritchie County
The Honorable Larry V. Starcher, Senior Status Judge
Criminal Action No. 11-P-19
REVERSED AND REMANDED
____________________________________________________________
Submitted: January 12, 2016
Filed: June 8, 2016
Patrick Morrisey, Esq. Matthew T. Yanni, Esq.
Attorney General Yanni Law Firm
Derek A. Knopp, Esq. Martinsburg, West Virginia
Assistant Attorney General Counsel for the Respondent
Charleston, West Virginia
Counsel for the Petitioner
JUSTICE BENJAMIN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the
circuit court in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We
review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard;
the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law
are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W. Va. 417, 633
S.E.2d 771 (2006).
2. “The purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to ensure that
sentencing courts do not exceed, by the device of multiple punishments, the limits
prescribed by the legislative branch of government, in which lies the substantive power to
define crimes and prescribe punishments.” Syl. pt. 3, State v. Sears, 196 W. Va. 71, 468
S.E.2d 324 (1996).
3. “The Double Jeopardy Clause in Article III, Section 5 of the West
Virginia Constitution, provides immunity from further prosecution where a court having
jurisdiction has acquitted the accused. It protects against a second prosecution for the
same offense after conviction. It also prohibits multiple punishments for the same
offense.” Syl. pt. 1, Conner v. Griffith, 160 W. Va. 680, 238 S.E.2d 529 (1977).
4. “Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
i
offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not.” Syl. pt. 8, State v. Zaccagnini, 172 W. Va. 491, 308 S.E.2d 131(1983).
5. “In ascertaining legislative intent, a court should look initially at the
language of the involved statutes and, if necessary, the legislative history to determine if
the legislature has made a clear expression of its intention to aggregate sentences for
related crimes. If no such clear legislative intent can be discerned, then the court should
analyze the statutes under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), to determine whether each offense requires an element
of proof the other does not. If there is an element of proof that is different, then the
presumption is that the legislature intended to create separate offenses.” Syl. pt. 8, State
v. Gill, 187 W. Va. 136, 416 S.E.2d 253 (1992).
6. “The test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct.
180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), is a rule of statutory construction. The rule is not controlling
where there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.” Syl. pt. 5, State v. Gill,
187 W. Va. 136, 416 S.E.2d 253 (1992).
ii
Benjamin, Justice:
In a December 19, 2014, order, the Circuit Court of Ritchie County
dismissed respondent Gregg D. Smith’s conviction for malicious assault involving a
firearm, determining that his convictions for both malicious assault involving a firearm
and wanton endangerment involving a firearm offended double jeopardy principles. The
petitioner Patrick Mirandy, Warden of St. Mary’s Correctional Center (“the State”)1
appeals, arguing that Gregg Smith’s convictions for both crimes are constitutional. Upon
our review, we conclude that double jeopardy principles have not been violated.
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand this case for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Gregg Smith’s convictions arose from his involvement in a physical
altercation with Thomas Smith on September 7, 2007. During the fight, Gregg Smith
attacked Thomas Smith with a hammer, and then following a struggle over a loaded
1
To the extent that Petitioner Mirandy, in his capacity as the warden of St. Mary’s
Correctional Center, is represented by the Attorney General’s office, we will hereinafter
refer to Petitioner as “the State.”
1
shotgun, Gregg Smith discharged the shotgun into Thomas Smith’s leg. T.L.P.C.,2
Thomas Smith’s minor son, was present during the altercation.
Gregg Smith was subsequently indicted on one count of malicious assault
of Thomas Smith involving a hammer, one count of malicious assault of Thomas Smith
involving a firearm, one count of wanton endangerment of T.L.P.C. involving a firearm,
and one count of attempted murder of Thomas Smith. See W. Va. Code § 61-2-9(a)
(2004) (malicious assault); W. Va. Code § 61-7-12 (1994) (wanton endangerment
involving a firearm); W. Va. Code § 61-11-8 (attempt); W. Va. Code § 61-2-1 (1991)
(2002) (murder). On September 5, 2008, Gregg Smith was convicted by a jury on all four
counts. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two to ten years for each of his
malicious assault convictions, a definite term of five years for his conviction of wanton
endangerment involving a firearm, and three to fifteen years for his conviction of
attempted first degree murder.
After failing to obtain relief in his direct appeal to this Court, Gregg Smith
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Ritchie County on
November 28, 2011. In his petition, filed on his behalf by appointed counsel, he claimed
2
Because Thomas Smith’s son was a minor at the time of the events at issue in
this appeal, pursuant to Rule 40(e) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, we will refer to
him by using his initials.
2
he was entitled to relief on four grounds, one of which alleged a violation of his due
process rights, and three of which alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel. A
multi-day evidentiary hearing was held, after which Gregg Smith filed a memorandum of
law in support of his habeas petition. In addition to addressing the four grounds raised in
the petition, the memorandum of law also alleged that Gregg Smith’s conviction and
sentence for both the malicious assault of Thomas Smith using a firearm and the wanton
endangerment of T.L.P.C. involving a firearm placed Gregg Smith in double jeopardy.
Prior to filing the memorandum of law, Gregg Smith did not mention the double jeopardy
issue in any habeas filings. Similarly, the double jeopardy issue was not raised by his trial
counsel, nor his sentencing and appellate counsel.
On November 7, 2013, the circuit court entered an order rejecting Gregg
Smith’s claims that he was denied due process of law or effective assistance of counsel;
however, the circuit court granted his requested relief in habeas corpus on the ground that
his double jeopardy rights had been violated. The court reasoned that
because all evidence before this [c]ourt is that the firing of the
shotgun that injured Thomas F. Smith was a single volitive
act and because the State of West Virginia has not borne its
burden to show otherwise, this Court finds that convicting
[Gregg Smith] of Malicious Assault and Wanton
Endangerment Involving a Firearm is a violation of [his]
constitutional rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under
the Double Jeopardy Clause in Article III, Section 5 of the
West Virginia Constitution.
3
(emphasis omitted). Essentially, the circuit court concluded that the conviction of wanton
endangerment involving a firearm was a lesser included offense of the malicious assault
using a firearm conviction. To cure the perceived double jeopardy violation, the court
permitted Gregg Smith to choose one of the two offending convictions and its
corresponding sentence to be dismissed. He chose to have his conviction and sentence for
malicious assault with a firearm dismissed.
The State filed an objection to the circuit court’s order granting habeas
corpus relief, asserting that Gregg Smith had never raised the double jeopardy argument
at any point before the evidentiary hearing. The State requested that the court reconsider
its order and hold it in abeyance to allow the State to present evidence with regard to
Respondent’s argument on double jeopardy. The court held another hearing to address
the State’s objections. Exactly one year after it entered an order granting Gregg Smith
relief in habeas corpus, the circuit court entered a final order on November 7, 2013,
reaffirming its grant of habeas corpus relief. On December 19, 2014, the circuit court
entered an order dismissing his conviction and sentence for malicious assault involving a
firearm. The State now appeals the December 19, 2014, order.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether Gregg Smith’s conviction
and sentence for both the malicious assault of Thomas Smith using a firearm and the
4
wanton endangerment of T.L.P.C. involving a firearm offend double jeopardy principles.
Our review of double jeopardy claims is de novo. Syl. pt. 1, State v. McGilton, 229 W.
Va. 554, 557, 729 S.E.2d 876, 879 (2012) (“‘[A] double jeopardy claim [is] reviewed de
novo.’ Syllabus Point 1, in part, State v. Sears, 196 W.Va. 71, 468 S.E.2d 324 (1996).”
(alterations in original)). Specifically regarding the review of habeas corpus actions, we
have held:
In reviewing challenges to the findings and
conclusions of the circuit court in a habeas corpus action, we
apply a three-prong standard of review. We review the final
order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of
discretion standard; the underlying factual findings under a
clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law are subject to
a de novo review.
Syl. pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W. Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006).
III. ANALYSIS
In its sole assignment of error, the State argues that the circuit court erred in
determining that the double jeopardy clauses in our state and federal constitutions
prohibit Gregg Smith’s convictions and sentences for malicious assault of Thomas Smith
using a firearm and wanton endangerment of T.L.P.C. involving a firearm. The State
contends that because each crime contained an element of proof the other did not—a
different victim—the convictions and sentences for those crimes pass constitutional
muster under well-settled state and federal law. Gregg Smith disagrees, arguing that
5
wanton endangerment involving a firearm is a lesser included offense of malicious
assault when predicated on a single act, such as the single gunshot in this case.
The Legislature has “substantive power to define crimes and prescribe
punishments.” Syl. pt. 3, in part, State v. Sears, 196 W. Va. 71, 468 S.E.2d 324 (1996).
This power, though, has its limits; the double jeopardy clauses in both the state and
federal constitutions3 “provide[] immunity from further prosecution where a court having
jurisdiction has acquitted the accused[,] . . . protect[] against a second prosecution for the
same offense after conviction[, and] . . . prohibit[] multiple punishments for the same
offense.” Syl. pt. 1, Conner v. Griffith, 160 W. Va. 680, 238 S.E.2d 529 (1977); accord
syl. pt. 5, State v. Johnson, 197 W. Va. 575, 476 S.E.2d 522 (1996); syl. pt. 7, State v.
Broughton, 196 W. Va. 281, 470 S.E.2d 413 (1996); syl. pt. 2, State v. Gill, 187 W. Va.
136, 416 S.E.2d 253 (1992). In this case, we are asked to determine whether Gregg Smith
has received multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of double jeopardy
principles.
We have observed that
3
Article III, § 5 of the West Virginia Constitution provides, “No person shall . . .
be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offence.” Similarly, Amendment V
to the United States Constitution provides, “No person shall . . . be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”
6
[t]he double jeopardy prohibition against multiple
punishments is usually encountered in two types of cases. The
first is where the defendant is charged with committing both a
lesser included offense and the greater offense. . . . The
second type of case involves instances where there has been
an ongoing criminal scheme such as embezzlement and there
is a question of whether such activity constitutes one crime or
several separate crimes.4
State v. Myers, 171 W. Va. 277, 280, 298 S.E.2d 813, 816 (1982) (footnote added). The
case at bar fits squarely within the first type, because it involves one act constituting a
violation of two separate statutes, one of which the circuit court determined constituted a
lesser included offense set forth in the other. The case does not fall within the second
type, which deals with cases in which a defendant is prosecuted for multiple offenses of
the same statute related to an ongoing criminal scheme.
“Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or
4
The Court recently addressed the second type of case in State ex rel. Lorenzetti v.
Sanders, 235 W. Va. 353, 774 S.E.2d 19 (2015). In Lorenzetti, the defendant was indicted
on fifty-three counts of allegedly used a state-issued purchasing card to make fraudulent
and unauthorized purchases in violation of one specific statute governing purchasing
cards, W. Va. Code § 12-3-10b (1996). 235 W. Va. at 356, 774 S.E.2d at 22. The lower
court determined that the misuse of the purchasing card constituted a continuing offense,
not fifty-three separate offenses, and to avoid running afoul of the double jeopardy
clauses, the court collapsed all fifty-three counts into one count. Id. at 357, 774 S.E.2d at
23. The State filed a writ of prohibition with this Court to prohibit enforcement of the
lower court’s decision. Id. This Court granted the requested relief, concluding that the
unit of prosecution set forth in the controlling statute was each purchase made with the
purchasing card, not the continued use of the card. Id. at 363–64, 774 S.E.2d at 30.
7
only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other
does not.” Syl. pt. 8, State v. Zaccagnini, 172 W. Va. 491, 308 S.E.2d 131 (1983); accord
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). This test, the Blockburger test, is
“traditionally regarded as ‘a rule of statutory construction . . . [based on] . . . [t]he
assumption underlying the rule . . . that [the Legislature] ordinarily does not intend to
punish the same offense under two different statutes.’” Gill, 187 W. Va. at 142, 416
S.E.2d at 259 (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691–92 (1980)); accord
Sears, 196 W. Va. at 82, 468 S.E.2d at 335. “If there is an element of proof that is
different, then the presumption is that the [L]egislature intended to create separate
offenses.” Syl. pt. 8, in part, Gill, 187 W. Va. 136, 416 S.E.2d 253. However, where “the
[L]egislature has made a clear expression of its intention to aggregate sentences for
related crimes,” courts should comply with the expressed legislative intent instead of
evaluating the crimes using the Blockburger test. Syl. pt. 8, in part, id. “The [Blockburger
test] is a rule of statutory construction. The rule is not controlling where there is a clear
indication of contrary legislative intent.” Syl. pt. 5, id.W. Va. Code § 61-2-9(a), sets forth the crime of malicious assault,
providing that “[i]f any person maliciously shoot, stab, cut or wound any person, or by
any means cause him bodily injury with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or kill, he shall,
except where it is otherwise provided, be guilty of a felony.” W. Va. Code § 61-7-12 sets
forth the crime of wanton endangerment involving a firearm, providing, in part, that
8
“[a]ny person who wantonly performs any act with a firearm which creates a substantial
risk of death or serious bodily injury to another shall be guilty of a felony.” The circuit
court determined that under the facts of this case, wanton endangerment of T.L.P.C.
involving a firearm is a lesser included offense of the malicious assault of Thomas Smith.
This Court used the Blockburger test to evaluate the malicious assault
statute and the wanton endangerment involving a firearm statute in State v. Wright, 200
W. Va. 549, 490 S.E.2d 636 (1997). In Wright, the defendant shot and wounded an
acquaintance. 200 W. Va. at 551, 490 S.E.2d at 638. For his action against the
acquaintance, the defendant was ultimately convicted of one count malicious assault and
one count of wanton endangerment, and he was sentenced for each crime. Id. On appeal,
the defendant argued that his conviction and sentence for both crimes placed him in
double jeopardy. Id. at 552, 490 S.E.2d at 639. He alleged that “his convictions for
wanton endangerment [involving a firearm] and malicious assault [were] predicated upon
a single gunshot, which [made] wanton endangerment a lesser-included offense of
malicious assault.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
Upon reviewing the language of the two Code sections at issue, this Court
found “no ‘clear expression of [a legislative] . . . intention to aggregate sentences’ in
these matters. Id. (quoting syl. pt. 8, in part, Gill, 187 W. Va. 136, 416 S.E.2d 253). This
9
Court proceeded to apply the Blockburger test, first setting forth the elements of the
crimes as follows:
[I]n this case, both convictions are predicated on a single act
involving a single gunshot. In this case, the elements of
wanton endangerment include: (1) the defendant (2) did
wantonly perform (3) with a firearm (4) an act (5) creating
substantial risk of (6) death or serious bodily injury to
another. And in this case, the elements of malicious assault
include: (1) the defendant (2) maliciously (3) shot with a
firearm [statute says “shoot, stab, cut or wound”] (4) causing
bodily harm to the victim (5) with intent to maim, disfigure,
disable or kill.
Id. at 553, 490 S.E.2d at 640 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court noted that
[t]he test of determining whether a particular offense is
a lesser included offense is that the lesser offense must be
such that it is impossible to commit the greater offense
without first having committed the lesser offense. An offense
is not a lesser included offense if it requires the inclusion of
an element not required in the greater offense.
Id. (quoting syl. pt. 1, State v. Neider, 170 W. Va. 662, 295 S.E.2d 902 (1982)). In
Wright, we concluded that “[g]iven the circumstances of this case, we find that wanton
endangerment is a lesser included offense because it would have been impossible for Mr.
Wright [the defendant] to have committed malicious assault without first having
committed wanton endangerment.” Id. at 554, 490 S.E.2d at 641. Because his conviction
and punishment for both crimes violated double jeopardy principles, this Court directed
the circuit court to resentence Mr. Wright on remand. Id.10
Although this Court determined in Wright that the defendant’s conviction
and sentence for both crimes placed him in double jeopardy, the Court recognized that
“convictions of both wanton endangerment and malicious assault do not always
constitute double jeopardy.” Id. at 553, 490 S.E.2d at 640. The present matter is one such
instance.
We begin our analysis of the State’s assigned error by observing, as we did
in Wright, that there is no clear legislative intent that the sentences for the crimes of
malicious assault and wanton endangerment involving a firearm be aggregated.
Accordingly, we must apply the Blockburger test. Upon examining the elements of each
crime—malicious assault and wanton endangerment involving a firearm—we find that
each includes the victim as an element. While the Wright defendant’s crimes involved the
same victim, the crimes at issue in the case at bar involve two different victims. Gregg
Smith’s conviction for malicious assault involving a firearm required proof that the
victim was Thomas Smith, whereas his conviction for wanton endangerment involving a
firearm required proof that the victim was T.L.P.C. Application of the Blockburger test
shows that because Gregg Smith committed these crimes against two different victims,
each crime required proof of a fact the other did not. See syl. pt. 8, Zaccagnini, 172 W.
Va. 491, 308 S.E.2d 131 (quoted supra). Therefore, his conviction and sentence for both
crimes do not violate double jeopardy principles.
11
Below, the circuit court relied on State ex rel. Watson v. Ferguson, 166 W.
Va. 337, 274 S.E.2d 440 (1980), to conclude that because one act gave rise to the
crimes—a single shotgun blast—double jeopardy prohibited multiple punishments
premised on that one act. In Watson, the defendant killed four victims on a summer
morning in 1979 by beating them repeatedly with a tire lug wrench. 166 W. Va. at 339,
352, 274 S.E.2d at 441, 448. He was indicted on four counts of first degree murder. Id. at
339, 274 S.E.2d at 441. The Court explored whether the four offenses were “so similar
that they constitute[d] the ‘same offense’ such that under double jeopardy principles . . .
multiple . . . punishments [were] prohibited.” Id. at 346, 274 S.E.2d at 445. The Court’s
analysis focused on whether the acts were all part of “a single volitive act” arising from
the same transaction. Id. at 352, 274 S.E.2d at 448. Relying on prior case law, the Court
said that “we have not confined our double jeopardy test to the same evidence but have
broadened it to include a transactional test at least to the extent . . . that if two persons are
killed by the single volitive act of another, such homicides would be treated as a single
transaction for jeopardy purposes.” Id. at 353, 274 S.E.2d at 448. Under the transactional
test referred to in Watson, “offenses are the same if they grow out of a single criminal act,
occurrence, episode or transaction.” Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Dowdy v. Robinson, 163 W.
Va. 154, 257 S.E.2d 167 (1979).
The Watson Court concluded that the four charges for first degree murder
did not violate double jeopardy principles, holding that “where multiple homicides occur
12
even though they are in close proximity in time, if they are not the result of a single
volitive act of the defendant, they may be tried and punished separately under the double
jeopardy clause of Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution.” Id. at 352–53,
274 S.E.2d at 448 (emphasis added). The circuit court, relying on this language, decided
in its November 7, 2013, order that “because all evidence before this Court is that the
firing of the shotgun that injured Thomas F. Smith was a single volitive act,” Gregg
Smith’s conviction and sentence for both malicious assault and wanton endangerment
involving a firearm placed him in double jeopardy.
First, we observe that Watson dealt with an entirely different double
jeopardy question than the one presented in this case. The case at bar involves a single act
giving rise to a violation of two separate statutory provisions, requiring us to determine,
using the Blockburger test, whether one provision sets forth a crime that is a lesser
included offense of the other provision. Watson, on the other hand, involved multiple
violations of the same statute, and the issue was whether under that statute multiple
punishments could be imposed. In cases like Watson, which involve multiple violations
of the same statute, the Court has said that “it is doubtful that the Blockburger test can be
appropriately utilized to ascertain legislative intent where a single statute is in issue and
the question is whether or not under that statute multiple punishments can be meted out
for one criminal act.” State v. Collins, 174 W. Va. 767, 771, 329 S.E.2d 839, 843 (1984).
13
Second, the Court has explicitly declared that the “same transaction” test,
upon which Watson based its “single volitive act” language, may not be used to decide
whether prosecution and punishment imposed under two distinct statutory provisions
violates double jeopardy principles. State v. Johnson, 197 W. Va. 575, 585, 476 S.E.2d
552, 562 (1996) (“[W]e now state that our current caselaw is that Blockburger is the only
test to be used when determining whether multiple prosecutions have violated the double
jeopardy constitutional provisions in the state and federal constitutions.”), superseded by
rule on other grounds as recognized in State v. Larry A.H., 230 W. Va. 709, 742 S.E.2d
125 (2013).5
Thus, the circuit court’s reliance on Watson to conclude that Gregg Smith’s
single shotgun blast into Thomas Smith’s leg could constitute only one crime was in
error.6 As we established, supra, under the appropriate test—the Blockburger test—
Gregg Smith’s convictions and sentences do not violate due process principles.
IV. CONCLUSION
5
A strictly procedural version of the “same transaction” test, addressing joinder of
offenses, has been integrated into Rule 8(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
6
In addition to Watson, the circuit court relied upon State v. Collins, 174 W. Va.
767, 329 S.E.2d 839 (1984), in granting the petitioner’s requested relief in habeas corpus.
Because the double jeopardy issue in Collins involved multiple violations of one statutory
provision, like Watson, it is not instructive in our analysis of the present case.
14
Upon our de novo review, we conclude that the circuit court erroneously
determined that Gregg Smith’s double jeopardy rights had been violated. By granting his
requested relief in habeas corpus on this ground, the circuit court abused its discretion.
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s December 19, 2014, order dismissing Gregg
Smith’s conviction for malicious assault and remand this case for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
15