In Re: R.H. ( 2014 )


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  •                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    In Re: R.H.                                                                   November 24, 2014
    RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 14-0517 (Roane County 13-JA-04)                                            OF WEST VIRGINIA
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner Mother, by counsel Christen M. Justice, appeals the May 7, 2014, order of the
    Circuit Court of Roane County that terminated her parental rights to ten-year-old R.H. The
    child’s guardian ad litem, Anita Harold Ashley, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s
    order. The Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by counsel S.L. Evans, also
    filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order. On appeal, petitioner argues that the
    circuit court erred when it (1) allowed the DHHR to file an amended abuse and neglect petition
    after the adjudicatory hearing, (2) found that petitioner abused and/or neglected the subject child,
    (3) denied petitioner’s motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period, and (4) terminated
    petitioner’s parental rights to the subject child.
    This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    In April of 2013, the DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition against petitioner, the
    child’s unknown father, and the child’s maternal grandparents. The petition alleged that
    petitioner abused the child by allowing him to live in the maternal grandparents’ home, where
    the child was abused and neglected by his grandparents, and neglected the child by refusing to
    supply him with the necessary food, clothing, shelter, supervision, medical care, and education
    while petitioner lived in Florida. The petition stated that the child disclosed to school officials
    that on April 18, 2013, his grandfather beat him approximately thirty times on his back, arm,
    face, and chest, leaving severe bruises, after the grandfather accused the child of lying about
    brushing his teeth. The petition also alleged that the child reported that (1) a regular form of
    punishment at his grandparents’ home was to sit in one spot of the living room for the entire day,
    with breaks only to use the bathroom and to eat one sandwich; (2) the grandfather called the
    child a “lying bastard” and a “f----ing bastard; (3) the child is permitted to eat only one meal a
    day at the grandparents’ home; (4) the child is fearful of his grandfather; and (5) the grandfather
    once threw the child so high up into the air that the child’s hands hit the ceiling and wall. All
    parties waived their rights to a preliminary hearing.
    At the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing in May of 2013, the circuit court found that
    the child had been living with his maternal grandparents for almost two years and that there was
    evidence that sustained findings of abuse and neglect against the grandparents, but not against
    1
    petitioner. Following these findings, the circuit court granted petitioner’s attorney’s motion for a
    home study. The DHHR subsequently conducted a multidisciplinary treatment (“MDT”) meeting
    with the grandparents.
    At a hearing in August of 2013, the DHHR moved to amend the underlying abuse and
    neglect petition, in light of new information from the MDT meeting that supported new
    allegations of abandonment against petitioner. The DHHR stated that the amended petition
    would allege that ongoing abuse and neglect proceedings against petitioner in Florida alleged
    abandonment. The DHHR also stated that since the DHHR filed the original petition in the
    instant case, petitioner had not made any efforts to appear at the hearings or maintain contact
    with her attorney, the DHHR, or the child. The DHHR alleged that this behavior demonstrated
    petitioner’s abandonment of the case and the child. After none of the parties objected to the
    DHHR filing an amended petition based on these new allegations, the circuit court granted the
    DHHR’s motion. Subsequently, the DHHR filed its amended abuse and neglect petition
    containing allegations of abandonment.
    Following the filing of the DHHR’s amended petition, the circuit court heard testimony
    from the family’s Child Protective Services (“CPS”) worker and the child’s maternal
    grandmother. Petitioner did not appear at the hearing, but was represented by counsel. The CPS
    worker testified that she and petitioner had only spoken once and that petitioner had not
    attempted to visit the child or provide any financial support during the proceedings. The child’s
    maternal grandmother testified that petitioner “told a lot of lies” and that petitioner had a pending
    abuse and neglect case in Florida that contained allegations of abandonment against her. Based
    on this evidence, the circuit court found clear and convincing evidence that petitioner abandoned
    the case and subject child. Petitioner thereafter moved for a post-adjudicatory improvement
    period.
    In November of 2013, petitioner appeared for a hearing thereon. Petitioner testified that
    although she knew of her father’s history with child abuse through her personal experience with
    him, she did not have reservations about sending her child to West Virginia to live with him.
    Petitioner further testified that she questioned the validity of her parents’ testimony concerning
    her lack of contact with the child and the testimony that petitioner had knowledge of hearings
    scheduled in the matter. The circuit court denied petitioner’s motion for a post-adjudicatory
    improvement period based on findings that petitioner failed to regularly appear in the case, failed
    to visit or retrieve her child despite knowledge of the maternal grandfather’s abuse, failed to
    accept responsibility of her failures to act, and failed to provide any sufficient reasons as to why
    she failed to check on the child in nearly six months or see the child in nearly two years.
    At the dispositional hearing in February of 2014, petitioner did not appear, and the CPS
    worker testified that petitioner attended only one hearing in the case and inadequately
    communicated with her attorney. Following the dispositional hearing, the circuit court found that
    there was no reasonable likelihood that petitioner could substantially correct the conditions of
    abuse and neglect and that termination was necessary for the child’s welfare. The circuit court
    terminated petitioner’s parental rights by an order entered in May of 2014. Petitioner now
    appeals.
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    This Court has previously established the following standard of review:
    “Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de
    novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the
    facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the
    evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether
    such child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a
    reviewing court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when,
    although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire
    evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
    committed. However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply
    because it would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if
    the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record
    viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 
    196 W.Va. 223
    ,
    
    470 S.E.2d 177
     (1996).
    Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 
    228 W.Va. 89
    , 
    717 S.E.2d 873
     (2011).
    Upon our review of the record, we find no error by the circuit court granting the DHHR’s
    motion to file an amended petition. We have often stated that “[g]enerally the failure to object
    constitutes a waiver of the right to raise the matter on appeal.” State v. Asbury, 
    187 W.Va. 87
    ,
    91, 
    415 S.E.2d 891
    , 895 (1992). The record clearly shows that none of the parties objected to the
    DHHR’s motion to file an amended petition based on new allegations of petitioner’s
    abandonment of the child. Even if we were to review the merits of petitioner’s argument,
    however, we would find no error. Rule 19(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child
    Abuse and Neglect states as follows:
    If new allegations arise after the final adjudicatory hearing, the allegations should
    be included in an amended petition rather than in a separate petition in a new civil
    action, and the final adjudicatory hearing shall be re-opened for the purpose of
    hearing evidence on the new allegations in the amended petition.
    The record reveals that the amended petition contained new allegations concerning petitioner’s
    abandonment of the child based on information learned after the first adjudicatory hearing.
    Accordingly, the circuit court properly heard further evidence on these allegations in the same
    underlying abuse and neglect proceeding.
    We also find no error by the circuit court in finding that petitioner’s abandonment of the
    child constituted abuse and neglect. We have recognized the following:
    “A parent has the natural right to the custody of his or her infant child and, unless
    the parent is an unfit person because of misconduct, neglect, immorality
    abandonment, or other dereliction of duty . . ., the right of the parent to the
    custody of his or her infant child will be recognized and enforced by the courts.”
    3
    Syl., in part, State ex rel. Kiger v. Hancock, 
    153 W.Va. 404
    , 
    168 S.E.2d 798
     (1969). The record
    is clear that petitioner did not maintain contact with the family’s CPS worker, her attorney, or her
    child, and only appeared at one hearing, despite knowledge and notice of the ongoing
    proceedings. Petitioner’s testimony at the one hearing she attended also shows that she had no
    knowledge of what grade her child was in or how he was progressing in school.
    The Court further finds no error in the circuit court denying petitioner’s motion for a
    post-adjudicatory improvement period. Under West Virginia Code § 49-6-12(b), a circuit court
    has the discretion to grant a subject parent a post-adjudicatory improvement period if the parent
    demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that he or she would fully participate in an
    improvement period. We have further recognized that an improvement period is futile if the
    subject parent has failed to acknowledge the existence of the problem. W.Va. Dept. of Health and
    Human Res. ex rel. Wright v. Doris S., 
    197 W.Va. 489
    , 498, 
    475 S.E.2d 865
    , 874 (1996). We
    have held that “in the context of abuse and neglect proceedings, the circuit court is the entity
    charged with weighing the credibility of witnesses and rendering findings of fact.” In re Emily,
    
    208 W.Va. 325
    , 339, 
    540 S.E.2d 542
    , 556 (2000) (citing Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re Travis W., 
    206 W.Va. 478
    , 
    525 S.E.2d 669
     (1999)). The record demonstrates that petitioner disagreed with prior
    testimony and evidence that she had knowledge of the ongoing proceedings and that she failed to
    maintain a presence in her child’s life. Further, our review of the transcripts shows that petitioner
    was reluctant to acknowledge the abuse and neglect allegations pertaining to her father, despite
    knowledge of his history with physical abuse.
    Lastly, we find no error in the circuit court terminating petitioner’s parental rights. Under
    West Virginia Code § 49-6-5(b)(4), a parent’s abandonment of a child constitutes a circumstance
    in which there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be
    substantially corrected. The previously discussed evidence supports the circuit court’s
    termination of petitioner’s parental rights based on its findings that she abandoned the child and
    that termination was necessary for the child’s best interests. Pursuant to West Virginia Code §
    49-6-5(a)(6), circuit courts are directed to terminate parental rights upon such findings.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the May 7, 2014, order of the Circuit Court of
    Roane County terminating petitioner’s parental rights to R.H.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: November 24, 2014
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Robin Jean Davis
    Justice Brent D. Benjamin
    Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Menis E. Ketchum
    Justice Allen H. Loughry II
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