Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. John F. Hussell ( 2014 )


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  • No. 13-0544 Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Hussell
    FILED
    November 25, 2014
    RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    Justice Workman, concurring:
    I concur with the decision of the majority in this case. As explained by the
    majority, the HPS found that attorney John Hussell violated the West Virginia Rules of
    Professional Conduct and recommended that Mr. Hussell be sanctioned by suspension for
    ninety days, supervised practice for one year, psychiatric treatment, and reimbursement of
    costs. In the vast majority of lawyer disciplinary cases, this Court adopts such findings and
    recommendations. However, this Court has the ultimate decision-making authority on
    lawyer ethics and on occasion decides to set the matter for full hearing, after which it may
    accept or modify the HPS recommendations. As succinctly stated in Committee on Legal
    Ethics v. McCorkle, 192 W.Va. 286, 
    452 S.E.2d 377
    (1994), “this Court independently
    examines each case on its own merits in determining what, if any, disciplinary action is
    warranted.” 192 W.Va. at 
    290, 452 S.E.2d at 381
    .1 Ironically, this matter was set for a full
    1
    Rule 3.12 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure provides:
    If the parties consent to the recommended disposition, the matter shall
    (continued...)
    1
    hearing due to our concerns regarding possible over-leniency in this disciplinary action
    against lawyer John Hussell.
    Having examined this matter in its entirety, with due regard to the applicable
    standards of review,2 it is now clear that there is no factual dispute that the sexual
    1
    (...continued)
    be filed with the Supreme Court of Appeals for entry of an order consistent
    with the recommended disposition. If the Court does not concur with the
    recommended disposition, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals shall
    promptly establish a briefing schedule and notify the parties of the date and
    time of oral argument or submission of the case without oral argument before
    the Supreme Court of Appeals. Whenever the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
    advocates any position before the Supreme Court of Appeals which differs
    from findings of fact, conclusions of law, or recommended disposition of the
    Hearing Panel Subcommittee, it shall provide notice to the Hearing Panel
    Subcommittee, whether by service of a copy of its brief or otherwise, and the
    Hearing Panel Subcommittee shall be permitted, if it so desires, to file, within
    thirty days of receipt of such notice, its own brief before the Supreme Court
    of Appeals, in support of its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
    recommended disposition. Following oral argument or submission of the case
    without oral argument, the Court will file an opinion or order disposing of the
    case. Unless otherwise provided in the Court’s opinion or order, any sanction
    will not take effect until after expiration of the rehearing period or the denial
    of any petition for rehearing.
    2
    “A de novo standard applies to a review of the adjudicatory record made for the
    Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar [currently, the Hearing Panel
    Subcommittee of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board] as to questions of law, questions of
    application of the law to the facts, and questions of appropriate sanctions; this Court gives
    respectful consideration to the Committee’s recommendations while ultimately exercising
    its own independent judgment. On the other hand, substantial deference is given to the
    Committee’s finding of fact, unless such findings are not supported by reliable, probative,
    and substantial evidence on the whole record.” McCorkle, 192 W.Va. at 
    287, 452 S.E.2d at 378
    , syl. pt. 3.
    2
    relationship between Mr. Hussell and Mrs. Carolyn L. did not commence until all legal
    representation in the estate planning matters had concluded. Again, there is no factual
    dispute that Mr. James L. discharged Mr. Hussell as attorney in these matters and that no
    further legal representation by Mr. Hussell was thereafter undertaken. What muddies up the
    waters is that, prior to Mr. James L. terminating Mr. Hussell, a letter outlining the “rules” of
    continued joint representation of the L’s designed to protect each of their interests had been
    sent to the L’s. It is unclear why Mr. L signed and returned the letter in view of the fact that
    he had just fired Mr. Hussell shortly before.
    Additionally, the HPS felt that Mr. Hussell improperly represented Mrs.
    Carolyn L. in connection with the divorce pending between the L’s by giving her legal advice
    on marital property and alimony matters. Mr. Hussell did not undertake any type of
    representation of Mrs. L. in the divorce matter. Consequently, the majority concludes that
    Mr. Hussell did not commit an ethical violation sanctionable by the West Virginia Rules of
    Professional Conduct. Had the evidence demonstrated that a sexual relationship existed
    between Mr. Hussell and Carolyn L. during Mr. Hussell’s legal representation of her and/or
    her husband, this Court unquestionably would have found violations of the Rules of
    Professional Conduct, and Mr. Hussell would have been sanctioned accordingly.
    The wiser course for Mr. Hussell to have followed was to memorialize the
    termination of the legal representation agreement in this matter by means of an unequivocal
    3
    disengagement letter by Mr. Hussell. Although there is no current ethical rule that requires
    such a disengagement letter, if an attorney wishes to avoid allegations of ethics violations for
    questionable conduct with a former client, he or she would be well-advised to specifically
    and emphatically memorialize key elements of the process of legal representation and its
    termination.
    In consequence of our full review of this record, I must concur with the
    majority that the HPS failed to prove the charges contained in its report by clear and
    convincing evidence.3 Hopefully, though, this case will capture the attention of the Bar for
    the principle that attorneys should document termination of representation agreements for
    both the clients’ protection as well as the lawyers’ protection.
    3
    Rule 3.7 of the West Virginia Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure states: “In
    order to recommend the imposition of discipline of any lawyer, the allegations of the formal
    charge must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-0544

Filed Date: 11/25/2014

Precedential Status: Separate Opinion

Modified Date: 11/26/2014