State of West Virginia v. Randy Cleveland ( 2015 )


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  •                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    State of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below,                                        January 12, 2015
    Respondent                                                                     RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    vs) No. 13-1262 (Monongalia County 13-F-36)
    Randy Cleveland, Defendant Below,
    Petitioner
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner Randy Cleveland, by counsel Timothy Gentilozzi, appeals the Circuit Court of
    Monongalia County’s sentencing order entered on December 4, 2013, following his conviction
    of battery. The State of West Virginia, by counsel Derek Knopp, filed a response. On appeal,
    petitioner argues the circuit court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal.
    This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    In January of 2013, petitioner was indicted by the Monongalia County Grand Jury on one
    count of malicious assault following an altercation outside of a bar. On March 1, 2013, petitioner
    filed notice of the affirmative defense of self-defense, wherein he admitted that he stabbed the
    victim twice in self-defense. Following a jury trial in October of 2013, petitioner was convicted of
    the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery pursuant to West Virginia Code § 61-2-9(c).1
    On November 4, 2013, petitioner filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground of
    an inconsistent jury verdict. Petitioner argues that giving the jury a lesser included instruction on
    the verdict form led to an inconsistent verdict because it was impossible to be found guilty of
    battery based upon his affirmative defense of self-defense. By order entered on December 4,
    2013, the circuit court denied petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to a
    period of incarceration for one year. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for
    judgment of acquittal because the verdict was inconsistent. In support of his position, petitioner
    1
    The circuit court instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses of unlawful assault
    and battery. The circuit court also instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of self-defense.
    1
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    maintains that it is impossible to be found guilty of the lesser included offense of battery because
    he was acquitted of malicious assault and the lesser included offense of unlawful assault based
    on his affirmative defense of self-defense. We disagree.
    Upon our review, we find no error in the circuit court’s order denying petitioner’s motion
    for judgment of acquittal. This Court has previously held that “‘[a]ppellate review of a claim of
    inconsistent verdicts is not generally available.’ State v. Hall, 
    174 W.Va. 599
    , 
    328 S.E.2d 206
    (1985).” Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Bartlett, 
    177 W.Va. 663
    , 
    355 S.E.2d 913
     (1987). Even if appellate
    review of a claim of inconsistent verdicts were reviewable, it is clear from a review of the record
    that the verdict was not inconsistent. The evidence is undisputed that petitioner admitted to
    stabbing the victim twice.
    It is well established that “[o]nce there is sufficient evidence to create a reasonable doubt
    that the . . . defendant act[ed] in self-defense, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
    doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.” Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Kirtley, 
    162 W.Va. 249
    ,
    
    252 S.E.2d 374
     (1978). Furthermore, “‘[i]t is peculiarly within the province of the jury to weigh
    the evidence upon the question of self-defense, and the verdict of a jury adverse to that defense
    will not be set aside unless it is manifestly against the weight of the evidence.’ Syllabus point 5,
    State v. McMillion, 
    104 W.Va. 1
    , 
    138 S.E. 732
     (1927).” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Whittaker, 
    221 W.Va. 117
    , 
    650 S.E.2d 216
     (2007). Petitioner’s argument is based on the unsupported premise that the
    jury acquitted him of malicious assault and unlawful assault based upon his affirmative defense
    of self-defense. “The jury is the trier of the fact and in performing that duty it is the sole judge as
    to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Bailey, 
    151 W.Va. 796
    , 
    155 S.E.2d 850
     (1967). See State v. Clark, 
    175 W.Va. 58
    , 62, 
    331 S.E.2d 496
    , 500
    (1985) (“We have historically been reluctant to interfere with a jury verdict rejecting a claim of
    self-defense”). The jury could have concluded that the prosecution rebutted the presumption that
    petitioner did not act in self-defense, but that the State only proved beyond a reasonable doubt
    that petitioner was guilty of battery. Therefore, the jury’s guilty verdict of battery is not
    inconsistent with its acquittal of malicious assault and unlawful assault.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: January 12, 2015
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Robin Jean Davis
    Justice Brent D. Benjamin
    Justice Menis E. Ketchum
    Justice Allen H. Loughry II
    2
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