Sheri M. Comer v. Elizabeth S. Bloch ( 2015 )


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  •                               STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    Sheri M. Comer, Plaintiff Below,                                                 January 12, 2015
    Petitioner                                                                     RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    vs) No. 14-0055 (Kanawha County 12-C-51)
    Elizabeth S. Bloch, Defendant Below,
    Respondent
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner Sheri M. Comer, by counsel J. David Fenwick, appeals the Circuit Court of
    Kanawha County’s December 13, 2013, order denying her motion for a new trial. Respondent
    Elizabeth Bloch, by counsel Kirk Lightner, filed a response. On appeal, petitioner argues that the
    circuit court erred in denying her motion for a new trial.
    This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    On May 6, 2011, the automobile operated by respondent struck the rear of the automobile
    operated by petitioner. At the time of the impact, petitioner had stopped her automobile and was
    waiting to enter traffic, headed eastbound, on MacCorkle Avenue in Charleston, West Virginia.
    Following the accident, petitioner filed a complaint alleging negligence and seeking
    $49,021.67 in economic and non-economic damages. Respondent denied that petitioner’s neck
    and back injuries were a direct and proximate result of the automobile accident. Respondent
    further argued that petitioner’s own acts were comparatively negligent. Thereafter, respondent
    admitted liability and a jury trial commenced on September 9, 2013. Petitioner presented
    evidence that she suffered $49,021.67 in damages as a result of the automobile accident.1
    Respondent disputed that petitioner’s medical bills were incurred as a direct result of the
    accident.
    The case was submitted to the jury with no objections to the jury instructions. During
    deliberations, the jury submitted a written question to the circuit court that stated, “Judge Stucky:
    1
    The record does not contain a copy of the trial transcript or evidence that was submitted
    in the underlying proceeding.
    1
    ­
    The jurors would like to ascertain if any or all of the $49,021.67 has been paid by the plaintiff,
    Sheri M. Comer.” After discussing the matter with counsel, the circuit court responded, “You
    have heard all of the evidence.”2 On September 13, 2013, the jury awarded petitioner $7,502.50,
    which represented her actual medical expenses to date.
    After trial, and pursuant to Rule 59 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure,
    petitioner moved for a new trial arguing that the circuit court should have reinstructed the jury
    because the jury was confused about its role or the applicable law. Respondent objected, arguing
    that petitioner failed to make an objection on the record and that the jury weighed the evidence
    and awarded an amount that was attributable to the accident. After conducting a hearing on
    petitioner’s motion, the circuit court entered an order denying her motion. It is from this order
    that petitioner now appeals.
    On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion for a new
    trial because the circuit court failed to reinstruct the jury. In support of her position, petitioner
    maintains that the circuit court was required to reinstruct the jury because the jury was confused
    about its role or the applicable law.
    In terms of our standard of review of the grant or denial of a new trial, we have held:
    This Court reviews the rulings of the circuit court concerning a new trial
    and its conclusion as to the existence of reversible error under an abuse of
    discretion standard, and we review the circuit court’s underlying factual findings
    under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo
    review.
    Syl. Pt. 1, The Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Rice, 
    230 W. Va. 105
    , 
    736 S.E.2d 338
     (2012).
    This Court held that “‘[w]here it clearly and objectively appears in a criminal case from
    statements of jurors that the jury has failed to comprehend an instruction on a critical element of
    the crime or a constitutionally protected right, the trial court must, on request of defense counsel,
    reinstruct the jury.’ Syl. Pt. 2, State v. McClure, 
    163 W.Va. 33
    , 
    253 S.E.2d 555
     (1979).” King v.
    Ferguson, 
    198 W.Va. 307
    , 
    480 S.E.2d 516
     (1996)
    After carefully examining the limited record on appeal, as well as the arguments of the
    parties, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. The transcript reveals that
    petitioner’s counsel failed to properly request that the jury be reinstructed in accordance with our
    case law. A new trial should not be granted “unless it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error
    has crept into the record or that substantial justice has not been done.” In re State Pub. Bldg.
    Asbestos Litig., 
    193 W.Va. 119
    , 124, 
    454 S.E.2d 413
     418 (1994). The record does not support
    that prejudicial error crept into the record or substantial injustice has not been done. While
    respondent admitted liability, she contested that petitioner’s medical bills were proximately
    2
    Petitioner’s counsel suggested that the circuit court should have stated that “[t]he answer
    to this question is irrelevant.”
    2
    ­
    related to the accident. The conflicting amounts of medical bills that were attributable to the
    accident was a matter for the jury to decide. After properly considering all of the evidence, the
    jury returned a verdict for petitioner, but for less than she sought. The fact that the verdict was
    less than petitioner sought does not mean that the jury was confused about its role, the applicable
    law, or substantial justice has not been done. For the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of
    discretion in the circuit court denying petitioner’s motion for a new trial.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: January 12, 2015
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Robin Jean Davis
    Justice Brent D. Benjamin
    Justice Menis E. Ketchum
    Justice Allen H. Loughry II
    3
    ­
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-0055

Filed Date: 1/12/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2015