Jay Lawrence Smith v. Teresa Tarr, W. Va. Judicial Investigation Commission ( 2015 )


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  •                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    Jay Lawrence Smith,
    Plaintiff Below, Petitioner                                                       FILED
    January 12, 2015
    vs.) No. 13-1230 (Kanawha County 13-C-483)                                   RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    Teresa Tarr, in her capacity as counsel
    for the West Virginia Judicial Investigation
    Commission; and the West Virginia
    Judicial Investigation Commission,
    Defendants Below, Respondents
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner Jay Lawrence Smith, by counsel Michael T. Clifford and Richelle K. Garlow,
    appeals the Circuit Court of Kanawha County’s October 23, 2013, order granting respondents’
    motion to dismiss this civil action. Respondents Teresa Tarr, in her official capacity as counsel
    for the West Virginia Judicial Investigation Commission (“JIC”), and the West Virginia Judicial
    Investigation Commission, a governmental agency, by counsel John M. Hedges and Stephanie J.
    Shepherd, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order. Additionally, the Court
    acknowledges the filing of amicus curiae briefs by the West Virginia Judicial Association, the
    Defense Trial Counsel of West Virginia, and the West Virginia Association for Justice.
    This Court has considered the briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    On September 7, 2012, petitioner, a freelance news reporter, sent a West Virginia
    Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)1 request to respondents for “[t]he total number of
    [judicial ethics] complaints filed by year” against twenty-seven West Virginia circuit and family
    court judges identified by name. Petitioner stated in his request that respondents provided similar
    information to another individual on or about August 25, 2012.2 On September 24, 2012,
    1
    See W.Va. Code §§ 29B-1-1 through -7.
    2
    Respondents maintain that they changed their policy regarding disclosure of judicial
    ethics complaint filings after August 25, 2012, in order to comply with Rule 2.4 of the West
    Virginia Rules of Judicial Disciplinary Procedure. Further, respondents assert that any prior
    disclosures do not obviate Rule 2.4 and are irrelevant to petitioner’s FOIA requests. We agree
    1
    respondents denied petitioner’s FOIA request on the grounds that (a) the request lacked a
    specific timeframe3 and (b) under the confidentiality requirements set forth in the West Virginia
    Rules of Judicial Disciplinary Procedure, the requested information was confidential. Months of
    correspondence followed between petitioner and respondents regarding the September 24, 2012,
    denial. Petitioner ultimately clarified the timeframe of his request as the time from each of the
    named judges’ investiture until the time of the request.
    On January 31, 2013, petitioner renewed his September 7, 2012, request and also
    submitted a request for the same information for seven additional West Virginia judges.
    Respondents denied petitioner’s requests.4
    On March 12, 2013, petitioner filed the present action against respondents in the Circuit
    Court of Kanawha County for declaratory and injunctive relief. Petitioner asserted that the
    information he requested on September 7, 2012, and January 31, 2013, was not exempt from
    FOIA and that he was entitled to an award of litigation costs and fees. Respondents moved to
    dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure
    for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In that motion, respondents argued
    that the class of information sought by petitioner was exempt from disclosure, pursuant to West
    Virginia Code §§ 29B-1-4(a)(2) and -4(a)(5).5 Respondents relied upon Rule 2.4 of the West
    Virginia Rules of Judicial Disciplinary Procedure to satisfy West Virginia Code § 29B-1­
    with respondents that any prior disclosures are not relevant to the outcome of the case presently
    before us.
    3
    West Virginia Code § 29B-1-3(4) provides, in part, “[a]ll requests for information must
    state with reasonable specificity the information sought.”
    4
    The record on appeal indicates that respondents received two separate FOIA requests
    from petitioner on January 28, 2013, and January 30, 2013, that are not at issue in this appeal. In
    February of 2013, respondents granted petitioner’s requests and released statistical information
    regarding the total number of judicial ethics complaints filed by calendar year between 2001 and
    2012. Importantly, however, this statistical information did not include the names of the
    complainants, the judges named therein, or any details of the complaints or investigations.
    5
    W.Va. Code § 29B-1-4(a)(2) provides an exemption from FOIA disclosure for
    [i]nformation of a personal nature such as that kept in a personal, medical or
    similar file, if the public disclosure thereof would constitute an unreasonable
    invasion of privacy, unless the public interest by clear and convincing evidence
    requires disclosure in the particular instance: Provided, That nothing in this article
    shall be construed as precluding an individual from inspecting or copying his or
    her own personal, medical or similar file.
    W.Va. Code § 29B-1-4(a)(5) provides an exemption from FOIA disclosure for
    “[i]nformation specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.”
    2
    4(a)(5).6 In reply, petitioner claimed that Rule 2.4 violated the open courts clause of the West
    Virginia Constitution.7 Following a hearing held on September 16, 2013,8 the circuit court
    granted respondents’ motion to dismiss the compliant. This appeal followed.
    This Court has long held that “[a]ppellate review of a circuit court’s order granting a
    motion to dismiss a complaint is de novo.” Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott
    Runyan Pontiac–Buick, Inc., 
    194 W.Va. 770
    , 
    461 S.E.2d 516
     (1995). Further, in assessing a
    plaintiff’s appeal from a circuit court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
    claim upon which relief can be granted, allegations contained in the complaint must be accepted
    as true and construed most favorably in the plaintiff’s behalf. See Appalachian Regional
    Healthcare, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 
    232 W.Va. 388
    , 397, 
    752 S.E.2d 419
    , 428 (2013); Adams v. Ireland, 
    207 W.Va. 1
    , 
    528 S.E.2d 197
     (1999); Doe v. Wal-
    Mart Stores, Inc., 
    198 W.Va. 100
    , 105, 
    479 S.E.2d 610
    , 615 (1996); Garrison v. Herbert J.
    Thomas Memorial Hosp. Ass’n, 
    190 W.Va. 214
    , 
    438 S.E.2d 6
     (1993). However, we have also
    explained that “[d]ismissal for failure to state a claim is proper ‘where it is clear that no relief
    could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.’”
    Mey v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, 
    228 W.Va. 48
    , 
    717 S.E.2d 235
     (2011) (internal citations
    omitted); see also Franklin D. Cleckley, Robin J. Davis, & Louis J. Palmer, Jr., Litigation
    Handbook on West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure § 12(b)(6)[2], at 348 (“[a]lthough a
    plaintiff’s burden in resisting a motion to dismiss is a relatively light one, the plaintiff is still
    required at a minimum to set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of his/her claim.
    If plaintiff fails to do so, dismissal is proper. . . .”) (footnotes omitted). Finally, as this matter
    rests on clear questions of law, we also note that “[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit
    court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo
    standard of review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 
    194 W.Va. 138
    , 
    459 S.E.2d 415
    (1995).
    On appeal, petitioner assigns error to the circuit court’s dismissal of his civil action. He
    maintains that, if his complaint were taken as true, he set forth sufficient allegations to prove that
    respondents violated FOIA. He also argues that the circuit court erroneously construed his FOIA
    6
    In this case, the circuit court applied Rule 2.4 to satisfy West Virginia Code § 29B-1­
    4(a)(5)’s exemption by “statute.” Respondents and all three amicus curiae support the circuit
    court’s application of Rule 2.4 arguing that a rule duly promulgated by this Court carries the
    force and effect of statutory law. See Syl. Pt. 10, Teter v. Old Colony Co., 
    190 W.Va. 711
    , 
    441 S.E.2d 728
     (1994) (“Under Article VIII, Section 8 [and Section 3] of the Constitution of West
    Virginia (commonly known as the Judicial Reorganization Amendment), administrative rules
    promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia have the force and effect of
    statutory law and operate to supersede any law that is in conflict with them.”) (internal citations
    omitted). Petitioner does not raise this issue as error on appeal, and he cites to no portion of the
    record where he contested this issue below. Therefore, we do not address this issue.
    7
    West Virginia Constitution, Article III, Section 17, provides, in part, that “[t]he courts of
    this state shall be open[.]”
    8
    The record on appeal does not contain a transcript of the September 16, 2013, hearing.
    3
    requests as requests for information concerning judicial ethics complaints for which no probable
    cause had been found, and, further, that Rule 2.4 is unconstitutional, pursuant to Daily Gazette
    Company v. The Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar, 
    174 W.Va. 359
    , 
    326 S.E.2d 705
     (1984) and Charleston Gazette d/b/a Daily Gazette Co. v. Smithers, 
    232 W.Va. 449
    ,
    
    752 S.E.2d 603
     (2013). Respondents, on the other hand, joined by all three amicus curiae, argue
    that the circuit court correctly dismissed this action because Rule 2.4 is constitutional and
    necessarily prevents disclosure of meritless judicial ethics complaints prior to a finding of
    probable cause. Based on our review of the record on appeal, we find no error in the circuit
    court’s order granting respondents’ motion.
    FOIA provides every person the “right to inspect or copy any public record of a public
    body in this state, except as otherwise expressly provided[.]” W.Va. Code § 29B-1-3(1).9 We
    have held that “‘[t]he disclosure provisions of this State’s Freedom of Information Act, W.Va.
    Code, 29B–1–1 et seq., as amended, are to be liberally construed, and the exemptions to such
    Act are to be strictly construed. W.Va. Code, 29B–1–1 [1977].’ Syl. Pt. 4, Hechler v. Casey, 
    175 W.Va. 434
    , 
    333 S.E.2d 799
     (1985).” Smithers at 449, 752 S.E.2d at 603, syl. pt. 3. Pursuant to
    West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(a)(5), a record custodian is not required to disclose
    “[i]nformation specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.” When a person files a judicial
    ethics complaint against a member of the West Virginia judiciary as provided by the West
    Virginia Rules of Judicial Disciplinary Procedure, Rule 2.4 restricts as confidential the details of
    that complaint and subsequent investigation prior to a finding of probable cause under Rule 2.7.
    Rule 2.4 provides as follows:
    The details of complaints filed or investigations conducted by the Office of
    Disciplinary Counsel shall be confidential, except that when a complaint has been
    filed or an investigation has been initiated, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
    may release information confirming or denying the existence of a complaint or
    investigation, explaining the procedural aspects of the complaint or investigation,
    or defending the right of the judge to a fair hearing. Prior to the release of
    information confirming or denying the existence of a complaint or investigation,
    reasonable notice shall be provided to the judge.10
    9
    We have previously held that “[t]he West Virginia Freedom of Information Act, W.Va.
    Code § 29B-1-1 et seq. does not require the creation of public records.” Syl. Pt. 1, Affiliated
    Const. Trades Foundation v. Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, 
    200 W.Va. 621
    ,
    
    490 S.E.2d 708
     (1997). In this case, petitioner’s FOIA requests sought from respondents the
    “total number of complaints filed by year against” individual West Virginia judges categorized
    by name from the beginning of each judges’ investiture until the time of the requests. Taking his
    complaint as true and construing it most favorably in his behalf, petitioner sought information
    from respondents that would have required respondents to create a new record conforming to his
    demands or to permit him to inspect or copy all such complaints filed. FOIA does not place the
    burden of record creation on record custodians.
    10
    Neither the parties nor the amicus curiae argue that the exceptions provided in Rule 2.4
    apply to the requested information at issue here. Respondents do assert, however, that these
    exceptions are discretionary on the ODC because they employ the word “may,” rather than the
    word “shall.” See Syl. pt. 1, Nelson v. West Virginia Pub. Emps. Ins. Bd., 
    171 W.Va. 445
    , 300
    4
    If probable cause is found, the Rules of Judicial Disciplinary Procedure specifically provide that
    any subsequent admonishment or hearing on formal charges before the Judicial Hearing Board
    shall be public. W.Va. R. Jud. Disc. P. 2.7(c) and 4.3.
    In this matter, petitioner was not entitled to inspect or copy the complaints at issue.
    Taking petitioner’s complaint as true and construing it most favorably in his behalf, it is clear
    that petitioner’s September 7, 2012, and January 31, 2013, FOIA requests sought details of ethics
    complaints filed against individual West Virginia judges that were confidential under Rule 2.4.
    Petitioner states in his complaint that he requested the total number of judicial ethics complaints
    filed against individual West Virginia circuit and family court judges listed by name and
    categorized by year. In those requests, petitioner did not seek information regarding
    admonishments or hearings on formal charges before the Judicial Hearing Board, which would
    be public pursuant to Rules 2.7(c) and 4.3 and as otherwise permissible by law. Instead,
    petitioner sought information regarding “complaints filed”; such information expressly falls
    within that class protected by Rule 2.4.
    Moreover, petitioner claims both in his underlying complaint and in his brief before this
    Court that his request for information “only concerned numbers” and “statistical data much like
    [respondents] provided [him] . . . on February 3, 201[3]. . . and February 14, 2013.” However, as
    petitioner points out, in February of 2013 respondents provided him, pursuant to two separate
    FOIA requests, with statistical data of the number of complaints filed by year from 2001 until
    2012 without further detail. Following the February of 2013 disclosure of numbers and statistical
    information, petitioner filed the current civil action arguing that respondents violated FOIA.
    Thus, it is clear that respondents’ February of 2013 disclosure did not answer petitioner’s
    requests to his satisfaction, which demonstrates that petitioner sought more than mere “numbers”
    or “statistical data.” To the contrary, he sought details of complaints filed, which are specifically
    exempted from FOIA disclosure pursuant to Rule 2.4 and West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(a)(5).
    Petitioner argues that given our prior holdings in Daily Gazette and Smithers this Court
    must strike down Rule 2.4 as unconstitutional. We disagree and find those cases distinguishable
    from the present matter. In Daily Gazette, we considered a challenge to the privacy procedures
    then in effect for records regarding lawyer disciplinary matters. The West Virginia State Bar By­
    laws and Rules and Regulations at issue in Daily Gazette provided that “all proceedings” of
    lawyer disciplinary matters were confidential unless recommended for public discipline. Under
    those procedures, lawyer disciplinary records were not subject to discovery in civil litigation,
    and, importantly, attorneys could be found to have committed unethical behavior and yet be
    “privately” reprimanded, which kept all information about the unethical behavior away from the
    public. In holding that those privacy procedures were unconstitutional, this Court explained that
    the “overly broad restrictions upon public access” in lawyer disciplinary procedures violated the
    open courts clause of the West Virginia Constitution, Article III, Section 17. We specifically
    noted the “special status” lawyers hold in our judicial system, and “[t]his [ir]refutable public
    S.E.2d 86 (1982) (“It is well established that the word ‘shall,’ in the absence of language in the
    statute showing a contrary intent on the part of the Legislature, should be afforded a mandatory
    connotation.”). These exceptions do not bear on our decision, and their applicability is not raised.
    5
    interest in the administration of justice of attorney disciplinary proceedings is related to the
    lawyer’s role as an officer of the court.” Id. at 364, 326 S.E.2d at 710. We further explained that
    the public should know when attorneys, as officers of the court, are charged with
    disloyalty thereto. It is only through the possession of such knowledge that the
    people can intelligently deal with the members of the legal profession and
    [e]ntrust business to them.
    Id. at 365, 326 S.E.2d at 711 (internal citations omitted). We made clear that “[t]he reporting of
    the existence of groundless or frivolous complaints after there has been a decision to dismiss
    them as such poses no real threat to the reputations of attorneys.” Id. at 367 n.17, 326 S.E.2d at
    713 n.17. However, we also noted “that the public’s right of access is not absolute.” Id. at 364
    n.9, 326 S.E.2d at 711 n.9.
    In Smithers, we reviewed whether records from the West Virginia State Police
    concerning its internal review of complaints against police officers and other personnel, or other
    qualifying incidents subject to review by the internal review board, were subject to FOIA
    disclosure. Unlike the case at bar, in Smithers, we examined how three FOIA exemptions related
    to the role of police officers. We ultimately concluded that information concerning those
    complaints or other reviewable incidents is subject to disclosure, but only after a determination
    that further action or discipline is necessary and with certain details, including the names of
    complainants or other identifying information, redacted in accordance with legislative
    confidentiality rules. 232 W.Va. at 455, 752 S.E.2d at 608-609, syl. pts. 11 and 12. As in Daily
    Gazette, Smithers did not consider the role of judges in our judicial system, the Rules of Judicial
    Disciplinary Procedure, or West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(a)(5). Further, it did not strike down
    any rule or statute as unconstitutional.
    Although we are sensitive to the concerns raised herein, we do not discern from Daily
    Gazette, Smithers, or any other authority cited by petitioner, a constitutional imperative to strike
    down Rule 2.4. Daily Gazette is clearly distinguishable from this case, and Smithers does not
    stand for such a proposition. To the contrary, our holdings in Smithers permitted the non­
    disclosure of details such as the complainants name and other identifying information, much like
    those details at issue in this case. Further, Rule 2.4 places significantly fewer restrictions on the
    public’s access to records than those procedures at issue in Daily Gazette. Unlike the lawyer
    disciplinary rules at issue in Daily Gazette, the Rules of Judicial Disciplinary Procedure at issue
    here do not provide for private reprimands, and if a judge is found to have committed any
    unethical behavior, Rules 2.7(c) and 4.3 expressly provide for public admonishments and public
    hearings on formal charges. Further, where the holdings in Daily Gazette expressly applied to
    lawyer disciplinary procedure in light of the role lawyers hold in our judicial system, this case
    concerns rules applicable to judges, who occupy a markedly different role. As noted in Daily
    Gazette, lawyers are representatives of the public’s business, employed by individuals or entities
    based upon an intelligent understanding of the lawyer’s abilities, and the reporting of a dismissed
    ethics complaint poses no real threat to a lawyer’s reputation. Lawyers can defend themselves
    against such meritless complaints. Judges, however, are not in the same position. Judges lack the
    freedom to defend themselves publicly against all meritless complaints and to choose the cases
    or parties before them. We have previously observed that “[w]hile recognizing that judges are
    6
    subject to the rule of law as much as anyone else, this Court cannot ignore the special status that
    judges have in our judicial system, and the effect this difference has on the process.” State ex rel.
    Kaufman v. Zakaib, 
    207 W.Va. 662
    , 668, 
    535 S.E.2d 727
    , 733 (2000). In addition, throughout
    Daily Gazette and Smithers, we noted the need for confidentiality of investigatory records and
    meritless complaints in limited circumstances.
    Further, public disclosure of governmental records is not limitless. See Syl. Pt. 6, in part,
    State ex rel. Garden State Newspapers, Inc. v. Hoke, 
    205 W.Va. 611
    , 
    520 S.E.2d 186
     (1999)
    (“The qualified public right of access to civil court proceedings guaranteed by Article III,
    Section 17 of the Constitution of West Virginia is not absolute and is subject to reasonable
    limitations imposed in the interest of the fair administration of justice or other compelling public
    policies.”); Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton, 
    165 W.Va. 103
    , 
    267 S.E.2d 544
    (1980) (“Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution, when read in light of our open
    courts provision in Article III, Section 17, provides a clear basis for finding an independent right
    in the public and press to attend criminal proceedings. However, there are limits on access by the
    public and press to a criminal trial, since in this area a long-established constitutional right to a
    fair trial is accorded the defendant.”).
    Petitioner’s second and final assignment of error concerns the circuit court’s denial of an
    award of attorney’s fees and court costs incurred in connection with this litigation. West Virginia
    Code § 29B-1-7 provides that “any person who is denied access to public records . . . and who
    successfully brings a suit . . . shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney fees and court
    costs[.]” As petitioner did not succeed in his suit pursuant to West Virginia Code §§ 29B-1-1
    through -7, the circuit court did not err in denying such an award.
    Based upon all of the above, the circuit court did not err in finding that petitioner’s
    general requests were confidential and exempted from FOIA disclosure. Petitioner could prove
    no set of facts based upon his complaint that would have entitled him to relief, and he was, thus,
    not entitled to recover the fees and costs of this litigation. For the foregoing reasons, we find no
    error in the decision of the circuit court, and its October 23, 2013, order is hereby affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: January 12, 2015
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Robin Jean Davis
    Justice Brent D. Benjamin
    Justice Menis E. Ketchum
    Justice Allen H. Loughry II
    7