State of West Virginia v. Gary A. ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    No. 15-0537 – State v. Gary A.                                        September 23, 2016
    released at 3:00 p.m.
    LOUGHRY, Justice, concurring:                                              RORY L. PERRY, II CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    I fully concur in the majority’s opinion and write separately to emphasize an
    important point: Rule 404(b) testimony establishing lustful disposition toward children is
    not rendered inadmissible solely by alleged remoteness. The Rule 404(b) testimony of
    Amanda R. and Sabrina R. was clearly admissible in the instant case even though it pertained
    to events occurring many years before the petitioner molested L.M. This evidence went
    squarely to the issue of the petitioner’s lustful disposition toward children, and the jury was
    free to consider the remoteness in time and accord the evidence whatever weight it deemed
    appropriate.
    In the instant case, 404(b) witnesses Amanda R. and Sabrina R. testified about
    incidents of sexual misconduct that the petitioner inflicted upon them when they were young
    girls. Amanda R. recounted that when she was between seven and ten years old, the
    petitioner would “tickle” her in the pelvic area. She also recalled how, at a sleepover, she
    awoke to find the petitioner’s hand on her pelvic area outside of her pants. Sabrina R.
    testified that the petitioner molested her beginning when she was four or five years old and
    continuing until she was ten or eleven years old, and that his conduct included touching her
    genitalia with both his hands and his genitalia. Notably, Amanda R. and Sabrina R. were
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    approximately the same age as the young female victim herein, L.M., when the misconduct
    occurred, and the conduct they described is similar to the sexual touching described by L.M.
    Moreover, they, like L.M., were related to the petitioner and in a position of trust to the
    petitioner when the misconduct occurred. The petitioner even conceded that he committed
    some acts of sexual misconduct against Sabrina R.
    The circuit court correctly concluded that this evidence showed the petitioner’s
    lustful disposition toward children and was thus admissible pursuant to West Virginia law:
    Collateral acts or crimes may be introduced in cases
    involving child sexual assault or sexual abuse victims to show
    the perpetrator had a lustful disposition towards the victim, a
    lustful disposition towards children generally, or a lustful
    disposition to specific other children provided such evidence
    relates to incidents reasonably close in time to the incident(s)
    giving rise to the indictment.
    Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W.Va. 641, 
    398 S.E.2d 123
    (1990). In
    adopting the lustful disposition exception to Rule 404(b), the Court recognized that children
    often have greater difficulty than adults in establishing the precise dates and details of
    incidents of sexual abuse, and that a full disposition of the facts forming the context of the
    crime presents a fairer opportunity for the jury to assess witness credibility. 
    Id. at 650-51,
    398 S.E.2d at 132-33.
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    The petitioner argues that the conduct reported by Amanda R. and Sabrina R.
    should have been excluded from the trial on the basis that it was not “reasonably close” in
    time to the events described by L.M., as that phrase is used in Edward Charles L.
    Recognizing first the considerable gatekeeping discretion afforded the circuit court in
    determining whether an incident is “reasonably close,” I reject the notion that this holding
    serves to supplant our wealth of case law on the issue of remoteness as relates to 404(b)
    evidence. This Court has made abundantly clear that the admissibility of 404(b) evidence
    is not nullified by the fact that the occurrences were remote in time. Rather, “‘[a]s a general
    rule remoteness goes to the weight to be accorded the evidence by the jury, rather than to
    admissibility.’ Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Gwinn, 169 W.Va. 456, 
    288 S.E.2d 533
    (1982).” Syl. Pt.
    5, State v. Winebarger, 217 W.Va. 117, 
    617 S.E.2d 467
    (2005). This general rule applies to
    404(b) evidence in child sexual assault cases:
    More recently, this Court has recognized that the
    probative value of other bad act evidence is not completely
    nullified by the fact that various sexual assaults occurred remote
    in time from one another. In State v. McIntosh, 207 W.Va. 561,
    
    534 S.E.2d 757
    (2000), this Court held that evidence of prior
    sexual incidents involving a defendant teacher and his female
    students was admissible, although the sexual assaults occurred
    within four, seven and thirteen years of each other. In coming
    to this conclusion in McIntosh, we recognized that “the decision
    on remoteness as precluding the admissibility of evidence is
    generally for the trial court to determine in the exercise of its
    sound discretion.” 
    Id. (quoting State
    v. Gwinn, 169 W.Va. 456,
    472, 
    288 S.E.2d 533
    , 542 (1982)). We also relied upon our prior
    holding in Yuncke v. Welker, 128 W.Va. 299, 
    36 S.E.2d 410
                  (1945), wherein we stated:
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    An abuse of discretion is more likely to result
    from excluding, rather than admitting, evidence
    that is relevant but which is remote in point of
    time, place and circumstances, and that the better
    practice is to admit whatever matters are relevant
    and leave the question of their weight to the jury,
    unless the court can clearly see that they are too
    remote to be material.
    
    Id. at 311-12,
    36 S.E.2d at 416.
    It is well understood that “[a]s a general rule remoteness
    goes to the weight to be accorded the evidence by the jury,
    rather than to admissibility.” State v. Gwinn, 169 W.Va. at 
    457, 288 S.E.2d at 535
    . “The admissibility of evidence concerning
    prior bad acts under rule 404(2) must be determined upon the
    facts of each case; no exact limitation of time can be fixed as to
    when prior acts are too remote to be admissible.” McIntosh, 207
    W.Va. at 
    572, 534 S.E.2d at 768
    (quoting State v. Burdette, 
    259 Neb. 679
    , 697, 
    611 N.W.2d 615
    (2000)). Furthermore, “[w]hile
    remoteness in time may weaken the probative value of evidence,
    such remoteness does not, in and of itself, necessarily justify
    exclusion of the evidence.” 
    Id. at 573,
    534 S.E.2d at 769.
    Several courts have made similar holdings.
    State v. Rash, 226 W.Va. 35, 45-46, 
    697 S.E.2d 71
    , 81-82 (2010) (footnote omitted); see also
    State v. Parsons, 214 W.Va. 342, 350, 
    589 S.E.2d 226
    , 234 (2003) (finding that
    approximately twenty years was not too remote for 404(b) evidence in child sexual assault
    trial).
    In the case at bar, the circuit court properly determined that the overwhelming
    similarities between the 404(b) testimony and L.M.’s allegations rendered the 404(b)
    evidence admissible and that, in accordance with the general rule articulated above, the jury
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    was permitted to accord whatever weight it deemed appropriate to the lapse in time between
    events. Moreover, the defendant was afforded substantial safeguards by the circuit court
    through its careful adherence to the procedures required by State v. McGinnis, including:
    holding an in camera hearing; determining by a preponderance of the evidence that the
    events occurred and were committed by the petitioner; finding that the evidence was relevant
    and not unfairly prejudicial; and giving cautionary instructions to the jury. See, Syl. Pt. 2,
    State v. McGinnis, 193 W.Va. 147, 
    455 S.E.2d 516
    (1994) (specifying procedures for
    admission of Rule 404(b) evidence).
    We review a circuit court’s admission of 404(b) evidence for an abuse of
    discretion. “‘As the control of the scope, latitude and method of introduction of evidence of
    collateral crimes and charges is vested in the trial court, motions to introduce and motions
    and objections for exclusion of such evidence are addressed to the sound discretion of the
    court.’ Syl. Pt. 14, State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640, 
    203 S.E.2d 445
    (1974).” Winebarger,
    217 W.Va. at 
    119, 617 S.E.2d at 469
    , syl. pt. 3. Based upon the foregoing, I agree with the
    majority’s conclusion that the circuit court properly admitted the 404(b) evidence on the issue
    of the petitioner’s lustful disposition toward children and seek to reiterate our clear precedent
    holding that remoteness will not, alone, serve to render 404(b) evidence inadmissible.
    Accordingly, I respectfully concur.
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