Joyce E. Minnich v. MedExpress Urgent Care, Inc. - West Virginia ( 2017 )

No. 15-1148 - Joyce Minnich, as Executrix of the Estate of Andrew A. Minnich, and
Joyce E. Minnich, individually v. MedExpress Urgent Care, Inc. –
West Virginia d/b/a MedExpress Urgent Care – South Charleston
FILED
February 14, 2017
released at 3:00 p.m.
RORY L. PERRY, II CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
Davis, Justice, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent in this matter as I believe that the majority opinion ignores
the facts of record in favor of a narrow construction of the allegations set forth in the
complaint. This is a tragic case involving, in part, a serious head injury sustained by a
seventy-one-year-old man as a result of a fall while on MedExpress premises. It is alleged,
and experts have opined, the resulting head injury substantially contributed to his rapid
decline and ultimate death.
The majority found that Mr. Minnich’s fall occurred while he was attempting
to comply with the directive of a health care provider to sit on an examination table, and thus,
the injuries sustained as a result of the fall occurred in the course of evaluation at
MedExpress. My review of the record suggests that this characterization of the underlying
events is factually inaccurate and wrongly portrays what actually transpired.1
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I am also concerned that the circuit court’s order emphasizing “continuity of care” and
fall risk potential improperly focused on these medical terms of art rather than on the overarching
facts indicative of simple negligence in this case.
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The complaint alleged that a MedExpress employee took Mr. and Mrs. Minnich
to an exam room, instructed Mr. Minnich to get on the exam table, and then left the room.
The complaint adroitly avoided pleading a medical professional liability claim. Instead, the
action was framed as a simple negligence or premises liability claim. If the matter were
before this Court on review of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, we would properly consider only the allegations of the
complaint and closely parse whether it was well-pled. However, this appeal arises out of a
summary judgment determination following extensive factual development. I cannot place
blinders on so as to ignore the facts of record.
The factual development through requests for admissions and depositions
reveals that MedExpress has, at every stage of the litigation, denied that Mr. Minnich was
directed by a medical assistant to get on the exam table. MedExpress, in its Answer, denied
any staff member directed Mr. Minnich to get on the exam table. MedExpress asserted that
it was not foreseeable that Mr. Minnich would get on the exam table without direction or
assistance. In response to requests for admission, MedExpress repeatedly stated that it
objected to any representation that Mr. Minnich was directed to get on the exam table. The
staff person who escorted Mr. and Mrs. Minnich to the exam room testified at deposition that
she walked into the room, “flipped on” the light, and instructed Mr. Minnich to have a seat.
Not only did she not tell Mr. Minnich to get on the exam table, in accordance with her
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MedExpress training, she has never instructed any patient to get on an exam table.
The non-employee Incident Report completed by Stephani Vealey, the
MedExpress Manager, characterized the incident type as “slip and fall”. (Emphasis added).
She further indicated that Mr. and Mrs. Minnich were taken to the exam room, and the staff
person told Mr. Minnich to “have a seat.” According to Ms. Vealey, “Next thing we know
the patient’s wife is on the floor screaming for help.” Ms. Vealey further indicated: “No
faulty equipment – however, the foot stool on the exam room table was not completely pull
out (sic) when patient went to step on it.” Ms. Vealy stated at deposition that she observed
the exam table step had not been fully extended.
The remarks of Ms. Vealey on the Incident Report are critical when considered
in connection with examination room requirements. The staff person testified in deposition
regarding MedExpress requirements for exam room preparation. According to the medical
assistant, in order to prepare the room for a patient, “you clean the exam table, wipe it down,
put down new paper, make sure the foot stool is out.” At deposition, the medical assistant
conceded that the failure to have the footstool fully extended constituted a safety hazard.
This Court has held,
“The West Virginia Medial Professional Liability Act,
codified at W. Va. Code § 55-7B-1 et seq., applies only to
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claims resulting from the death or injury of a person for any tort
or breach of contract based on health care services rendered, or
which should have been rendered, by a healthcare provider or
health care facility to a patient. It does not apply to other claims
that may be contemporaneous to or related to the alleged act of
medical professional liability.” Syllabus point 3, Boggs v.
Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corp., 216 W. Va. 656, 609
S.E.2d 917 (2004).
Syl. pt. 1, Manor Care, Inc. v. Douglas, 234 W. Va. 57, 763 S.E.2d 73 (2014). In Manor
Care, we rejected the argument of nursing home entities that the Medical Professional
Liability Act (“MPLA”) provided the exclusive remedy for claims brought arising in
connection with nursing home care. In discussing that the MPLA applies only to actions
based upon health care services rendered or which should have been rendered we remarked,
[i]t has been correctly observed that “[t]he
fact that the alleged misconduct occurs in a
healthcare facility does not, by itself, make the
claim one for malpractice. Nor does the fact that
the injured party was a patient at the facility or of
the provider, create such a claim.” Madison Ctr.,
Inc. v. R.R.K., 853 N.E.2d 1286, 1288
(Ind.Ct.App.2006). See also Atlanta Women’s
Health Group v. Clemons, 287 Ga. App. 426, 651
S.E.2d 762 (2007) (“Of course, not every suit
which calls into question the conduct of one who
happens to be a medical professional is a medical
malpractice action. We must look to the
substance of an action against a medical
professional in determining whether the action is
one for professional or simple negligence.”);
Perkins v. Susan B. Allen Mem’l Hosp., 36
Kan. App. 2d 885, 146 P.3d 1102, 1107 (2006)
(“Not every claim for negligence against a
healthcare provider constitutes malpractice.”);
Draper v. Westerfield, 181 S.W.3d 283, 290
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(Tenn.2005) (“Cases involving health or medical
entities do not automatically fall within the
medical malpractice statute.”) Thus, “when the
complaint does not allege negligence in
furnishing medical treatment to a patient, but
rather the failure of a medical provider in
fulfilling a different duty, the claim sounds in
negligence.” Rodriquez v. Saal, 43 A.D.3d 272,
841 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 (2007).
Riggs v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 221 W. Va. 646, 665­
66, 656 S.E.2d 91, 110-11 (2007) (per curiam) (Davis, C.J.,
concurring).
234 W. Va. at 73, 763 S.E.2d at 89. (footnote and additional citation omitted).
Significantly, the complaint in the case sub judice contains no allegations that
MedExpress breached the standard of care in providing health care services to Mr. Minnich.
Indeed, there are no allegations that any health care services were provided to Mr. Minnich.
The clear import of the complaint is that, following intake, Mr. Minnich was escorted to an
exam room to await a provider who would render health care services to him. There are no
claims asserted against any physicians, nurses, or medical assistants, nor are there any
assertions that health care services were improperly provided to Mr. Minnich.
Unfortunately, the majority avoids the facts when it stresses, “the determination
of whether a cause of action falls within the MPLA is based upon the factual circumstances
giving rise to the cause of action, not the type of claim asserted.” (Emphasis supplied in
majority opinion). The majority proceeds to focus on a narrow reading of the allegations of
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the complaint. Where the majority falls short is in their lack of consideration of the
voluminous discovery conducted in this case and the factual circumstances developed in the
cause of discovery.
The issue in this case as pled, and as developed, is whether the fall sustained
by Mr. Minnich occurred in the course of his receipt of health care services at MedExpress.
My review of the record compels me to conclude that the conduct that forms the basis for this
litigation is not rooted in the provision of medical care. Rather, the core of the claim sounds
in ordinary negligence – specifically, premises liability. The claim simply does not turn on
medical questions. Even the MedExpress Center Manager applied basic common sense when
she referred to the incident as a “slip and fall.” Surely, no specialized medical skill or
training is required to fully extend a footstool on an exam table. It confounds common sense
to suggest that a physician expert is required to opine on the medical professional standard
of care for extending a footstool–a matter wholly unrelated to specialized medical skill or
training. A jury should be fully capable, without the assistance of a medical professional
expert, of considering whether there was negligence in the failure to have the exam table
footstool fully extended prior to escorting a patient into an exam room. The basis for the
Minniches’ claim is the failure of MedExpress to maintain a safe environment by exposing
its customer to defectively maintained equipment in the form of a dangerous, partially
extended footstool. Here, the medical assistant plainly testified there was no rendering of
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medical services with respect to escorting Mr. Minnich to an exam room to await the
rendering of health care services. She simply showed Mr. and Mrs. Minnich to the exam
room, “flipped on the light,” and told Mr. Minnich to have a seat. Such acts do not constitute
the delivery of medical services. I view this setting no differently than if Mr. Minnich was
seated in the exam room chair and was injured when the chair collapsed.
Because I do not agree with the majority’s interpretation and application of the
law and the facts of record, I dissent.
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