SER Maxxim Shared Services, LLC v. the Honorable Warren R. McGraw, Judge ( 2019 )

FILED
No. 19-0415 – SER Maxxim Shared Serv. v. McGraw November 14, 2019
released at 3:00 p.m.
EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
WORKMAN, J., dissenting: SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
From a policy perspective, the majority’s refusal to permit development of
facts in support of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by anyone other
than a person of marital or familial relation ignores the fact that other significant human
relationships may be sufficiently emotionally close to be equated with that generally
created by marriage or family.
From a legal perspective, if the majority’s goal was to apply the law
enunciated in Heldreth v. Marrs, 188 W. Va. 481, 425 S.E.2d 157 (1992), no new syllabus
point was even necessary to rule in favor of petitioner inasmuch as Mr. Blankenship never
alleged or purported to be in a marital or familial relationship with the victim, Mr.
Workman. A simple reference to Heldreth’s “closely related” holding would be all that
was necessary to find the claim invalid and issue the writ. Further, if the majority wanted
to illuminate the meaning of “closely related” by lifting the more specific language
contained in the body (but not in the syllabus point) of Heldreth—i.e. a “close marital or
familial relationship”—it could have created a new syllabus point doing so. Id. at 487, 425
S.E.2d at 163 (emphasis added). Instead, it inartfully discusses these concepts and in so
doing, haphazardly injects the issue of whether “familial relationship” requires blood
relation with its repeated reference to “blood or marriage” in the body of the opinion. As
is evident, whether “familial” relationship requires “blood relation” is in no way in
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controversy in this case inasmuch as Mr. Blankenship and the victim were only alleged to
be friends and co-workers.1
Moreover, while the majority asserts that the opinion is in lockstep with other
jurisdictions, a review of other jurisdictions actually reveals a disparate treatment of the
central issue: “The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress has bedeviled courts
and commentators for over 100 years. The lack of agreement on the appropriate rule and
the seeming arbitrariness of each states’ rule illustrate the continuing problems besetting
this area of tort law.” Uhl, Thomas T., Bystander Emotional Distress: Missing an
Opportunity to Strengthen the Ties That Bind, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 1399, 1403–04 (1995).
Implicitly then, the majority’s establishment of rigid boundaries serves the sole purpose of
ease of application. However, as the New Jersey Supreme Court observed, the concern for
“counteract[ing] fraudulent and meretricious claims” should not “outweigh the need to
recognize claims that are legitimate and just.” Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 378 (N.
J. 1994). Certainly many such claims, in absence of a marital or familial relationship, may
well prove insufficient to permit recovery; however, without an examination of the
1
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schatken, 230 W. Va. 201, 210, 737 S.E.2d
229, 238 (2012) (“[W]e have traditionally held that ‘courts will not . . . adjudicate rights
which are merely contingent or dependent upon contingent events, as distinguished from
actual controversies.’ . . . ‘Indeed, a matter must be ripe for consideration before the court
may review it. Courts must be cautious not to issue advisory opinions.’” (quoting Zaleski
v. West Virginia Mut. Ins. Co., 224 W.Va. 544, 552, 687 S.E.2d 123, 131 (2009) (citations
omitted))).
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evidence regarding the relationship between the victim and bystander, valid claims will be
excluded and render an injustice.
But even absent the majority’s preemptive exclusion of Mr. Blankenship’s
claim, its opinion is problematic. In Heldreth, written nearly thirty years ago, this Court
required a plaintiff seeking to bring a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim to
establish that he or she was “closely related” to the injury victim. Syl. Pt. 2, in part, 188
W. Va. 481, 425 S.E.2d 157. In dicta, the Heldreth Court referenced the “close marital or
familial relationship” contemplated by the phrase “closely related.” Id. at 487, 425 S.E.2d
at 163 (emphasis added).
The majority’s new syllabus point now holds (somewhat unnecessarily given
the language of Heldreth) that an “unrelated co-worker” may not recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. However, it casually tosses about the phrase “blood or
marriage” in the opinion and boldly declares that “[t]his State’s law on bystander recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress is consistent with the vast majority of
jurisdictions across the country that interpret ‘closely related’ to mean marital or blood
relations.” (emphasis added). Does the majority now suggest that, in West Virginia, only
those of marital or blood—rather than familial—relation satisfy the Heldreth “closely
related” requirement? Is its declaration of our “consistency” with other such jurisdictions
intended to tacitly adopt such a narrow interpretation of “closely related”? If so, on what
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justification does the majority draw this drastic and arbitrary line? If not, what does this
statement actually mean going forward?
Any such backhanded narrowing of “familial relationship” to “blood
relationship”—even in dicta—creates an astounding degree of unnecessary confusion on
the state of our law. Under Heldreth, an in-law, step-relative, or adoptive family
member—or even those who live in a familial-type construct—would be permitted to
recover. The majority’s inartfully suggested narrowing of “familial” to “blood” relation
would exclude these individuals from the ability to recover for emotional distress caused
by witnessing the serious injury or death of family members. By way of example of its
absurdity, if a biological child, a step-child, and an adoptive child all witness their mother
seriously injured or killed, only the biological child could recover for negligent infliction
of emotional distress under the majority’s implicit definition of “familial relation.”2 To
whatever extent the majority did not intend to suggest such a drastic potential alteration to
our existing law, its careless wording has created nothing more than unnecessary
confusion.3
2
As the mother of three children, one of whom is adopted, it is disturbing to think
that the majority opinion discounts the relationship between me and my child (and other
adoptive families) because we are not “blood.”
3
This criticism is more than semantics or legal sophistry. While certainly dicta is
not binding upon West Virginia courts, the language of the Court’s opinions is instructive
and elucidates its syllabus points. Had the majority wished to alter the Heldreth rule of
4
From a broader perspective, as indicated, the majority’s out-of-hand rejection
of Mr. Blankenship’s claim is equally precipitous. As the circuit court below observed, an
inflexible rule which limits recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to only
those who are married or of a traditional familial relationship is as arbitrary as it is unfair.
This “line in the sand” elevates formal relationships over real ones. It permits recovery to
those who fulfill legalistic requirements but may have no substantial emotional connection
to the injured party and simultaneously denies recovery to those who may have such a
connection, but lack the formality the rule requires. As the New Jersey Superior Court
observed, whether a relationship is sufficient to warrant a claim of bystander liability
should “not [] be determined by application of a verbal formula but rather by particularized
“marital or familial” relation, it should have done so forthrightly in a syllabus point, rather
than slipping such a newly narrowed interpretation of “familial” into one of the few, if not
only, cases to construe that aspect of Heldreth since its inception.
The West Virginia Constitution provides: “[I]t shall be the duty of the court to
prepare a syllabus of the points adjudicated in each case in which an opinion is written and
in which a majority of the justices thereof concurred, which shall be prefixed to the
published report of the case.” W. Va. Const. art. VIII, § 4. This Court has explained that
“[t]his Court will use signed opinions when new points of law are announced and those
points will be articulated through syllabus points as required by our state constitution.”
Syl. Pt. 2, Walker v. Doe, 210 W. Va. 490, 558 S.E.2d 290 (2001), holding modified by
State v. McKinley, 234 W. Va. 143, 764 S.E.2d 303 (2014) (emphasis added). The Court
explained that “if the Court addresses a novel legal issue or otherwise intends to change
the law,” it issues a new syllabus point. Id. at 497, 558 S.E.2d at 297 (Starcher, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). See also State v. Lopez, 197
W. Va. 556, 569, 476 S.E.2d 227, 240 (1996) (Workman, J., dissenting) (noting that new
syllabus points reflect “major policy changes in the law”). It is the duty of this Court to
articulate its holdings with thoughtful care and precision and not unnecessarily generate
meaningless or inadvertent inconsistency in its decisions.
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attention to the qualities of the actual relationships at issue in the context of the goals sought
to be served by the legal standard at issue.” Dunphy v. Gregor, 617 A.2d 1248, 1253 (N.
J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992), aff’d, 136 N.J. 99, 642 A.2d 372 (1994). A “mechanistic
formula in a definition” serves little equity. Id. at 1254. See Hislop v. Salt River Project
Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 5 P.3d 267, 275 (Az. Ct. App. 2000) (Garbarino, J., dissenting)
(“While this rule will be predictable, it will permit some people to pursue this claim who
have no close relationship, and yet prohibit others who have a loving, close relationship
with someone injured or killed from pursuing these claims merely because they are not
related by blood or marriage.” (quoting Grotts v. Zahner, 989 P.2d 415, 417 (Nev. 1999)
(Rose, C. J., dissenting))).
Instead of adhering to a simplistic rule that admittedly excludes meritorious
claims, the majority should have permitted bystanders claiming a sufficiently close
relationship to an injured party to develop their evidence and, if sufficient, present it to a
jury for assessment. While certainly not every acquaintanceship or familiarity will give
rise to an actionable claim and, without question, the circuit court is well-situated to serve
as a gatekeeper for claims which are “spurious.” See Syl. Pt. 2, Ricottilli v. Summersville
Mem’l Hosp., 188 W. Va. 674, 675, 425 S.E.2d 629, 630 (1992) (“An individual may
recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress absent accompanying physical
injury upon a showing of facts sufficient to guarantee that the emotional damages claim is
not spurious.” (emphasis added)).
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However, where the facts support an emotional bond equivalent to that which
one would expect those of close familial relations, there is no justification for denying the
opportunity to present the claim to a jury for determination. As the Dunphy court wisely
noted: “Our courts have shown that the sound assessment of the quality of interpersonal
relationships is not beyond a jury’s ken and that courts are capable of dealing with the
realities, not simply the legalities, of relationships to assure that resulting emotional injury
is genuine and deserving of compensation. 642 A.2d at 378. Moreover, as Judge
Garbarino observed,
We ask juries to make all sorts of difficult determinations and
deciding the closeness of a relationship is a judgment juries are
uniquely qualified to make. Leaving this factual determination
to the jury would [provide] . . . a reasonably flexible rule that
does not arbitrarily bar those who would otherwise be able to
establish a close relationship.
Hislop, 5 P.3d at 276 (Garbarino, J., dissenting) (quoting Grotts, 989 P.2d at 417-18 (Rose,
C. J., dissenting). Just as the “credibility of the plaintiff’s claim of emotional attachment
should always be open to disproof, and not presumed to exist just because a particular
degree of kinship exists,” a claim of emotional attachment should not be presumed to be
absent given the simple lack of marital or familial relation. Dunphy, 617 A.2d at 1254.
Rather, such claims should be assessed on the merits of their individual facts. Accord
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978) (holding that determination
whether bystander liability exists based in part on “degree . . . of familial or other
relationship between the claimant and the third person” (emphasis added)); Leong v.
Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (Haw. 1974) (holding that “plaintiff should be permitted to
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prove the nature of his relationship to the victim and the extent of damages he has suffered
because of this relationship”); see also Smith v. Kings Entm’t Co., 649 N.E.2d 1252, 1253
(Oh. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing viability of bystander liability claim between friends but
dismissing based on lack of close relationship).
Limitation of this cause of action to those who are of marital or familial
relation is not only an idle dismissal of an important issue, but an attempt to force complex,
modern relationships into unrealistic boxes: “What constitutes a ‘familial relationship’ is
perforce a fact-sensitive analysis, driven by evolving social and moral forces. No one can
reasonably question that the social and legal concept of ‘family’ has significantly evolved
. . . .” Moreland v. Parks, 191 A.3d 729, 736-37 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018); see
Hislop, 5 P.3d at 275-76 (Garbarino, J., dissenting) (“Anyone living in a non-traditional
relationship will be denied the chance to recover emotional distress damages, while those
living together with benefit of marriage will not suffer such prejudice.”).
Permitting plaintiffs such as Mr. Blankenship to develop their evidence and,
in the event of a sufficiently close relationship, presenting it to a jury creates no
unreasonable burden upon defendants nor expands the scope of foreseeable injury beyond
that which already exists. As the Dunphy Court observed:
The identical acts of reasonable care that would have prevented
the fatal accident that claimed the life of Michael Burwell
would have preserved the emotional security of Eileen
Dunphy. Certainly the extension of such a duty of care [to a
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closely related bystander] . . . as a foreseeable and protectable
person does not increase the burden of care or extend it beyond
what is ordinarily expected and appropriate for reasonable
drivers.
642 A.2d at 377. Similarly, the duty of care owed by petitioners to avoid injuring Mr.
Workman is the same measure of care which would have prevented the trauma suffered by
Mr. Blankenship. Simply permitting Mr. Blankenship to attempt to establish a close
affinity and relationship with Mr. Workman does nothing to broaden the scope of
petitioner’s duty. Further, as noted above, any concern about insubstantial claims was
addressed nearly contemporaneously with Heldreth with the express requirement that a
court evaluate such claims for spuriousness.4 See Syl. Pt. 2, Ricottilli, 188 W. Va. 674, 425
S.E.2d 629. Rather than examining whether our existing law adequately serves the
competing interests presented or addressing the underlying difficulty with the rule, the
majority casually creates even sharper limitations on the cause of action.
There is little question that the relationship between “co-workers and friends
can be enduring, substantial, and sealed by strong emotional bonds[.]” Hislop, 5 P.3d at
273 (Garbarino, J., dissenting). In this event, “[t]he law should find more than pity for one
who is stricken by seeing that a loved one has been critically injured or killed.” Dunphy,
617 A.2d at 1255 (quoting Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 526 (N. J. 1980)). The majority
herein blithely dismisses Mr. Blankenship’s claim as one for bystander liability between
4
Heldreth was issued on December 14, 1992. Ricottilli was issued four days later
on December 18, 1992.
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mere co-workers and fails to address the inherent inequity in the Heldreth rule. While Mr.
Blankenship may well have been unable to develop evidence sufficient to demonstrate a
non-spurious claim, it is simply premature to make that calculation in absence of anything
more than his complaint. Moreover, the majority’s haphazard use of imprecise and
confounding terms inconsistent with our existing law casts a startling new shadow over a
long-settled concept.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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