D.J., next friend etc. v. Mercer County Board of Ed. ( 2013 )


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  •                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    D.J., next friend and on behalf of                                                  FILED
    T.J., a minor child,                                                             November 22, 2013
    RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    Plaintiff Below, Petitioner                                                 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    vs) No. 13-0237 (Mercer County 12-C-512)
    Mercer County Board of Education,
    Mercer County Schools, and
    Deborah S. Akers, Superintendent,
    Defendants Below, Respondents
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner D.J., next friend on behalf of T.J., by counsel Patrick Lane, appeals the “Order
    Denying Writ of Mandamus” entered by the Circuit Court of Mercer County on February 8,
    2013. Respondents Mercer County Board of Education, Mercer County Schools, and
    Superintendent Deborah S. Akers, by counsel Kermit J. Moore, filed their response. Petitioner
    requests that this Court reverse the order dismissing the complaint and declare that T.J. is entitled
    to be admitted to the school or, in the alternative, be provided homebound education or other
    arrangement to ensure that T.J. is provided a free public education.
    This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision is
    appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    Petitioner is the parent of T.J., a minor child who was enrolled as a student in Mercer
    County. T.J. began the 2012-2013 school year as a seventh grade student. In September of 2012,
    respondents informed petitioner that T.J. would no longer be permitted to attend school.
    Petitioner was informed that although T.J. had received the vaccinations required by West
    Virginia Code § 16-3-4, he was no longer permitted to attend school because he had not received
    the new vaccinations required by interpretive rule West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-95-8.1
    In response, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. Following a hearing on
    1
    West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-95-8, in pertinent part, requires that after June 1,
    2012, and prior to the beginning of the school year 2012-2013, a Tdap vaccine booster and
    meningococcal vaccine shall be required for children attending middle and high schools in West
    Virginia and proof of vaccination shall be presented upon entry to the seventh and twelfth
    grades.
    1
    that motion, on February 8, 2013, the circuit court entered an order denying the requested writ. In
    that order, the circuit court states that it relies on the final order in related litigation in Kanawha
    County, Civil Action No. 12-F-1700. 2 In the Kanawha County action, plaintiffs challenged the
    validity of West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-95-8, contending that the DHHR exceeded its
    authority by promulgating this interpretive rule. In its order, the Circuit Court of Kanawha
    County examined state and federal law and upheld the new vaccination requirements. In the
    instant case, the Circuit Court of Mercer County recognized that the Kanawha County order was
    not binding upon it, but went on to state that for the reasons articulated by the Circuit Court of
    Kanawha County, it likewise concludes that the vaccinations required by West Virginia Code of
    2
    In the Kanawha County action, Civil Action No. 12-C-1700, the circuit court’s “Final
    Order Dismissing Case,” addressed certain vaccinations, finding that West Virginia Code § 16-3­
    4 is not inconsistent with West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-95-4.1. That order also states
    that West Virginia Code § 16-3-4 requires a rubeola and a rubella vaccination but goes on to
    state that separate vaccines for these diseases are no longer available, citing a Centers for Disease
    Control internet site. The court noted that the only vaccine available to immunize against rubeola
    and rubella is the MMR vaccine (for measles, mumps, and rubella), which includes a vaccination
    for mumps. The circuit court, therefore, found that the inclusion of the mumps vaccine is
    completely consistent with West Virginia Code § 16-3-4. In addressing the Tdap vaccine, the
    circuit court found that West Virginia Code § 16-3-4 specifically requires that students entering
    school must have been vaccinated against tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis, and those vaccines
    are given in a single shot, the DTaP (also referred to as Tdap).The circuit court further stated that
    studies show that the protection from this vaccine fades over time, so another dose is needed at
    approximately age eleven or twelve. The circuit court then determined that West Virginia Code §
    16-3-4 includes Tdap as if Tdap was explicitly set forth in the statute.
    In that order, the circuit court also addresses the Hepatitis B, Varicella, and
    Meningococcal vaccines jointly. The circuit court looks to the State Board of Education which
    has adopted West Virginia Code of State Rules § 126-51-5.2 (2012), which provides that
    students must be in compliance with the required immunization schedule as set forth by the
    Bureau of Public Health Commissioner. The circuit court further found that under the DHHR
    rule, the vaccines are lawfully required. The circuit court states that while West Virginia Code §
    16-3-4 does not explicitly include these vaccinations, that does not prevent the defendants in that
    action from adding them to that list. It further found that the defendants relied upon the standards
    of medical practice used in that rule that incorporate the most current recommendations issued by
    the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Advisory Committee on
    Immunization Practices, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Academy of
    Family Physicians. The rule was found to be entitled to substantial deference, as it represents the
    best judgment of a national group with undoubted expertise and experience whose judgments are
    vetted before the public. The circuit court also determined that the right to an education is not a
    “private right.” This finding was based on the fact that a thorough and efficient education is
    meant to develop the student as a responsible and contributing member of society, and the United
    States Supreme Court’s finding in Plyler v. Doe, 
    457 U.S. 202
    , 221 (1982), that education has a
    fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. The Kanawha County court thereby
    dismissed Civil Action No. 12-C-1700.
    2
    State Rules § 64-95-8 are a valid exercise of the board of health’s authority and that the
    immunizations are both lawful and mandatory. The Circuit Court of Mercer County attached the
    order from the Kanawha County action to its order.3 It is from the Mercer County order that
    petitioner appeals.
    “‘“A writ of mandamus will not issue unless three elements coexist- (1) a clear
    legal right in the petitioner to the relief sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of
    respondent to do the thing which the petitioner seeks to compel; and (3) the
    absence of another adequate remedy.” Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Billy Ray C.
    v. Skaff, 190 W.Va. 504, 
    438 S.E.2d 847
    (1993); Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel.
    Kucera v. City of Wheeling, 153 W.Va. 538, 
    170 S.E.2d 367
    (1969).’ Syllabus
    point 2, Staten v. Dean, 195 W.Va. 57, 
    464 S.E.2d 576
    (1995).” Syllabus point 2,
    Ewing v. Board of Education of Summers County, 202 W.Va. 228, 
    503 S.E.2d 541
           (1998).
    Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. ACF Industries, Inc. v. Vieweg, 204 W.Va. 525, 
    514 S.E.2d 176
    (1999).
    “A de novo standard of review applies to a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a writ of
    mandamus.” Syl. Pt. 1, Harrison County Com’n v. Harrison County Assessor, 222 W.Va. 25,
    
    658 S.E.2d 555
    (2008). We review a circuit court’s underlying factual findings and conclusions
    of law in a mandamus case under a clearly erroneous standard. O’Daniels v. City of Charleston,
    200 W.Va. 711, 715, 
    490 S.E.2d 800
    , 804 (1997) (citing Staten v. Dean, 195 W.Va. 57, 62, 
    464 S.E.2d 576
    , 581 (1995)). In the case at bar, the circuit court found that petitioner did not meet the
    three criteria for a writ of mandamus to issue.
    Petitioner asserts four assignments of error on appeal; however, petitioner sets forth
    argument on only three of his assignments of error. Petitioner first argues that the circuit court
    erred in failing to recognize the high standard that must be met in order to deny a child’s
    fundamental constitutional right to public education in West Virginia. Petitioner points to the
    requirement of a thorough and efficient system found in Article XII, Section 1 of the West
    Virginia Constitution, which petitioner claims make education a fundamental, constitutional right
    in this state. Petitioner argues that respondents’ actions to enforce the new compulsory
    immunizations rule violates the State Constitution and public policy by infringing upon T.J.’s
    fundamental constitutional right to an education. Petitioner contends that respondents cannot
    deny T.J. an education by not providing alternative arrangements on the ground that it would
    impose a financial burden on respondents. According to petitioner, T.J. has taken the
    vaccinations required by West Virginia Code § 16-3-4, but he has not taken those required by
    West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-95-8.1. Petitioner describes the scheme of compulsory
    immunizations as arbitrary and capricious, resulting in disparate treatment. Petitioner concedes
    that he is out of compliance with the new immunization interpretive rule, but he argues that the
    rule does not supersede T.J.’s fundamental right to an education.
    3
    The Kanawha County action was appealed to this Court in Appeal No. 12-1394. That
    action was dismissed as moot in light of the passage of Senate Bill 265 during the 2013
    legislative session. Petitioner in Appeal No. 12-1394 filed a Petition for Rehearing, and that
    Petition was refused pursuant to this Court’s order entered on September 24, 2013.
    3
    West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-95-5.5 states that children who are delinquent for
    any required vaccinations or who have exceeded the provisional enrollment period will be
    considered out of compliance with the law and may be required to stop attending school until the
    appropriate vaccine(s) are received and the records amended. West Virginia Code of State Rules
    § 64-95-8.1 states that following the effective date of this rule, “all children entering middle
    school or high school are strongly encouraged to get the [Tdap and meningococcal vaccines]
    prior to the fall term in 2011.” In reliance on this statement, petitioner contends that the
    vaccinations at issue are not mandatory. Petitioner’s argument ignores West Virginia Code of
    State Rules § 64-95-8.2, which states:
    From and after June 1, 2012, and prior to the beginning of the school year 2012­
    2013, the [Tdap and meningococcal vaccines] shall be required for children
    attending middle and high schools in West Virginia. . . . Proof of vaccination shall
    be presented upon entry to the 7th and 12th grades, as indicated.
    Further, West Virginia Code of State Rules § 64-95-8.3.b specifically states that proof of the
    Tdap vaccination shall be presented upon entry to the seventh grade, and West Virginia Code of
    State Rules § 64-95-8.4.b states that proof of the meningococcal vaccination shall be presented
    upon entry to the seventh grade. In terms of public policy, as set forth in West Virginia Code §
    16-3-5(a), the legislature has found “that early immunization for preventable diseases represents
    one of the most cost-effective means of disease prevention.”
    The State Board of Education (“Board”) is thus empowered to make rules under its
    constitutional authority to supervise the state schools. W.Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Hechler, 180 W.Va.
    451, 455, 
    376 S.E.2d 839
    , 843 (1988). Courts generally defer to the Board when analyzing a rule
    of the Board due to the Board’s constitutional grant of authority to supervise the State’s
    educational system. Randolph Co. Bd. of Educ. v. Adams, 196 W.Va. 9, 15 n.7, 
    467 S.E.2d 150
    ,
    156 n.7 (1995). Included in the Board’s authority is the authority to make rules “governing
    school attendance [] and such other matters [] as may seem to the state board to be necessary and
    expedient.” Detch v. Bd. of Educ. of Greenbrier County, 145 W.Va. 722, 729, 
    117 S.E.2d 138
    ,
    142 (1960).
    West Virginia Code of State Rules § 126-51-5.2 sets forth the Board’s rule regarding
    immunizations. It requires that students be in compliance with the required immunization
    schedule as set forth by the Bureau Commissioner for the West Virginia Bureau for Public
    Health. Further, West Virginia Code of State Rules § 126-51-5.2.2 states:
    Beginning in the school year 2012-2013, two additional vaccine requirements
    shall be added for students entering the 7th and 12th grades, in accordance with the
    guidance from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and
    the revised rule of the West Virginia Bureau for Public Health, 64CSR95. Proof
    of Tdap and Meningococcal vaccinations shall be presented upon entry to seventh
    and twelfth grade as indicated in Interpretive Rule, Immunization Requirements
    and Recommendations for New School Enterers, 64 CSR95. . . .
    4
    Further, West Virginia Code of State Rules § 126-51-5.2.2.a. requires proof of the Tdap
    vaccination for entry to the seventh grade, while West Virginia Code of State Rules § 126-51­
    5.2.2.c. requires proof of age appropriate MCV vaccination upon entry to the seventh grade. As
    this Court has found previously, “‘[r]ule-making by the State Board of Education is within the
    meaning of ‘general supervision’ of state schools pursuant to art. XII, § 2 of the West Virginia
    Constitution, and any statutory provision that interferes with such rule-making is
    unconstitutional. . . .’ Syllabus Point 2, in part, West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Heckler, 180 W.Va.
    451, 
    376 S.E.2d 839
    (1988).” Syl. Pt. 2, Bd. of Educ. of Cnt’y of Kanawha v. W.Va. Bd. of Educ.,
    184 W.Va. 1, 
    399 S.E.2d 31
    (1990).
    Petitioner’s second assignment of error is that the circuit court erred in drawing an
    arbitrary distinction that the fundamental right to an education in West Virginia is a “public
    right,” rather than a “private right,” and is therefore not held to as high a standard as
    infringement. In its order, the Circuit Court of Mercer County specifically found that the United
    States Supreme Court recognized that education “‘has a fundamental role in maintaining the
    fabric of our society,’ and, concomitantly, that a ‘public education is a public right’ [footnote
    omitted], not a private one subject to judicial enforcement.” Petitioner cites no West Virginia
    authority that holds that providing an education to a student is a private right. A court’s first
    concern when dealing with public schools is the impact of a decision on the education that the
    state’s children will receive. Hancock Cnt’y Bd. of Educ. v. Hawken, 209 W.Va. 259, 262, 
    546 S.E.2d 258
    , 261 (1999). We conclude that by finding that the fundamental right to an education
    is a “public right,” the lower court properly considered the effects that would flow to the State’s
    children.
    The third assignment of error addressed in petitioner’s appeal is the contention that the
    circuit court erred by failing to properly analyze the denial of education through the equal
    protection and due process standards provided by West Virginia law. Petitioner’s argument is
    based on the premise that the enforcement of the vaccination requirements set forth in the West
    Virginia Code of State Rules is discriminatory. Thus, petitioner contends that the State has to
    demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify enforcement of those rules, but that there is no
    such compelling state interest. Due to the fact that education is a fundamental right in this state,
    an interference with that right is subject to strict scrutiny, requiring the State to demonstrate that
    the action is narrowly tailored to promote a compelling interest. Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672,
    708, 
    255 S.E.2d 859
    , 878 (1979). Because the protection of the health and safety of the public is
    one of the most important roles of the State, the requirement that the State’s interest be
    compelling is satisfied. State ex rel. Perry v. Miller, 171 W.Va. 509, 512, 
    300 S.E.2d 622
    , 625
    (1983). Importantly, in addition to providing classroom instruction, schools are also responsible
    for ministering to the health needs of children. State v. Riddle, 168 W.Va. 429, 439, 
    285 S.E.2d 359
    , 364 (1981).
    Under West Virginia law, a student who does not comply with mandatory vaccination
    requirements may not be enrolled in public school. See W.Va. C.S.R. § 126-51-5; see also W.Va.
    C.S.R. § 64-95-8 and W.Va. Code § 16-3-4. Due to the fact that the Advisory Committee on
    Immunization Practices and the revised rule of the West Virginia Bureau for Public Health
    recommend or require boosters of the Tdap and meningococcal vaccines, the Board now requires
    proof of those vaccinations for entry into the seventh and twelfth grades. We, therefore, find that
    5
    the there is a compelling state interest for the rules requiring proof of these vaccinations to attend
    public school in this state.
    For the reasons set forth herein, under the facts of this case, we find that petitioner is not
    entitled to a writ of mandamus. We further find that the circuit court’s factual findings and
    conclusions of law were not clearly erroneous.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: November 22, 2013
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Justice Robin Jean Davis
    Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Menis E. Ketchum
    Justice Allen H. Loughry II
    DISSENTING:
    Chief Justice Brent D. Benjamin
    6