Jane Doe v. Willits Unified School Distric , 473 F. App'x 775 ( 2012 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                              JUN 08 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    JANE DOE, a minor; KRISTEN D.,                   No. 10-16786
    Guardian ad Litem,
    D.C. No. 3:09-cv-03655-JSW
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    WILLITS UNIFIED SCHOOL
    DISTRICT; WILLITS CHARTER
    SCHOOL; SALLY RULISON; CLINT
    SMITH,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    JANE DOE, a minor; KRISTEN D.,                   No. 10-17880
    Guardian ad Litem,
    D.C. No. 3:09-cv-03655-JSW
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.
    WILLITS CHARTER SCHOOL; SALLY
    RULISON,
    Defendants - Appellees,
    and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    CLINT SMITH; WILLITS UNIFIED
    SCHOOL DISTRICT,
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 16, 2012**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: THOMAS, McKEOWN, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
    Jane Doe, through her guardian ad litem, Kristen D., appeals the district
    court’s summary judgment in favor of Willits Unified School District, Willits
    Charter School, and Sally Rulison, the Director of the school (collectively
    “Willits”). Doe’s action stems from a sexual relationship between Doe and her
    high school math and science teacher. After the relationship was made public, Doe
    filed suit alleging claims under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     and Title IX of the Education
    Amendments of 1972, 
    20 U.S.C. § 1681
    (a), as well as under state law for negligent
    hiring and supervision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we
    affirm.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    -2-
    Although Doe advances multiple grounds for relief, her appeal fails because
    she is unable to meet a key threshold requirement: that the school’s response to the
    alleged injuries was deliberately indifferent. Damages under Title IX are available
    only if an official with authority to address the alleged discrimination and institute
    corrective measures has actual knowledge of the discrimination and fails to
    adequately respond—i.e., acts with deliberate indifference. Gebser v. Lago Vista
    Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    524 U.S. 274
    , 290 (1998). The test for deliberate indifference is
    “whether a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the [school]’s response was
    clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” Oden v. N. Marianas
    Coll., 
    440 F.3d 1085
    , 1089 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). To meet this high standard there must, in essence, be an official decision
    not to remedy the violation and this decision must be clearly unreasonable. Davis
    v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
    526 U.S. 629
    , 649 (1999). Summary judgment is
    proper when a school’s response to the harassment was not clearly unreasonable as
    a matter of law. Even a showing of heightened negligence is insufficient to prove
    deliberate indifference. See Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 
    520 U.S. 397
    ,
    411-12 (1997) (discussing deliberate indifference as it applies to § 1983 cases).
    Doe argues that during the summer and fall of 2008, the school should have
    noticed warning signs of an inappropriate relationship. Those warning signs,
    -3-
    however, do not amount to actual notice and, as the district court stated, “[t]here
    is . . . no admissible evidence that anyone, including Plaintiff’s mother, informed
    the school administration” of some of those warning signs. Construing all the
    admissible evidence in Doe’s favor, she fails to establish either actual knowledge
    prior to January 8, 2009, or deliberate indifference. Rumors of the teacher favoring
    Doe in his classes did not reach Rulison until December 2008. In response,
    Rulison called the teacher and Doe, separately, into her office to make inquiries but
    both vehemently denied any favoritism or inappropriate relationship.
    As soon as Rulison was told of the sexual relationship, on January 8, 2009,
    she took immediate and appropriate action. She reported the relationship to Child
    Protective Services and followed up when she did not hear back promptly,
    contacted the Sheriff, turned the case over to the Willits Police Department, and
    placed the teacher on mandatory administrative leave. Rulison’s response cannot
    be characterized as deliberately indifferent, and Doe fails to establish that Rulison
    or the school had actual knowledge of the sexual relationship prior to January 8,
    2009. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment.
    AFFIRMED.
    -4-