William R. Wooton v. Elizabeth D. Walker ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 2016 Term
FILED
____________________ April 19, 2016
released at 3:00 p.m.
NO. 16‐0226 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
____________________ OF WEST VIRGINIA
WILLIAM R. WOOTON, candidate for the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,
Petitioner
v.
ELIZABETH D. WALKER, candidate for the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia;
West Virginia Secretary of State NATALIE TENNANT;
West Virginia State Election Commission members
GARY A. COLLIAS and VINCENT P. CARDI;
West Virginia State Auditor GLEN B. GAINER, III;
And West Virginia State Treasurer JOHN D. PERDUE,
Respondent
_________________________________________________________________________________________
Certified Question from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
The Honorable Charles E. King, Jr., Judge
Civil Action No. 16‐AA‐13
CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Submitted: March 23, 2016
Filed: April 19, 2016
Robert M. Bastress, Jr. K&L GATES LLP
Post Office Box 1295 Thomas C. Ryan
Morgantown, WV 26507‐1295 210 Sixth Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Robert V. Berthold, Jr. Attorney for Respondent
BERTHOLD LAW FIRM PLLC Walker
Charleston, WV 25335
Thomas Patrick Maroney Richard L. Gottlieb
608 Virginia Street, East, Floor 2 Webster J. Arceneaux, III
Charleston, WV 25301 Spencer D. Elliott
Attorneys for Petitioner Wooton LEWIS GLASSER CASEY &
ROLLINS, PLLC
300 Summers St., Suite 700
Charleston, WV 25301
Attorneys for Respondents
Tennant, Collias & Cardi
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS H. KEADLE
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
CHIEF JUSTICE MENIS E. KETCHUM,
JUSTICE ROBIN JEAN DAVIS,
JUSTICE BRENT D. BENJAMIN,
JUSTICE MARGARET L. WORKMAN, and
JUSTICE ALLEN H. LOUGHRY II, deeming themselves
disqualified, did not participate in the decision of
this case.
SENIOR STATUS JUDGE THOMAS H. KEADLE,
as Acting Chief Justice,
SENIOR STATUS JUDGE JAMES O. HOLLIDAY,
JUDGE JOHN W. HATCHER, JR.,
JUDGE JAMES P. MAZZONE, and
JUDGE THOMAS C. EVANS, III, sitting by
temporary assignment.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “The appellate standard of review of questions of law answered and
certified by a circuit court is de novo.” Syl. Pt. 1, Gallapoo v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc.,
197 W. Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996).
2. “A regulation that is proposed by an agency and approved by the
Legislature is a ‘legislative rule’ as defined by the State Administrative Procedures
Act, W. Va. Code, 29A‐1‐2(d) [1982], and such a legislative rule has the force and
effect of law.” Syl. Pt. 5, Smith v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm’n, 216 W. Va. 2,
602 S.E.2d 445 (2004).
3. The West Virginia State Election Commission has discretion to certify a
participating candidate for public funding under the “West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals Public Campaign Financing Program,” W. Va. Code § 3‐12‐1 et seq.
(2014), notwithstanding the candidate’s failure to meet the time deadlines set forth
in W. Va. Code of State Rules §§ 146‐5‐6.1 & 6.2, where the candidate has
substantially complied with all requirements set forth in the Act and the rules and
where there is no showing of prejudice.
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KEADLE, Acting Chief Justice:
Petitioner William R. Wooton is a candidate seeking election to the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, and a “participating candidate” as that
term is defined in the “West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Public Campaign
Financing Program,” W. Va. Code § 3‐12‐3(11) (2014). On February 5, 2016, the
West Virginia State Elections Commission (“the Commission”) certified Petitioner
Wooton’s campaign for public funding under the Act, overruling a challenge filed by
Respondent Elizabeth D. Walker, a non‐participating candidate also seeking election
to the Court.
Pursuant to the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act, W. Va.
Code § 29A‐5‐1 et seq., Respondent Walker appealed the Commission’s decision to
the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, which certified the following question to this
Court:
Whether the West Virginia State Election Commission’s certification
of Respondent [now Petitioner] Wooton for public financing of his
candidacy for the West Virginia Supreme Court under West Virginia
Code § 3‐12‐1, et seq., was valid.
The court answered the question in the negative.
After thorough review of the record Appendix, the parties’ briefs and
oral arguments, and the applicable law, we modify and answer the certified
question, reverse the judgment of the court below, and reinstate the decision of the
Commission certifying Petitioner Wooton.
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
West Virginia Code § 3‐12‐1, et seq. (2014), known as the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Public Campaign Financing Program, was
enacted by the West Virginia Legislature to “protect the Constitutional rights of
voters and candidates from the detrimental effects of increasingly large amounts of
money being raised and spent to influence the outcome of elections, protect the
impartiality and integrity of the judiciary, and strengthen public confidence in the
judiciary….” W. Va. Code § 3‐12‐1(10).
A candidate seeking public financing must file a Declaration of Intent
prior to the end of the qualifying period, W. Va. Code § 3‐12‐7, which period begins
on September 1 of the year preceding the election year and ends on the last
Saturday in January of the election year. W. Va. Code § 31‐12‐3(13). After filing the
Declaration of Intent but before certification for public financing, a candidate must
gather at least 500 “qualifying contributions” from West Virginia voters. W. Va.
Code § 3‐12‐9(c). Each contribution can be as little as $1.00, but can in no event
exceed $100.00. W. Va. Code § 3‐12‐9(a). The total amount of the contributions
must be no less than $35,000.00 and no more than $50,000.00. Id. 1
After a participating candidate has collected the requisite number of
qualifying contributions, and within two business days of the close of the qualifying
1 If the aggregate amount of a candidate’s qualifying contributions exceeds
$50,000.00, the excess is paid over into the Fund. Id.
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period,2 he or she files a final report and applies to the Commission to be certified to
receive public financing. W. Va. Code § 3‐12‐10(a); W. Va. Code of State Rules §§
146‐5‐6.1, 6.2. The candidate’s application must include a sworn statement that he
or she has and will comply with all requirements of the program. Id. In the instant
case, Petitioner Wooton filed his final report and all required substantive
information on February 2, 2016, but did not file his sworn statement until February
3, 2016, one day late. This is the sole basis upon which Respondent Walker
challenges Wooton’s certification in this appeal. 3
The Commission overruled the challenge, finding that it had the
authority to certify the Wooton campaign for public financing notwithstanding the
one‐day delay in submission of the sworn statement. On appeal, the circuit court
certified and answered the question set forth above, concluding, by necessary
implication,4 that the Commission did not have such authority. Appeal to this Court
followed, and the case was set for briefing and argument on an expedited schedule.
2 The qualifying period ends on January 30, which in 2016 fell on a Saturday; thus,
February 2, 2016, was the second business day.
3 Although Respondent Walker filed a blanket challenge to all of Petitioner Wooton’s
contributions by letter of February 2, 2016, “reserv[ing]the right to submit
challenge forms as soon as possible…,” she never pursued the matter.
4 The certified question and answer are framed in wholly conclusory language and
give no hint as to the court’s ratio decidendi.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
It is well established that “[t]he appellate standard of review of
questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court is de novo.” Syl. Pt. 1,
Gallapoo v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 197 W. Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996).
III. DISCUSSION
Standing
As a threshold matter, we conclude that under the specific facts of this
case, Respondent Walker has been “adversely affected” by the Commission’s
decision, a prerequisite for standing to appeal under the Administrative Procedures
Act, W. Va. Code § 29A‐5‐ 4(a), and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
Public Financing Program, W. Va. Code § 3‐12‐10(i).
Respondent Walker frames the argument as one involving “the
fundamental and sacred constitutional rights of free speech and substantive due
process…,” but there is very little meat on these constitutional bones. This Court has
held that “speech is chilled ‘when an otherwise willing speaker is prevented from
speaking, or cajoled into no longer speaking, by government conduct[,]’” Men and
Women Against Discrimination v. The Family Services Protection Board, 229 W. Va.
55, 62, 725 S.E.2d 756, 763 (2011), and it would be a far stretch to conclude that the
certification of Petitioner Wooton for public funding in any way abridges or chills
Respondent Walker’s free speech rights. She is as free now as she was prior to
February 5, 2016, when the Commission certified Petitioner Wooton for public
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funding, to conduct her campaign and articulate the reasons she believes herself to
be a candidate worthy of support at the ballot box.
In any event, “[i]nasmuch as this case may be decided on statutory
grounds, this Court need not address the constitutional issue.” Hudson v. Bowling,
232 W. Va. 282, 291 n. 13, 752 S.E.2d 313, 322 n. 13 (2013), citing Lee Trace, LLC v.
Raynes, 232 W. Va. 183, 191, 751 S.E.2d 703, 711 (2013). Simply put, in this case
Respondent Walker was a party to the proceedings held before the Commission, and
the Commission’s decision at issue in this case was made as a direct result of her
challenge to the Wooton campaign’s certification. Under these circumstances, we
can perceive of no basis on which to conclude that Respondent Walker has no first‐
party standing to appeal from the denial of that challenge.
Mandatory Disqualification/Substantial Compliance
Although the question certified by the court below is very broad, the
briefs and arguments of the parties make it clear that the sole issue for decision in
this case is very narrow: whether Petitioner Wooton’s failure to file his sworn
statement on or before February 2, 2016, the second business day after the close of
the qualifying period, mandated his disqualification under the Act. Respondent
Walker argues that “a deadline is a deadline,” and that under the Act and the
legislative rules, W. Va. Code of State Rules § 146‐5‐1 et seq., the West Virginia State
Election Commission has no discretion to excuse or extend any deadline for any
reason. Further, Respondent Walker makes a policy argument that any exercise of
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discretion on the part of the Commission will erode public confidence in the
integrity of the public financing program. Cf. Brady v. Hechler, 176 W. Va. 570, 574,
346 S.E.2d 546, 550 (1986).
In contrast, Petitioner Wooton argues that the legislative rules, and in
particular W. Va. Code of State Rules §§ 146‐5‐6.1 & 6.2, are mere “administrative
guide[s],” and that nothing in the Act or the legislative rules imposes an obligation
on the Commission to disqualify any candidate on the basis of a late filing of his or
her sworn statement. Petitioner Wooton also makes a policy argument that denying
public funding to a participating candidate who makes any procedural misstep, no
matter how inconsequential, would defeat the reform goals of the Act.
We begin with the acknowledgment that “[a] regulation that is
proposed by an agency and approved by the Legislature is a ‘legislative rule’ as
defined by the State Administrative Procedures Act, W. Va. Code, 29A‐1‐2(d) [1982],
and such a legislative rule has the force and effect of law.” Syl. Pt. 5, Smith v. West
Virginia Human Rights Comm’n, 216 W. Va. 2, 602 S.E.2d 445 (2004). Accordingly,
we reject any suggestion that W. Va. Code of State Rules §§ 146‐5‐6.1 & 6. 2 are
mere “guides,” a term with no legal significance, or are otherwise of no consequence.
This, however, is hardly the end of the inquiry. It is well settled under
this Court’s precedents that “not all technical procedural violations merit relief
where there is substantial compliance with substantive law.” West Virginia Alcohol
6
Beverage Control Administration and Division of Personnel v. Scott, 205 W. Va. 398,
403, 518 S.E.2d 639, 644 (1999) (Workman, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
E.g., State ex rel. Catron v. Raleigh County Bd. of Educ., 201 W. Va. 302, 496 S.E.2d 444 (1997) (substantial compliance in filing grievance); State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton,
196 W. Va. 208, 470 S.E.2d 162 (1996) (substantial compliance with publication
requirements); Hare v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 183 W. Va. 436, 396 S.E.2d 203 (1990) (substantial compliance with evaluation procedures leading up to
termination from employment); Vosberg v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of West Virginia, 166
W. Va. 488, 275 S.E.2d 640 (1981) (substantial compliance with grievance
procedure). This Court has even applied the principle of substantial compliance in
cases involving procedural requirements set forth in the West Virginia Constitution.
E.g., State ex rel. Smith v. Kelly, 149 W. Va. 381, 141 S.E.2d 142 (1965) (substantial
compliance with notice requirements prior to statewide vote on proposed
constitutional amendment); Morgan v. O’Brien, 134 W. Va. 1, 60 S.E.2d 722 (1948)
(to same effect).
In In re Burks, 206 W. Va. 429, 525 S.E.2d 310 (1999), a DUI case, the
circuit court reversed a license revocation order issued by the Commissioner of the
Division of Motor Vehicles because the arresting officer had failed to mail his
“Statement of Arresting Officer” to the Commissioner within forty‐eight hours of the
driver’s arrest, as required by statute. This Court reversed, holding that “[a] law
enforcement officer’s failure to strictly comply with the DUI arrest reporting time
requirements of W. Va. Code, 17C‐5A‐1(b)[1994] is not a bar or impediment to …
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administrative action based on the arrest report, unless there is actual prejudice to
the driver as a result of such failure.” Burks, Syl. Pt. 1, in part, 206 W. Va. at 430, 525
S.E.2d at 311.
Applying these principles to the instant case, we conclude that
Petitioner Wooton substantially complied with the Act and the rules. From the time
he became a participating candidate, through and including February 2, 2016, he
timely filed every form, every disclosure, and every piece of information required –
with the exception of one piece of paper, a pro forma sworn statement, which he
filed one day late. The record is devoid of evidence that Petitioner Wooton’s tardy
submission of the statement was of any consequence to anyone, let alone caused any
prejudice or harm to anyone.
Nothing in the history or language of the Act suggests that the Commission
intended its legislative rules, authorized by W. Va. Code § 3‐12‐11(d), to constitute a
complicated regulatory trap for the unwary. Additionally, nothing in the history or
language of the Act suggests that a violation of any rule, no matter how
inconsequential, carries a mandatory “death penalty” for a participating candidate.
See, e.g, State ex rel. Bumgardner v. Mills, 132 W. Va. 580, 53 S.E.2d 416 (1949); State
ex rel. Hall v. Gilmer County Court, 87 W. Va. 437, 105 S.E. 693, 694‐95 (1921); State
v. Bd. of Canvassers, 87 W. Va. 472, 105 S.E. 695 (1921). As this Court stated in
Bumgardner, 132 W. Va. at 595, 53 S.E.2d at 428:
This Court has held that prior statutory provisions [governing
verified statements of financial transactions], although exacting
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promptness in the preparation and the delivery of the expense
account of every candidate for public office, manifest ‘no express
or implied determination to disqualify permanently one who is
tardy in that respect from discharging the functions and
receiving the emoluments of the office to which he has been
elected, but only until he has filed the required statements.’
The case of Brady v. Hechler, 176 W. Va. 570, 346 S.E.2d 546 (1986),
relied upon by Respondent Walker, does not compel a different conclusion. In
Brady, this Court issued a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary of State and
the ballot commissioners of the Ninth Senatorial District of West Virginia to strike
Tracy W. Hylton’s name from the May 13, 1986, ballot, for failure to timely file his
certificate of candidacy with the Secretary of State as required by W. Va. Code § 3‐5‐
7 (1985). A certificate of candidacy is a very different thing from the pro forma
sworn statement at issue in this case; submission of the former sets in motion all of
the machinery necessary to prepare the ballots, while submission of the latter is
merely the final ministerial step allowing issuance of a check to a participating
candidate who has otherwise fulfilled every obligation imposed by law on him or
her. The only person prejudiced by late submission of the sworn statement is the
candidate, who will suffer a delay in receipt of the funding necessary to run his or
her campaign.
Two further considerations guide this Court’s resolution of the issue
presented in this case. First, although we do not find it necessary to determine
whether the time periods contained in W. Va. Code of State Rules §§ 146‐5‐6.1 & 6.2
are “arbitrary or capricious,” Grim v. Eastern Electric, LLC, 234 W. Va. 557, 565, 767
9
S.E.2d 267, 275 (2014), citing Syl. Pt. 2, W. Va. Health Care Cost Review Authority v.
Boone Memorial Hospital, 196 W. Va. 326, 472 S.E.2d 411 (1996), or inconsistent
with “the legislative intent expressed in the controlling or substantive statute which
the rule is promulgated to implement,” Harrison v. Commissioner, Division of Motor
Vehicles, 226 W. Va. 23, 31, 697 S.E.2d 59, 67 (2010), we do find that they are so
abbreviated as to invite exactly the type of problems that arose in this case. The
documents required to be filed within two business days of January 30, the end of
the qualifying period, include, inter alia, a full accounting, with documentation, of all
qualifying contributions received by the candidate during the month of January – in
Petitioner Wooton’s case, 754 contributions totaling $46,952.00.5 To make things
worse, W. Va. Code of State Rules § 146‐5‐7.3 requires that any challenges to these
contributions must be “filed with, and received by, the Secretary [of State] within
two business days after the close of the qualifying period of the filing of a
candidate’s Application for Certification, whichever is earlier.” This means, in
practical terms, that a challenger has hours, or perhaps even minutes, to file timely
challenges. In short, the restrictive time periods set forth in the relevant regulations
set the stage for exactly what happened in this case: a candidate timely filed a 29
page report, which included information and documentation of 754 contributions,
but failed to include one additional piece of paper, the pro forma cover letter; and
5 We reject Respondent Walker’s argument that Petitioner Wooton was negligent in
“waiting until the last minute” to file his paperwork, as under the Act he could not
compile his final accounting until after the last qualifying contribution in January,
2016, had come in.
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then the objection that followed was untimely because the challenger didn’t know
she had a challenge until after the time period had already expired.6
The second consideration which guides our resolution of this case is
the complete lack of prejudice to Respondent Walker, or anyone else, resulting from
Petitioner Wooton’s submission of his sworn statement one day late. Nowhere in
her brief or in oral argument was Respondent Walker able to articulate any
prejudice resulting from the Commission’s decision to certify Petitioner Wooton,
other than the conclusory assertion that any exercise of discretion by the
Commission in enforcing procedural deadlines will cast a “shroud of doubt” over the
election. We disagree. In this case, as noted above, the only prejudice was suffered
by Petitioner Wooton himself, as his late filing of the sworn statement resulted in a
delay in his receipt of the funding he needs to run his campaign.
In West Virginia Code § 3‐12‐2(10), the Legislature articulated the
critical objectives of the Act:
As demonstrated by the 2012 West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
Public Campaign Financing Pilot Program, an alternative public
campaign financing option for candidates running for a seat on the
Supreme Court of Appeals will ensure the fairness of democratic elections
in this state, protect the Constitutional rights of voters and candidates
from the detrimental effects of increasingly large amounts of money
6 It is questionable whether Respondent Walker had the right to challenge in this
case at all, since the Act, W. Va. Code § 3‐12‐10(g), and the regulations, W. Va. C.S.R.
§ 146‐5‐7.1, provide only for challenges to qualifying contributions, not to any other
act or omission on the part of a participating candidate. The Commission found that
it should, in equity, consider the challenge, and Petitioner Wooton mentions but
does not contest the point. Accordingly, this Court has reached the merits of the
challenge.
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being raised and spent to influence the outcome of elections, protect
the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary, and strengthen
public confidence in the judiciary….
As this Court recently noted in a workers’ compensation case, “[t]here
is no rational basis to discourage medically necessary treatment; this reasoning is
wholly incompatible with the Act’s benevolent objectives.” Moore v. K‐Mart
Corporation, 234 W. Va. 658, 664, 769 S.E.2d 35, 41 (2015) (emphasis in original).
Similarly, in the instant case, there is no rational basis to deny funding to a
participating candidate who has substantially complied with the whole welter of
statutes and rules governing the “West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Public
Campaign Financing Program.” The Act specifically seeks to encourage participation
in the program, not to erect trap doors through which participating candidates
plunge upon the slightest misstep.
Mindful of the important objectives served by the Act, and in light of the
foregoing authorities, we conclude, and so hold, that the West Virginia State Election
Commission has discretion to certify a participating candidate for public funding
under the “West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Public Campaign Financing
Program,” W. Va. Code § 3‐12‐1 et seq., notwithstanding the candidate’s failure to
meet the time deadlines set forth in W. Va. Code of State Rules §§ 146‐5‐6.1 & 6.2,
where the candidate has substantially complied with all requirements set forth in
the Act and the rules and where there is no showing of prejudice.
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Although in this case the Commission made no specific findings of
substantial compliance or lack of prejudice, we find it unnecessary to remand for the
Commission to consider these issues. The evidence in the voluminous record
submitted by the parties is undisputed that Petitioner Wooton substantially
complied with the Act and the rules, and that Respondent Walker suffered no
prejudice from the one day delay in submission of Wooton’s cover letter. No
contrary inference could be drawn, and therefore this case may be finally resolved
in this appeal.
The Certified Question
As set forth herein, the question answered and certified by the court below
gives no hint as to the reasoning employed by the court, and therefore serves no
purpose other than to announce winners and losers. Because this is an important
case involving an issue likely to recur in proceedings before the West Virginia State
Election Commission, this Court will modify the certified question in order to make
clear the ratio decidendi of our decision, thereby providing guidance to the
Commission and other interested parties:
Whether the West Virginia State Election Commission has discretion
to certify a participating candidate for public funding under the
“West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Public Campaign
Financing Program,” W. Va. Code § 3‐12‐1 et seq., notwithstanding
the candidate’s failure to meet the time deadlines set forth in W. Va.
Code of State Rules §§ 146‐5‐6.1, 6.2, where the candidate has
substantially complied with all requirements set forth in the Act and
the rules and where there is no showing of prejudice.
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We answer this question in the affirmative, and find that in this case
the Commission acted within its discretion in certifying the campaign of Petitioner
Wooton for public funding under the Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we modify the certified question to apply to
the specific facts of this case, and answer the modified certified question in the
affirmative. The decision of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County is hereby
REVERSED, and the decision of the West Virginia State Election Commission is
hereby reinstated in its entirety.
Certified Question Answered.
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