W. Va. Dept. of Health and Human Resources v. E.H. ( 2017 )


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  •                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    West Virginia Department of Health
    and Human Resources, Bureau for
    FILED
    Behavioral Health and Health Facilities,                                        June 9, 2017
    Respondent Below, Petitioner                                                   RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    vs) No. 16-0781 (Kanawha County 81-MISC-585)
    E.H., et al.,
    Petitioners Below, Respondents
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner and respondent below West Virginia Department of Health and Human
    Resources, Bureau for Behavioral Health and Health Facilities (“the Department”), by counsel
    Elbert Lin, Andrew S. Dornbos, Charles R. Bailey, and Kelly C. Morgan, appeals the July 21,
    2016, order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County that granted the motion to enforce and for
    sanctions filed by respondents and petitioners below E.H., et al. Respondents, by counsel Lydia
    C. Milnes and Jennifer S. Wagner filed a response. Petitioner submitted a reply.
    This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    This institutional reform case began in 1981, in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, to
    address the deplorable conditions at the State’s two psychiatric hospitals, Mildred Mitchell
    Bateman Hospital (“Bateman”) and William R. Sharpe, Jr., Hospital (“Sharpe”). Because this
    Court recently recounted the case’s long and extensive history in West Virginia Department of
    Health and Human Resources v. E.H., et al., 
    236 W. Va. 194
    , 
    778 S.E.2d 643
    (2015), the lengthy
    procedural facts that are not pertinent to this appeal will not be repeated here.
    The instant appeal involves staffing and staff pay as part of the effort to improve patient
    care at the two hospitals. Following a hearing conducted before the circuit court in April 2009,
    which included evidence of chronic and severe understaffing, the parties entered into an Agreed
    Order that was designed to remedy a host of problems, including the staff-related issues.
    Relevant to this appeal is that portion of the July 2, 2009, Agreed Order that provided as follows:
    10. Facilities:
    (a) [The Department] shall provide for increased pay for direct care workers at
    Bateman and Sharpe in order to (i) be able to recruit staff and retain existing
    1
    staff and (ii) preclude the practices of mandatory overtime and reliance on
    temporary workers (except in exceptional and infrequent contexts). (See
    Attachment B.)
    (Emphasis added). Attachment B is a chart that, inter alia, set forth mandatory salary increases,1
    including the agreement to increase the pay of Health Service Trainees by $1,000, and Health
    Service Workers and Health Service Assistants by $2,000.2
    Thereafter, in October of 2012, respondents filed a request for resolution in which it
    alleged, among other things, that the Department had not increased pay for health service
    trainees, workers, and assistants as set forth in Attachment B to the 2009 Agreed Order.
    Following a hearing thereon, the circuit court entered an order on December 11, 2012, in which
    it ordered, inter alia, that the Department must comply with paragraph 10(a) of the 2009 Agreed
    Order, above, regarding increased pay for health service employees at the two hospitals; that the
    increased pay “shall be for the exact amount listed in ‘Attachment B’ under the Proposed
    Increase column[;]”3 that this pay increase “shall be implemented on or before January 1,
    2013[;]” and that it is “prospective, meaning it shall be for those workers at Sharpe and Bateman
    Hospitals who are employed in the classes listed in ‘Attachment B’ on January 1, 2013 . . . .”
    The Department subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the December 11, 2012,
    order and a hearing was conducted. By order entered December 18, 2012, the circuit court denied
    the Department’s motion and clarified that health service trainees, workers, and assistants
    employed on or after January 1, 2013, are entitled to pay raises effective January 1, 2013, as
    provided in the December 11, 2012, order. The December 18, 2012, order provided further that
    “[t]his Order applies equally to those whose employment continues as to those whose
    employment with the Department ends after January 1, 2013 . . . .” Finally, the order provided
    “that starting January 31, 2013, the Department will be held in contempt at the rate of $50 per
    day, per affected employee, for each day the employee does not receive funds for the raises
    effective January 1, 2013.”
    Following an April 24, 2014, hearing addressing the Department’s efforts to recruit and
    retain full time employees at Bateman and Sharpe, the circuit court entered an order on June 3,
    1
    As described in E.H., et al., the evidence at the April 2009 evidentiary hearing
    demonstrated that “staffing vacancies were causing unsustainable working hours for clinical
    staff[;] . . . that increasing salaries would be an ‘extremely effective’ method for recruiting
    additional full-time employees[;]” and that “patients were being administered increased amounts
    of medication, a side effect of which is sedation, to treat their increased levels of anxiety
    attributable to understaffing and patient 
    overcrowding.” 236 W. Va. at 199
    , 778 S.E.2d at 648.
    2
    According to the circuit court’s order now on appeal, at the time the 2009 Agreed Order
    was entered, the base starting salary for a Health Service Trainee was $18,552; for a Health
    Service Worker, $19,488; and for a Health Service Assistant, $20,472.
    3
    At some point, the Department gave retention incentives to its employees; however, the
    incentives were not in the specific amounts listed in Attachment B to the 2009 Agreed Order.
    2
    2014, in which it found that the base starting salaries for health service trainees, workers and
    assistants were the same as they were prior to the 2009 Agreed Order and that the Department
    continued to hire employees in those three classifications at pre-2009 Agreed Order base salaries.
    In other words, the Department failed to pay these employees the salary increases required by
    Paragraph 10(a) and Attachment B of the 2009 Agreed Order, and the December 18, 2012, order.
    Accordingly, in subparagraph (b) of the June 3, 2014, order, the circuit court directed that the
    Department
    immediately implement a special starting salary for the three categories of health
    service workers as reflected in Attachment B to the 2009 Agreed Order.
    Employees in those three categories who have been hired and/or promoted to a
    new position since January 1, 2013, and who did not receive the benefit of the
    increased base salary must be retroactively compensated. This additionally
    includes newly hired employees who were paid above the base salary as a result
    of prior experience, the percent of their increases based on prior experience must
    be increased to reflect the appropriate base wage. Moreover, the retroactive
    compensation must include changes to amounts paid in overtime (which should
    have been paid at 150% of the higher salary) and changes in amounts paid to
    retirement benefits on behalf of the employee.
    (Emphasis added).
    In subparagraph (a) of the June 3, 2014, order, the circuit court also directed that
    the Department
    develop a plan to (1) significantly reduce the number of staff vacancies at Sharpe
    and Bateman[;] (2) discontinue the practice of mandatory overtime except in
    exceptional and infrequent contexts; and (3) discontinue the reliance on temporary
    employees and contract workers to fill the vacant positions. Among other things,
    the plan should utilize the currently available options, as set forth in the policies
    of the Division of Personnel, to implement special hiring rates and incentives in
    order to recruit fulltime direct care employees. In doing so, [the Department] shall
    consider prevailing market wages in the respective market areas for the two
    hospitals. The plan shall further include requests to the Division of Personnel for
    retention incentives to encourage retention of existing hospital employees. The
    plan must provide a schedule for future proposals to the Division of Personnel to
    ensure that base salaries remain competitive and that additional retention
    incentives are distributed . . . .
    The Department appealed the June 3, 2014, order to this Court.
    Meanwhile, the Department developed a salary plan directed at recruiting and retaining
    employees as required by subparagraph (a) of the June 3, 2014, order, which plan was approved
    by the West Virginia Division of Personnel on October 10, 2014. On January 1, 2015, the
    Department implemented the new salary plan, which included new starting salaries for new hires
    in nearly all classes of direct care employees (i.e., doctors, nurses, and health service employees).
    3
    This Court affirmed the June 3, 2014, order in an opinion filed October 7, 2015. See E.H.,
    et al.
    Subsequently, in response to discovery requests seeking information on the Department’s
    implementation of subparagraph (b) of the June 3, 2014, order, the Department stated, inter alia,
    that (1) it implemented a special starting salary for the three categories of health service
    employees as reflected in Attachment B of the Agreed Order, effective January 1, 2015; (2) it
    “issued salary increases in compliance with Attachment B of the Agreed Order effective January
    1, 2013;” (3) no qualifying employee was excluded for any reason from the three categories of
    health service employees as reflected in Attachment B from receiving the January 1, 2013, salary
    increases; (4) overtime was paid in compliance with the January 1, 2013, salary increases and in
    compliance with Attachment B; and (5) retirement benefits were paid in compliance with
    Attachment B. The Department further stated that it was unaware of any employee who was
    owed retroactive compensation and “request[ed] specificity as to any specific individual who is
    alleged to have not received retroactive pay.”
    Thereafter, respondents provided the Department with information on a sampling of nine
    employees who were hired into the health service employee categories at issue4 after January 1,
    2013, and who were being paid the starting base salary in effect before the 2009 Agreed Order.5
    These employees were not receiving the increased salary required by the 2009 Agreed Order,
    and the December 18, 2012, order. Nevertheless, counsel for the Department thereafter advised
    respondents’ counsel that none of the spot-checked employees were entitled to retroactive
    compensation.
    On April 25, 2016, respondents filed a motion to enforce and for sanctions in which they
    alleged that the Department failed to comply with subparagraph (b) of the June 3, 2014, order.
    Specifically, respondents’ motion alleged that the Department failed to immediately implement a
    new starting salary for the previously described categories of health service workers and
    retroactively compensate those workers. In response, the Department maintained that it had
    complied with the June 3, 2014, order.
    Monica Robinson, then Director of the Department’s Office of Human Resources
    Management, was deposed on May 9, 2016. She testified that the special starting salary that the
    Department implemented effective January 1, 2015, to purportedly comply with subparagraph
    (b) of the June 3, 2014, order, was, in fact, the salary plan the Department implemented to
    comply with subparagraph (a) of that order. Further, Ms. Robinson confirmed that the spot-
    check of the nine employees, described above, included employees who were hired between
    4
    Out of the nine employees, only four were still employed by the Department as of May
    9, 2016.
    5
    According to the Department’s brief, respondents believe there are more than 400
    employees who were hired between January 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014, and who were not
    being paid pursuant to the 2009 Agreed Order.
    4
    January 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014, who were being paid the minimum salary for their
    position, which did not include the increased pay required by Attachment B to the 2009 Agreed
    Order. Ms. Robinson further acknowledged that the Department had not retroactively
    compensated any employee as a result of the June 3, 2014, order to provide them the amounts
    they should have been paid effective January 1, 2013. According to Ms. Robinson, the
    Department did not believe it was ordered to do so.
    In a July 21, 2016, order,6 the circuit court concluded, as a matter of law, that the
    Department admitted that it had not retroactively compensated any health service employees who
    were employed between January 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014, at the minimum salary for
    their position, nor had these employees been given the benefit of the increased salary as required
    by the 2009 Agreed Order and subsequent circuit court orders. Thus, the circuit court concluded
    that the Department had failed to implement its order of June 3, 2014, despite ample time to do
    so.
    Accordingly, the July 21, 2016, order ordered the Department (1) to identify from its
    employment records those employees and former employees who were hired and/or promoted
    into the positions of health service trainee, worker, or assistant between January 1, 2013, and
    December 31, 2014; (2) to recalculate each of these employees’ salary from the time of hire
    and/or promotion until December 31, 2014, using the increased salary applicable to that position,
    as required by the 2009 Agreed Order and the court’s subsequent orders; (3) to recalculate the
    corrected overtime, retirement benefits, and any other benefits paid to these employees using the
    correct salary as the base figure; (4) to pay the difference between the correct compensation and
    the amounts actually paid to these employees in salary, overtime, retirement, and other benefits,
    from the time of hire and/or promotion to December 31, 2014; (5) to complete this review by
    August 31, 2016, and to provide the retroactive compensation to the affected employees by
    September 30, 2016; and (6) to be held in contempt and pay a penalty of $50 per day, per
    affected employee, for each day past September 30, 2016, that the retroactive compensation is
    not paid. It is from this order that the Department now appeals.7
    In considering the circuit court’s July 21, 2016, order, “[t]his Court reviews the circuit
    court’s final order and ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard. We review
    challenges to findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard; conclusions of law are
    reviewed de novo.” Syl. Pt. 4, Burgess v. Porterfield, 
    196 W. Va. 178
    , 
    469 S.E.2d 114
    (1996).
    The Department’s primary argument on appeal is that the circuit court erred in
    concluding that the Department failed to retroactively compensate employees in the three
    6
    According to the July 21, 2016, order, a status hearing was conducted on May 25, 2016,
    at which time the parties represented that the record contained sufficient evidence for the court to
    rule on respondent’s motion to enforce and for sanctions without any further evidence being
    taken at that hearing.
    7
    By order entered September 14, 2016, upon the Department’s motion, this Court
    ordered that the July 21, 2016, order be stayed pending resolution of this appeal.
    5
    categories of health service workers as required by subparagraph (b) of the June 3, 2014, order.
    As set forth above, subparagraph (b) required that the Department
    immediately implement a special starting salary for the three categories of health
    service workers as reflected in Attachment B to the 2009 Agreed Order.
    Employees in those three categories who have been hired and/or promoted to a
    new position since January 1, 2013, and who did not receive the benefit of the
    increased base salary must be retroactively compensated.
    The Department contends that retroactive compensation was required only if employees
    in one of the three categories of health service workers were “hired and/or promoted to a new
    position since January 1, 2013” and “did not receive the benefit of the increased base salary.”
    The Department argues that “[s]ince [it] gave the increased salary base to all its health service
    workers on January 1, 2015[,] as required by the plan developed under subparagraph (a) of the
    [June 3, 2014,] Order, then there were no such employees who qualified for the retroactive
    compensation.” According to the Department, the July 21, 2016, order improperly altered and
    exceeded the scope of the circuit court’s June 3, 2014, order.
    Based upon our careful review of the record and the arguments of the parties, we find no
    error. In the context of this institutional reform litigation, this Court has stated “[t]hat the DHHR
    can be compelled to act in accordance with its prior agreements, as well as prior court orders, is
    beyond dispute.” E.H., 236 W.Va. at 
    210, 778 S.E.2d at 659
    . “Indeed, it is axiomatic that a
    circuit court has the inherent power to do those things necessary to compel a party’s compliance
    with prior agreements, to enforce its prior orders, and to protect the court from acts obstructing
    the administration of justice, including the use of its contempt powers.” 
    Id. See Clark
    v.
    Druckman, 218 W.Va. 427, 435, 
    624 S.E.2d 864
    , 872 (2005) ((stating that “‘[c]learly, a trial
    judge has the inherent power to do those things necessary to enforce its orders . . . .’”) quoting
    Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mays & Mitchell, P.A., v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 
    639 So. 2d 606
    , 608-9 (Fla. 1994)).
    It is clear that one of the primary purposes of subparagraph (b) was to provide for an
    increase in pay for the three categories of health service workers who were employed at Bateman
    and Sharpe on or after January 1, 2013. To that end, subparagraph (b) directed the Department to
    immediately implement a specific pay increase for the three categories of health service workers
    as reflected in Attachment B to the 2009 Agreed Order and to retroactively compensate
    employees who should have received—but did not receive—the increase in pay beginning
    January 1, 2013. The evidence showed that, although special starting salaries were implemented
    under subparagraph (a) for the three categories of health service workers (as well as for other
    direct care employees) effective January 1, 2015, pay increases were not retroactively given to
    workers in these three categories who were hired and/or promoted on or after January 1, 2013.
    The Department’s position—that it was not required to compensate these employees for this
    twenty-four month period simply because they received pay increases beginning January 1,
    2015—is a misapprehension of the June 3, 2014, order. As the prior December 18, 2012, order,
    made clear, the three categories of health service workers “employed on or after January 1, 2013,
    are entitled to pay raises effective January 1, 2013[.]” In ordering that the Department recalculate
    the salaries and benefits of employees hired and/or promoted into the positions of health service
    6
    trainee, worker, and assistant between January 1, 2013, and December 31, 2014, and pay the
    correct compensation to the affected employees as specifically set forth in the July 21, 2016,
    order, the circuit court did not alter or exceed the scope of its June 4, 2014, order. Thus, we find
    that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.
    The Department also makes the attendant argument that the circuit court abused its
    discretion by imposing sanctions upon the Department without first providing it with the
    opportunity to comply with the “new terms” set forth in the July 21, 2016, order. As previously
    established herein, the July 21, 2016, order does not include “new terms” because it does not
    alter or exceed the scope of the June 3, 2014, order. Rather, the order now on appeal simply
    enforces the clear terms of the court’s June 3, 2014, order, with which the Department has failed
    to comply despite ample time to do so.
    “The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is
    essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
    enforcement of the judgments, orders and writs of the courts and, consequently, to
    the due administration of justice.” In re Morrissey, 
    305 F.3d 211
    , 217 (4th Cir.
    2002) (citing Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510, 
    22 L. Ed. 205
           (1873)).
    In re Frieda Q., 230 W.Va. 652, 662, 
    742 S.E.2d 68
    , 78 (2013). See Bartles v. Hinkle, 196 W.
    Va. 381, 389, 
    472 S.E.2d 827
    , 835 (1996) (stating that the “trial court has broad authority to
    enforce its orders and to sanction any party who fails to comply with its . . . rulings”). This Court
    has further stated that “[t]he choice of imposition of sanctions for failing to comply with a court
    order lies with the trial court, and we will not lightly disturb that decision.” 
    Id. Based upon
    our review, and under the facts and circumstances presented, we conclude
    that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions upon the Department in
    this matter. During the course of this lengthy institutional reform case, the Department has
    repeatedly failed to comport with various orders of the circuit court concerning the very specific
    required increase in pay for the three categories of health service workers, including, the 2009
    Agreed Order, and the December 18, 2012, and June 3, 2014, orders, the specific terms of which
    have been recounted herein. The Department’s repeated failure to compensate these health
    service workers undermines the ultimate goal of the pay increase, which is to improve patient
    care. The circuit court thus had the inherent authority to hold the Department in contempt and to
    impose sanctions.8
    8
    Indeed, the imposition of sanctions should come as no surprise to the Department. As
    previously noted, in its December 18, 2012, order denying the Department’s motion to alter or
    amend the December 11, 2012, order, the circuit court ordered that the Department implement
    pay increases for the exact amounts listed in Attachment B on or before January 1, 2013, and that
    “the Department will be held in contempt at the rate of $50 per day, per affected employed, for
    each day the employee does not receive funds for the raises effective January 1, 2013.”
    Furthermore, we reject the Department’s claim that it was not afforded a meaningful
    opportunity to be heard on the issue of sanctions. At the properly noticed hearing on the motion
    to enforce and for sanctions, it was the Department that advised the circuit court that the
    (continued . . . )
    7
    Finally, the Department argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in ordering that
    health service trainees, workers, and assistants who were hired and/or promoted between January
    1, 2013, and December 31, 2014, but who are no longer employed at the two hospitals, must also
    receive retroactive compensation. The Department contends that it “can think of no reason
    whatsoever that would support [the] decision to provide a windfall to former employees when
    the goal of such pay raises was to improve patient care by improving the hospitals’ abilities to
    retain employees.” We find no error.
    Beginning with the 2009 Agreed Order, the circuit court directed that health service
    trainees, workers, and assistants at Bateman and Sharpe be given a specific pay increase. When
    the Department failed to comply with this directive, the circuit court entered subsequent orders
    on December 11, and 18, 2012, and June 3, 2014, that specifically required that the pay increase
    be given to those health service employees who were hired and/or promoted on or after January
    1, 2013. The pay increase was ordered to be effective on January 1, 2013.9 The fact that the
    Department failed to timely implement the pay increase on January 1, 2013, such that workers
    then employed at the two hospitals would immediately benefit, should not now inure to their
    detriment because the employees are no longer employed there. Accordingly, we conclude that
    the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that health service trainees, workers,
    and assistants who were hired and/or promoted between January 1, 2013, and December 31,
    2014, were entitled to the pay increase and shall be compensated retroactively.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: June 9, 2017
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Allen H. Loughry II
    Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Menis E. Ketchum
    Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
    DISSENTING:
    Justice Robin Jean Davis
    deposition of Ms. Robinson and the exhibits attached to both the motion and response formed a
    sufficient evidentiary basis for the court to make its decision. Respondents agreed and the circuit
    court determined that no further evidence would be taken. Thus, the Department’s claim that it
    was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issue of sanctions is without merit.
    9
    As the December 18, 2012, order specifically directed, “[t]his Order applies equally to
    those whose employment continues as to those whose employment with the Department ends
    after January 1, 2013 . . . .” The Department does not now contend that it appealed this ruling.
    8