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. The court further found that the crimes at issue involved
“an act of violence against a person” pursuant to the competency statute and determined
that it would maintain jurisdiction over the petitioner for a period of fifty years, which was
the maximum possible sentence he would have received if he had been convicted of the
crimes charged, or until he attained competency.

 The defendant, who was committed
to a mental health facility, appealed the court’s ruling raising the exact issue here – that the
circuit court erred in finding that the crimes with which he had been charged involved an

 (emphasis added). Based on a plain reading of this language, we reject the petitioner’s
argument that the 2021 amendment “makes clear that an offense that involves an act of
violence against a person requires the risk of bodily injury to a person.” The petitioner fails
to cite to any specific language in the statute adding this alleged clarity, and our
independent review of the 2007 and 2021 versions of the statute reveals that the language
at issue is found in both and has not materially changed. Therefore, the law established in
George K. and Riggleman controls.
9
act of violence under West Virginia Code section 27-6A-3(h). See

233 W. Va. at 701

.
On appeal, the Court undertook an examination of what an “act of violence”
meant under West Virginia Code section 27-6A-3(h). 7 The Court rejected the notion that
if “an act of violence” was not a specific statutory element of the crime charged then the
crime did not fall within the meaning of “involved an act of violence against a person”
under section 27-6A-3(h). George K.,

233 W. Va. at 709

760 S.E.2d at 523

. In other
words, the elements of the crime charged did not limit the determination of what constitutes
an “act of violence.”

 In this regard, the Court held that “[i]n determining whether a
misdemeanor or felony involves an “act of violence against a person” pursuant to

W. Va. Code § 27

-6A-3 (2007), a court’s analysis is not limited by whether an ‘act of violence
against a person’ is an element of the offense.”

233 W. Va. at 700

, Syl.
Pt. 1.
We then analyzed whether “act of violence” required actual physical harm.
The petitioner in George K., like the petitioner herein, argued that the child victim did not
suffer physical harm and therefore the crimes at issue did not involve acts of violence. We
See Syl. Pt. 4, Mace v. Mylan Pharm., Inc.,

227 W. Va. 666

714 S.E.2d 223

 (2011)
7
(“‘“The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of
the Legislature.” Syllabus point 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner,

159 W.Va. 108

219 S.E.2d 361

 (1975).’ Syl. Pt. 3, Davis Mem’l Hosp. v. W. Va. State Tax
Comm’r,

222 W.Va. 677

671 S.E.2d 682

 (2008).”).
10
disagreed that actual physical harm was required; we found that the purpose of the
competency statute is to protect the public and that the phrase “act of violence” is not
limited to physical violence.

Id. at 711

. Thus, we held that “an ‘act of
violence against a person’ within the meaning of

W. Va. Code § 27

-6A-3 (2007)
encompasses acts that indicate the incompetent defendant poses a risk of physical harm,
severe emotional harm, or severe psychological harm to children.”

233 W. Va. at 700

, Syl. Pt. 2. The Court determined that the crimes with which George K. was
charged – third degree sexual assault and sexual abuse by a custodian – were crimes that
cause severe emotional and psychological harm to children and were therefore crimes
involving acts of violence within the meaning of West Virginia Code section 27-6A-3.

233 W. Va. at 711

, and Syl. Pt. 4.
Following its decision in George K., the Court was presented with a case
involving felony possession of child pornography, see

W. Va. Code § 61

-8C-3 (2014), and
asked to determine whether that crime involved an act of violence to a person under West
Virginia Code section 27-6A-3(h). See Riggleman, 238 W. Va. at 723, 798 S.E.2d at 849.
Once again, the petitioner in that case, like the petitioner herein, focused on his lack of
contact with the victims (the children depicted in pornographic images), arguing that the
mere viewing of the images was not an “act of violence” required by the statute. We
disagreed, noting that
the issue is not whether the incompetent defendant committed
an act of violence against a person; the language of West
Virginia Code § 27-6A-3(h) does not require the State to make
11
that showing. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the crime
charged involves an act of violence against a person.
Riggleman, 238 W. Va. at 725, 798 S.E.2d at 851 (emphasis added). The Court determined
that the crime charged, possession of child pornography, involved an “act of violence,”
stating that “[i]t is axiomatic that child pornography harms children[.]” Specifically, the
Court held that
[d]istributing and exhibiting material depicting minors
engaged in sexually explicit conduct in violation of West
Virginia Code § 61-8C-3 (2014) is a crime that ‘involve[s] an
act of violence against a person’ within the meaning of West
Virginia Code § 27-6A-3(h) (2013) because it derives from and
is proximately linked to physical, emotional, and psychological
harm to children.
238 W. Va. at 723, 798 S.E.2d at 847, Syl. Pt. 5 (emphasis added).
In view of the foregoing, we decline the petitioner’s invitation to overturn
George K. and Riggleman. Significantly, we recognize that the petitioner’s arguments in
support of overturning these decisions are virtually identical to arguments that this Court
considered and rejected therein. First, the petitioner argues, as did George K., that neither
the crime of solicitation of a minor,

W. Va. Code § 61

-3C-14b, nor the use of obscene
matter with intent to seduce a minor,

W. Va. Code § 61

-8A-4, includes as an element of
the crime an “act of violence against a person.” The petitioner contends that this fact alone
is sufficient to find that neither crime involves an act of violence for purposes of West
Virginia Code § 27-6A-3. However, in making this argument the petitioner disregards the
fact that we expressly considered and rejected this very argument in George K. See 233
12
W. Va. at 709,

760 S.E.2d at 523

. Moreover, the petitioner presents no new or novel legal
basis which would cause us to revisit prior law on this point.
Next, we disagree with the petitioner’s argument that there is no evidence
that “suggests” he poses a risk of physical harm, severe emotional harm or severe
psychological harm to other children. 8 Our focus in George K. was not only the victim in
that case but also on the future harm that the defendant could inflict on children if he was
not committed.

Id. at 711

. Specifically, we found that “‘[c]hildren are
the most vulnerable of victims, suffering traumatic and frequently life-long physical and
emotional damage.’ State v. Goff,

203 W.Va. 516

, 522,

509 S.E.2d 557

, 563 (1998)
(internal quotation omitted)[]” from these types of crimes.

233 W. Va. at 711

.
Critically, in this type of proceeding there is no burden on the victim to show
8
physical harm, severe emotional harm, or severe psychological harm; rather, the focus is
on whether the petitioner’s “acts . . . indicate the incompetent defendant poses a risk of
physical harm, severe emotional harm, or severe psychological harm to children.” George
K., 233 W Va. at 701,

, Syl. Pt. 2. In any event, the petitioner’s assertion
that the victim did not suffer any harm is not supported by evidence.
Further, the fact that the victim did not open the picture of the penis that the
petitioner sent to her is of no consequence. Again, the court’s examination is focused on
the petitioner’s act of sending the picture and whether that act demonstrates that the
petitioner “poses a risk of physical harm, severe emotional harm, or severe psychological
harm to children.”

13
In Riggleman, the Court then applied the reasoning of George K. to the
offense of possession of child pornography, a crime in which the defendant had no physical
contact with the victims. 238 W. Va. at 722, 798 S.E.2d at 848. Nevertheless, we found
[i]t is axiomatic that child pornography harms children and
“the victimization of a child depicted in pornographic materials
flows just as directly from the crime of knowingly receiving
child pornography as it does from the arguably more culpable
offenses of producing or distributing child pornography.”
United States v. Norris,

159 F.3d 926

, 930 (5th Cir. 1998). The
defendants who reproduce, distribute, or possess these images
all play a part in sustaining this tragedy; they are all involved
in the substantial network of child pornography that derives
from violent sexual acts performed on children.
238 W. Va. at 728, 798 S.E.2d at 854. Thus, we had no problem finding that the
“acts prohibited by West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3 are sufficiently involved with the
victimization of the children harmed in the images that they trigger the application of West
Virginia Code § 27-6A-3(h).”

238 W. Va. 728

, 798 S.E.2d at 854.
In the instant case, the text messages and nude photograph sent to the victim
were disturbing in that they clearly expressed the petitioner’s desire to engage in sexual
relations with a minor and clearly solicited the minor to engage in such conduct. Equally
distressing was the petitioner’s pursuit of the victim despite the fact that she was his half-
sister. 9
Included in the appendix record are the petitioner’s Dangerousness Risk
9
Assessment that was performed April 23, 2021, and a Final Commitment Hearing Order
(“Commitment Order”) entered on April 25, 2022, both of which belie the petitioner’s
argument that he poses no risk of physical harm, severe emotional harm or severe
psychological harm to other children. Specifically, in the risk assessment Dr. Nicholas
14
The petitioner was charged with two counts of soliciting a minor via a
computer, West Virginia Code section 61-3C-14b, which provides:
Any person over the age of eighteen, who knowingly
uses a computer to solicit, entice, seduce or lure, or attempt to
solicit, entice, seduce or lure, a minor known or believed to be
at least four years younger than the person using the computer
or a person he or she believes to be such a minor, in order to
engage in any illegal act proscribed by the provisions of article
eight, eight-b, eight-c or eight-d of this chapter, or any felony
offense under section four hundred one, article four, chapter
sixty-a of this code, is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned in a
state correctional facility not less than two nor more than ten
years, or both.
Id.   The petitioner was also charged with use of obscene matter with intent to seduce a
minor,

W. Va. Code § 61

-8A-4, which provides:
Any adult, having knowledge of the character of the
matter, who knows or believes that a person is a minor at least
four years younger than the adult, and distributes, offers to
distribute or displays by any means any obscene matter to the
person who is known or believed to be a minor at least four
years younger than the adult, and such distribution, offer to
distribute, or display is undertaken with the intent or for the
purpose of facilitating the sexual seduction or abuse of the
Jasinski, a psychologist, indicates that the petitioner “has both static (historical
unchanging) and dynamic (changeable) risk factors for future violence and/or sexual
misconduct.” It is also noted that since his hospitalization, the petitioner has demonstrated
“problematic interpersonal behavior” on several occasions. When confronted about his
behavior, the petitioner became “loud and angry[,]” denying any action on his part. Dr.
Jasinski further notes that the petitioner’s behavior “indicat[es] an ongoing difficulty
maintain[ing] safe and appropriate boundaries and behavior with others . . . . He clearly
continues to manifest problematic behavior that makes him inappropriate for release into
the community.” The recommendation was for the petitioner’s placement in a facility with
twenty-four-hour supervision and on-site mental health treatment services. Likewise, in
the more recent Commitment Order, the circuit court noted the parties’ agreement that the
petitioner “remains a substantial danger to himself and others. . . outside the hospital
setting[.]” (Emphasis added).
15
minor, is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall
be fined not more than $25,000, or imprisoned in a state
correctional facility for not more than five years, or both. For
a second and each subsequent commission of such offense,
such person is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be
fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned in a state
correctional facility for not more than ten years, or both.

Id.

 In light of our analysis in George K. and Riggleman, it is beyond argument that both
of the crimes charged herein involve the same type of acts involved in our precedents –
acts that pose a risk of physical harm, severe emotional harm, or severe psychological harm
to children. See George K.,

233 W. Va. at 700