In re E.H., J.S., E.K., and C.K. ( 2022 )


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  •           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
    September 2022 Term                 FILED
    _______________
    November 17, 2022
    No. 22-0067                   released at 3:00 p.m.
    EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
    _______________             SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    In re E.H., J.S., E.K., and C.K.
    ________________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mercer County
    The Honorable Derek C. Swope
    Case Nos. 21-JA-002-DS, 21-JA-003-DS, 21-JA-004-DS, and 21-JA-005-DS
    VACATED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
    ________________________________________________________________________
    Submitted: November 1, 2022
    Filed: November 17, 2022
    Gerald R. Linkous, Esq.                 Patrick Morrisey
    Mercer County Public Defender           Attorney General
    Corporation                             Brittany Ryers-Hindbaugh
    Princeton, West Virginia                Assistant Attorney General
    Counsel for Petitioner R.H.             Charleston, West Virginia
    Counsel for Respondent
    Tiffany Kent, Esq.                      Department of Health and Human Resources
    ChildLaw Services, Inc.
    Guardian ad Litem
    JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
    JUSTICE ARMSTEAD dissents and reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.
    SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
    1.     “‘When this Court reviews challenges to the findings and conclusions
    of the circuit court, a two-prong deferential standard of review is applied. We review the
    final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard, and we
    review the circuit court’s underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard.’
    Syl., McCormick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    197 W.Va. 415
    , 
    475 S.E.2d 507
     (1996).” Syllabus
    Point 1, In re S.W., 
    236 W. Va. 309
    , 
    779 S.E.2d 577
     (2015).
    2. “‘Where a trial court order terminating parental rights merely declares that
    there is no reasonable likelihood that a parent can eliminate the conditions of neglect,
    without explicitly stating factual findings in the order or on the record supporting such
    conclusion, and fails to state statutory findings required by West Virginia Code § 49-6-
    5(a)(6) (1998) (Repl. Vol. 2001) on the record or in the order, the order is inadequate.’ Syl.
    Pt. 4, in part, In re Edward B., 
    210 W. Va. 621
    , 
    558 S.E.2d 620
     (2001).” Syllabus Point 7,
    In re K. S., 
    246 W. Va. 517
    , 
    874 S.E.2d 319
     (2022).
    3. “‘Where it appears from the record that the process established by the
    Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes for the
    disposition of cases involving children adjudicated to be abused or neglected has been
    substantially disregarded or frustrated, the resulting order of disposition will be vacated
    and the case remanded for compliance with that process and entry of an appropriate
    i
    dispositional order.’ Syl. Pt. 5, In re Edward B., 
    210 W. Va. 621
    , 
    558 S.E.2d 620
     (2001).”
    Syllabus Point 8, In re K. S., 
    246 W. Va. 517
    , 
    874 S.E.2d 319
     (2022).
    ii
    WALKER, Justice:
    Petitioner-Father R.H. was adjudicated an abusing parent of minor children
    E.H. and J.S. in September 2021.1 By order entered December 27, 2021, the circuit court
    terminated Petitioner’s parental rights to the children under West Virginia Code § 49-4-
    604(c)(6), due to “aggravated circumstances.” 2 Petitioner raises four assignments of error
    on appeal, but we address the substance of only one: that the dispositional order entered on
    December 27, 2021, lacks sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to permit this
    Court to conduct a meaningful review of the proceedings below. So, we vacate the
    dispositional order and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this
    Opinion.
    I.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    The Department of Health and Human Resources filed a petition in January
    2021 alleging that Petitioner-Father R.H. and his wife, B.H., abused E.H., J.S., E.K., and
    1
    Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use
    initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re
    K.H., 
    235 W. Va. 254
    , 
    773 S.E.2d 20
     (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 
    230 W. Va. 731
    ,
    
    742 S.E.2d 419
     (2013); State v. Brandon B., 
    218 W. Va. 324
    , 
    624 S.E.2d 761
     (2005); State
    v. Edward Charles L., 
    183 W. Va. 641
    , 
    398 S.E.2d 123
     (1990).
    2
    Disposition under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) results in the termination
    of an abusing parent’s “parental, custodial and guardianship rights and responsibilities . . .
    .” We refer to that trio of rights as “parental rights” throughout this Opinion.
    1
    C.K.3 Petitioner is the biological father of E.H. (mother, B.H.) and J.S (mother, A.S.).
    E.K. and C.K. are B.H.’s children with P.K.4 The Department alleged that it received a
    referral on February 16, 2020, that police had been called to Petitioner and B.H.’s home
    after Petitioner hit B.H. B.H. claimed that Petitioner kicked her, and that Petitioner had
    sexually abused C.K.        A social worker with Child Protect of Mercer County, Inc.,
    conducted forensic interviews of E.K. and C.K. later that month. E.K. reported witnessing
    domestic violence between his mother, B.H., and Petitioner, his stepfather. And C.K.
    stated that Petitioner had sexually abused her and detailed Petitioner’s conduct.          In
    February 2021, Petitioner was indicted on charges stemming from that abuse. C.K.
    testified at Petitioner’s trial in July 2021.
    On September 21, 2021, the circuit court conducted an adjudicatory hearing
    for both B.H. and Petitioner. The court heard testimony from (1) Dr. David Ellis,
    psychologist; (2) Lindsay Pack, forensic interviewer; (3) Teresa Larew, an employee of the
    federal Department of Housing and Urban Development; (4) B.H.; (5) J.S.’s mother, A.S.;
    and (6) P.K., father to E.K. and C.K. Petitioner also testified, admitting that he had exposed
    the children to domestic violence but denying that he had sexually abused C.K. Also,
    3
    E.K. and C.K. are not the subjects of this appeal.
    4
    The Department named A.S., P.K., and R.K. (P.K.’s wife) as non-offending
    parents.
    2
    during the hearing, Petitioner relinquished any rights he may have had to his stepchildren,
    E.K. and C.K.
    The circuit court found by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner had
    abused the children based on his admission to engaging in domestic violence with B.H.
    Likewise, the circuit court adjudicated B.H. as an abusing parent based on her admitted
    participation in domestic violence with Petitioner. 5 The court stated that it had reviewed
    the transcript of C.K.’s testimony at Petitioner’s trial but had not reviewed the transcript of
    C.K.’s forensic interview. The circuit court deferred ruling on the allegations of sexual
    abuse until it could review that transcript. On November 1, 2021, the circuit court entered
    an order finding by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner had sexually abused C.K.
    The circuit court conducted a dispositional hearing on December 13, 2021.
    Petitioner requested a post-adjudicatory improvement period, to which the Department and
    the guardian ad litem objected. Petitioner also requested disposition under West Virginia
    Code § 49-4-604(c)(5) (2020), so that only his custodial rights to E.H. and J.S. would be
    terminated. Finally, Petitioner requested post-termination visitation with E.H. and J.S.,
    should the court terminate his parental rights under § 49-4-604(c)(6). The Department
    5
    The court granted B.H. a post-adjudicatory improvement period.
    3
    requested that the circuit court terminate Petitioner’s parental rights to E.H. and J.S. under
    § 49-4-604(c)(6). The guardian ad litem concurred in that request.
    The circuit court terminated Petitioner’s parental rights to E.H. and J.S. at
    the conclusion of the hearing,6 explaining on the record that:
    Well, I’m going to terminate his parental rights to all the
    children. I’m going to amend my earlier finding, and here’s
    why: I mean, I think there -- not only the sexual assault but
    just the entire gamut of these things. It’s just not, you know, –
    - it’s just bad. That’s all I can say.
    I believe the child. . . . I thought the child was very
    creditable. . . . I haven’t seen any real attempt to improve on
    some of these things, so I’m terminating the parental rights.
    Two weeks later, on December 27, 2021, the court entered an order stating
    as follows:
    [Petitioner], by counsel, requests an improvement
    period regarding his two children, [E.H. and J.S.].
    The Department requests that the Court terminate his
    parental rights and the guardian ad litem joins the motion.
    Upon consideration of the matters presented and
    argument of counsel, this Court FINDS and concludes, in the
    best interests of the children that:
    6
    The permanency plan for E.H. is continued residence with B.H. The permanency
    plan for J.S. is continued residence with A.S., his non-offending mother.
    4
    A [multi-disciplinary team] meeting is scheduled for
    January 3, 2021, at 10:00 a.m.
    WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that:
    The Court ORDERS that the parental, custodial, and
    guardianship rights of [Petitioner] be terminated as those rights
    relate to [E.H. and J.S.], due to aggravated circumstances.
    Termination of Petitioner’s parental rights mooted the issue of a post-adjudication
    improvement period. The circuit court did not address Petitioner’s motion for post-
    termination visitation with E.H. and J.S.7
    Petitioner now appeals the December 27, 2021 order terminating his parental
    rights to E.H. and J.S.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This Court applies a two-prong standard of review in child abuse and neglect
    cases:
    The dispositional order does not address sibling visitation. Compare Syl. Pt. 4,
    7
    James M. v. Maynard, 
    185 W. Va. 648
    , 
    408 S.E.2d 400
     (1991) (“In cases where there is a
    termination of parental rights, the circuit court should consider whether continued
    association with siblings in other placements is in the child’s best interests, and if such
    continued association is in such child’s best interests, the court should enter an appropriate
    order to preserve the rights of siblings to continued contact.”). However, the parties
    represented to the Court that both of Petitioner’s biological children, E.H. and J.S., appear
    to visit with each other. On remand, the circuit court should formally address sibling
    visitation.
    5
    “When this Court reviews challenges to the findings and
    conclusions of the circuit court, a two-prong deferential
    standard of review is applied. We review the final order and
    the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard,
    and we review the circuit court’s underlying factual findings
    under a clearly erroneous standard.” Syl., McCormick v.
    Allstate Ins. Co., 
    197 W.Va. 415
    , 
    475 S.E.2d 507
     (1996).[8]
    III. ANALYSIS
    Petitioner assigns four errors to the proceedings before the circuit court.
    First, Petitioner contends that the circuit court should have granted him a post-adjudicatory
    improvement period. 9 Second, he argues that the court erred when it terminated his
    parental rights to E.H. and J.S., rather than his custodial rights, only. Third, Petitioner
    asserts that the court erred by terminating his parental rights because neither the record nor
    the December 27, 2021 order contain the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law
    and so should be vacated. Finally, Petitioner argues that the court erred by failing to
    address his request for post-termination contact and/or visitation with E.H. and J.S.
    8
    Syl. Pt. 1, In re S.W., 
    236 W. Va. 309
    , 
    779 S.E.2d 577
     (2015).
    9
    Petitioner does not appeal his adjudication as an abusing parent.
    6
    We need address Petitioner’s third assignment of error, only. 10 Rule 36(a)
    of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings details
    the necessary contents of a dispositional order:
    [a]t the conclusion of the disposition hearing, the court
    shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law, in writing
    or on the record, as to the appropriate disposition in accordance
    with the provisions of 
    W. Va. Code § 49-4-604
    . The court shall
    enter a disposition order, including findings of fact and
    conclusions of law, within ten (10) days of the conclusion of
    the hearing.[11]
    In the context of termination of parental rights under § 49-4-604(c)(6), the
    requisite findings are two-fold: that “there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions
    of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future,” and termination of
    parental rights is “necessary for the welfare of the child.” 12           Those are “distinct
    requirements” that must be “afforded their proper significance” under § 49-4-604(c)(6). 13
    Indeed, as we have explained,
    [t]he prerequisite that there must first be “no reasonable
    likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be
    10
    Because we are vacating the dispositional order and remanding this matter for
    further proceedings, consideration of Petitioner’s other assignments of error is not
    necessary to our resolution of this case.
    11
    W. VA. R. OF PROC. FOR CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT PROC. 36(a).
    12
    
    W. Va. Code § 49-4-604
    (c)(6).
    13
    In re A. P., 
    245 W. Va. 248
    , 255, 
    858 S.E.2d 873
    , 880 (2021).
    7
    substantially corrected” speaks to the parent’s current
    situation, conduct, and/or abilities relative to his or her
    caretaking of the child. [
    W. Va. Code § 49-4-604
    (c)(6)]. In
    contrast, the “and[ ] when necessary for the welfare of the
    child” requirement concerns itself with the particular needs of
    the child as pertains to his or her physical and emotional well-
    being. 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    This latter requirement—through its pre-condition of
    abject necessity—duly recognizes the heightened burden
    which must be satisfied to terminate, with finality, a parent’s
    fundamental right to custody of his or her child.[14]
    Finally, and as we recently emphasized, “‘[t]he State must produce clear and convincing
    evidence to support [disposition under § 49-4-604(c)(6)] before the court may sever the
    custodial rights of the natural parents.’” 15
    In view of those authorities, we agree with Petitioner that the December 27,
    2021 dispositional order does not contain the requisite findings of fact or conclusions of
    law to support termination of his parental rights under § 49-4-604(c)(6). The order cites
    no evidence offered by the State to support the conclusion that termination of Petitioner’s
    parental rights is in either E.H. or J.S.’s best interests. Nor does the order cite evidence
    sufficient to arrive at the additional finding required to terminate parental rights under §
    49-4-604(c)(6)—that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and
    14
    Id.
    15
    In re K. S., 
    246 W. Va. 517
    , ___, 
    874 S.E.2d 319
    , 327 (2022) (emphasis in
    original) (quoting State v. C.N.S., 
    173 W. Va. 651
    , 656, 
    319 S.E.2d 775
    , 780 (1984)).
    8
    neglect can be substantially corrected. Section 49-4-604(d) provides that the phrase “‘[n]o
    reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected’
    means that, based upon the evidence before the court, the abusing adult or adults have
    demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on their
    own or with help . . . .” Here, the order simply states that termination was necessary due
    to “aggravated circumstances,” with no further discussion. 16 While the court stated at the
    dispositional hearing that it had not seen “any real attempt [by Petitioner] to improve on
    some of these things,” that statement is simply too vague “‘to enable us properly to exercise
    and not exceed our powers of review.’”17
    We have held that,
    16
    The phrase “aggravated circumstances” appears in § 49-4-604(c)(7)(A), which
    provides that:
    [f]or purposes of the court’s consideration of the
    disposition custody of a child pursuant to [§ 49-4-604(c)], the
    department is not required to make reasonable efforts to
    preserve the family if the court determines . . . [t]he parent has
    subjected the child, another child of the parent or any other
    child residing in the same household or under the temporary or
    permanent custody of the parent to aggravated circumstances
    . . . . which include, but are not limited to, . . . sexual abuse . .
    ..
    (Emphasis added).
    17
    In re Edward B., 
    210 W. Va. 621
    , 632, 
    558 S.E.2d 620
    , 631 (2001) (quoting
    Nicpon v. Nicpon, 
    157 N.W.2d 464
    , 467 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968)).
    9
    “[w]here a trial court order terminating parental rights
    merely declares that there is no reasonable likelihood that a
    parent can eliminate the conditions of neglect, without
    explicitly stating factual findings in the order or on the record
    supporting such conclusion, and fails to state statutory findings
    required by West Virginia Code § [49-4-604(c)(6) (2020)] on
    the record or in the order, the order is inadequate.”[18]
    Further,
    “[w]here it appears from the record that the process
    established by the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and
    Neglect Proceedings and related statutes for the disposition of
    cases involving children adjudicated to be abused or neglected
    has been substantially disregarded or frustrated, the resulting
    order of disposition will be vacated and the case remanded for
    compliance with that process and entry of an appropriate
    dispositional order.”[19]
    Applied here, those syllabus points mandate that we vacate the final
    dispositional order of December 27, 2021.           We remand this matter for any further
    proceedings necessary to permit the circuit court to enter a dispositional order containing
    the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with the provisions of
    Syl. Pt. 7, In re K. S., 246 W. Va. at 517, 874 S.E.2d at 322 (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, In
    18
    re Edward B., 
    210 W. Va. at 621
    , 
    558 S.E.2d at 620
    ).
    19
    Syl. Pt. 8, 
    id.
     (quoting Syl. Pt. 5, In re Edward B., 
    210 W. Va. at 621
    , 
    558 S.E.2d at 620
    ).
    10
    West Virginia Code § 49-4-604 and Rule 36(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure
    for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings.
    VACATED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
    11