Verizon Services Corp. v. Board of Review of Workforce West Virginia , 811 S.E.2d 885 ( 2018 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 2018 Term
FILED
March 13, 2018
No. 17-0288 released at 3:00 p.m.
EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
VERIZON SERVICES CORP.,
Petitioner Below, Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF WORKFORCE WEST VIRGINIA;
JACK CANFIELD, CHAIRMAN, LESLIE R. FACEMEYER, MEMBER,
AND GINO COLOMBO, MEMBER; RUSSELL L. FRY, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF WORKFORCE WEST VIRGINIA; AND
JASON E. ALLMAN, ET AL., CLAIMANTS,
Respondents Below, Respondents.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
Honorable Tod J. Kaufman, Judge
Civil Action No. 16-AA-96
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Submitted: January 23, 2018
Filed: March 13, 2018
Mark H. Dellinger, Esq. Vincent Trivelli, Esq.
Jessie F. Reckart, Esq. The Law Office of Vincent Trivelli, PLLC
Bowles Rice LLP Morgantown, West Virginia
Charleston, West Virginia Attorney for Respondent Claimants
Attorneys for Petitioner
JUSTICE LOUGHRY delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE WALKER, deeming herself disqualified, did not participate in the decision in this
case.
JUDGE JOSEPH K. REEDER, sitting by temporary assignment.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “The findings of fact of the Board of Review of [WorkForce West
Virginia] are entitled to substantial deference unless a reviewing court believes the findings
are clearly wrong. If the question on review is one purely of law, no deference is given and
the standard of judicial review by the court is de novo.” Syl. Pt. 3, Adkins v. Gatson, 192
W.Va. 561, 453 S.E.2d 395 (1994).
2. “The term ‘stoppage of work’, within the meaning of the unemployment
compensation statutes of this state, refers to the employer’s operations rather than to a mere
cessation of employment by claimants of benefits under the provisions of such statutes; and,
in order that employees may be disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation
benefits because of ‘a stoppage of work’ resulting from a labor dispute, it must appear that
there has resulted a substantial curtailment of the employer’s normal operations.” Syl. Pt.
2, Cumberland & Allegheny Gas Co. v. Hatcher, 147 W.Va. 630, 130 S.E.2d 115 (1963),
overruled on other grounds by Lee-Norse Co. v. Rutledge, 170 W.Va. 162, 291 S.E.2d 477(1982).
i
3. “Where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain
meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation.” Syl. Pt. 2, State
v. Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968).
4. “A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that significance and effect
must, if possible, be given to every section, clause, word or part of the statute.” Syl. Pt. 3,
Meadows v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 207 W.Va. 203, 530 S.E.2d 676 (1999).
5. “Each word of a statute should be given some effect and a statute must
be construed in accordance with the import of its language. Undefined words and terms used
in a legislative enactment will be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning.” Syl.
Pt. 6, in part, State ex rel. Cohen v. Manchin, 175 W.Va. 525, 336 S.E.2d 171 (1984).
6. The phrase “factory, establishment or other premises at which he or she
was last employed” in West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(4) (2012) means the distinct
geographical location where the claimant was last employed prior to the labor dispute.
ii
LOUGHRY, Justice:
The petitioner, Verizon Services Corp. (“Verizon”), appeals the February 22,
2017, final order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County affirming a decision of the
respondent, the Board of Review of Workforce West Virginia (“Board”), that granted
twenty-five Verizon employees, respondents herein (“the claimants”1), unemployment
compensation benefits for a period of time during which they were on strike. In this appeal,
Verizon argues that the lower tribunals erred by not finding that a “stoppage of work”
occurred at its Clarksburg facility during the strike which disqualified the claimants for
unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(4) (2012).2
Alternatively, Verizon argues that the lower tribunals erred by not making individualized
determinations regarding whether each claimant was disqualified for unemployment
compensation benefits under West Virginia Code §§ 21A-6-3(1) and 21A-6-3(3).3
1
The claimants have only been identified as “Jason E. Allman and others.”
2
We apply the version of the statute in effect at the time of the strike, the relevant
language of which is set forth in section III, infra. In 2017, the Legislature amended West
Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(4) to disqualify an individual from receiving unemployment
compensation benefits for any week “in which he or she did not work as a result of . . . [a]
strike or other bona fide labor dispute which caused him or her to leave or lose his or her
employment.” The amendment became effective on July 2, 2017.
3
Under West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(1) (2012), an individual is disqualified for
unemployment compensation benefits “[f]or the week in which he or she left his or her most
recent work voluntarily without good cause involving fault on the part of the employer[.]”
West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(3) (2012) disqualifies an individual for unemployment
compensation benefits “[f]or the week in which he or she failed without good cause to apply
1
Having considered the parties’ briefs and arguments, the submitted appendix
record, and the applicable authorities, we find that the claimants were disqualified for
unemployment compensation benefits under West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(4). Accordingly,
we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand this case for entry of an order denying the
claimants’ applications for unemployment compensation benefits.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Verizon operates a call center in Clarksburg, West Virginia, through which it
provides sales and services to customers of Verizon Communications, Inc. (“VCI”) who live
in other states.4 In the spring of 2016, Verizon experienced a nationwide strike of its union
employees. During the strike, the Clarksburg facility was closed.5 The calls that would have
normally been answered by the Clarksburg call center were automatically rerouted to Verizon
for available, suitable work, accept suitable work when offered, or return to his or her
customary self-employment when directed to do so by the commissioner[.]” These
subsections of West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3 were not altered by the 2017 amendment
except for a stylistic change to the second paragraph of subsection (1). See W.Va. Code §
21A-6-3 (2017).
4
According to Verizon, VCI sold its West Virginia landline operations to Frontier
Communications several years ago and, therefore, does not have any West Virginia
customers.
5
At the time of the strike, thirty people were employed at the Clarksburg facility, three
of whom were managers. Two employees, who were union members, were on short-term
disability during the relevant time period and, therefore, did not seek unemployment
compensation benefits. The other twenty-five employees participated in the strike and are the
claimants in this case.
2
call centers in other states. The claimants performed no work and did not receive any wages
during the strike, which lasted from April 13, 2016, to May 21, 2016. They sought
unemployment compensation benefits for this time period by filing applications with the
Board.
Verizon opposed the claimants’ applications for unemployment compensation
benefits. The matter was assigned to a labor dispute tribunal of the Board. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the labor dispute tribunal ruled that the claimants were not disqualified
from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. After the decision was affirmed by
the Board, Verizon appealed the ruling to the circuit court. By order entered February 22,
2017, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
Our standard of review is set forth in syllabus point three of Adkins v. Gatson,
192 W.Va. 561, 453 S.E.2d 395 (1994), as follows:
The findings of fact of the Board of Review of
[WorkForce West Virginia] are entitled to substantial deference
unless a reviewing court believes the findings are clearly wrong.
If the question on review is one purely of law, no deference is
given and the standard of judicial review by the court is de novo.
In considering the issue presented, we are also mindful of the fact that “the burden of
persuasion is upon the former employer to demonstrate by the preponderance of the evidence
3
that the claimant’s conduct falls within a disqualifying provision of the unemployment
compensation statute.” Peery v. Rutledge, 177 W.Va. 548, 552, 355 S.E.2d 41, 45 (1987).
Guided by these precepts, we consider the parties’ arguments.
III. Discussion
Whether the claimants were entitled to collect unemployment compensation
benefits while on strike in 2016 is governed by West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3 (2012).6 With
regard to a strike or labor dispute, the statute provided, in pertinent part:
Upon the determination of the facts by the commissioner,
an individual is disqualified for benefits:
....
(4) For a week in which his or her total or partial
unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists
because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment or other
premises at which he or she was last employed[.]
W.Va. Code § 21A-6-3(4). It was established long ago that the phrase “stoppage of work”
in this context refers to the employer’s operations rather than the employees’ conduct. As
this Court held in syllabus point two of Cumberland & Allegheny Gas Co. v. Hatcher, 147
W.Va. 630, 130 S.E.2d 115(1963), overruled on other grounds by Lee-Norse Co. v. Rutledge,
170 W.Va. 162, 291 S.E.2d 477 (1982):
The term “stoppage of work”, within the meaning of the
unemployment compensation statutes of this state, refers to the
employer’s operations rather than to a mere cessation of
6
See supra, note 2.
4
employment by claimants of benefits under the provisions of
such statutes; and, in order that employees may be disqualified
from receiving unemployment compensation benefits because
of “a stoppage of work” resulting from a labor dispute, it must
appear that there has resulted a substantial curtailment of the
employer’s normal operations.
Explaining further, this Court stated:
It is not required that there be a complete cessation of all
activities of the employer to constitute a “stoppage of work.”
The general rule is that the term “stoppage of work” as used in
statutes of this nature is held to refer to the employer’s plant
operations rather than to the employees’ labor, and to mean a
substantial curtailment of work or operations in the employing
establishment rather than a mere cessation of work by the
claimants. 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 190,
page 283. “It is generally agreed that a stoppage of work
commences at the place of employment when a definite or
substantial curtailment of operations occurs * * * . The stoppage
need not be complete and it will suffice if there has been a
substantial curtailment of operations.” 28 A.L.R.2d 322, Anno.
Hatcher, 147 W.Va. at 638, 130 S.E.2d at 120. Finally, this Court recognized in Hatcher that
“[a] determination of the existence or nonexistence of a stoppage of work in a case of this
nature must necessarily depend upon the facts of each case.” Id. at 639, 130 S.E.2d at 121.
In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that the Clarksburg facility closed and
ceased to operate during the strike. At the evidentiary hearing below, Tammy Mason,
Verizon’s Customer Service Supervisor, responded to questions from Verizon’s attorney as
follows:
5
Q: After the employees at the Clarksburg CSSC establishment
went on strike, did Verizon keep that center open during the
strike?
A: No.
Q: Was that establishment closed during the entire time of the
strike?
A: Yes.
Q: Were any customer calls handled at that location during the
strike?
A: No.
Q: Were any products sold at that location during the strike?
A: No.
****
Q: Were any services provided to customers at the [Clarksburg]
facility during the strike?
A: No
Q: Were any type of services conducted at that call center during
the strike?
A: No.
Q: Was any business whatsoever conducted at the Clarksburg
CSSC Call Center during the strike?
A: No.
Q: Would it be fair to say that all activities at the Clarksburg
CSSC Call Center ceased completely during the strike?
A: Yes.
Other evidence submitted at the evidentiary hearing showed that the calls that
would have been answered by the Clarksburg facility were automatically transferred to
Verizon call centers outside of West Virginia that remained open.7 In addition, the evidence
indicated that prior to the strike, Verizon generally answered 94% of the calls received within
7
At the evidentiary hearing, Angela Gutierrez, Verizon’s Associate Director under
Work Force Planning and Analysis, testified that, nationwide, 39,000 Verizon employees
went on strike. Verizon kept open fifteen of its call centers by utilizing emergency stoppage
employees.
6
sixty seconds, and that during strike, it answered 87% of the calls within the same time limit
although the call volume was less during this time period.8 Nonetheless, because Verizon
utilized managers and contract workers during the strike to perform the work of its union
employees at locations in other states, customers only had to wait approximately two minutes
longer for service from a call center facility during the strike. Upon consideration of this
evidence, the Board concluded that there had not been a substantial curtailment in Verizon’s
operations during the strike because the calls that were normally handled by the Clarksburg
facility were rerouted to call centers in other states and handled in a manner akin to normal
operations. Based upon “the volume of calls offered and handled per day during the strike,
as compared to the volume of calls offered and handled per day before the strike, and the
other productive and service statistics” submitted at the evidentiary hearing, the Board
determined that “there was not a stoppage of work at [Verizon] call centers during the
strike.” Specifically, the Board “concluded that there was not a stoppage of work at the
[Verizon] call centers during the labor dispute, from a national or collective perspective.”
Upholding the Board’s decision on appeal, the circuit court stated, “it is clear that services
were rendered and that such a limited reduction does not constitute a substantial curtailment.”
8
Ms. Gutierrez testified, “We handled 2/3 less volume at 7 percent less efficiencies
[sic] due to the fact that we had less head count required to handle the calls.”
7
In this appeal, Verizon argues that the lower tribunals erred by considering
whether its nationwide operations were substantially curtailed during the strike rather than
focusing on what occurred at its Clarksburg facility. By looking at the operations at call
centers outside of West Virginia during the strike, Verizon contends that the lower tribunals
failed to apply the plain language of the statute that requires a determination of whether a
work stoppage existed “because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment or other
premises at which [the claimant] was last employed.” W.Va. Code § 21A-6-3(4) (emphasis
added). Specifically, Verizon maintains that the phrase “factory, establishment or other
premise at which [the claimant] was last employed” as set forth in the statute refers to the
claimant’s individual site of employment not the employer’s entire operation and, therefore,
the lower tribunals misapplied the substantial curtailment standard set forth in Hatcher. In
contrast, the claimants assert that because the evidence showed that management and contract
employees undertook their work during the strike and because Verizon failed to produce any
evidence of lost revenue, Verizon failed to prove a subtantial curtailment of its operations.
This Court has observed that “[u]nemployment compensation statutes, being
remedial in nature, should be liberally construed to achieve the benign purposes intended to
the full extent thereof.” Syl. Pt. 6, Davis v. Hix, 140 W.Va. 398, 84 S.E.2d 404 (1954). We
have made clear, however, that “[t]his ‘liberality’ rule is not to be utilized when its
application would require us to ignore the plain language of the statute.” Adkins, 192 W.Va.
8at 565, 453 S.E.2d at 399; see also Davenport v. Gatson, 192 W.Va. 117, 119, 451 S.E.2d
57, 59 (1994) (“While we recognized that unemployment compensation statutes should be
liberally construed in favor of the claimant . . . we are not at liberty to ignore the plain
language of a statute.” (citation and footnote omitted)).9 Indeed, our rules of statutory
construction require that “[w]here the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity
the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation.” Syl. Pt.
2, State v. Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968). Therefore, “[c]ourts should favor
the plain and obvious meaning of a statute as opposed to a narrow or strained construction.”
T. Weston, Inc. v. Mineral Cnty., 219 W.Va. 564, 568, 638 S.E.2d 167, 171 (2006).
Courts must also read and consider a legislative enactment in its entirety
because “the Legislature is presumed to intend that every word used in a statute has a specific
purpose and meaning.” State ex rel. Johnson v. Robinson, 162 W.Va. 579, 582, 251 S.E.2d
9We have also indicated:
[I]t is . . . important for the Court to protect the
unemployment compensation fund against claims by those not
entitled to the benefits of the Act. . . . we believe that the basic
policy and purpose of the Act is advanced both when benefits
are denied to those for whom the Act is not intended to benefit,
as well as when benefits are awarded in proper cases.
Additionally, we believe that the Act was clearly designed to
serve not only the interest of qualifying unemployed persons,
but also the general public.
Childress v. Muzzle, 222 W.Va. 129, 133, 663 S.E.2d 583, 587 (2008) (footnote omitted).
9
505, 508 (1979). In other words, “[a] cardinal rule of statutory construction is that
significance and effect must, if possible, be given to every section, clause, word or part of
the statute.” Syl. Pt. 3, Meadows v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 207 W.Va. 203, 530 S.E.2d 676(1999). To that end, “[e]ach word of a statute should be given some effect and a statute
must be construed in accordance with the import of its language. Undefined words and terms
used in a legislative enactment will be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning.”
Syl. Pt. 6, in part, State ex rel. Cohen v. Manchin, 175 W.Va. 525, 336 S.E.2d 171 (1984).
In accordance with our rules of statutory construction, the phrase “factory,
establishment or other premises at which [the claimants were] last employed” in West
Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(4) must be afforded its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning
and be given effect. Although our focus in prior unemployment compensation cases has not
been on this phrase, the physical location at which the claimant was employed prior to the
strike at issue has been pivotal to the “stoppage of work” determination. For instance, in
Homer Laughlin China Co. v. Hix, 128 W.Va. 613, 37 S.E.2d 649 (1946), this Court
considered whether an employee was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits for
a period of unemployment following the employee’s rejection of an offer made by the
employer to striking employees to return to their regular work. At the outset of that case, this
Court observed that the employee had voluntarily ceased to work for the employer “because
of a strike . . . which resulted in a stoppage of work at the factory of the company” where he
10
was employed. Id. at 615, 37 S.E.2d at 651. Subsequently, in Hatcher, this Court expressly
defined “stoppage of work” as a “substantial curtailment of work or operations in the
employing establishment . . . . [and] commenc[ing] at the place of employment.” Id. at 638,
130 S.Ed.2d at 120 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
More recently, in Verizon Services Corp. v. Board of Review of WorkForce
West Virginia, No. 12-1106, 2013 WL 5967047 (W.Va. Nov. 8, 2013) (memorandum
decision), a case that concerned a 2012 strike at this same Verizon location, our sole focus
was on the operations at the Clarksburg facility during the labor dispute. In that case, this
Court affirmed the lower tribunals’ award of unemployment compensation benefits because
“Verizon continued to operate the [Clarksburg] facility [during the labor dispute] with
replacement workers answering and handling customers calls.” Id. at *3. Verizon’s
nationwide operations during the 2012 strike were not considered and, in fact, we indicated
that the rerouting of calls to facilities outside of West Virginia would have supported
Verizon’s contention that there had been a substantial curtailment of its operations at the
Clarksburg facility but “protocols on entering data had not been followed during the strike”
and “the record was unclear as to how many calls were re-routed to other call centers.” Id.
Verizon points out that other jurisdictions that have considered the meaning
of “factory, establishment and other premises” in the context of their unemployment
11
compensation laws have also concluded that these words refer to distinct employment
locations rather than an employer’s facilities as a whole. As one court explained,
[t]he word “establishment,” has a clear and natural
meaning as a distinct place of business. In other words,
“establishment” as used in this [unemployment compensation]
act connotes a place of employment. The fact that, as here, an
employer conducts a highly integrated business composed of
individual units spread over many states with the operation of
each unit interdependent on the operation of other units does not
constitute such business as an “establishment” within the
meaning of this act.
To hold as urged by the appellant would render
superfluous the use by the General Assembly of the words,
“factory and other premises,” in conjunction wi[t]h
“establishment,” since the word “establishment” itself would
include factories and other premises.
Abnie v. Ford Motor Co., 194 N.E.2d 136, 138 (Ohio 1963).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reached the same conclusion in Giant Food,
Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, 738 A.2d 856 (Md. 1999). In that case, the employer, who operated
a grocery store chain, argued that its distribution and warehouse employees were not entitled
to unemployment compensation benefits during a work stoppage caused by a month-long
strike. The lower tribunals awarded the striking workers unemployment benefits because the
grocery chain was able to remain open during the labor dispute as the employer had
overstocked the stores in anticipation of the strike and used other wholesalers and suppliers
to ships goods directly to its retail locations. Reversing the decision that awarded
unemployment compensation benefits, the Maryland court held that “the term ‘stoppage of
12
work’ refers to the substantial curtailment of work at each individual facility, premises, or
individual department within such facility.” Id. at 870. The court explained:
Since its passage, our understanding of the operation of the
labor disqualification provision has been that, in order for
claimants to be disqualified from receiving benefits, there must
be both a labor dispute and a work stoppage at the individual
place, site, factory, workshop, establishment, or premises where
they worked.
Id. at 865. Accordingly, the court concluded that “[b]ecause operations ceased at the various
premises in which the employees worked in this case, there was a ‘stoppage of work’ at each
of these locations cause by the labor dispute in question.” Id. at 870; see also Ahnne v. Dept.
of Labor and Indus. Relations, 489 P.2d 1397, 1401 (Haw. 1971) (stating that “[t]he word
‘establishment’ should be given its natural meaning . . . refer[ring to a building or group of
proximate buildings, but, generally speaking . . . not refer[ring] to locations many miles
apart”); Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm’n of Va., 63 S.E.2d 28, 33 (Va.
1951) (finding “[t]he word ‘establishment,’ coupled as it is in the Virginia Act with the
words ‘factory’ and ‘other premises’ means . . . the place of business where the worker was
employed . . . each characterizes and designates the kind of place at which the employees
work and not the manner of its operations”); Ford Motor Co. v. N.J. Dept. of Labor and
Indus., 76 A.2d 256, 260 (N.J. 1950) (explaining “the statutory sense of the term
‘establishment’ is not embracive of the whole of Ford’s far-flung enterprise as a single
industrial unit” and its “normal usage in business and government” is “reference to a distinct
physical place of business”).
13
The claimants contend that the cases Verizon relies upon are factually
distinguishable because they mostly concern the auto industry and that Mountain States Tel.
and Tel. Co. v. Sakrison, 225 P.2d 707 (Ariz. 1950), which this Court looked to for guidance
in Hatcher, supports their position that the term “establishment” encompasses all of the
employer’s operations. In Hatcher, we found Mountain States to be instructive concerning
the factors to be considered “in measuring the degree of curtailment of the employer’s
operations resulting from the strike.” 147 W.Va. at 642-43, 130 S.E.2d at 123. In that
regard, we recognized that “marked decrease[s]” in revenue, services and employment would
be indicative of a substantial curtailment of the employer’s operations. Id. In this instance,
however, the claimants rely upon Mountain States’ determination that “the company’s
statewide system constituted a ‘single establishment’ for the application of the statute.” Id.
at 711.
Similar to the case at bar, Mountain States involved a nationwide strike of
affiliated telephone and telegraph companies and required the appellate court to discern the
meaning of the words “establishment and other premises” as set forth in Arizona’s
“Employment Security Act.” 225 P.2d at 709. Noting that other courts had defined
“establishment” as a “place or area of employment,” the Arizona court, nonetheless,
concluded in summary fashion that the Employment Security Commission had not erred
when it “decided that the nature of the company’s business and operation required the
14
conclusion that the statewide system constituted a ‘single establishment’ for the application
of the statute.” 225 P.2d. at 710-11. We do not find Mountain States to be reflective of the
approach taken by most courts regarding the definition of “establishment,” nor is it
supportive of the claimants’ position in this case. Here, the claimants contend that the term
“establishment” encompasses all of Verizon’s operations nationwide. Yet, even Mountain
States limited its definition of “establishment” to the employer’s “statewide system.” Id. As
the Ahnne court noted,
[a]n occasional court has given special emphasis to the
“functional integration” of interrelated plants, and grouped
separate locations into a single establishment, but that approach
has been generally rejected. The factor most courts emphasize
in determining when employees occupy distinct establishments
is the physical location where the employees work. Employees
working in a separate geographical situs are classified into a
separate establishment.
489 P.2d. at 1400 (footnotes omitted). See also Abnie, 194 N.E.2d at 138 (observing that
arguments pertaining to “functional integration are “[a]lmost unanimously . . not well taken”
and most courts define “establishment” as “distinct place of business” or “place of
employment”); Walgreen Co.v. Murphy, 53 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ill. 1944) (refusing to add “a
test of functional integration” not prescribed by statute).10
10
Even where functional integration has been considered to determine whether
multiple plants constitute a single “establishment,” physical proximity has also been deemed
highly relevant. See Hilley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 800 So.2d 167, 173 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000)
(finding strike at Ohio plant and resulting unemployment at functionally-integrated Alabama
plants several states and several hundred miles away “did not occur in the same
‘establishment’”).
15
Based on all the above, we now hold that the phrase “factory, establishment or
other premises at which he or she was last employed” in West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(4)
(2012) means the distinct geographical location where the claimant was last employed prior
to the labor dispute.11 Applying our holding to the facts of this case, we find that the lower
tribunals erred by considering Verizon’s nationwide operations to determine whether a “work
stoppage” occurred during the 2016 strike. In light of the undisputed evidence submitted at
the evidentiary hearing, we further find that there was a “substantial curtailment” of
Verizon’s operations at the Clarksburg facility during the 2016 labor dispute. As discussed
above, no employees, union or otherwise, worked at the Clarksburg facility during the labor
dispute, and the facility completely ceased to operate for the entire strike period.
Consequently, no products were sold, no services were rendered, and no revenue was
generated from this Verizon location from April 13, 2016, to May 21, 2016. Therefore, a
“work stoppage” occurred at Verizon’s Clarksburg facility during the 2016 labor dispute
which disqualified the claimants for unemployment compensation benefits under West
Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(4).12
11
We recognize that our holding today will have limited application in light of the
2017 amendment to West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(4).
12
Having found the claimants were disqualified for unemployment compensation
benefits under West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(4), we need not address Verizon’s argument
with respect to other subsections of the statute.
16
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the final order of the Circuit Court
of Kanawha County entered on February 22, 2017, is reversed, and the case is remanded for
entry of an order denying the claimants’ applications for unemployment compensation
benefits.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
17