Joseph Todd Hutchinson and Jennifer Lynn Hutchinson v. Mark Forest Underwood, Patricia Jennings and Underwood Law Office ( 2020 )


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  •                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    Joseph Todd Hutchinson and
    Jennifer Lynn Hutchinson,                                                       FILED
    Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners                                             September 18, 2020
    EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    vs.) No. 19-1079 (Cabell County 17-C-149)                                        OF WEST VIRGINIA
    Mark Forest Underwood, Patricia Jennings, and
    Underwood Law Office,
    Defendants Below, Respondents
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioners Joseph Todd Hutchinson and Jennifer Lynn Hutchinson, self-represented
    litigants, appeal the October 21, 2019, order of the Circuit Court of Cabell County awarding
    judgment as a matter of law at the close of petitioners’ evidence to Respondents Mark Forest
    Underwood, Patricia Jennings, and the Underwood Law Office (collectively, “respondents”) and
    the circuit court’s November 1, 2019, order denying petitioners’ motion for a new trial.
    Respondents, by counsel Kevin A. Nelson and Arie M. Spitz, filed a response in support of the
    circuit court’s orders. Petitioners filed a reply.
    The Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s orders is appropriate under Rule
    21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    Petitioners retained respondents to represent them in a proceeding before the West
    Virginia Court of Claims (“Court of Claims”).1 According to the Court of Claims’ January 20,
    1
    The West Virginia Court of Claims is now known as the West Virginia Legislative
    Claims Commission. State ex rel. Ladanye v. West Virginia Legislative Claims Commission, 
    242 W. Va. 420
    , __, 
    836 S.E.2d 71
    , 78 (2019) (citing W. Va. Code § 14-2-4 (2019)). The function of
    this legislative body is to make “a recommendation to the Legislature based upon a finding of
    moral obligation, and the enactment process of passage of legislation authorizing payments of
    claims recommended by the court is at legislative discretion.”
    Id. (quoting W. Va. Code
    § 14-2-
    28 (2014)). As we noted in Ladanye, “[o]ur State constitution provides sovereign immunity
    protections and does not allow for suits to be brought against the State.
    Id. at
    __, 836 S.E.2d at
    76-77 (citing W. Va. Const. art. VI, § 35).
    1
    2014, decision, petitioners filed a claim against the West Virginia Division of Highways
    (“DOH”) alleging that the DOH was “responsible for the maintenance of the roadway and the
    culvert that abuts [petitioners’] property located” on Aracoma Road in Huntington, West
    Virginia, and that “runoff from Aracoma Road clogged or crushed a culvert which caused or
    contributed to damage to [petitioners’] [p]roperty.” Petitioners and the DOH reached a settlement
    in the amount of $85,000 in “a full and complete satisfaction of any and all past and future
    claims that [petitioners] may have against [the DOH] arising from the matters described in said
    claim.” Pursuant to the settlement, petitioners agreed that:
    Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) of the settlement sum is expressly earmarked
    for [petitioners] to hire a contractor of their choosing to clear the culvert that abuts
    [petitioners’] [p]roperty and [petitioners] shall be solely responsible for directing
    such work and shall defend, protect, and indemnify [the DOH] from and against
    any such claims or liabilities arising from such work. [Petitioners] further agreed
    that the sum to be paid herein shall forever bar [petitioners] or any future owners
    of the [p]roperty from any claim against the [DOH] arising from the [d]amages as
    identified in the parties’ stipulation.
    Based on the settlement of petitioner’s claim against the DOH, the Court of Claims
    recommended to the Legislature that it authorize an award of $85,000 to petitioners. As
    respondents’ fee, respondents received 40% of the $85,000 subsequently awarded to petitioners.
    On March 3, 2017, petitioners filed the instant civil action against respondents in the
    Circuit Court of Cabell County, alleging that respondents breached a fiduciary duty that they
    owed to petitioners in settling petitioners’ claim against the DOH. Petitioner sought $400,000 in
    compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. On March 30, 2017, respondents
    filed a motion for a more definite statement, which was granted by an order entered on May 25,
    2017. On June 22, 2017, petitioners filed a supplemental complaint specifically alleging that
    respondents failed to inform petitioners that the settlement with the DOH would bar future
    claims against the DOH regarding the culvert abutting their property. On July 13, 2017,
    respondents filed an answer. The parties disputed whether petitioners’ claim was for breach of a
    fiduciary duty or for legal malpractice.
    Prior to trial, respondents challenged petitioners’ service of process on the individual
    respondents, prompting the circuit court to provide petitioners with additional time to complete
    service of process, and petitioners thereafter successfully served each respondent. On July 24,
    2019, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the civil action, alleging that petitioners were
    engaging in serious litigation misconduct by threatening respondents, their attorneys, and
    potential witnesses. By order entered on September 5, 2019, the circuit court denied the motion.
    The circuit court held the trial on September 4 and 5, 2019. After petitioners rested their
    case, respondents moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the West
    Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that no reasonable jury could find in petitioners’ favor
    based on the evidence they presented. After argument by the parties, the circuit court awarded
    judgment as a matter of law to respondents. By order entered on October 21, 2019, the circuit
    court found that petitioners’ evidence was insufficient to persuade a jury to find in petitioners’
    2
    favor because their evidence could not establish all of the elements of either a breach of fiduciary
    duty or a legal malpractice claim. On October 28, 2019, petitioners filed a motion for a new trial.
    By order entered on November 1, 2019, the circuit court denied the motion, thereby rejecting
    petitioners’ argument that they were not allowed to call all of the witnesses and introduce all of
    the documentary evidence that they wished to present during their case-in-chief.
    Petitioners now appeal the circuit court’s October 21, 2019, and November 1, 2019,
    orders. We review the circuit court’s award of judgment as a matter of law to respondents
    pursuant to the following standard:
    “‘The appellate standard of review for the granting of a motion for a
    [judgment as a matter of law] pursuant to Rule 50 of the West Virginia Rules of
    Civil Procedure is de novo. On appeal, this court, after considering the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the nonmovant party, will sustain the granting of a
    [judgment as a matter of law] when only one reasonable conclusion as to the
    verdict can be reached. But if reasonable minds could differ as to the importance
    and sufficiency of the evidence, a circuit court’s ruling granting a [judgment as a
    matter of law] will be reversed.’ Syllabus Point 3, Brannon v. Riffle, 
    197 W. Va. 97
    , 
    475 S.E.2d 97
    (1996).” Syl. pt. 5, Smith v. First Community Bancshares, Inc.,
    
    212 W. Va. 809
    , 
    575 S.E.2d 419
    (2002).[2]
    Syl. Pt. 1, Estep v. Mike Ferrell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 
    223 W. Va. 209
    , 
    672 S.E.2d 345
    (2008) (Footnote added). With regard to the circuit court’s denial of petitioners’ motion for a
    new trial, “[c]ourts do not grant new trials unless it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error has
    crept into the record or that substantial justice has not been done[.]” In re State Pub. Bldg.
    Asbestos Litig., 
    193 W. Va. 119
    , 124, 
    454 S.E.2d 413
    , 418 (1994) (quoting 11 Charles Alan
    Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2803 at 32-33 (1973))
    (Footnotes omitted).
    2
    Rule 50(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
    (a) Judgment as a Matter of Law.
    (1) If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no
    legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on
    that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a
    motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim
    or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated
    without a favorable finding on that issue.
    (2) Motions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before
    submission of the case to the jury. Such a motion shall specify the judgment
    sought and the law and the facts on which the moving party is entitled to the
    judgment.
    3
    On appeal, petitioners raise fifteen assignments of error. Respondents counter that
    petitioners raise issues that the circuit court resolved in petitioners’ favor such as allowing
    petitioners additional time to serve each respondent and denying respondents’ motion to dismiss
    the civil action due to petitioners’ alleged misconduct.3 Petitioners argue that “[t]he point is not
    that . . . [p]etitioners prevailed in the lower court” on certain issues, but that the circuit court
    generally allowed respondents to obstruct petitioners’ opportunity to be heard. See Syl. Pt. 2,
    Simpson v. Stanton, 
    119 W. Va. 235
    , 
    193 S.E. 64
    (1937) (holding that “[t]he due process of law
    guaranteed by the State and Federal Constitutions, when applied to procedure in the courts of the
    land, requires both notice and the right to be heard”) (Emphasis added); State ex rel. Peck v.
    Goshorn, 
    162 W. Va. 420
    , 422, 
    249 S.E.2d 765
    , 766 (1978) (same).
    Upon our review of petitioners’ assignments of error, we find that many of the
    assignments are duplicative.4 Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure
    provides that “[t]he argument must contain appropriate and specific citations to the record on
    appeal, including citations that pinpoint when and how the issues in the assignments of error
    were presented to the lower tribunal,” and that “[t]he Court may disregard errors that are not
    adequately supported by specific references to the record on appeal.”5 “Although we liberally
    On April 24, 2020, petitioners filed a “motion for default judgment” with this Court,
    3
    alleging that respondents failed to serve petitioners with a copy of the response. We deny that
    motion because such a motion is not recognized by the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
    Procedure. We further reject petitioners’ argument that respondents failed to serve petitioners
    with a copy of the response as the certificate of service attached thereto states that the response
    was served on petitioners on April 16, 2020.
    4
    Petitioners’ assignments of error are the following: (1) whether petitioners’ cause of
    action was for a breach of a fiduciary duty or legal malpractice; (2) whether all three of the
    individual respondents were properly served; (3) whether all three of the individual respondents
    were properly served in March of 2017; (4) whether respondents and their attorneys slandered
    petitioners in court proceedings, in court filings, and to the general public; (5) whether
    petitioners were prevented from calling their subpoenaed witness through the use of false
    information; (6) whether respondents’ attorneys made false and inflammatory statements about
    petitioners to potential witnesses; (7) whether the circuit court erred in refusing to allow
    petitioners to introduce their documentation into evidence; (8) whether the circuit court erred in
    requiring petitioners to serve the three individual respondents on multiple occasions; (9) whether
    the circuit court erred in ensuring that all three of the individual respondents were properly
    served; (10) whether respondents and their attorneys committed perjury; (11) whether petitioners
    threatened respondents, respondents’ attorneys, and other persons; (12) whether respondents’
    attorneys’ labeling of Petitioner Joseph Todd Hutchinson as an “al-Qaeda spokesman” was
    improper; (13) whether respondents’ attorneys made numerous defamatory statements about
    petitioners; (14) whether the circuit court expressed aggravation with petitioners’ attempts to
    discover the source of the false information about them; and (15) whether petitioners were
    prevented from calling one witness when that witness became hostile to them during pre-trial.
    (continued . . .)
    4
    construe briefs in determining issues presented for review, issues which are not raised, and those
    mentioned only in passing but [which] are not supported with pertinent authority, are not
    considered on appeal.” State v. LaRock, 
    196 W. Va. 294
    , 302, 
    470 S.E.2d 613
    , 621 (1996); State
    v. Lilly, 
    194 W. Va. 595
    , 605 n.16, 
    461 S.E.2d 101
    , 111 n.16 (1995) (finding that cursory
    treatment of an issue is insufficient to raise it on appeal).
    Here, we find that the only issues we need to address are petitioners’ arguments that (1)
    the circuit court erred in finding that petitioners’ evidence was insufficient to persuade a jury to
    find in petitioners’ favor because their evidence could not establish all of the elements of either a
    breach of fiduciary duty or a legal malpractice claim; and (2) the circuit court did not permit
    petitioners to call all of the witnesses or introduce all of the documentary evidence they wished
    to present during their case-in-chief. With regard to these issues, we find that the circuit court
    properly resolved both issues in its October 21, 2019, order awarding respondents judgment as a
    matter of law pursuant to Rule 30 and/or its November 1, 2019, order denying petitioners’
    motion for a new trial.
    Having reviewed the circuit court’s October 21, 2019, “Final Order Granting Defendants’
    Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law,” and its November 1, 2019, “Order Denying Plaintiffs’
    Motion for New Trial,” we hereby adopt and incorporate the circuit court’s well-reasoned
    findings and conclusions. The Clerk is directed to attach a copy of each order to this
    memorandum decision. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court’s award of judgment as a
    matter of law to respondents and denial of petitioners’ motion for a new trial were not erroneous.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s October 21, 2019, and November
    1, 2019, orders.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: September 18, 2020
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Tim Armstead
    Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
    Justice Evan H. Jenkins
    Justice John A. Hutchison
    5
    On March 27, 2020, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that we
    should decline to review all fifteen of petitioners’ assignments of error pursuant to Rule 10(c)(7)
    of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure. We deny this motion as moot.
    5