David Dempster and Sara Arditti v. AAAA Self Storage & Moving and AAAA Self Storage Management Group ( 2020 )


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  •                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    David Dempster and                                                                   FILED
    Sara Arditti,                                                                     July 30, 2020
    Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners                                                   EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    vs.) No. 19-0555 (Jefferson County CC-19-2015-C-206)
    AAAA Self Storage & Moving and
    AAAA Self Storage Management Group,
    Defendants Below, Respondents
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioners David Dempster and Sara Arditti, by counsel Christian J. Riddell, appeal the
    order of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, entered on May 15, 2019, that compels arbitration
    and dismisses Mr. Dempster’s and Ms. Arditti’s complaint for claims arising out of a storage unit
    lease agreement, and the circuit court’s order, also entered on May 15, 2019, denying Mr.
    Dempster’s and Ms. Arditti’s motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the
    West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondents AAAA Self Storage & Moving and AAAA
    Self Storage Management Group (collectively, “AAAA”) appear by counsel Kevin Ward and P.
    Joseph Craycraft.
    This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons,
    a memorandum decision affirming the order of the circuit court is appropriate under Rule 21 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    Mr. Dempster and Ms. Arditti leased a storage unit from Charles Town Self Storage, LLC
    in 2011. The rental agreement that Ms. Arditti signed contained a clause under which Mr.
    Dempster and Ms. Arditti agreed that any dispute brought by them against “the [o]wner” would
    be submitted to binding arbitration.1 The agreement also contained a clause binding the parties’
    1
    Though this clause is specific to disputes brought by the tenants against the owner, and
    not vice versa, Mr. Dempster and Ms. Arditti have not argued that its unilateral nature creates
    unconscionability in the contract.
    1
    successors, representatives, and assigns to the agreement. While this rental agreement remained in
    effect, Charles Town Self Storage entered into a separate agreement with AAAA under which
    AAAA acted as Charles Town Self Storage’s managerial agent.
    Later, in August of 2015, Mr. Dempster and Ms. Arditti filed a complaint in the Circuit
    Court of Jefferson County, asserting that AAAA auctioned the contents of their storage unit
    without exercising due diligence to collect outstanding rental fees. After several years of litigation,
    AAAA filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration. 2 Mr. Dempster and Ms.
    Arditti opposed the motion on the ground that Charles Town Self Storage remained the owner,
    despite its delegation of the managerial function to AAAA, and the arbitration agreement only
    applies to disputes against the owner. The circuit court conducted a hearing and ultimately ordered
    the complaint dismissed and the claims referred to arbitration. Mr. Dempster and Ms. Arditti filed
    a motion to alter or amend judgment, which circuit court denied.
    On appeal, Mr. Dempster and Ms. Arditti assert two assignments of error: first, that the
    circuit court erred in enforcing the arbitration clause as requested by AAAA and, second, that the
    circuit court erred in denying Mr. Dempster’s and Ms. Arditti’s motion to alter or amend its
    judgment. Our review of the circuit court order dismissing the complaint is de novo (Syl. Pt. 2,
    State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 
    194 W. Va. 770
    , 
    461 S.E.2d 516
    (1995)), and we apply the same standard of review to the circuit court’s order denying the motion
    to alter or amend judgment (see Syl. Pt. 1, Wickland v. Am. Travellers Life Ins. Co., 
    204 W. Va. 430
    , 
    513 S.E.2d 657
    (1998)(“The standard of review applicable to an appeal from a motion to alter
    or amend a judgment, made pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 59(e), is the same standard that would
    apply to the underlying judgment upon which the motion is based and from which the appeal to
    this Court is filed.”)).
    Mr. Dempster and Ms. Arditti rest on the argument that AAAA is not the “owner”
    identified in the arbitration clause, while largely ignoring the agency clause that makes the entire
    agreement binding on Charles Town Self Storage’s “heirs, successors, personal representatives
    and assigns.” The agreement between AAAA and Charles Town Self Storage shows that the duties
    assumed by AAAA—including signing, renewing, and canceling leases; collecting rents;
    terminating tenancies; evicting tenants; prosecuting actions; and “sign[ing] and serv[ing] in the
    name of [the o]wner”—are such that AAAA acts as a personal representative standing in the place
    of Charles Town Self Storage. The lease agreement signed by Ms. Arditti clearly stated that
    Charles Town Self Storage’s personal representatives would receive the benefits set forth in the
    agreement, and the arbitration clause is not excluded. Mr. Dempster and Ms. Arditti have neither
    asserted facts suggesting that AAAA acted outside the scope of its agency role nor offered legal
    authority precluding the assignment of the arbitration benefit under the present circumstances. We
    find, therefore, that the circuit court did not err.
    2
    In their reply brief, Ms. Arditti and Mr. Dempster suggest that AAAA waived its right to
    demand arbitration by allowing litigation to continue for years before filing the motion to compel
    arbitration. They do not, however, demonstrate that they raised this issue with the circuit court.
    Generally, nonjurisdictional questions raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.
    Whitlow v. Bd. of Educ. of Kanawha Cty., 
    190 W. Va. 223
    , 226, 
    438 S.E.2d 15
    , 18 (1993). The
    question of waiver is thus not before us.
    2
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: July 30, 2020
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Tim Armstead
    Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
    Justice Evan H. Jenkins
    Justice John A. Hutchison
    3