Contemporary Galleries of West Virginia, Inc. v. Riggs Commercial Realty, LLC ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
FILED
January 2022 Term
March 21, 2021
released at 3:00 p.m.
EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
No. 21-0007
CONTEMPORARY GALLERIES OF WEST VIRGINIA, INC.,
Defendant Below, Petitioner,
V.
RIGGS COMMERCIAL REALTY, LLC,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent.
_________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
The Honorable Carrie Webster, Judge
Civil Action No. 18-C-287
AFFIRMED
_________________________________________________________
Submitted: February 9, 2022
Filed: March 21, 2022
William V. DePaulo Mark W. Kelley
Lewisburg, West Virginia John J. Brewster
Attorney for the Petitioner Ray, Winton & Kelley, PLLC
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Respondent
JUSTICE MOATS delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE ALAN D. MOATS, sitting by temporary assignment.
i
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “It is within the sound discretion of the court in the furtherance of the
interests of justice to permit either party, after it has rested, to reopen the case for the
purpose of offering further evidence and unless that discretion is abused the action of the
court will not be disturbed.” Syllabus point 4, State v. Fischer, 158 W. Va. 72, 211 S.E.2d
666 (1974).
ii
Moats, Justice:
Petitioner Contemporary Galleries of West Virginia, Inc. (“Contemporary
Galleries”) appeals the December 8, 2020 order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
denying Contemporary Galleries’ motion for a new trial. In its order, the circuit court
reaffirmed its evidentiary rulings and its prior denial of Contemporary Galleries’ motions
for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, Contemporary Galleries argues that the circuit
court erred when it denied the motions for judgment as a matter of law, 1 and generally
committed evidentiary error when it reopened Respondent Riggs Commercial Realty,
1
Throughout the underlying trial, and in both parties’ briefs, two of the
motions below are repeatedly referred to as “motions for directed verdict.” However, in
1998, Rule 50 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure was amended, and the term
“directed verdict” was replaced with the term “judgment as a matter of law.” Yet, despite
the change in terminology, this Court has explained that “[t]he amendment did not,
however, affect either the standard by which a trial court reviews motions under the rule or
the standard by which an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling.” McCloud v. Salt
Rock Water Pub. Serv., 207 W. Va. 453, 457 n.1, 533 S.E.2d 679, 683 n.1 (internal citations
omitted).
The proper procedural designation for the . . . motion is one for
judgment as a matter of law. Because “‘“[w]e are not bound
by the label[s] employed below, and will treat [matters] made
pursuant to” the most appropriate rule.’” Shaffer v. Charleston
Area Med. Ctr., 199 W. Va. 428, 433, 485 S.E.2d 12, 17 (1997)
(quoting Kopelman & Assoc., L.C. v. Collins, 196 W. Va. 489,
494 n. 6, 473 S.E.2d 910, 915 n. 6 (1996) (additional citation
omitted)). Therefore, we will treat the order before us for
review as one [addressing] a motion for judgment as a matter
of law.
Waddy v. Riggleman, 216 W. Va. 250, 255, 606 S.E.2d 222, 227 (2004). As such, since
the proper terminology is “judgment as a matter of law,” we will refer to the motions in the
case sub judice as “motions for judgment as a matter of law.”
1
LLC’s (“Riggs”) case in chief to admit further evidence. Having considered the briefs
submitted on appeal, the appendix record, the parties’ oral arguments, and the applicable
legal authority, we find that the circuit court did not err. Accordingly, we affirm the rulings
of the circuit court.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March of 2018, Riggs filed a complaint against Contemporary Galleries
seeking to recover brokerage fees. According to the complaint, Riggs, a real estate
brokerage firm, secured a purchaser for one of Contemporary Galleries’ buildings in
Charleston, and a tenant for another building in Kanawha City. After the sale and lease,
Contemporary Galleries refused to pay the brokerage commission, and denied any
obligation, contractual or otherwise, to pay any brokerage fees to Riggs. 2 Riggs alleged
2
In the complaint, Riggs alleges the parties “entered into a
contract . . .whereby [Riggs] would find a tenant for [Contemporary Galleries’]
commercial real estate at 3808 MacCorkle Avenue S.E. and as compensation for its
services, [Riggs] would be paid a commission.” Likewise, Riggs alleges that the two
parties “entered into a contract . . .whereby [Riggs] would list, broker, and attempt to sell
[Contemporary Galleries’] commercial real estate at 1210 Smith Street and as
compensation for its services, [Riggs] would be paid a commission.” Riggs further
contends in its complaint that Riggs “fulfilled and completed all of the terms and conditions
of the contract” by securing both a tenant and a purchaser for Contemporary Galleries’
properties.
There is no dispute that a sale and a lease occurred, however, there is a
dispute about who brought about the sale and/or lease. Because Contemporary Galleries
denies that Riggs brought about the sale and lease, it claims it felt no obligation to pay any
brokerage fees to Riggs. As such, Riggs filed the instant lawsuit seeking to recover said
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breach of contract—with regard to the property for sale and property for rent—and sought
fees for the sale and lease transactions. In its answer and counterclaim, Contemporary
Galleries denied that the parties entered into any contract, denied that Riggs brought about
the sale or lease of either property, and denied that Riggs was entitled to any relief under
the theory of promissory estoppel.
The parties conducted discovery and ultimately proceeded to a jury trial. At
trial, Angela Rae Moore (“Ms. Moore”), the sole member of Riggs, testified that she was
an attorney and a real estate broker. After Riggs rested its case in chief, Contemporary
Galleries moved for judgment as a matter of law in light of the requirements of West
Virginia Code § 30-40-25 (eff. 2002). West Virginia Code § 30-40-25 provides, in full:
No person may bring or maintain any action in any court
of this state for the recovery of compensation for the
performance of any act or service for which a broker’s license
is required, without alleging and proving that he or she was the
holder of a valid broker’s license at all times during the
performance or rendering of any act or service: Provided, That
an associate broker or salesperson shall have the right to
institute suit in his or her own name for the recovery of
compensation from his or her employing broker for acts or
services performed while in the employ of said employing
broker.
fees. While the above-mentioned information comprises the underlying facts of the
litigation, they are not relevant to the resolution of the limited issues before this Court.
3
In citing this statute, Contemporary Galleries argued that, despite Ms.
Moore’s testimony that she was a real estate broker, Riggs did not “allege and prove” that
it, through its employee, Ms. Moore, held a valid broker’s license at all times Riggs
rendered services to Contemporary Galleries. In response, Riggs argued that the statute is
silent on what level of proof is required, and that Ms. Moore’s testimony was sufficient
proof. Riggs then moved the court to reopen its case in chief. The circuit court decided to
take the mandates of the statute under consideration and asked the parties to brief the issue
overnight. The following day, after hearing arguments from both sides, and after having
conducted additional research, the court orally denied the motion for judgment as a matter
of law, and allowed for the reopening of Riggs’ case in chief for the narrow “purpose of
hearing brief testimony regarding Ms. Moore’s licensing as a real estate broker.”
During the reopened case in chief, the following testimony was immediately
elicited from Ms. Moore:
Counsel for Riggs: Ms. Moore, are you a licensed real
estate broker?
Ms. Moore: Yes.
Counsel for Riggs: And were you a licensed real estate
broker in 2016 when the events that gave rise to this
litigation occurred?
Ms. Moore: Yes.
Counsel for Riggs: Have you been continuously
licensed as a real estate broker since that time?
Ms. Moore: Yes.
4
Then, Riggs introduced three original certificates from the West Virginia Real Estate
Commission showing that Ms. Moore was a licensed real estate broker in West Virginia.
After Riggs rested its case, Contemporary Galleries made a second motion for judgment as
a matter of law and alleged once again that Riggs failed to prove that Ms. Moore was a
licensed real estate broker. The court disagreed and once again denied the motion.
The trial continued, and, at the conclusion of trial, the jury found in favor of
Riggs and awarded it damages for both properties at issue. The judgment order was entered
on July 10, 2020. Five days later, on July 15, 2020, Contemporary Galleries filed a motion
for a new trial and relief from judgment, in which Contemporary Galleries reincorporated
the arguments it previously made in the motions for judgment as a matter of law. The
motion for a new trial was denied by order entered on December 8, 2020. This appeal
followed.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, Contemporary Galleries argues that the circuit court erred by
denying its motion for a new trial. We review the circuit court’s denial of Contemporary
Galleries’ motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard.
[I]t is well-established that “‘[a]lthough the ruling of a trial
court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial is entitled
to great respect and weight, the trial court’s ruling will be
reversed on appeal when it is clear that the trial court has acted
under some misapprehension of the law or the evidence.’
5
Syllabus point 4, Sanders v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 159
W. Va. 621, 225 S.E.2d 218 (1976).” Syllabus Point
3, Carpenter v. Luke, 225 W. Va. 35, 689 S.E.2d 247 (2009).
In other words, our standard of review for a trial court’s
decision regarding a motion for a new trial is abuse of
discretion. Marsch v. American Elec. Power Co., 207 W. Va.
174, 180, 530 S.E.2d 173, 179 (1999).
MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc., 227 W. Va. 707, 715, 715 S.E.2d 405, 413 (2011). With
this standard in mind, we proceed to the arguments presented.
III.
DISCUSSION
In the case sub judice, Contemporary Galleries contends that the circuit court
erred in denying its motion for a new trial based upon various evidentiary errors committed
in the course of the prior proceedings: (1) denying its pre-verdict motion for judgment as a
matter of law (made after Riggs rested at trial); (2) granting Riggs’ motion to reopen the
case in chief; and (3) denying its second pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of
law (made at the end of Riggs’ reopened case). Each of these assignments of error will be
addressed in turn.
A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Contemporary Galleries first argues that the circuit court erred in denying
its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Rule 50(a)(1) of the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that
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[i]f during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on
an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for
a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court
may determine the issue against that party and may grant a
motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with
respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling
law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on
that issue.
Upon the close of Riggs’ case in chief, Contemporary Galleries moved the
circuit court for judgment as a matter of law, asserting that Riggs failed to establish the
mandates of West Virginia Code § 30-40-25. West Virginia Code § 30-40-25 provides, in
pertinent part:
No person may bring or maintain any action in any court
of this state for the recovery of compensation for the
performance of any act or service for which a broker’s license
is required, without alleging and proving that he or she was the
holder of a valid broker’s license at all times during the
performance or rendering of any act or service[.]
Specifically, Contemporary Galleries contends that Riggs failed to “allege and prove” that
Ms. Moore was “the holder of a valid broker’s license at all times” pertinent to this matter.
In response, Riggs maintains that it provided a legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for a reasonable jury to find that Riggs “alleged and proved” that it was the holder of
a valid broker’s license at all times that it rendered services to Contemporary Galleries. To
support this assertion, Riggs noted that (1) its complaint explicitly stated that it was “duly
licensed to conduct business in the State of West Virginia as a real estate broker” and
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(2) Ms. Moore testified during trial that she was an “attorney and a real estate broker,” and
such testimony was not rebutted by Contemporary Galleries.
In Syllabus point 5 of Wager v. Sine, 157 W. Va. 391, 201 S.E.2d 260 (1973),
this Court held that “[u]pon a motion for a [judgment as a matter of law], all reasonable
doubts and inferences should be resolved in favor of the party against whom the verdict is
asked to be directed.” Additionally, this Court has noted that
the circuit court’s denial of the motion for judgment as a matter
of law poses a question of law, and, therefore, this Court’s
review of such a ruling is plenary. In addressing such issues
on appeal, we must approach the evidence from a coign of
vantage identical to that employed by the trial court in the first
instance. This approach dictates that we take the record in the
light most flattering to the nonmoving party, without probing
the veracity of the witnesses, resolving conflicts in the
testimony, or assaying the weight of the evidence. We may
reverse the denial of such a motion only if reasonable persons
could not have reached the conclusion that the jury [ultimately]
embraced.
Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 69 v. City of Fairmont, 196 W. Va. 97, 100, 468 S.E.2d
712, 715 (1996). See also Franklin D. Cleckley, Robin J. Davis, & Louis J. Palmer,
Jr., Litigation Handbook on West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure § 50(a)(1), at 1108 (4th
ed. 2012) (“In reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court should (1)
resolve direct factual conflicts in favor of the nonmovant, (2) assume as true all facts
supporting the nonmovant which the evidence tended to prove, (3) give the nonmovant the
benefit of all reasonable inferences, and (4) deny the motion if the evidence so viewed
8
would allow reasonable jurors to differ as to the conclusions that could be drawn.”
(footnote omitted)).
In the case before us, Contemporary Galleries is not arguing that Riggs was
not a licensed broker; rather, Contemporary Galleries argues only that Riggs failed to
introduce sufficient evidence to prove that it had a valid broker’s license during all relevant
times. However, after a thorough review of West Virginia Code § 30-40-25, it is clear that
the statute fails to state what amount of proof is needed to establish that an individual is
indeed a licensed broker. When the evidence that was presented is considered in a light
most favorable to Riggs, the nonmoving party, we conclude that substantial evidence
existed which would have allowed a reasonable jury to find that Ms. Moore was a licensed
real estate broker who met the mandates of West Virginia Code § 30-40-25. Therefore, we
affirm the denial of Contemporary Galleries’ motion for judgment as a matter of law.
B. Reopening the Case in Chief
In its second assignment of error, Contemporary Galleries contends that the
circuit court abused its discretion when it allowed Riggs to reopen its case in chief. As to
the appropriateness of permitting a case to be reopened, this Court has held that
[i]t is within the sound discretion of the court in the
furtherance of the interests of justice to permit either party,
after it has rested, to reopen the case for the purpose of offering
further evidence and unless that discretion is abused the action
of the court will not be disturbed.
9
Syl. pt. 4, State v. Fischer, 158 W. Va. 72, 211 S.E.2d 666 (1974). See also Syl. pt. 1,
Janssen v. Carolina Lumber Co., 137 W. Va. 561, 73 S.E.2d 12 (1952) (“‘A trial court has
discretion to reopen a case at the request of either party, after it has been closed and before
it has gone to the jury, and admit evidence to prove an omitted fact.’ Point 6, syllabus,
Harrold v. City of Huntington, 74 W. Va. 538[,] [82 S.E. 476].”).
With regard to this issue, we have no difficulty in finding that the circuit
court acted well within its discretion in allowing Riggs to reopen its case in chief. As this
Court has stated, “‘[t]he policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried on its merits;
and it looks with disfavor upon a party who, regardless of merits of his case, attempts to
take advantage of mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or neglect of his adversary.’” McDaniel
v. Romano, 155 W. Va. 875, 879-80, 190 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1972) (quoting Kelly v. Belcher,
155 W. Va. 757, 769, 187 S.E.2d 617, 623 (1972)). Not only did the circuit court take the
time to review West Virginia Code § 30-40-25 overnight, but also it required the parties to
conduct additional research and it heard oral argument on the implication of the
aforementioned statute in court the next day. While the depth and extent of this research
was likely not necessary, it does illustrate the circuit court’s intention to have this case be
resolved on its merits and not on a technicality. Furthermore, it is important to point out
that the circuit court reopened the case only for the limited purpose of having Riggs elicit
testimony regarding Ms. Moore’s licensing as a real estate broker—it did not give Riggs
an opportunity to retry its case from scratch. We therefore conclude that, with respect to
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the reopening of Riggs’ case in chief for a narrowly defined purpose, the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion.
C. Second Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Lastly, Contemporary Galleries alleges that the circuit court erred in denying
its second motion for judgment as a matter of law at the end of Riggs’ reopened case in
chief. In particular, Contemporary Galleries contends once again that Riggs failed to meet
the evidentiary requirements of West Virginia Code § 30-40-25. Contemporary Galleries
maintains that Riggs failed to “allege and prove” that it was licensed at all times pertinent
to the case despite Ms. Moore testifying twice under oath that she was a licensed real estate
broker, and in spite of the three original certificates from the West Virginia Real Estate
Commission showing that she was a licensed real estate broker in West Virginia.
In Syllabus point 2 of Fredeking v. Tyler, 224 W. Va. 1, 680 S.E.2d 16(2009), this Court held:
When this Court reviews a trial court’s order granting
or denying a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law
after trial under Rule 50(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure [1998], it is not the task of this Court to review the
facts to determine how it would have ruled on the evidence
presented. Instead, its task is to determine whether the
evidence was such that a reasonable trier of fact might have
reached the decision below. Thus, when considering a ruling
on a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law after trial,
the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.
11
Although Contemporary Galleries’ second motion for judgment as a matter of law in the
case sub judice was made during trial—unlike in Fredeking—the spirit and wisdom of
Fredeking still apply. This Court repeatedly has recognized, that “[t]he province of
the jury as the trier of fact is fundamental in our system of jurisprudence.” Hatten v. Mason
Realty Co., 148 W. Va. 380, 391, 135 S.E.2d 236, 243 (1964). See also State v. Bailey,
151 W. Va. 796, 805, 155 S.E.2d 850, 856 (1967) (“The jury is the trier of the facts and in
performing that duty it is the sole judge as to the weight of the evidence and
the credibility of the witnesses.”).
After the reopening of Riggs’ case in chief, not only did Riggs reiterate and
confirm the prior sworn testimony that Ms. Moore was a licensed real estate broker, but
also Riggs submitted Ms. Moore’s real estate broker licenses into evidence. When
reviewed together with the evidence submitted prior to the reopening of Riggs’ case in
chief, we conclude that this is more than enough evidence for the jury to make a
determination as to whether Riggs “alleged and proved” the mandates of West Virginia
Code § 30-40-25. As mentioned above, it is not the task of this Court to determine how
we would have ruled, but rather, it is our task to determine whether the evidence was such
that a reasonable jury might have reached the decision below. As such, after carefully
examining the trial transcript and the evidence submitted to the jury, we conclude that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Contemporary Galleries’ second motion
for judgment as a matter of law and allowing the case to be submitted to the jury.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we find no error in the denial of the motions
for judgment as a matter of law, and we find no error in the reopening of Riggs’ case in
chief. Accordingly, the December 8, 2020 order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
denying Contemporary Galleries’ motion for a new trial is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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