State of West Virginia v. Tremaine Lamar Jackson ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
FILED
January 2023 Term
_____________ June 9, 2023
released at 3:00 p.m.
EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
No. 21-0738 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
_____________
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent,
V.
TREMAINE LAMAR JACKSON,
Defendant Below, Petitioner.
________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Raleigh County
The Honorable Robert A. Burnside, Jr., Judge
Criminal Action No. CC-41-2020-F-430
REVERSED AND REMANDED
________________________________________________
Submitted: March 22, 2023
Filed: June 9, 2023
Graham B. Platz, Esq. Patrick Morrisey, Esq.
Public Defender Services Attorney General
Appellate Advocacy Division Michael R. Williams, Esq.
Charleston, West Virginia Senior Deputy Solicitor General
Attorney for the Petitioner William E. Longwell, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Respondent
JUSTICE BUNN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE ARMSTEAD dissents and reserves the right to file a separate opinion.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “When a prior conviction constitute[s] a status element of an offense,
a defendant may offer to stipulate to such prior conviction[]. If a defendant makes an offer
to stipulate to a prior conviction[] that is a status element of an offense, the trial court must
permit such stipulation and preclude the state from presenting any evidence to the jury
regarding the stipulated prior conviction[]. When such a stipulation is made, the record
must reflect a colloquy between the trial court, the defendant, defense counsel and the state
indicating precisely the stipulation and illustrating that the stipulation was made voluntarily
and knowingly by the defendant. To the extent that State v. Hopkins, 192 W. Va. 483, 453
S.E.2d 317 (1994)[,] and its progeny are in conflict with this procedure they are expressly
overruled.” Syllabus point 3, State v. Nichols, 208 W. Va. 432, 541 S.E.2d 310 (1999),
overruled on other grounds by State v. McCraine, 214 W. Va. 188, 588 S.E.2d 177 (2003),
and reinstated by State v. Herbert, 234 W. Va. 576, 767 S.E.2d 471 (2014).
2. “When a defendant is charged with a crime in which a prior conviction
is an essential element of the current crime charged (e.g.[,] being a felon in possession of
a firearm under [W. Va. Code § 61-7-7(b) (eff. 2016)]), and stipulates to having been
previously convicted of a crime, the trial court shall inform the jury that the defendant
stipulated to the prior conviction. The jury shall be informed that the defendant was
i
convicted of a prior felony or misdemeanor, but shall otherwise not be informed of the
name or nature of the defendant’s prior convictions. To the extent State v. Dews, 209
W. Va. 500, 549 S.E.2d 694 (2001), is inconsistent with this holding, it is hereby
modified.” Syllabus point 5, State v. Herbert, 234 W. Va. 576, 767 S.E.2d 471 (2014).
3. A trial court may establish and enforce a pretrial deadline for
producing stipulations in criminal proceedings. However, when no deadline has been set,
a trial court must permit a defendant to stipulate to a prior conviction during trial when
(1) that prior conviction is an essential element of a current crime charged, and (2) the
purpose of the stipulation is to prevent the State from informing the jury of the name and
nature of the prior conviction.
ii
BUNN, Justice:
The defendant, Tremaine Lamar Jackson, appeals four felony convictions
stemming from an incident in May 2020 that resulted in Troy Williams’s death after he
was shot in the chest. At the time of the shooting, Mr. Jackson was on parole from a 2017
felony conviction for voluntary manslaughter, so the charges against him included the
status offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Mr. Jackson claims the Circuit
Court of Raleigh County committed reversible error by refusing to accept his stipulation to
his prior felony conviction. The circuit court refused the stipulation because Mr. Jackson
offered it during the trial, after refusing earlier attempts by the prosecutor to obtain the
stipulation. The court’s refusal permitted the State to admit evidence of the name and nature
of Mr. Jackson’s prior, similar offense. We find the admission of this evidence prejudiced
Mr. Jackson. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial.1
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Troy Williams was fatally shot in the chest during a bogus drug transaction
with Mr. Jackson. During the incident, Mr. Jackson, accompanied by three companions,
attempted to sell rock salt to Mr. Williams by representing that it was methamphetamine.
1
Mr. Jackson also claims that the circuit court erred by prohibiting him from
testifying that someone else shot Mr. Williams. This ruling was based on a purported lack
of notice. Because we reverse and remand for a new trial on other grounds, we do not
address this issue.
1
Following a police investigation, Mr. Jackson was indicted, and ultimately convicted, of
four felony counts: (1) first-degree murder in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-2-1;
(2) use or presentation of a firearm during the commission of first-degree murder in
violation of West Virginia Code § 61-7-15a; (3) being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of West Virginia Code § 61-7-7; and (4) use or presentation of a firearm during
the commission of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of West Virginia
Code § 61-7-15a.
Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent to use evidence of Mr. Jackson’s
2017 conviction for voluntary manslaughter, pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Evidence
404(b), to show absence of mistake or modus operandi in connection with the first-degree
murder charge. During a pretrial hearing, Mr. Jackson opposed the use of the Rule 404(b)
evidence, arguing that it was unfairly prejudicial.2 The circuit court preliminarily found the
evidence was inadmissible but stated that the issue could be revisited if the evidence
presented at trial justified reconsideration.
During trial, the State called Detective Jonathan Weaver of the Charleston
Police Department to testify. Detective Weaver participated in the investigation of Mr.
Williams’s death as well as the investigation that led to Mr. Jackson’s 2017 conviction for
2
See W. Va. R. Evid. 403 (allowing exclusion of relevant evidence that is
unfairly prejudicial).
2
voluntary manslaughter. When the State began to question Detective Weaver about the
2017 conviction, Mr. Jackson objected based on the court’s pretrial ruling that evidence of
the prior conviction was inadmissible pursuant to Rule 404(b). The State explained that it
offered the evidence to establish the status element necessary to prove that Mr. Jackson
was a felon in possession of a firearm, and not for the reasons previously rejected by the
court. It also expressed its intent to introduce the 2017 sentencing order from Mr. Jackson’s
voluntary manslaughter conviction, which identified the offense and noted the use of a
firearm.
Mr. Jackson then offered to stipulate to his prior felony conviction. The State
refused to accept Mr. Jackson’s offer to stipulate because it previously attempted,
unsuccessfully, to elicit this stipulation from Mr. Jackson.3 The State argued that accepting
the stipulation during trial would be unfair because, absent an earlier stipulation, it had
prepared to prove the 2017 conviction by Detective Weaver’s testimony and the sentencing
order, which it viewed as the best evidence of an element of the felon in possession charge.
The circuit court overruled Mr. Jackson’s objection and allowed the State to question
Detective Weaver about the prior conviction. While Detective Weaver did not testify about
the factual details of the prior conviction, and the court instructed the jury on the limited
purpose for the evidence, the State still elicited testimony that Mr. Jackson had a prior
3
Mr. Jackson did not refute the State’s assertion that it made pretrial attempts
to obtain a stipulation concerning Mr. Jackson’s prior felony conviction.
3
felony conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Furthermore, the court admitted into
evidence the 2017 sentencing order, which noted the use of a firearm in committing the
offense. The jury received a copy of the 2017 sentencing order with the admitted trial
exhibits for use during its deliberations. The jury convicted Mr. Jackson on all four counts
of the indictment, with a recommendation of mercy for the first-degree murder charge.
By amended sentencing order entered on August 24, 2021, the circuit court
sentenced Mr. Jackson to life with mercy for first-degree murder; a determinate term of ten
years for use of a firearm in the commission of first-degree murder; a determinate term of
five years for being a felon in possession of a firearm, with a recidivist enhancement of an
additional five years; and a determinate term of ten years for use of a firearm in committing
the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court ordered these sentences
to be served consecutively. This appeal followed.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mr. Jackson challenges an evidentiary ruling by the trial court. “The West
Virginia Rules of Evidence . . . allocate significant discretion to the trial court in making
evidentiary . . . rulings.” State v. Swims, 212 W. Va. 263, 269, 569 S.E.2d 784, 790 (2002)
(quoting Syl. pt. 9, Tudor v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 203 W. Va. 111, 506 S.E.2d
554 (1997)). For this reason, “with few exceptions, this Court reviews
4
‘evidentiary . . . rulings of the circuit court under an abuse of discretion standard.’” State
v. Delorenzo, ___ W. Va. ___, ___, 885 S.E.2d 645, 663 (2022) (quoting Syl. pt. 1, in part,
State v. Gray, 204 W. Va. 248, 511 S.E.2d 873 (1998) (per curiam) (additional quotations
and citation omitted)). Touching on one of these exceptions, we have acknowledged that
“[a]lthough most rulings of a trial court regarding the admission of evidence are reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard, . . . an appellate court reviews de novo the legal
analysis underlying a trial court’s decision.” State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 680, 461
S.E.2d 163, 186 (1995). Guided by these standards, we address the circuit court’s decision
to refuse Mr. Jackson’s offered stipulation, bearing in mind that “[e]ven if we find the
circuit court abused its discretion, the error is not reversible unless the defendant was
prejudiced.” State v. Marple, 197 W. Va. 47, 51, 475 S.E.2d 47, 51 (1996).
III.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Jackson asks us to determine whether the circuit court erred by refusing
his stipulation to a prior felony conviction as a status element of the offense of being a
felon in possession of a firearm.4 He argues that the circuit court was required to accept his
4
We have explained that there are two scenarios when a prior conviction is
a status element of an offense:
The fact that a defendant has been previously convicted
of a crime is a status element when: (1) his/her prior conviction
makes otherwise legal conduct illegal, meaning that the prior
5
felon status stipulation and to refuse to admit evidence of the name and nature of his prior
offense.
This Court has previously established a mandatory obligation on trial courts
to accept a defendant’s offer to stipulate to a prior conviction that is a status element of an
offense:
When a prior conviction constitute[s] a status element
of an offense, a defendant may offer to stipulate to such prior
conviction[]. If a defendant makes an offer to stipulate to a
prior conviction[] that is a status element of an offense, the trial
court must permit such stipulation and preclude the state from
presenting any evidence to the jury regarding the stipulated
prior conviction[]. When such a stipulation is made, the record
must reflect a colloquy between the trial court, the defendant,
defense counsel and the state indicating precisely the
stipulation and illustrating that the stipulation was made
voluntarily and knowingly by the defendant. To the extent that
State v. Hopkins, 192 W. Va. 483, 453 S.E.2d 317 (1994)[,]
and its progeny are in conflict with this procedure they are
expressly overruled.
conviction is an essential element of the current crime charged
(e.g., a felon possessing a firearm); or (2) the prior conviction
is merely a penalty enhancer, meaning that it enhances the
penalty for conduct that is itself illegal even without the
defendant’s prior convictions (e.g., third-offense driving under
the influence).
State v. Herbert, 234 W. Va. 576, 592, 767 S.E.2d 471, 487 (2014). In this case, Mr.
Jackson’s status of having a prior felony conviction is an essential element of the crime of
being a felon in possession of a firearm.
6
Syl. pt. 3, State v. Nichols, 208 W. Va. 432, 541 S.E.2d 310 (1999), overruled on other
grounds by State v. McCraine, 214 W. Va. 188, 588 S.E.2d 177 (2003), and reinstated by
State v. Herbert, 234 W. Va. 576, 767 S.E.2d 471 (2014).
The pertinent facts of this case differ from those addressed by the Nichols
Court. The defendant in Nichols was on trial for third-offense DUI and stipulated to the
status element of that offense—his two prior DUI convictions—to keep the jury from
learning of his prior convictions. Despite this stipulation, the circuit court required the State
to present evidence to establish those prior convictions.5 Here, the circuit court refused to
accept Mr. Jackson’s offer to stipulate to his prior felony conviction. While this refusal
violates our holding in Nichols, the State argues that the circuit court did not err in refusing
to accept Mr. Jackson’s stipulation because it was made during trial and was not reduced
to writing, signed, or filed with the circuit court clerk as required by Rule 42.05 of the West
Virginia Trial Court Rules.6
5
The circuit court relied on State v. Hopkins, 192 W. Va. 483, 453 S.E.2d
317 (1994), when it required the State to present evidence of Mr. Nichols’s two prior DUI
convictions. This Court overruled Hopkins in the Nichols opinion. See Syl. pt. 3, State v.
Nichols, 208 W. Va. 432, 541 S.E.2d 310 (1999).
6
Pursuant to West Virginia Trial Court Rule 42.05, “[u]nless otherwise
ordered, stipulations must be in writing, signed by the parties making them or their counsel,
and promptly filed with the clerk.”
7
To determine whether or under what circumstances a circuit court must
accept a last-minute stipulation that does not comply with Trial Court Rule 42.05, we
consider the rationale underlying our holding in Nichols, which followed the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S. Ct. 644, 136
L. Ed. 2d 574 (1997).7 The decision in Nichols was centered on addressing the risk of a
conviction tainted by a jury’s improper consideration of a prior conviction for similar
conduct:
“Evidence of prior convictions may lead a jury to
convict a defendant for crimes other than the charged crime,
convict because a bad person deserves punishment rather than
based on the evidence presented, or convict thinking that an
erroneous conviction is not so serious because the defendant
already has a criminal record.”
Nichols, 208 W. Va. at 443-44, 541 S.E.2d at 321-22 (quoting State v. Alexander, 571
N.W.2d 662, 668 (Wis. 1997)). Similarly, the Old Chief Court observed that, while
evidence of prior criminal conduct is relevant, “‘the risk that a jury will convict for crimes
other than those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad
person deserves punishment—creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary
relevance.’” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181, 117 S. Ct. at 650, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574 (quoting
United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982)). This risk is particularly
7
As in this case, the defendant in Old Chief was charged with possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon. “The government wanted to introduce a copy of the
judgment of his prior conviction, which contained the name and nature of the offense
committed . . . . The defendant offered to stipulate to the fact that he had been previously
convicted of a felony.” Nichols, 208 W. Va. at 442-43, 541 S.E.2d at 320-21.
8
significant when the prior conviction involves the use of a gun or is similar to an offense
in the pending case:
[T]here can be no question that evidence of the name or nature
of the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice
to the defendant. . . . Where a prior conviction was for a gun
crime or one similar to other charges in a pending case the risk
of unfair prejudice would be especially obvious[.]
Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 185, 117 S. Ct. at 652, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574. Consequently, once a
defendant has stipulated to a prior conviction that is a status element of a charged crime,
and that conviction is an essential element of that crime (as opposed to a penalty enhancer),8
the jury may not be informed of the name and nature of the prior conviction:
When a defendant is charged with a crime in which a
prior conviction is an essential element of the current crime
charged (e.g.[,] being a felon in possession of a firearm under
[W. Va. Code § 61-7-7(b) (eff. 2016)] and stipulates to having
been previously convicted of a crime, the trial court shall
inform the jury that the defendant stipulated to the prior
conviction. The jury shall be informed that the defendant was
convicted of a prior felony or misdemeanor, but shall otherwise
not be informed of the name or nature of the defendant’s prior
convictions. To the extent State v. Dews, 209 W. Va. 500, 549
S.E.2d 694 (2001), is inconsistent with this holding, it is hereby
modified.
Syl. pt. 5, State v. Herbert, 234 W. Va. 576, 767 S.E.2d 471 (2014).
Importantly though, this Court has recognized with approval “the ‘familiar,
standard rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice,
8
See supra note 4 for an explanation of the two types of status elements.
9
or, more exactly, that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the
full evidentiary force of the case as the Government chooses to present it.’” State v. Gates,
No. 17-0905, 2018 WL 6131292, at *2 (W. Va. Nov. 21, 2018) (memorandum decision)
(quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186-87, 117 S. Ct. at 653, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574). In Nichols,
we acknowledged that relying on a stipulation to establish a prior conviction that is merely
a status element of an offense does not deprive the jury of necessary information or prevent
the prosecution from presenting the substance of its case:
In reaching its result, the opinion in Old Chief made a
distinction between stipulations to a status element of an
offense, as opposed to a stipulation to other elements of an
offense. Justice Souter wrote that “proof of the defendant’s
status goes to an element entirely outside the natural sequence
of what the defendant is charged with thinking and doing to
commit the current offense.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191, 117
S. Ct. at 655, 136 L. Ed. 2d 594. Old Chief reasoned that
because a status element of an offense is independent of an
offense’s mental and physical requirements, it was not
necessary that a jury be informed of a status element. . . .
Nichols, 208 W. Va. at 443, 541 S.E.2d at 321. See also Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190, 117
S. Ct. at 654-55, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574 (“[R]ecognition that the prosecution with its burden of
persuasion needs evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story has, however, virtually no
application when the point at issue is a defendant’s legal status, dependent on some
judgment rendered wholly independently of the concrete events of later criminal behavior
charged against him.”).
10
The risk of unfair prejudice from evidence of the name and nature of the prior
conviction, when that conviction is an essential element of a current charge, must inform
our consideration of the State’s contention that Mr. Jackson’s offered stipulation was
properly rejected by the trial court because it was made during trial and did not comply
with West Virginia Trial Court Rule 42.05. Neither Rule 42.05 nor Nichols imposes a
specific timeframe for stipulations. Pursuant to Rule 42.05, “[u]nless otherwise ordered,
stipulations must be in writing, signed by the parties making them or their counsel, and
promptly filed with the clerk.” W. Va. Tr. Ct. R. 42.05. While the rule includes mandatory
language requiring that “stipulations must be in writing, signed . . . , and promptly filed
with the clerk,”9 this rule also allows for discretion by adding the qualification “[u]nless
otherwise ordered.” Id. (emphasis added). Given this discretion, we easily reconcile Trial
Court Rule 42.05 with the Nichols mandate that a court accept an offered stipulation of a
prior conviction when that conviction is a status element of a charged offense. When an
offered stipulation falls within Syllabus point 3 of Nichols, a circuit court must exercise its
discretion and accept the stipulation. The absence of a contemporaneous writing simply
does not outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice to a defendant from the court’s refusal to
accept such a stipulation. In fact, we have previously found the lack of a written stipulation
to be harmless in circumstances less compelling than these. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 214
W. Va. 516, 524, 590 S.E.2d 709, 717 (2003) (finding the lack of a writing memorializing
9
“Typically, the word ‘must’ is afforded a mandatory connotation.” Ashby
v. City of Fairmont, 216 W. Va. 527, 532, 607 S.E.2d 856, 861 (2004).
11
stipulations that occurred during a pretrial hearing to be either harmless or invited error).
Cf. Syl. pt. 7, State v. Redden, 199 W. Va. 660, 487 S.E.2d 318 (1997) (holding that even
though W. Va. R. Crim. P. 23(a) requires a defendant’s waiver of a jury trial to be in
writing, when the record firmly establishes a defendant otherwise knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently waives the right, the failure to have the waiver in writing does not
invalidate the waiver).
That said, however, the better practice is for a defendant to timely enter into
a stipulation that complies with the writing, signing, and filing requirements of Trial Court
Rule 42.05. Furthermore, this issue could be prevented by the trial court establishing a
deadline for the submission of Rule 42.05 compliant stipulations, which is certainly within
a trial court’s inherent authority. See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, in part, State v. Fields, 225 W. Va.
753, 696 S.E.2d 269 (2010) (“[A] circuit court has inherent authority to conduct and control
matters before it in a fair and orderly fashion.”); State v. Delorenzo, ___ W. Va. at ___,
885 S.E.2d at 657 (same).10 Accordingly, we now hold that a trial court may establish and
10
The State relies upon this inherent authority to argue that the circuit court
properly rejected Mr. Jackson’s offered stipulation. However, a court may not exercise its
authority to manage proceedings in a manner that materially prejudices a defendant. See,
e.g., State v. Kennon, 18 Wash. App. 2d 1062, 2021 WL 3619870, at *4 (2021)
(unpublished opinion) (“[Defendant] alleges that the trial court violated his constitutional
right to a fair trial when it allowed additional officers to ‘lurk . . . behind the prosecutor
table’ during [a witness’s] testimony. Because the officers’ presence was not inherently
prejudicial and the trial court has broad discretion to manage court proceedings, we
disagree.” (emphasis added)), review denied, 501 P.3d 146 (Wash. 2022). See also Great
Am. Ins. Co. v. Mueller, No. 21-12039, 2022 WL 2377391, at *3 (11th Cir. June 30, 2022)
12
enforce a pretrial deadline for producing stipulations in criminal proceedings. However,
when no deadline has been set, a trial court must permit a defendant to stipulate to a prior
conviction during trial when (1) that prior conviction is an essential element of a current
crime charged, and (2) the purpose of the stipulation is to prevent the State from informing
the jury of the name and nature of the prior conviction.11
(“While the court has ‘broad discretion’ to manage its cases, the ‘[f]ailure to consider and
rule on significant pretrial motions before issuing dispositive orders can be an abuse of
discretion’ if the litigant was ‘materially prejudiced’ as a result . . . .” (citations omitted));
United States v. Acad. Mortg. Corp., No. 16-CV-02120-EMC, 2021 WL 4079145, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2021) (“Trial courts have broad discretion to manage their dockets and
can modify their case management orders upon a showing of ‘good cause,’ which considers
the moving party’s diligence and any prejudice that will result to the non-moving party.”
(emphasis added)); Helal v. Helal, No. 2592, Sept. term, 2019, 2021 WL 2000082, at *5
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 19, 2021) (“[C]ourts have broad discretion to manage their
resources, and we will not second guess such decisions ‘unless it clearly appear[s] that
prejudice has resulted from the denial of a legal right.’” (citation omitted)).
11
The State additionally contends, without explanation, that the Nichols
requirement for “a colloquy between the trial court, the defendant, defense counsel and the
state indicating precisely the stipulation and illustrating that the stipulation was made
voluntarily and knowingly by the defendant,” cannot be accomplished during a jury trial.
Syl. pt. 3, in part, Nichols, 208 W. Va. 432, 541 S.E.2d 310. We disagree. The Nichols
Court clarified that it did not intend a burdensome dialog:
We do not require that trial courts engage in the formal
requirements under Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of
Criminal Procedure for accepting plea agreements. A
stipulation to prior convictions is an acknowledgment of a fact
that, in nearly every case, will be a matter that is of public
record.
Nichols, 208 W. Va. at 445 n.22, 541 S.E.2d at 323 n.22. Furthermore, courts often pause
to address issues outside the presence of the jury and we see no reason why this colloquy
cannot be handled similarly.
13
In this case, no deadline for producing stipulations was set by the trial court.
Furthermore, because Mr. Jackson’s offer to stipulate to his prior conviction for voluntary
manslaughter was refused, the jury had evidence of the name and nature of that offense,
including the fact that it was committed with a firearm. While the State produced this
evidence to establish that Mr. Jackson was a felon in possession of a firearm, he was also
being tried for first-degree murder and for using a firearm in the commission of that murder.
Given these charges, providing the jury with details of Mr. Jackson’s prior conviction
produced an unreasonable risk that his convictions were based upon improper grounds, i.e.,
that he acted in conformance with his prior illegal conduct or that he is simply a bad person
worthy of punishment. In other words, “‘the only reasonable conclusion [is] that the risk
of unfair prejudice . . . substantially outweigh[ed] the discounted probative value of the
record of conviction.’” Nichols, 208 W. Va. at 443, 541 S.E.2d at 321 (quoting Old Chief,
519 U.S. at 191, 117 S. Ct. at 655, 136 L. Ed. 2d. 574). As such, the circuit court abused
its discretion by refusing Mr. Jackson’s offered stipulation and unfairly prejudiced him by
that error.
14
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we reverse the Circuit Court of Raleigh
County’s amended sentencing order dated August 24, 2021, and remand this matter for a
new trial consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and Remanded.
15