Eric Kell v. Donnie Ames, Superintendent, Mt. Olive Correctional Complex ( 2023 )


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  •                                                                                         FILED
    June 13, 2023
    STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                                EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    Eric Kell,
    Petitioner Below, Petitioner
    vs.) No. 21-0978 (Mercer County 20-C-130DS)
    Donnie Ames, Superintendent, Mt. Olive
    Correctional Complex,
    Respondent Below, Respondent
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner Eric Kell appeals the Circuit Court of Mercer County’s November 5, 2011, order
    denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.1 Upon our review, we determine that oral argument
    is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate.
    See W. Va. R. App. Proc. 21.
    Petitioner pled guilty2 to six counts of sexual abuse by a parent, guardian, custodian or
    person in a position of trust to a child and six counts of third-degree sexual assault. He was
    sentenced and did not file a direct appeal. Instead, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas
    corpus.3 The court conducted an omnibus evidentiary hearing, after which it denied petitioner
    habeas relief. Petitioner now appeals from that order.
    1
    Petitioner appears by counsel Robert P. Dunlap, II. Respondent appears by counsel
    Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General Gail V. Lipscomb.
    2
    At the plea hearing, the State offered a summary of the evidence it would present at trial
    to support petitioner’s convictions. Petitioner agreed with the State’s summary and advised the
    court that he was entering a guilty plea because he was “in fact guilty.” Moreover, petitioner
    confirmed he understood that by entering a guilty plea he was waiving any non-jurisdictional
    defects in the criminal proceeding against him. After an extensive colloquy, the court accepted
    petitioner’s guilty plea, finding that there was a factual basis for the plea and that petitioner entered
    his plea “freely, voluntarily, intelligently, knowingly and understandably.”
    3
    Petitioner asserted the following claims for habeas corpus relief: (1) lack of mental
    competency at the time of the crime; (2) lack of mental competency at time of trial; (3) ineffective
    assistance of counsel; (4) cumulative error; (5) consecutive sentence for the same transaction; (6)
    (continued . . . )
    1
    In this appeal, petitioner argues that the court “erred by abusing its discretion in denying
    [p]etitioner’s claim regarding [p]etitioner’s allegation that the tape recording of his interview by
    law enforcement was tampered with after the fact [and] that [p]etitioner was under the influence
    of Xanax in violation of [p]etitioner’s Constitutional rights” at the time that he provided the
    statement.
    Our review is guided by the following standard:
    In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court
    in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review
    the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard;
    the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions
    of law are subject to a de novo review.
    Syl. Pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines, 
    219 W. Va. 417
    , 
    633 S.E.2d 771
     (2006).
    We have repeatedly held, “[o]n an appeal to this Court the appellant bears the burden of
    showing that there was error in the proceedings below resulting in the judgment of which he
    complains, all presumptions being in favor of the correctness of the proceedings and judgment in
    and of the trial court.” Meadows v. Mutter, 
    243 W. Va. 211
    , 218-19, 
    842 S.E.2d 764
    , 771-72 (2020)
    (citation omitted).
    At the outset, we acknowledge that petitioner was convicted upon his knowing, voluntary,
    and intelligent unconditional guilty plea. We have noted that “[i]f any principle is well settled in
    this State, it is that, in the absence of special circumstances, a guilty plea waives all antecedent
    constitutional and statutory violations save those with jurisdictional consequences.” State v.
    Greene, 
    196 W. Va. 500
    , 505, 
    473 S.E.2d 921
    , 926 (1996); See also, State v. Bennett, 
    179 W. Va. 464
    , 475, 
    370 S.E.2d 120
    , 131 (1988) (“the defendant waives all procedural objections except the
    jurisdiction of the court and the voluntariness of his plea when he pleads guilty.”). Accordingly,
    inasmuch as petitioner pled guilty, we find that petitioner waived any right to complain about the
    court’s ruling on his motion to suppress.
    Moreover, petitioner did not raise these claims with the circuit court. Although petitioner
    claimed in his motion to suppress that his statement was not provided “knowingly, intelligently
    and voluntarily and was the product of coercion in a manner inconsistent with constitutional
    principles,” he did not argue in his habeas petition or during his omnibus habeas hearing that his
    recorded statement had been tampered with as a ground for relief.4 Additionally, petitioner did not
    argue below that he was not capable of giving a statement to law enforcement because he took
    unfulfilled plea bargains; (7) erroneous information in the pre-sentence report; (8) non-disclosure
    of grand jury minutes; and (9) mistaken advice of counsel as to parole or probation eligibility.
    4
    On cross-examination at the omnibus hearing, petitioner’s trial counsel testified that he
    did not recall petitioner raising any concerns related to the statement nor did he hear any breaks or
    pauses in the recording. Although petitioner’s habeas counsel asked a few fleeting cross-
    examination questions that referenced the possibility of alleged tampering with petitioner’s
    statement, petitioner did not raise this in his petition or at the omnibus hearing. Accordingly, the
    habeas court did not consider tampering of petitioner’s statement as a ground for habeas relief.
    2
    Xanax or another medication.5 It is well established that “our law clearly supports the proposition
    that any grounds not raised in the petition for habeas corpus are deemed waived.” Lewis v. Ames,
    
    242 W. Va. 405
    , 410, 
    836 S.E.2d 56
    , 61 (2019). Accordingly, because petitioner did not raise these
    issues in the circuit court, we find that he waived these arguments.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: June 13, 2023
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
    Justice Tim Armstead
    Justice John A. Hutchison
    Justice William R. Wooton
    Justice C. Haley Bunn
    5
    At his suppression hearing, petitioner argued the opposite — that he was not adequately
    medicated at the time he gave his statement to law enforcement.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-0978

Filed Date: 6/13/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/13/2023