state-of-wyoming-ex-rel-west-park-hospital-district-and-yellowstone , 2014 WY 41 ( 2014 )


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  •               IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
    
    2014 WY 41
    OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2013
    March 25, 2014
    STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. WEST
    PARK HOSPITAL DISTRICT and
    YELLOWSTONE BEHAVIORAL
    HEALTH CENTER,
    Appellants
    (Petitioners),
    S-13-0110, S-13-0153
    v.
    BRYAN A. SKORIC, Park County and
    Prosecuting Attorney, in his official
    capacity,
    Appellee
    (Respondent).
    Appeal from the District Court of Park County
    The Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge
    Representing Appellants:
    Larry B. Jones and Chris Edwards of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLC, the
    Cody, Wyoming division of Burg Simpson Eldredge Hersh and Jardine, P.C.,
    Cody, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Jones.
    Representing Appellee:
    James F. Davis, Deputy Park County Attorney, Cody, Wyoming
    Before KITE, C.J., and HILL, VOIGT,* BURKE, and DAVIS, JJ.
    * Justice Voigt retired effective January 3, 2014
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.
    Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building,
    Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be
    made before final publication in the permanent volume.
    DAVIS, Justice.
    [¶1] In these consolidated appeals, Appellants West Park Hospital District and
    Yellowstone Behavioral Health Center challenge the district court’s denial of their
    petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Park County Attorney to commence court
    proceedings and to appear at initial emergency detention hearings under Wyo. Stat. Ann.
    § 25-10-109 (LexisNexis 2013), as well as to appear and prosecute the case in chief at the
    involuntary hospitalization hearings under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-10-110 (LexisNexis
    2013). We agree with Appellants that the statutes in question do require a county
    attorney’s office to participate in civil commitment proceedings as they claim it should.
    However, we also find that the statutes are ambiguous, and that the district court therefore
    did not abuse its discretion by refusing to issue a writ of mandamus. Therefore, although
    we disagree with the district court as to the county attorney’s duty in civil commitment
    cases, we affirm.
    ISSUES
    [¶2]    Two interrelated issues are raised in this appeal:
    1.     What are the statutorily required duties of a Wyoming
    county attorney in civil commitment proceedings under Wyo.
    Stat. Ann. §§ 25-10-109 and 110?
    2.    Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying
    Appellants’ petition for writ of mandamus?
    FACTS
    [¶3] West Park Hospital District is a hospital district formed under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §
    35-2-401. It frequently houses patients believed to be mentally ill when they are
    temporarily detained pending civil commitment hearings, and if they are determined to be
    a danger to themselves or others, pending transportation to the Wyoming State Hospital.1
    Yellowstone Behavioral Health Center (Yellowstone) is a Wyoming non-profit
    corporation which furnishes mental health services throughout the Big Horn Basin, and
    particularly in the emergency room of West Park. Yellowstone provides examiners who
    evaluate patients to determine whether they must be detained for their own safety or that
    of the community until an involuntary commitment hearing can be held under Title 25,
    Chapter 10 of the Wyoming statutes.
    1
    A law enforcement officer or examiner (generally a mental health professional) who believes that a
    patient is mentally ill—meaning that he is a danger to himself or others and needs treatment—may initiate
    emergency detention in a local hospital or other suitable facility. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-10-109(a);
    25-10-101(a)(iv), (ix) (LexisNexis 2013).
    1
    [¶4] Appellee Bryan A. Skoric is the duly elected Park County and Prosecuting
    Attorney. The Park County Attorney’s office has historically represented the public’s
    interest in emergency detention and involuntary hospitalization hearings under Title 25.
    The county attorney or his deputies filed applications for involuntary hospitalization and
    appeared at emergency detention hearings under § 25-10-109 as well as involuntary
    hospitalization hearings under § 25-10-110. If the assigned attorney from the county
    attorney’s office believed detention and/or involuntary hospitalization appropriate, he or
    she would present the case for hospitalization by making an opening statement and
    closing argument, conducting direct examinations, cross-examining adverse witnesses,
    and preparing all necessary paperwork. Once notified that an individual was being
    detained on an emergency basis under § 109, the office handled all necessary
    commitment proceedings on behalf of the State, commencing the case in the district court
    and prosecuting it to completion, whether it involved just an emergency detention hearing
    or proceeded to an involuntary commitment hearing under § 110(h).
    [¶5] In 2013, following our decision in In re RB, 
    2013 WY 15
    , 
    294 P.3d 24
    (Wyo.
    2013), described below, Mr. Skoric reconsidered the extent of his office’s participation in
    civil commitment proceedings. He determined that it lacked statutory authority to
    participate in emergency detention hearings under § 109, and that appearing in the
    public’s interest at an involuntary hospitalization hearing under § 110 did not require him
    to present the case in chief. He concluded instead that a county attorney was only
    required to observe commitment proceedings and ensure that the statutes are followed at
    a § 110 hearing, presumably meaning that he or his deputies could sit in the back of the
    courtroom and speak up if something untoward took place. He feared that if his office
    handled cases as it had in the past, he and his deputies would not be entitled to
    prosecutorial immunity from civil claims, and that they could be subject to criminal
    liability under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-10-126.2
    [¶6] The effect of the Park County Attorney’s decision was to place the burden of
    going forward with emergency detention and involuntary hospitalization hearings on
    2
    That statute provides as follow:
    (a) A person who willfully causes the unwarranted
    hospitalization of any individual under this act [§§ 25-10-101 through
    25-10-305] is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine not exceeding five
    thousand dollars ($5,000.00) or imprisonment not exceeding five (5)
    years, or both.
    (b) A person who willfully denies any individual any of the
    rights accorded to him under this act is guilty of a misdemeanor
    punishable by a fine not exceeding seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00)
    or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both.
    Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-10-126 (LexisNexis 2013).
    2
    employees of or attorneys paid by Appellants. This led Appellants to file a Verified
    Petition for Writ of Mandamus pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-30-101 et seq., asking the
    district court to compel the Park County Attorney to proceed in the same way he had for
    many years. They conceded, as they do in this appeal, that the county attorney has
    discretion to decline to pursue emergency detention or involuntary commitment in a
    particular case in which he believes either to be inappropriate, but claim that he could not
    simply refuse to appear in all such proceedings or decline to present any case for
    involuntary commitment while just watching the proceedings from the sideline.
    [¶7] Mr. Skoric moved to dismiss the petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the
    writ could not be granted because the law did not impose a duty upon him or his office to
    participate in emergency detention hearings or to present a case for involuntary
    commitment. After holding a hearing and considering the arguments presented by the
    parties, the district court denied Appellants’ application for the writ. Adhering to the
    strict standards for ordering such extraordinary relief, it concluded:
    The issue in In the Interest of RB was the authority of
    the county attorney to object to the proposed release of an
    involuntarily hospitalized person. However, Justice Davis,
    writing for a unanimous court set forth in detail the rules of
    statutory construction and an analysis of the role of the
    county attorney in Title 25 proceedings that this Court
    considers dispositive, particularly in view of the standards for
    the issuance of a writ of mandamus as outline above.
    W.S. §25-10-109 provides that emergency detention
    may be initiated by a law enforcement officer or an examiner
    and in subsection (h), that the Court will conduct a hearing
    within 72 hours to determine whether continued detention is
    appropriate pending the initiation of involuntary
    hospitalization proceedings. Significantly, W.S. §25-10-109
    does not require the participation of the county attorney in
    order to detain a person or to determine whether continued
    detention is appropriate pending an application for
    involuntary hospitalization. Reading W.S. §25-10-109 in the
    light of the Court’s discussion of involuntary hospitalization
    procedure and examinations, this Court cannot identify a
    primary role for the county attorney much less a clear
    unambiguous duty to act. It is not until involuntary
    hospitalization proceedings are commenced that the
    legislature by enacting W.S. §25-10-110 requires the county
    attorney to appear in the public interest. The Supreme Court
    in In the Interest of RB discusses the legitimate interest of the
    3
    public at that stage of the proceedings. However, W.S. §25-
    10-110 can be fairly read to allow any interested person to
    commence proceedings for involuntary commitment by filing
    a written application with the appropriate court. The
    obligation of the county attorney is to “appear” in the public
    interest.
    There are many reasons why it might be preferable to
    have the county attorney involved in the emergency detention
    proceedings provided for in W.S. §25-10-109. Such
    proceedings involve public safety, public funds, and most
    importantly and most assuredly, the safety, the wellbeing and
    the liberty of proposed patients. However, the Legislature,
    despite several revisions through the years has not seen fit to
    define a role for the county attorney in the emergency
    detention process and arguably a non-exclusive role in the
    involuntary hospitalization process.
    Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal from this order.
    [¶8] Appellants also filed a motion to alter or amend the order under W.R.C.P. 59(e),
    essentially requesting the district court to determine what the legislature intended to
    require of the county attorney when he appeared “in the public interest” under § 110(c).
    The court denied the Rule 59(e) motion, finding that the language in § 110 does not
    “define a definitive role” for the county attorney in the involuntary hospitalization
    process. Appellants timely filed a second notice of appeal from the denial of that motion.
    The appeals were consolidated.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [¶9] Whether there is a statutory duty which might permit issuance of a writ of
    mandamus is a question of law which we review de novo, adhering to our general rules of
    statutory construction. State ex rel. Arnold v. Ommen, 
    2009 WY 24
    , ¶ 14, 
    201 P.3d 1127
    ,
    1132 (Wyo. 2009). Whether a writ of mandamus will be issued in a particular case is a
    decision entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court, and we will reverse only if
    the district court could not reasonably conclude as it did. 
    Id. DISCUSSION Duties
    of a County Attorney in Involuntary Hospitalization Proceedings
    [¶10] We must first determine whether a county attorney has the duty to participate in
    emergency detention hearings and to present the case for involuntary commitment. We
    4
    therefore examine the applicable statutes. In interpreting statutes, our objective is to
    determine the legislature’s intent. In re RB, ¶ 
    16, 294 P.3d at 29
    . Legislative intent must
    be ascertained initially and principally from the words used in the statute; for when the
    words are clear and unambiguous, there is a peril that a court may impermissibly
    substitute its own views if any attempt is made to interpret or construe statutes on any
    basis other than the language invoked by the legislature. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters Local
    Union No. 279 v. City of Cheyenne, 
    2013 WY 15
    7, ¶ 9, 
    316 P.3d 1162
    , 1166 (Wyo.
    2013).
    [¶11] We look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in a statute to
    determine if it is ambiguous. In re RB, ¶ 
    16, 294 P.3d at 29
    . “A statute is clear and
    unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its
    meaning with consistency and predictability.” Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters Local Union
    No. 279, ¶ 
    9, 316 P.3d at 1166
    . “Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be
    vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.” 
    Id. Divergent opinions
    among parties as to the meaning of a statute may be evidence of ambiguity; however, the
    fact that there are differing opinions as to its meaning is not conclusive of ambiguity. See
    Romsa v. State ex rel. Wyoming Dep’t of Transp., 
    2012 WY 146
    , ¶ 22, 
    288 P.3d 695
    , 702
    (Wyo. 2012). Whether a statute is ambiguous is a matter of law that is determined by this
    Court. In re RB, ¶ 
    16, 294 P.3d at 29
    .
    [¶12] Title 25, Chapter 10 of the Wyoming statutes provides a procedure for the
    detention and hospitalization of a mentally ill individual, establishing a two-step hearing
    process in which a district court may first detain a proposed mentally ill individual if a
    preponderance of the evidence at an informal hearing shows that the person is mentally ill
    as that term is defined by the statute. §§ 25-10-109, 101(a)(ix). The statutes then provide
    for a more formal hearing on whether the patient should be involuntarily hospitalized. At
    that hearing, a patient has the right to have the court (or a jury if one is timely requested)
    determine whether he suffers from mental illness to the extent that he is a danger to
    himself or others. § 25-10-110(h), (j). The pertinent portions of the statues in question
    are as follows:
    (a) Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of a person
    may be commenced by the filing of a written application with
    the court in the county in which the person is initially
    detained. Proceedings may also be initiated in the county in
    which there is a designated hospital if there is a written
    agreement executed by the county in which the person resides
    and the designated hospital stating that the county in which
    the person resides will be responsible for costs of treatment
    under W.S. 25-10-112(e) that are not covered by the state. . . .
    . . .
    5
    (c) Proceedings under this section shall be entitled “In the
    Interest of . . . .”. The county attorney of the county where the
    application is filed shall appear in the public interest. The
    court shall expedite the proceedings.
    .   .   .
    (h) The proposed patient, the applicant, and all others to
    whom notice is required may appear at the hearing to testify
    and may present witnesses. The court may receive the
    testimony of other persons. The proposed patient shall be
    present at the hearing unless he waives his right to appear.
    All persons not necessary to protect the rights of the parties
    shall be excluded from the hearing. The hearing shall be
    conducted in as informal a manner as is consistent with
    orderly procedure and in a physical setting which will not
    have a harmful effect on the mental health of the proposed
    patient. Any hearing conducted under this subsection shall be
    recorded by the court reporter or by electronic, mechanical or
    other appropriate means.
    § 25-10-110(a), (c), (h). The applicable statute provides for a prompt detention hearing
    preceding a formal involuntary commitment hearing:
    (h) When a person is detained in emergency detention and an
    application for involuntary hospitalization is filed, the court
    shall appoint an attorney to represent the detained person
    unless he has his own attorney, and the court shall conduct a
    hearing within seventy-two (72) hours, excluding Saturdays,
    Sundays and legal holidays, of the initial detention to
    determine whether continued detention is required pending
    involuntary hospitalization proceedings.
    § 25-10-109(h).
    [¶13] Appellants assert that §§ 25-10-109 and 110 clearly and unambiguously prescribe
    county attorneys’ duties. We disagree and find the statute to be ambiguous as to the
    specific duties of a county attorney in emergency detention and involuntary
    hospitalization proceedings. The statutes do not explicitly define the county attorney’s
    role in detention hearings, and they likewise do not expressly state what a county attorney
    appearing in the public interest must do. Appellants concede that the phrase “appear in
    the public interest” is ambiguous.
    6
    [¶14] Once we have determined that a statute is ambiguous, we must apply general
    principles of statutory construction in an effort to determine the legislature’s intent.
    Petroleum Inc. v. State ex rel. State Bd. of Equalization, 
    983 P.2d 1237
    , 1240 (Wyo.
    1999). “In ascertaining the legislative intent in enacting a statute the court must look to
    the mischief the act was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment,
    the public policy of the state, the conditions of the law and all other prior and
    contemporaneous facts and circumstances that would enable the court intelligently to
    determine the intention of the lawmaking body.” 
    Id. (citations and
    ellipses omitted).
    This Court’s responsibility in interpreting § 109 and § 110 is to follow the rule that
    provisions in pari materia are to be compared and harmonized, if possible, and, “if not
    susceptible of a construction which will make all of their provisions harmonize, they are
    made to operate together so far as possible consistently with the evident intent of the
    latest enactment.” Huber v. Thomas, 
    45 Wyo. 440
    , 450, 
    19 P.2d 1042
    , 1044 (1933).
    [¶15] Reading the provisions of Wyoming’s statute governing the involuntary
    hospitalization of mentally ill persons in light of the rules for interpreting ambiguous
    statutes, we conclude that a county attorney has the duty to commence involuntary
    hospitalization proceedings by filing the written application, and that he must appear and
    present the case in support of the application on behalf of the State under Wyo. Stat. Ann.
    §§ 25-10-109 and 110.3 This conclusion assumes that the county attorney has determined
    that the application has merit and that the patient is in need of involuntary hospitalization,
    which is not a ministerial task. In other words, a county attorney retains discretion to
    determine in a particular case that the need for detention or involuntary hospitalization
    can or cannot be proven, but he or she cannot simply refuse to participate or limit
    participation after deciding to file the requisite application. There are a number of reasons
    to support our conclusion, including the following:
    3
    We note that the legislature recently enacted SEA 0019 (2014), which clarifies a county attorney’s role
    in emergency detention hearings. Our conclusions in this opinion are entirely consistent with the
    clarifications that the legislature deemed fit to make to ensure county attorneys perform their duties
    accordingly. SEA 0019 becomes effective July 1, 2014 and states in pertinent part (emphasis in original):
    25-10-109. Emergency detention.
    (h) When a person is detained in emergency detention and an application
    for involuntary hospitalization is filed by the county attorney, the court
    shall appoint an attorney to represent the detained person unless he has
    his own attorney, and the court shall conduct a hearing within seventy-
    two (72) hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, of the
    initial detention to determine whether continued detention is required
    pending involuntary hospitalization proceedings. The county attorney of
    the county where the application is filed shall appear on behalf of the
    state at the hearing. . . . .
    7
     The arrangement and connection of the words in §§ 109 and 110 lead to the
    logical conclusion that emergency detention and involuntary hospitalization
    hearings are parts of one proceeding. As set forth in § 110(a) and (c), the
    involuntary hospitalization of an individual is commenced by filing the requisite
    application which shall be entitled “In the Interest of . . .” and the county attorney
    shall appear in the public interest. Interrelated, in § 25-10-109(h), when an
    examiner finds that the individual is mentally ill and an application for involuntary
    hospitalization is filed, the district court must hold the initial hearing within 72
    hours, pending the subsequent hearing under § 110.
     The term “appear,” a verb, is synonymous with making an “appearance,” a noun,
    which is defined as “[a] coming into court as a party or interested person, or as a
    lawyer on behalf of a party or interested person.” Black’s Law Dictionary 113 (9th
    ed. 2009); see Multiple Resort Ownership Plan, Inc., v. Design-Build-Manage,
    Inc., 
    2002 WY 67
    , ¶ 17, 
    45 P.3d 647
    , 653 (Wyo. 2002). “Public interest” is
    defined as an interest in “[t]he general welfare of the public that warrants
    recognition and protection.” Black’s Law 
    Dictionary, supra, at 1350
    . The
    interested party that a county attorney appears on behalf of then, is the State,
    which “exercises its parens patraie powers under Title 25 to care for those who
    cannot care for themselves.” In re RB, ¶ 
    19, 294 P.3d at 30-31
    . Thus, the
    language of the statute means that a county attorney, in his capacity as the
    representative of the State at that stage of the proceedings, has a specific duty after
    filing the application to appear and go forward with presentation of the evidence
    justifying detention and commitment.
     Looking at the mischief that the statute was intended to cure; that is, the object and
    purpose that the legislature intended to accomplish when it enacted the statute,
    further supports our conclusion. “The general purpose of civil commitment is to
    treat the individual’s mental illness and protect him and society from his potential
    dangerousness.” In re RB, ¶ 
    21, 294 P.3d at 30
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    A county attorney appearing on behalf of the State best serves the statute’s
    purpose by commencing and presenting the case for detention or commitment,
    because these proceedings involve public safety, public funds, and most
    importantly the safety, wellbeing and liberty of proposed patients.
    [¶16] Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that absurd results would follow if
    it were not the county attorney’s duty to file the application and present the case during
    such proceedings. See In re RB, ¶ 
    17, 294 P.3d at 29
    (“We do not construe statutes ‘in a
    manner producing absurd results.’”); see also McTiernan v. Jellis, 
    2013 WY 15
    1, ¶ 20,
    
    316 P.3d 1153
    , 1160 (Wyo. 2013) (interpretation should not produce an absurd result). If
    county attorneys were not responsible for commencing and presenting the case during
    these proceedings, Appellants would have to execute their duties as “examiners” under §
    25-10-101(a)(iv) and § 25-10-109(a) and (b) and also then be forced to initiate and
    8
    prosecute the court proceedings under §§ 109(h) and 110(a), which would probably
    require them to retain an attorney. That was obviously not the result the legislature
    intended when it enacted the provisions for involuntary hospitalization of mentally ill
    individuals.
    [¶17] Appellants are not charged with appearing in the public interest or acting for the
    State at either the § 25-10-109(h) or § 25-10-110(a) hearings. There is no law which
    grants them the right to speak for the State and to execute its parens patraie powers under
    Title 25. The exercise of the State’s police power must stem from a grant contained in
    the Wyoming Constitution or be delegated by the legislature. See K N Energy, Inc. v.
    City of Casper, 
    755 P.2d 207
    , 212 (Wyo. 1988). There is no such delegation to
    Appellants in Title 25. Simply put, Appellants and their employees may have obligations
    as “examiners,” but nothing in the statutes suggests that they have been empowered by
    the legislature to act in the “public interest” by presenting the case for commitment to the
    court; rather, a county attorney, a publically elected official, is delegated this heavy
    responsibility.
    [¶18] The evolution of Wyoming’s involuntary hospitalization statutes also supports the
    conclusion that a county attorney’s duty is, and has been, to file the requisite application
    as well as appear on behalf of the State and present its case in support of the involuntary
    hospitalization of an individual at hearings under §§ 25-10-109 and 110. In 1929, the
    original act provided that a “lunacy commission” examined a proposed mentally ill
    person who had become the subject of a petition for commitment. See Wyo. Stat. § 51-
    207 (1945). Following the petition and examination, the statutes required a court hearing
    at which the county and prosecuting attorney was required to “appear and prosecute such
    petition for the state.” 
    Id. at §
    51-208 (1945).
    [¶19] Roughly thirty years later in 1963, the legislature amended the statute to require a
    form of emergency detention hearing followed by an involuntary hospitalization hearing,
    a procedure similar to the two-step process utilized today. See Wyo. Stat. §§ 25-59 & 60
    (1957). The statute adopted back then required the county attorney to “cause all
    proceedings under this section to be expeditiously accomplished and [to] appear in the
    public interest and conduct the examination in chief of the witnesses.” Wyo. Stat. § 25-
    60(c).
    [¶20] In 1982, the legislature once again amended the statute to contain the current
    language: “The county and prosecuting attorney of the county where the application is
    filed shall appear in the public interest.” § 25-10-110(c).4 We are convinced the
    evolving language regarding civil commitment proceedings are mere stylistic changes
    4
    The 1982 revisions were in response to United States Supreme Court precedent concerning the rights of
    those who were considered mentally ill. See Robert B. Keiter, A Preliminary Review of Wyoming’s
    Revised Civil Commitment Procedures, 17 Land & Water L. Rev. 531, 531-32 (1982).
    9
    which were not intended to scale back a county attorney’s duties from what we have
    described above. See In re RB, ¶¶ 
    19-22, 294 P.3d at 29-30
    .
    [¶21] Lastly, we address Mr. Skoric’s assertion that our recent opinion in In re RB calls
    for a different result than the one we reach in this decision. In In re RB, we decided that
    the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-10-116(b) does not grant Wyoming county
    attorneys the authority to object to a patient’s discharge from involuntary civil
    commitment or to obtain review of the State Hospital’s decision to release a patient from
    involuntary hospitalization. See In re RB, ¶¶ 1, 
    45, 294 P.3d at 27
    , 35. In so holding, we
    explained that “the involuntary hospitalization statutes require the county attorney to
    participate in civil commitment proceedings, at least to the point at which the patient is
    actually hospitalized.” 
    Id. at ¶
    25, 294 P.3d at 31
    . Nothing in In re RB contradicts our
    conclusion in this case.
    Writ of Mandamus
    [¶22] Having found that a county attorney is responsible for commencing involuntary
    hospitalization proceedings by filing the requisite written application and must appear on
    behalf of the State and present its case in support of the detention and involuntary
    hospitalization of an individual at hearings under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-10-109 and 110,5
    we turn to whether the district court erred in denying Appellants’ petition for writ of
    mandamus.
    “Mandamus is a writ issued in the name of the state to
    an inferior tribunal, a corporation, board or person
    commanding the performance of an act which the law
    specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
    station.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-30-101 . . . . The function of
    mandamus is to command performance of a ministerial duty
    which is plainly defined and required by law. Mandamus will
    not lie unless the duty is absolute, clear, and indisputable. The
    law must not only authorize the demanded action but require
    it. If the lower tribunal has the right to exercise discretion
    regarding an issue, mandamus is not an appropriate remedy.
    Arnold, ¶ 
    16, 201 P.3d at 1133
    (citations omitted). Succinctly put, “[m]andamus will
    only issue if the respondent, at the time of the application for mandamus, owes a clear
    duty to perform to the plaintiff.” 52 Am. Jur. 2d Mandamus § 45 (2011); see also State
    5
    This statement assumes that the county attorney or deputy assigned to the case has determined that the
    evidence available supports detention or involuntary commitment. Nothing in this opinion is intended to
    suggest that county attorneys should not exercise their professional judgment on a case-by-case basis, or
    that they cannot or should not refuse to pursue detention or commitment in cases in which they do not
    believe the evidence supports it.
    10
    ex rel. Epp v. Mayor, 
    894 P.2d 590
    , 595 (Wyo. 1995) (“Mandamus will not lie unless the
    duty itself is absolute and incontrovertible, or clear, certain, and indisputable.”).
    [¶23] The provisions in dispute are not clear and certain on their face. We have had to
    employ rules of statutory construction to determine the duties of a county attorney.
    Mandamus was therefore not warranted when Appellants applied for this extraordinary
    relief. See Arnold, ¶ 
    22, 201 P.3d at 1134
    ; see also 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 7 (2009)
    (Nature of Remedy—Extraordinary Nature of Relief). Accordingly, the district court did
    not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ petition for writ of mandamus at that time.
    Now that we have construed the statute to impose a duty that Mr. Skoric did not
    previously believe to exist, we have no trepidation that the Park County Attorney’s office
    will not faithfully perform that duty.
    CONCLUSION
    [¶24] A county attorney is responsible for commencing involuntary hospitalization
    proceedings by filing the requisite written application and must appear and present the
    State’s case in support for involuntary hospitalization under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-10-
    109 and 110. We recognize that a county attorney’s duties are not plainly defined on the
    face of the statute, requiring us to interpret its ambiguous language according to
    applicable rules of statutory construction. Because mandamus may only issue if the
    respondent owes a clear, certain and indisputable duty to perform at the time of the
    application for mandamus, such extraordinary relief was not warranted when Appellants
    filed their petition.
    [¶25] Affirmed.
    11