United States v. Jackson ( 2023 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 22-1100
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
LAVENEUR JACKSON,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Joseph N. Laplante, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge,
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
and Kelley,* District Judge.
Simon R. Brown, with whom Preti Flaherty PLLP was on brief,
for appellant.
Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Jane E. Young, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
January 23, 2023
* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
BARRON, Chief Judge. Laveneur Jackson appeals from his
two September 2021 convictions in the United States District Court
for the District of New Hampshire. Each conviction was for
possessing a firearm as a prohibited person -- i.e., someone who
has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than
one year of imprisonment -- in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)
and 924(a)(2). Jackson contends that the convictions must be
reversed due to a lack of sufficient evidence. But, as a fallback,
he contends that they must be vacated and the underlying charges
dismissed due to governmental misconduct during the grand jury
proceedings. We affirm.
I.
A.
At some point before December 23, 2016, Jackson asked
Angelina Keenan to buy guns for him in exchange for money or drugs,
and Keenan agreed to do so. And then, on that date, Jackson and
Keenan traveled together to a gun store in Pelham, New Hampshire.
Jackson provided cash to Keenan for the purpose of
purchasing a Ruger SR1911 pistol, which she did. To complete the
purchase, she -- like all people who purchase a firearm from a
federally licensed dealer -- was required to execute a form
prescribed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (the "ATF 4473 form"). Keenan left the store with the
gun and then gave it to Jackson in the parking lot.
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Four days after this first gun purchase, on December 27,
Keenan made another purchase for Jackson following a similar
pattern -- this time for two SCCY pistols at a gun store in
Hooksett, New Hampshire. And, in January 2017, Jackson and Keenan
again went to the Hooksett gun store together.
While the two were at that store, however, a store
employee who had become suspicious of their behavior placed a call
to law enforcement. A local police officer who had been deputized
as a task-force officer for the ATF, Matthew Barter, as well as an
ATF special agent, John Cook, responded to the call.
At some point after Barter and Cook arrived at the store,
Cook began to question Jackson. Cook asked Jackson if he had a
felony conviction, and Jackson responded in the affirmative. Cook
then told Jackson that he was "in trouble" for handling guns in
the store, and Jackson responded that he was not aware that it was
illegal for a person who had been convicted of a felony to merely
handle guns in a gun store.
Cook continued questioning Jackson, inquiring whether
Jackson would be willing to help him recover any guns that he had
previously acquired with Keenan's assistance. Jackson responded
that the guns were in Massachusetts, that it would take some time,
and that he would have to return some money to some people. After
Cook suggested that they would need to "work together," Jackson
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responded, "Yeah, I'm not going to do that," and indicated that he
would like to speak to a lawyer.
Jackson then asked Cook if he could get $1,000 that he
said that Keenan was "holding . . . for [him]." Cook at that
point went over to Keenan to ask if she had Jackson's money.
Keenan told Cook that she did have the money but indicated that
$100 of it belonged to her as a "payment" for buying the guns that
Jackson had asked her to purchase for him. Cook and Barter then
seized the money.
Following this encounter, Jackson left the gun store.
Keenan was taken to the local police department, where she was
further questioned about the purchases.
B.
Nearly twenty months later, in August 2018, the
government commenced grand jury proceedings to obtain an
indictment against Jackson for violating the federal prohibition
on gun possession by persons who have been convicted of a crime
punishable by more than one year. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2).2 The government called Cook to testify before the grand
2 Section 922(g)(1) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for
any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in
or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive
any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce."
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jury about the January 2017 encounter between Jackson and Cook at
the gun store. The following exchange occurred during Cook's
testimony:
Government: And just to clarify, [the January
2017] purchase was never consummated; right?
Cook: Right. That's the day we show up and
we stop it. . . . So at this point, I move
on to interviewing Jackson. . . . And he said
that he could get the guns back. He would
just have to return some money to some people
and it would take some time. I was like,
"Hey, sounds great. But we have to do that
as a team, like we're going to work together
so we can get those guns off the street." And
he's like, "Yeah, I'm not going to do that."
And he invoked -- asked to talk to a lawyer at
that point.
Government: And at that point you stopped
questioning; right?
Cook: I stopped talking to him.
Government: One thing. Before he asked to
speak to a lawyer, before he stopped
cooperating and talking to you, you had asked
him where the firearms had gone; right?
Cook: Right.
Government: And he said they were in
Massachusetts.
Cook: He did. That's right.
Section 924(a)(2), at the time Jackson was charged, in turn
provided that "[w]hoever knowingly violates subsection [(g)] of
Section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned
not more than 10 years, or both." The statute has since been
revised to provide for a penalty of up to 15 years of imprisonment
for a violation of subsection (g). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8).
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Government: Okay. All right. At this point
he invokes -- he says, "I want to talk to an
attorney." And you stop questioning him;
right?
Cook: Correct. Yes.
Government: But then he says something
without you asking him any questions; right?
Cook: Right. So I basically told him, okay,
you can go. And he said, "Well, you know, can
I get my money from her?" And I was like,
"What money?" And he was like, "She has
$1,000 of mine." I was like, "Why does she
have your money?" He said, "Well, she's just
holding it for me." So I was like, okay. So
I go over and I talk to Keenan. I'm like, "Do
you have $1,000?" She goes, "Yeah, he gave
me $1,000 to buy the guns." And then at that
point she said, "$100 was for me, for payment
for me for doing it, and the rest of the money
was to buy the guns." So, you know, we just
seized the whole $1,000 as evidence. We don't
give it to anybody. ATF takes it into
custody. We still have it in the evidence
room.
Government: All right. And after this room -
- after you seized the money, Jackson left the
area; right?
Cook: Correct.
Government: He walked away.
Cook: That's right.
Government: And he was free to walk away
because he wasn't under arrest.
Cook: Correct.
The government also sought during the grand jury
proceedings to show through Cook's testimony that Jackson had
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previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one
year. Cook's testimony in this regard was as follows:
Government: Is it fair to say that after
[your] review of [Jackson's] criminal history,
the last conviction you see on it is in
December of 2013 for assault with a dangerous
weapon?
Cook: That is one of the convictions I've
seen on his criminal history.
Government: I’m sorry, I’m thinking of
sentencing. Actually, the last sentence that
we see here is on July 30th of 2014; correct?
Cook: That's right.
Government: And that's for assault and
battery on a police officer?
Cook: I have his last felony conviction --
Government: Resisting arrest?
Cook: -- possession to distribute.
Government: And possession --
Cook: Possession to distribute, two counts,
on July 30th, 2014. That was in the Lawrence
District Court.
Government: A11 right. Let's go with that.
That's going to be Docket 118-CR-495?
Cook: 58613 is what I have for the Lawrence
District Court conviction.
Government: Okay. You have the -- okay. He
was sentenced for several things on that date.
But that is fair to say. So, possession to
distribute drugs?
Cook: Correct.
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Government: And July 30th of 2014 was the
last sentence?
Cook: Correct.
Government: And it doesn't look like he had
any probation. Just said one year; correct?
Cook: I believe that's correct, yes.
Government: So it's fair to say you don't
know for sure.
Cook: I don't know that for sure, no. I know
that he has multiple felony convictions. I
know that.
The grand jury returned an indictment alleging in two
separate counts that Jackson, "who on or about September 3, 2013,
was convicted in the Dorchester District Court in Massachusetts of
Assault with a Dangerous Weapon, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year, did knowingly possess" the Ruger
SR1911 pistol and the SCCY pistols "on or about" the two dates in
December 2016 that Keenan had purchased them. The indictment did
not allege that Jackson had any other felony convictions.3
At a detention hearing after Jackson had been arrested
on these charges, Jackson pointed out that the Dorchester,
Massachusetts conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon that
was identified in the indictment did not belong to him. The
3Jackson was also charged with two counts of aiding and
abetting the making of a false statement in connection with the
acquisition of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6), 924(a)(2),
but those charges were later dismissed by the District Court with
prejudice.
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government admitted after some further investigation that Jackson
was correct on that score and thereafter commenced grand jury
proceedings for the purpose of securing a superseding indictment.
During these grand jury proceedings, which took place in
February 2020, the government again called Cook to testify. The
following exchange occurred during Cook's testimony:
Government: And Special Agent Cook[,]
[w]ould you agree with me that [the colloquy
from the 2018 grand jury proceedings] about
[Jackson's prior felony] conviction was not
particularly clear?
Cook: Yes.
Government: All right. So what the
indictment originally said was a September
2013 Mass. conviction for assault with
dangerous weapons; right?
Cook: Correct.
Government: What did further investigation
reveal about that particular conviction?
Cook: I don't know if that actually was a
guilty conviction, that charge.
Government: For Mr. Jackson?
Cook: For Mr. Jackson, yes.
Government: Have you since that time done
additional research on Mr. Jackson's criminal
history?
Cook: Yes.
Government: Can you explain to the Grand Jury
what that investigation has determined?
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Cook: So when you get a criminal history
report, a lot of times they don't actually
have the disposition, you know, if they're
actually found guilty or not guilty. So if
you have a very lengthy criminal history, you
actually have to reach out to the courts and
request the court documents, go through the
court documents to see if they were actually
found guilty or not. So it's just not as
clear-cut, so it took a little bit more
digging. But what I found out is Mr. Jackson
has been convicted of several felony offenses.
Cook then identified a July 2002 conviction for breaking
and entering with intent to commit a felony in Springfield,
Massachusetts, which he testified that he determined was Jackson's
conviction through a fingerprint analysis. He also identified a
drug-distribution conviction in Methuen, Massachusetts, which he
similarly testified that he determined was Jackson's conviction
through a fingerprint analysis.
The grand jury handed up a superseding indictment that
alleges that Jackson, "knowing he had previously been convicted of
a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
did knowingly possess" the Ruger SR1911 and SCCY pistols "on or
about" the dates in December 2016 that Keenan had purchased them.
Jackson moved to dismiss the superseding indictment on the ground
that the government prosecutor and agent Cook committed misconduct
during the grand jury proceedings because they both knew that
Cook's statement that "I don't know if [the September 2013 assault
with a dangerous weapon] actually was a guilty conviction . . .
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[for] Jackson" was false because they both knew at that time that
the conviction was not Jackson's and failed to correct the false
statement. Jackson also moved to dismiss the superseding
indictment on the ground that in the course of the government's
questioning of Cook about his interrogation of Jackson at the gun
store, the government improperly characterized Jackson's
invocation of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain
silent to the grand jury by describing the invocation as a
cessation of Jackson's "cooperation."
The District Court held a hearing on both motions on
August 17, 2021. Following the hearing, the District Court denied
the motions.
C.
A two-day jury trial was held in the District of New
Hampshire on September 26 and September 27, 2021. Cook provided
similar testimony at the trial to the testimony that he gave during
the grand jury proceedings that resulted in the superseding
indictment. The government also called employees of the gun
stores that Jackson and Keenan had visited. In addition, the
government introduced photographs of the firearms in question and
certified copies of Jackson's Massachusetts Registry of Motor
Vehicles documents, including his license photographs and other
identifying information.
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To establish that the guns in question had traveled in
interstate commerce (i.e., the "interstate nexus element") the
government called another ATF employee, special agent John Forte,
who offered expert testimony about where the guns were likely
manufactured. Forte testified that he reviewed the ATF 4473 forms
that Keenan had executed at the gun stores to determine the
manufacturers and serial numbers of the guns in question. He then
testified that he reviewed certain reference materials --
including periodicals, books, online research, and notes gathered
by other nexus examiners -- in connection with his research,
although he did not name or testify to further details about those
materials. Forte also testified that he reviewed a database that
ATF maintains to determine whether the manufacturers had
potentially worked with a subcontractor to produce the guns in
question (the "variance database") and concluded that they had
not.
Forte then testified that, based on these reviews, he
determined that the Ruger pistol was manufactured in Prescott,
Arizona, and the two SCCY pistols were manufactured in Daytona
Beach, Florida. Forte further testified that he spoke to somebody
at Ruger and was able to confirm that the Ruger pistol was in fact
not manufactured elsewhere, and that he had "contacted SCCY" but
could not remember "the details" about that outreach. He
testified as well that "all of these things" are sources of
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information that are reasonably relied upon by experts in his
field.
Jackson moved to strike Forte's testimony on the grounds
that Forte's opinions were not based on "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge" and that his testimony in this case
was not the product of "reliable principles and methods." See
Fed. R. Evid. 702. The District Court denied the motions.
At the close of the government's case-in-chief, Jackson
moved for acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.
Jackson argued in the motion that the prosecution had not met its
burden of proving that Jackson was the perpetrator of the charged
crimes, or that Jackson knew that he had been convicted of a crime
punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. Jackson also
argued in that motion that Forte's testimony must be stricken under
the Federal Rules of Evidence and that, once stricken, the
interstate nexus element could not be satisfied, such that a
judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 would be warranted. The
District Court took the Rule 29 motion under advisement and invited
briefing on the issues that had been raised.
Jackson did not call witnesses of his own before he
rested his defense. The jury returned a guilty verdict on both
counts on September 28, 2021.
The District Court denied Jackson's motion for acquittal
under Rule 29 in an endorsed order on November 18, 2021, and later
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issued a published order explaining its reasoning on January 4,
2022. See United States v. Jackson, 578 F. Supp. 3d 240 (D.N.H.
2022). A few weeks later, on January 26, 2022, the District Court
sentenced Jackson to 66 months of imprisonment, followed by 3 years
of supervised release. Judgment of conviction entered on the same
day. Jackson thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.
We begin with Jackson's contention that his convictions
must be reversed because the government failed to present
sufficient competent evidence to prove the material elements of
the charges that were brought against him.4 We review a preserved
challenge to a District Court's denial of a Rule 29 sufficiency
motion de novo. United States v. Oliver, 19 F.4th 512, 516 (1st
Cir. 2021). In conducting this inquiry, we must draw "all
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict."
Id. at 519 (citing United States v. Fuentes-Lopez, 994 F.3d 66, 71
(1st Cir. 2021)). That said, we must "reject those evidentiary
interpretations and illations that are unreasonable,
insupportable, or overly speculative." United States v.
Rodríguez-Martinez, 778 F.3d 367, 371 (1st Cir. 2015) (internal
quotations omitted).
Jackson does not renew his challenge to the sufficiency of
4
the evidence that he knew he had previously been convicted of a
crime punishable by more than a year imprisonment, and we therefore
do not address it on appeal.
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A.
Jackson rests his contention that the District Court
erred in denying his request to enter judgment of acquittal under
Rule 29 in part on the ground that the government failed to
identify him as the perpetrator of the charged offenses at trial.
See United States v. Ayala, 289 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 2002)
("Identification of the defendant as the person who committed the
charged crime is always an essential element which the government
must establish beyond a reasonable doubt."). More specifically,
Jackson argues that no rational juror could have found that Jackson
was the perpetrator because no witnesses identified him in court
and -- especially in light of the fact that he was masked during
the entire trial -- the circumstantial evidence of his identity in
those circumstances was insufficient.
But, we agree with the District Court that there was in
fact an "in-court identification of Jackson as the person on
trial." Jackson, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 250. Indeed, in the course
of defense counsel's questioning of Cook, Cook was asked whether
he could "tell by looking at [Jackson] today" whether Jackson was
"heavier, the same, or thinner than he was" at the time of Cook's
encounter with Jackson at the Hooksett gun store, and Cook
responded: "[t]oday he's thinner," and then went on to further
testify that he believed Jackson was the person who was depicted
in surveillance footage from the Pelham store. See id.
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In any event, we also agree with the District Court that
"additional proof in the record supported the necessary link
between the individual sitting in the courtroom and the individual
named in the indictment." Id. at 250–51. For example, both the
prosecution and defense counsel "referred to the defendant at
trial" as the person involved in the alleged events, and the
defense at no point objected to the references to the person in
the courtroom at trial as "the defendant." See United States v.
Weed, 689 F.2d 752, 755-56 (7th Cir. 1982).
We therefore see nothing that would have required the
jury to rely on the type of "unreasonable, insupportable, or overly
speculative" inference that would warrant acquittal in order to
conclude that Jackson was in fact the perpetrator of the charged
offenses. See Rodríguez-Martinez, 778 F.3d at 371. Accordingly,
we reject this challenge to the denial of his Rule 29 motion.
B.
Jackson separately challenges the District Court's
denial of his Rule 29 motion due to the District Court's asserted
error in admitting the expert testimony of agent Forte, as Jackson
contends that without that testimony the evidence did not suffice
to show that the guns Jackson was charged for possessing traveled
in interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The
government does not dispute on appeal that, absent Forte's
testimony, the record would not suffice to permit a rational juror
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to find that the guns at issue traveled in interstate commerce.
So, the key issue is whether Jackson is right that the District
Court erred in not striking Forte's testimony under Federal Rules
of Evidence 702 and 703.
Our review of the District Court's decision not to strike
Forte's testimony is for abuse of discretion. Martínez v. United
States, 33 F.4th 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2022). Under this rubric:
embedded findings of fact are reviewed for
clear error, questions of law are reviewed de
novo, and judgment calls are subjected to
classic abuse-of-discretion review. We will
reverse a trial court's decision if we
determine the judge committed a material error
of law or a meaningful error in judgment.
This occurs when a material factor deserving
significant weight is ignored, when an
improper factor is relied upon, or when all
proper and no improper factors are assessed,
but the court makes a serious mistake in
weighing them.
Id. (citations omitted).
1.
We begin with Jackson's contention that the District
Court's decision to admit Forte's testimony violated Federal Rule
of Evidence 702. The Rule provides that a "witness who is
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise"
if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will help the
- 17 -
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts
or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the
principles and methods to the facts of the
case.
The Supreme Court of the United States explained in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597
(1993), that Rule 702 assigns a "gatekeeping role for the judge"
to determine whether "an expert's testimony both rests on a
reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand." But,
although the district court's "focus, of course, must be solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
generate," id. at 595, "nothing in either Daubert or the Federal
Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion
evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit
of the expert," Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
Rather, a "court may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Id.That said, "[t]hat 'the factual underpinning of an expert's opinion
is weak' is 'a matter affecting the weight and credibility of the
testimony -- a question to be resolved by the jury.'" Martínez,
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33 F.4th at 24 (quoting Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp.,
Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2011)).
Jackson does not argue to us that Forte -- as an ATF
"interstate nexus examiner" -- lacked the type of specialized or
technical knowledge or training necessary for someone to be
"qualified as an expert." He also does not argue to us that
Forte's testimony, if admissible, would not be "help[ful to] the
trier of fact" -- i.e., that it is not "relevant." Fed. R. Evid.
702(a); see Martínez, 33 F.4th at 27.5 Jackson contends instead
that the government failed to show through Forte's testimony that
his expert opinions in this case were "the product of reliable
principles and methods," and that the government similarly failed
to show through Forte's testimony that he "reliably applied the
principles and methods to the facts of [Jackson's] case." Fed.
R. Evid. 702(c), (d).
In pressing this contention, Jackson asserts that
Forte's testimony about the sources and reference materials that
he consulted to form his opinions was "extremely vague,"
"conclusory," and "non-specific." Jackson points in this regard
5 In the District Court, Jackson also argued that Forte lacked
the requisite "specialized" and "technical" knowledge to be
qualified to offer expert opinion testimony under Rule 702(a), but
the District Court rejected that aspect of the argument -- and
Jackson does not renew it on appeal. See also United States v.
Cortez-Oropeza, 40 F.4th 50, 55 (1st Cir.) (noting that this Court
has "repeatedly . . . rejected similar arguments"), cert. denied,
143 S. Ct. 271 (2022).
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to the fact that Forte did not specify in his testimony which
periodicals, online materials, books, or other materials he
consulted in reaching an opinion about the origin of the guns at
issue here and also could not provide any details from his
communications with Ruger and SCCY.
Jackson is right that Forte did not detail in his
testimony which reference materials he reviewed as to each gun
(with the exception of ATF's internal variance database). Jackson
is also right that Forte could not recall details that he learned
from his contact with Ruger and attempted contact with SCCY. And,
Jackson is right as well that a review of prior cases rejecting
challenges to the admissibility of expert testimony by an
interstate nexus examiner reveals that the expert testimony
offered in those cases more specifically detailed the precise
reference materials relied upon by the interstate nexus examiner.
See, e.g., United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d 84, 89-91 (1st Cir.
2000); United States v. Cormier, 468 F.3d 63, 72-73 (1st Cir.
2006).
But, we have accepted interstate nexus testimony
predicated on an examiner's reference to the types of materials
that Forte testified that he used -- including books, periodicals,
online research, ATF databases, and notes compiled by other
examiners. See Cormier, 468 F.3d at 72-73; see also, e.g., United
States v. Cortez-Oropeza, 40 F.4th 50, 53 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
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143 S. Ct. 271 (2022). And, Forte did testify that he "ma[d]e the
determination" as to the manufacturing location of the guns based
on those types of materials, even if he did not specify which
materials. Moreover, Jackson does not contend that those types
of materials do not in fact contain the type of information that
Forte would have needed to review to opine on where the gun was
likely manufactured. We are therefore satisfied that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Forte also
reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case. After all, where "the factual underpinning of an expert's
opinion is weak" but the methods are otherwise found to be
reliable, such an issue is "a matter affecting the weight and
credibility of the [expert's] testimony" -- that is, "a question
to be resolved by the jury." Martínez, 33 F.4th at 24 (quoting
Milward, 639 F.3d at 22).
Jackson does invoke out-of-circuit authority that he
argues supports his contention that Forte's testimony should have
been stricken under Rule 702. But, it does not.
Although Jackson is right that the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Valencia-Lopez, 971 F.3d 891, 900-03 (9th Cir.
2020), relied on Rule 702 to overturn the decision by the district
court there to admit expert testimony from a law enforcement
officer, the panel in doing so emphasized that the expert had
provided no explanation for his methodology in reaching his opinion
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-- there, that there was "almost nil" possibility that a drug
cartel would have tried to coerce the defendant in the manner that
the defendant claimed that it did. See 971 F.3d at 900. Here,
in contrast, Forte testified that he researched the particular
guns that Jackson possessed based on the serial numbers that were
reported on the ATF forms that he reviewed, and that he applied a
methodology that has been repeatedly accepted by this Court as
reliable to those guns.
Moreover, Jackson is right that in Coleman v. United
States, No. 4:17-CV-2228, 2018 WL 1165726, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Mar.
6, 2018), the district court did express concern about the
vagueness of the interstate nexus examiner's testimony concerning
the "ATF database [and] ATF reports" that he had relied upon in
reaching an opinion about the origin of the gun at issue. But,
the district court ultimately relied in granting habeas relief on
its separate finding that the expert failed to testify that other
experts in the field "reasonably rely" on the type of materials
that he used, see id. at *4, which implicates Rule 703 rather than
Rule 702. And -- as we next explain -- there is no such Rule 703
problem in this case.
2.
We turn, then, to Jackson's contention that the District
Court erred by not striking Forte's testimony pursuant to Rule
703, which provides: "An expert may base an opinion on facts or
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data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or
personally observed. If experts in the particular field would
reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an
opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion
to be admitted." Fed. R. Evid. 703.
The District Court rejected this argument on the ground
that its factual premise -- that Forte never testified that experts
in his field regularly use the variance database -- is wrong.
Jackson, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 254-55. We agree with the District
Court.
Forte testified that he always checks the variance
database when he is conducting an interstate nexus analysis. See
id. He went on to explain that he looked at his usual reference
materials for this case, including to determine whether the
manufacturers had "subcontracted [the manufacturing process] to
some other manufacturer." Id. at 255. The government then asked:
"all of the various things that you're looking at, are all of those
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field?" Forte responded,
"yes." Id.
The District Court interpreted Forte's affirmative
response to this question as including the variance database, id.,
and that factual finding is not clearly erroneous. As the District
Court explained, the "prosecutor's question could quite
reasonabl[y] have been understood as a catch-all that included the
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variance database that Agent Forte had discussed just minutes
prior." Id. It is also not otherwise clear from the record that
Forte intended to exclude the variance database from the set of
materials that he testified that other interstate nexus examiners
rely upon. See id. As a result, the District Court supportably
concluded that Forte's testimony "was based entirely on facts or
data reasonably relied on by experts in his field." Jackson, 578
F. Supp. 3d at 256. Thus, like the District Court, we must reject
Jackson's contention that the jury should not have been allowed to
consider Forte's testimony related to the variance database.
III.
We now turn to Jackson's fallback contention that his
convictions must be vacated because the District Court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to dismiss the superseding
indictment on the ground that the government committed misconduct
during the grand jury proceedings to obtain it. Jackson alleges
two types of misconduct: first, that the government knowingly
presented false information about Jackson's prior convictions and
failed to correct it, and second, that the government improperly
invited the grand jury to draw negative inferences from Jackson's
invocation of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel during his encounter with Cook. We conclude that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to dismiss
the indictments based on either ground.
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A.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution provides in relevant part that "[n]o person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." This constitutional guarantee secures, among
other things, the right of criminal defendants to "fundamental
fairness" in the proceedings that are brought against them.
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982);
United States v. Anzalone, 923 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2019).
This Court has recognized that while a "grand jury may
consider incompetent evidence" presented by the government in the
course of obtaining an indictment, a grand jury "cannot itself
violate a constitutional privilege." United States v. Flaherty,
668 F.2d 566, 583 (1st Cir. 1981) (emphasis added) (citing United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974)). Among these
privileges is a criminal defendant's right to fundamentally fair
proceedings under the Due Process Clause. See United States v.
Reyes-Echevarria, 345 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v.
Giorgi, 840 F.2d 1022, 1030 (1st Cir. 1988).
Thus, we have recognized that where the government
elicited false or misleading testimony in order to obtain an
indictment, knew that the relevant testimony was false, and failed
to correct the falsity, such that the government "distort[ed] the
integrity" of the grand jury proceeding, Giorgi, 840 F.2d at 1030,
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dismissal of the indictment may be warranted, see Reyes-
Echevarria, 345 F.3d at 4. In any given case, however, "it is
within the discretion of the trial court to dismiss an indictment
if it is based on incompetent or illicit evidence" presented to
the grand jury, and "[t]o a lesser extent, the court of appeals
has the supervisory power to make similar dismissals." Flaherty,
668 F.2d at 583.
The parties are in agreement that our review of the
District Court's denial of Jackson's motion dismiss on grounds of
government misconduct in the grand jury proceedings is for abuse
of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 775
F.3d 483, 492 (1st Cir. 2015). The parties also appear to agree
that if Jackson were right that the government committed misconduct
during the grand jury proceeding, then he must still show that the
violation prejudiced him. See Reyes-Echevarria, 345 F.3d at 4;
United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 328 (1st Cir. 1995)
("[A]s a general matter, a district court may not dismiss an
indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings unless such errors
prejudiced the defendants." (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States, 487 U.S. 250, 256 (1988))). And, under that standard,
Jackson must show that "the violation substantially influenced the
grand jury's decision to indict, or [that] there is grave doubt
that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence
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of such violations." Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256(internal quotations omitted).6
Jackson argues that the District Court abused its
discretion in declining to find that a violation of his
constitutional rights occurred during the second grand jury
proceedings because the government knew that Cook's testimony that
"I don't know if [the September 2013 assault with a dangerous
weapon] actually was a guilty conviction . . . [for] Jackson" was
false and failed to correct the falsity, even though the false
statement was made in front of the grand jury. Jackson then argues
that he was prejudiced because the grand jury must have been
influenced by testimony about a non-existent conviction for
assault with a deadly weapon -- "an especially inflammatory
representation where the grand jury was being asked to indict
Jackson for illegal, felonious possession of firearms."
6 We note that Jackson concedes to us that we must apply the
prejudice standard for "nonconstitutional error" articulated in
Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256, see Reyes-Echevarria, 345
F.3d at 4 (applying this standard to a similar challenge),
notwithstanding that the grand jury misconduct challenges that he
brings are predicated on what he contends are errors of
constitutional magnitude, but cf. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at
256-58 (explaining that the Court was adopting the standard "at
least where dismissal is sought for nonconstitutional error" and
noting that "no constitutional error occurred during the grand
jury proceedings" in the case).
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We bypass Jackson's claim that the government elicited
improper testimony and hold that he cannot show that he was
prejudiced. See Reyes-Echevarria, 345 F.3d at 4.
To prove that Jackson was guilty of the underlying
counts, the government needed to establish before the grand jury
that Jackson had at least one prior conviction that was punishable
by more than one year in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Yet,
Cook testified that the defendant had multiple felony convictions
other than the one that undergirds Jackson's due process challenge,
and Jackson does not contest the authenticity of those other
convictions. Thus, even though -- as the District Court put it -
- the government "engaged in a very sloppy presentation7 that was
difficult to follow," and even though the agent may have "made a
statement about a prior conviction [that was] incorrect," we see
no reason to think that the grand jury in issuing the superseding
indictment (which does not refer to any specific previous
convictions) did not rely on this "abundant" evidence of other
prior felony convictions.8 Nor does the precedent in this area
7 We note that this was the government's second grand jury
presentation. By choosing to read from the erroneous portions of
the transcript of the first grand jury presentation, the government
effectively repeated the misstep that led to the error in the
original indictment.
8 To be sure, Jackson may be right that there is potential
for prejudicial harm when the government mistakenly references a
violent felony offense like assault with a deadly weapon --
particularly in a firearms possession case -- but, such harm is
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that Jackson marshals as support for a contrary conclusion provide
it, as that precedent consists of one out-of-circuit district court
ruling that is readily distinguished. See United States v.
Cooper, 396 F. Supp. 3d 992, 95-96 (D. Kan. 2019) (dismissing
indictment without prejudice due to the government's failure to
correct a law enforcement officer's false testimony that a medical
examination report contained evidence of sexual penetration, an
essential element of the charged offense, when the report in fact
did not).
B.
Jackson next contends that the government committed
misconduct during the grand jury proceedings by prompting
testimony from Cook that referenced Jackson's invocation of his
constitutional rights and by characterizing the invocation as a
cessation of Jackson's "cooperation" with law enforcement (rather
than explaining to the jury that Jackson had every right to say
what he did). The parties appear to agree that the same abuse of
discretion and prejudice standards described above apply to this
second misconduct-based claim.
To recap, the government called Cook to testify before
the grand jury about his questioning of Jackson at the gun store
in Hooksett, New Hampshire. Cook testified that after he had
minimized where, as here, the mistaken reference must be balanced
against abundant evidence of multiple felony convictions.
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asked Jackson to "work together" with him to "get those guns off
the street," Jackson invoked his right to speak to an attorney,
and that he thereafter "stopped talking to [Jackson]." The
government then asked, "One thing. Before [Jackson] asked to
speak to a lawyer, before he stopped cooperating and talking to
you, you had asked him where the firearms had gone; right?"
(emphasis added). Cook clarified that Jackson had told him that
the guns were now in Massachusetts, and that it was then that
Jackson had asked to speak to a lawyer. Cook then testified that
Jackson asked -- without any prompting -- whether he could "get
[his] money" from Keenan.
Jackson contends that the grand jury would have
understood the government's statement that Jackson "stopped
cooperating" as "obstinan[ce] instead of a lawful exercise of [his]
constitutional right" (quoting United States v. Reeves, No. 11-
520, 2012 WL 1909350, at *18 (D.N.J. May 25, 2012)). Even assuming
that is true, though, Jackson by his own account still must show
that that the government intentionally and improperly sought to
invite the grand jury to draw a negative inference from the
invocation of his rights. United States v. Lopez-Gutierrez, 83
F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
Barbour, 393 F.3d 82, 90 (1st Cir. 2004). And, considering the
full context of the colloquy during Cook's grand jury testimony,
we cannot conclude that the government's questioning and Cook's
- 30 -
reference to Jackson's invocation of his rights rose to the level
of such intentional misconduct.
The District Court did conclude that the government's
questioning could be seen to criticize Jackson's refusal to speak
to Cook and that it would not allow such a reference at trial, but
the sequence of questioning reveals that the government was more
likely trying to show that Jackson freely offered additional
incriminating information about the money that he had given to
Keenan -- notwithstanding his own prior invocation of his rights.
In other words, on this record, the manner in which the government
referenced Jackson's invocation of his constitutional rights
cannot be said to have constituted an impermissible attempt to
infringe on the ability of the grand jury to exercise its own
independent judgment under our precedents. We thus affirm the
District Court's conclusion that "the colloquy on that issue was
[not] serious enough to warrant the extreme remedy of the dismissal
of the indictment."
C.
Jackson's final contention is that the two alleged
instances of government misconduct described above warrant
dismissal when considered together even if neither does when
considered on its own. That is so, Jackson contends, because
"[i]n a felony firearms prosecution, introduction of a non-
existent violent felony with a dangerous weapon conviction and
- 31 -
characterization of Jackson as a non-cooperator who sought a lawyer
in the face of law enforcement questioning, in totality, biased
the grand jury against Jackson in performing its fact-finding
function." But, Jackson's bare and speculative assertion that
"the grand jury procedure was compromised" by the asserted
cumulative misconduct does not amount to the required showing that
the grand jury was substantially influenced by the alleged
misconduct in its decision to indict. See also Reyes-Echevarria,
345 F.3d at 4 ("All but the most serious errors before the grand
jury are rendered harmless by a conviction at trial.").
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, Jackson's two convictions are
AFFIRMED.
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