Umeka Lewis v. John J. Jaeger, Robert E. Boge, and the City of Dubuque , 818 N.W.2d 165 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 11–0834
    Filed July 20, 2012
    UMEKA LEWIS,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    JOHN J. JAEGER, ROBERT E. BOGE,
    and THE CITY OF DUBUQUE,
    Appellees.
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,
    Lawrence H. Fautsch, Judge.
    Tenant appeals unfavorable district court judgment. AFFIRMED
    IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED.
    Raymond H. Johnson of Johnson Law Firm, West Des Moines, for
    appellant.
    Leslie V. Reddick of Kane, Norby & Reddick, P.C., Dubuque, for
    appellees Boge and City of Dubuque.
    Cory R. Thein, Dubuque, for appellee Jaeger.
    2
    APPEL, Justice.
    In this case, a tenant brings claims against her landlord, the City
    of Dubuque, and a city official, asserting that they unlawfully caused her
    eviction from her apartment. According to the defendants, the eviction
    occurred because a city housing official, acting pursuant to a city
    ordinance designed to protect public health and safety in emergency
    situations, issued a valid oral order directing the landlord to lock out a
    tenant who, according to the landlord, repeatedly left the water and gas
    stove running for hours at a time, including periods of time when no one
    was in the apartment.
    The tenant sued the City, the housing official, and her landlord. In
    her pleading, the tenant alleged that the conduct of the defendants
    violated a number of her statutory rights under the Iowa Uniform
    Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (IURLTA), including those related to
    eviction, entry onto the premises, and return of security deposits. To the
    extent the Dubuque ordinance authorized the action of the defendants,
    the ordinance, according to the tenant, was preempted by the IURLTA.
    The tenant also alleged the city defendants violated her constitutional
    rights to due process of law by invading her property right in her
    apartment without notice and an opportunity to be heard. The tenant
    further claimed the city defendants violated due process by attempting to
    enforce an unduly vague ordinance.       Finally, the tenant brought a
    common law claim for conversion of her private property, claiming the
    landlord took some of her possessions during the eviction process.
    After a one-day trial, the district court concluded that the tenant
    was entitled to the return of her security deposit but denied all other
    relief. The tenant appealed. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm
    3
    in part and reverse in part the judgment of the district court and remand
    for further proceedings.
    I. Factual and Procedural Background.
    This case arises out of a landlord–tenant dispute in Dubuque,
    Iowa, between tenant Umeka Lewis and landlord John Jaeger.                  Lewis,
    who was twenty-one years old at the time of trial, receives housing
    benefits under Section 8, a federal program to assist low-income
    persons. 1    Jaeger is a landlord who owns and manages twenty-two
    apartment units in six buildings in Dubuque.
    Lewis and Jaeger entered into a one-year rental agreement
    beginning November 1, 2008, and ending October 31, 2009.                       The
    agreement required Lewis to pay a $465 security deposit and $465 each
    month. Her apartment was part of a four-plex unit. Jaeger was aware
    that Lewis was a participant in the Section 8 program.
    Shortly after moving in, Lewis thought she heard bats in the walls
    of her apartment. She began to run the water for extended periods of
    time, including overnight, in an effort to scare the bats away. Also, at
    about the same time, Lewis found the heat in her apartment inadequate.
    The thermostat which controlled the heat, however, was located in a
    different unit and thus beyond Lewis’s direct control.                In order to
    increase the heat in her apartment, Lewis turned on her gas stove and
    opened the oven door. She left the gas stove on with the door open for
    several hours at a time, including while she slept.
    After receiving complaints from other tenants in the apartment
    building that there was no hot water, Jaeger investigated and determined
    1“Section8” is a reference to a provision of the United States Housing Act of
    1937, as amended in 1974. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f) (2006). This provision is designed
    to provide housing assistance to lower income families.       See Horizon Homes of
    Davenport v. Nunn, 
    684 N.W.2d 221
    , 222 (Iowa 2004).
    4
    that Lewis was running the water and heating the apartment with her
    oven. Jaeger told Lewis to stop, leaving several notes for his tenant. One
    note stated: “Umeka! Don’t pull that shit ever again. [You] can leave
    whenever you want. Call me. . . . [You are] being charged for the water
    [and] heat you used!!” A second note declared:
    Umeka,
    Here’s the deal, if you leave before this lease you can’t
    get housing for [one] year.
    If I have to evict you[,] you can’t get housing for [three]
    years.
    If you pay for all the charges to the gas [and] water,
    you can stay!
    Otherwise you will be evicted. They will turn the heat
    up if you are cold. You are running everyone out of hot
    water.
    Your case worker Karen knows about all of this.
    Your choice,
    John
    Lewis ceased running the water and the gas stove.
    The winter of 2008–2009 was uneventful.              During the spring of
    2009, Lewis called the City complaining about bats. Robert Boge, the
    City’s housing inspector supervisor, inspected the premises. He found
    no evidence of bats and could not find how bats could enter the
    apartment.
    In late September 2009, Lewis told Jaeger that she intended to
    move to Florida. She asked Jaeger to refund her security deposit so that
    she could pay an anticipated security deposit for a new apartment.
    Jaeger declined to make the refund. 2          At about this time, Lewis again
    2A tenant cannot compel premature payment of a security deposit while the
    tenant’s obligation continues, leaving the landlord unsecured for the remainder of the
    5
    began to heat her apartment with the oven and to leave the water
    running for extended periods of time. On several occasions during late
    September or early October, Jaeger entered Lewis’s apartment to turn
    the gas stove and water off. According to Jaeger, Lewis’s response was to
    simply turn the water and the gas stove back on.
    Lewis consulted with an attorney at Dubuque Legal Aid on
    October 7. Her primary concern was obtaining the security deposit from
    Jaeger. The fact that Lewis was consulting with a lawyer was a reflection
    of the deteriorating relationship between Lewis and Jaeger.
    Jaeger, too, was looking for outside help with the situation. On
    October 8, Jaeger telephoned Boge.             Jaeger testified that he informed
    Boge that Lewis would turn on the water and the gas stove and leave
    them on unattended for extended periods of time.                Jaeger further told
    Boge that he could not turn off the gas and water to Lewis’s apartment
    without also turning off the gas and water to the other apartments in the
    building.    Jaeger claimed that Boge then issued an order to Jaeger to
    lock the doors to Lewis’s apartment. It is undisputed that Boge did not
    talk with Lewis or attempt to contact her prior to making this oral order.
    Jaeger changed the locks on Lewis’s apartment. He also gathered
    her minimal belongings—an air mattress, a fan, and an alarm clock—and
    placed them outside the apartment. Jaeger then called Lewis on her cell
    phone and told her he had changed the locks and removed her
    belongings from the apartment.
    _______________________
    term of the lease. See Iowa Code § 562A.12(3) (2009) (stating a landlord has thirty days
    from the date of termination of the tenancy and receipt of mailing address or delivery
    instructions to return the tenant’s rental deposit or furnish statement showing the
    reason for withholding the deposit or any portion thereof); Seifert v. Dosland, 
    328 N.W.2d 531
    , 532 (Iowa 1983) (holding section 562A.12(3) applies when tenant
    prematurely terminates lease).
    6
    Lewis came to the apartment and gathered her belongings.         She
    called the Dubuque police, asserting that some of her belongings were
    missing. The Dubuque police arrived and investigated, but the record
    does not reveal any further action taken at that time by law enforcement
    authorities.
    On October 9, Lewis met with Alex Kornya, a legal aid lawyer, to
    discuss her plight. Kornya electronically sent a letter to Jaeger claiming
    that he had evicted Lewis in violation of a provision of the IURLTA,
    specifically Iowa Code section 562A.26 (2009). In the letter, which was
    dated October 9, Kornya stated that Lewis was terminating her tenancy
    as of the date of the letter and demanded the return of her security
    deposit by Monday, October 12, at 5:00 p.m. Kornya indicated that if the
    amount was not paid, a small claims action would be filed demanding
    the security deposit and damages related to her illegal eviction.
    On October 12, Boge prepared a handwritten memorandum of the
    order which was the basis of a more formal typed order.                The
    handwritten order, backdated to October 8, stated: “Landlord is ordered
    to . . . change the locks on the unit . . . . Tenant is leaving gas stove
    unattended and letting the hot water run unattended.                This is
    endangering the lives of other occupants of the building.”
    Based on the handwritten order, city staff prepared a more formal
    document entitled, “NOTICE TO VACATE.” The document consisted of a
    cover-page letter and an attachment.       The cover page, addressed to
    Jaeger, stated that a “housing inspection” had been performed on the
    apartment.     The second page of the notice, listing “expected repairs,”
    stated that, pursuant to Dubuque City Code section 6-6-4(B)(3):
    LANDLORD IS ORDERED TO CHANGE THE LOCKS ON THE
    UNIT AT 414 ½ LORAS BOULEVARD. TENANT IS LEAVING
    GAS STOVE ON UNATTENDED AND LETTING THE HOT
    7
    WATER RUN UNATTENDED. THIS IS ENDANGERING THE
    LIVES OF THE OTHER OCCUPANTS OF THE BUILDING.
    APPEAL RIGHTS, PLEASE NOTE:
    ANY PERSON HAVING ANY RECORDED TITLE OR LEGAL
    INTEREST OR ANY OCCUPANT HAVING BEEN SERVED A
    NOTICE AND ORDER, MAY APPEAL FROM THE NOTICE
    AND ORDER OF ANY ACTION OF THE CITY MANAGER TO
    THE HOUSING CODE APPEALS BOARD, PROVIDED THE
    APPEAL IS MADE IN WRITING AS PROVIDED IN THIS
    CODE, AND FILED WITH THE CITY MANAGER WITHIN
    FOURTEEN (14) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF SERVICE OF
    SUCH NOTICE AND ORDER, OR ACTION.
    FAILURE TO APPEAL WILL CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF ALL
    RIGHTS TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING AND
    DETERMINATION OF THE MATTER.
    Boge did not leave a copy of the notice on the door of Lewis’s apartment,
    nor did Boge mail or otherwise attempt to provide a copy of the notice to
    Lewis. In other words, he did not “nail and mail” the notice to achieve
    service on the tenant.
    Lewis subsequently filed an action against Jaeger, Boge, and the
    City of Dubuque.        Counts I through IV of the petition alleged Jaeger
    illegally retained Lewis’s security deposit, unlawfully entered Lewis’s
    apartment, converted Lewis’s property, and illegally evicted Lewis.3
    Count VI alleged Jaeger, Boge, and the City of Dubuque acted in concert
    to   deprive    Lewis   of   due   process     under    the   Iowa    and    Federal
    Constitutions. Specifically, Lewis argued that section 6-6-4(B)(3) of the
    Dubuque City Code is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied
    because it is not reasonably calculated to give adequate notice or a
    hearing.    Lewis also asserted the ordinance is vague, overbroad, and
    preempted by the IURLTA.
    3Count  V of the petition alleged the lease contained illegal lease provisions.
    Lewis filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue, which was granted.
    Although summary judgment was granted, the district court declined to award damages
    under Iowa Code section 562A.11(2) because it found Jaeger’s conduct was not willful.
    Lewis does not challenge this finding on appeal.
    8
    A bench trial was held in March 2011. Lewis gave her side of the
    story.     Among other things, Lewis testified that Jaeger entered her
    apartment on a number of occasions, including while she was asleep, to
    turn the water and gas stove off. She admitted that when he left, she
    would turn the water and gas stove back on.          She denied leaving the
    utilities on when she was not home. Lewis testified that Jaeger called
    her on the day of the eviction and told her he changed the locks and
    removed her possessions from the apartment. Lewis stated Jaeger did
    not mention any involvement by the City during the phone call. When
    she arrived at the apartment to retrieve her belongings, Lewis claimed a
    set of earrings given to her by her mother worth about $450, a blanket,
    and a DVD player were missing. She testified that if an official from the
    City had requested that she stop running the water or the gas stove, she
    would have complied. She asserted that as a result of her eviction and
    the failure of Jaeger to refund her security deposit, she lived in a
    homeless shelter for a period of time and, when the shelter closed, she
    lived out of her car. She testified that she often slept in her car at night
    in a Walmart parking lot or in the parking lot of a local hospital.
    Jaeger also testified. He stated Lewis left the water and stove on
    two or three times during the week of her eviction.        He testified that
    “there was no talking to her,” and that once he ensured the water and
    gas stove were off, Lewis would “turn it right back up.” Jaeger further
    testified that Lewis was not in the apartment when he turned off the
    utilities. According to Jaeger, at the time he locked her out, “everything
    was running, which was always the case: The faucet, the kitchen, the
    bathtub, the vanity in the thing, and the stove on and the door open.”
    Jaeger testified he told Boge that the gas stove and water were left
    on unattended in the apartment. Although he spoke with Boge, Jaeger
    9
    testified that “[he] was going to lock [Lewis] out pretty much probably
    anyways because [he] couldn’t figure a way to make the people around
    her safe.” After he locked her out, he found no reason to go to court to
    seek her eviction because, according to his testimony, he “assumed she
    was gone.” He did not give the public housing authority notice regarding
    the termination of the tenancy because “it seemed like she was going to
    be gone and out of everyone’s lives.”
    Boge testified about his actions. Boge explained that Jaeger called
    him and told him that Lewis was upset with him (Jaeger), that she
    wanted her deposit back, and that she was leaving the apartment with
    the gas stove turned on and the hot water running to get even with
    Jaeger. Boge himself had never observed the water running or the gas
    stove on at the apartment and made no further inquires after his
    conversation with Jaeger.
    Boge stated that he directed the lockout based on the conversation
    with Jaeger. Boge explained that his order was pursuant to Dubuque
    City Code section 6-6-4(B)(3), which states:
    Emergencies: Whenever, in the judgment of the city
    manager, an emergency exists which requires immediate
    action to protect the public health, safety or welfare, an
    order may be issued, without a hearing or appeal, directing
    the owner, occupant, operator or agent to take such action
    as is appropriate to correct or abate the emergency. If
    circumstances warrant, the city manager may act to correct
    or abate the emergency under terms of the Iowa statutes for
    abatement of public nuisance.
    According to Boge, Lewis’s conduct created an “emergency”
    requiring “immediate action to protect the public . . . safety” because
    “[t]he CO [carbon monoxide] that is emitted from a stove that’s running
    can kill somebody.” Boge stated leaving the gas stove unattended creates
    a fire hazard because the apartment can fill with gas if the pilot light
    10
    goes out. Boge also thought leaving the water running unattended posed
    a risk because, if the sink became plugged, the overflowing water could
    cause an electrical short resulting in a fire. Boge further testified that he
    believed that the only way to correct or abate the threat posed by Lewis’s
    behavior was to change the locks on Lewis’s apartment.
    Boge testified that he did not talk with Lewis about the situation.
    He indicated that usually the City would post a notice on the door of a
    residence that was uninhabitable.      He testified that he did not know
    whether Lewis would have listened had he talked to her about the
    situation.
    Two other persons who were tenants in the building at the time of
    the events, Patricia Stanford and Ellen Johnson, also testified at trial.
    They recounted problems with hot water at their apartments. Johnson
    testified that on one occasion, the gas stove was on when Lewis was not
    at the apartment.
    During trial, Jaeger made a confession of judgment in which he
    admitted that he owed the security deposit and was willing to pay $500.
    Lewis rejected the offer on the ground that she was entitled to $200 in
    liquidated damages for bad faith on top of her $465 security deposit.
    Following trial, the district court entered its order.    The district
    court made factual findings that the plaintiff “often left her gas stove on
    and water running for extended periods of time, including while she was
    asleep and at least several occasions when she was out of the
    apartment.”   The district court further determined that Boge ordered
    Jaeger to change the locks pursuant to the city ordinance after being
    contacted by Jaeger about the situation in early October. The district
    court found that “the only feasible way for the City to abate this
    emergency was to order that the locks be changed because it is clear that
    11
    [Lewis]   otherwise      would     have    continued      to   leave   the    stove   on
    unattended.” The district court found that in compliance with the order,
    Jaeger entered the apartment and changed the locks. Jaeger also placed
    Lewis’s property outside the apartment. In light of its factual findings
    and its analysis of legal issues, the district court concluded that the city
    ordinance was not preempted by the IURLTA, that there was no unlawful
    eviction or unlawful entry, and that no conversion occurred. The district
    court found that Lewis did not receive any notice of the action by the
    City, but did not address the due process issues raised by Lewis.
    Finally, the district court held that Lewis was entitled to her security
    deposit, but that there was no evidence Jaeger acted in bad faith. Lewis
    filed a motion to enlarge the findings to include the due process claims,
    which was overruled. 4 Lewis appealed.
    Lewis raises eight issues on appeal.              Lewis claims that (1) the
    ordinance in question is preempted by the IURLTA, codified at Iowa Code
    chapter 562A; (2) the City violated the due process provisions of the
    Federal and Iowa Constitutions by ordering the lockout without notice or
    an opportunity to be heard; (3) the ordinance is void for vagueness under
    the Federal and Iowa Due Process Clauses; (4) Jaeger unlawfully evicted
    Lewis under the provisions of the IURLTA; (5) Jaeger acted in bad faith
    when he failed to return the security deposit; (6) Jaeger converted some
    of Lewis’s belongings; (7) Jaeger illegally entered Lewis’s apartment; and
    4The  district court did not expressly decide the due process issues in its order
    overruling the motion to enlarge. We have held that a motion to enlarge findings
    preserves error on an issue not decided by the district court even if the district court
    does not address the issue following the motion. See Madden v. City of Eldridge, 
    661 N.W.2d 134
    , 138 (Iowa 2003); see also Thomas A. Mayes & Anuradha Vaitheswaran,
    Error Preservation in Civil Appeals in Iowa: Perspectives on Present Practice, 55 Drake L.
    Rev. 39, 70 (2006).
    12
    (8) Jaeger’s confession of judgment at trial was insufficient to preclude
    Lewis from recovering costs.
    II. Standard of Review.
    We review constitutional issues de novo.            Hensler v. City of
    Davenport, 
    790 N.W.2d 569
    , 578 (Iowa 2010). A wrongful eviction action
    is at law, and therefore our review is for correction of errors at law. See
    Roeder v. Nolan, 
    321 N.W.2d 1
    , 3 (Iowa 1982); Wernet v. Jurgensen, 
    245 Iowa 596
    , 598, 
    63 N.W.2d 216
    , 217 (1954). Issues involving statutory
    construction, including claims that a local ordinance is preempted by a
    statute, are reviewable for correction of errors at law.        Hensler, 790
    N.W.2d at 578. The conversion claim is an action at law and reviewable
    for errors at law. Murray v. Conrad, 
    346 N.W.2d 814
    , 817 (Iowa 1984);
    Larsen v. Housh, 
    259 Iowa 911
    , 913, 
    146 N.W.2d 314
    , 315 (1966).
    III. Discussion.
    A. Preemption.
    1. Introduction.      In this case, we consider the interaction of the
    IURLTA; Iowa Code section 364.17, which requires cities to develop and
    enforce housing codes; and a Dubuque municipal ordinance related to
    health and safety in housing. The specific legal question is whether the
    Dubuque city ordinance is preempted by the IURLTA.
    Under legislative home rule, municipalities are permitted to
    exercise   their   police   power   without prior   legislative approval   or
    authorization as long as the exercise is not “ ‘inconsistent with the laws
    of the general assembly.’ ”     City of Davenport v. Seymour, 
    755 N.W.2d 533
    , 538 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A). The doctrine
    of preemption has been developed to determine whether municipal action
    is permitted or prohibited by the legislature.      Id.   We have recognized
    three types of preemption: express preemption, implied or “conflict”
    13
    preemption, and implied field preemption. Id. at 538–39. Lewis argues
    that the IURLTA preempts the Dubuque ordinance under theories of
    implied conflict and implied field preemption.
    Implied conflict preemption occurs “where an ordinance prohibits
    an act permitted by statute, or permits an act prohibited by statute.” Id.
    at 538. The standard for conflict preemption is demanding and requires
    the local law to be “irreconcilable” with the state law. Id. at 539. We
    presume the ordinance is valid and, if possible, we will interpret the state
    statute harmoniously with the ordinance. Id. Under conflict preemption,
    “the conflict must be obvious, unavoidable, and not a matter of
    reasonable debate.” Id.; see also Hensler, 790 N.W.2d at 585; Goodell v.
    Humboldt Cnty., 
    575 N.W.2d 486
    , 493 (Iowa 1998).
    Implied field preemption occurs “when the legislature has so
    covered a subject by statute as to demonstrate a legislative intent that
    regulation in the field is preempted by state law.” Seymour, 755 N.W.2d
    at 539.    As with implied conflict preemption, the standard in field
    preemption is demanding and requires a “clear expression of legislative
    intent to preempt a field from regulation by local authorities, or a
    statement of the legislature’s desire to have uniform regulations
    statewide.”   Id.; see also Hensler, 790 N.W.2d at 585–86; Goodell, 575
    N.W.2d at 493.
    2.   Position of the parties.    Lewis maintains that the IURLTA
    preempts any application of Dubuque City Code section 6-6-4(B)(3) to
    this case. The ordinance provides:
    Emergencies: Whenever, in the judgment of the city
    manager, an emergency exists which requires immediate
    action to protect the public health, safety or welfare, an
    order may be issued, without a hearing or appeal, directing
    the owner, occupant, operator or agent to take such action
    as is appropriate to correct or abate the emergency. If
    14
    circumstances warrant, the city manager may act to correct
    or abate the emergency under terms of the Iowa statutes for
    abatement of public nuisance.
    Dubuque, Iowa, Code § 6-6-4(B)(3).          Lewis cites Iowa Code section
    562A.33, which provides that “[a] landlord may not recover or take
    possession of [a] dwelling unit by action or otherwise . . . except in case
    of abandonment, surrender, or as permitted in this chapter.” According
    to Lewis, the only way Jaeger could evict her under the circumstances of
    this case was to institute an eviction procedure under the IURLTA.
    Based on the premise that Jaeger must proceed under the IURLTA
    in any eviction, Lewis cites Iowa Code section 562A.27A as the procedure
    that Jaeger was required to follow. Iowa Code section 562A.27A provides
    that a landlord may bring a proceeding to evict a tenant where the tenant
    has created “[a] clear and present danger to the health or safety of other
    tenants.” Under Iowa Code section 562A.27A(1), a tenant is entitled to
    three days’ notice and an opportunity to contest the eviction in a court
    proceeding. According to Lewis, Jaeger and the City circumvented the
    procedural requirements of the IURLTA by invoking the alleged authority
    of the City under the ordinance.     Lewis sees the conflict between the
    IURLTA and the ordinance as “obvious, unavoidable, and not a matter of
    reasonable debate.”     See Hensler, 790 N.W.2d at 585 (citation and
    internal quotation marks omitted).
    Lewis also claims the doctrine of field preemption prevents the
    application of the city ordinance in this case. According to Lewis, the
    IURLTA establishes a comprehensive framework for evicting tenants.
    Because the IURLTA occupies the field, the ordinance can have no
    application under the facts of this case.
    Lewis makes a parallel claim under federal law. As a participant in
    Section 8 housing, her lease contains an addendum prohibiting eviction
    15
    without notice or court proceedings.          Under the applicable federal
    regulations, 24 C.F.R. section 982.310(e)(1)–(2) (2009), a tenant must be
    given notice of the grounds for termination during the lease term, and
    the Public Housing Authority must be given a copy of the notice before
    an action to terminate the lease is commenced. Lewis claims that under
    the circumstances, federal law prohibits the application of the ordinance
    against her.
    Jaeger counters that this court should seek “to interpret the state
    law in such a manner as to render it harmonious with the ordinance.”
    Goodenow v. City Council, 
    574 N.W.2d 18
    , 26 (Iowa 1998). He then cites
    two provisions of the IURLTA that bolster his position.
    The first provision of the IURLTA cited by Jaeger is Iowa Code
    section 562A.28, which provides:
    If there is noncompliance by the tenant with section
    562A.17, materially affecting health and safety, that can be
    remedied by repair or replacement of a damaged item or
    cleaning, and the tenant fails to comply as promptly as
    conditions require in case of emergency . . . the landlord may
    enter the dwelling unit and cause the work to be done in a
    competent manner . . . .
    Iowa Code § 562A.28. Iowa Code section 562A.17(5) requires a tenant to
    “[u]se in a reasonable manner all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating
    . . . and other facilities and appliances.”    These two provisions of the
    IURLTA, according to Jaeger, allow him to enter the apartment for the
    purpose of abating the hazard caused by Lewis’s conduct.
    The second IURLTA provision cited by Jaeger is Iowa Code section
    562A.3. The provision states:
    Unless displaced by the provisions of this chapter, the
    principles of law and equity in this state, including the law
    relating to capacity to contract, mutuality of obligations,
    principal and agent, real property, public health, safety and
    fire prevention, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
    16
    coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating                   or
    invalidating cause, shall supplement its provisions.
    Id. § 562A.3. Jaeger contends that the ordinance is a public health or
    safety and fire prevention measure that does not conflict with, but
    supplements, provisions of the IURLTA. 5
    The City repeats much of Jaeger’s arguments. The City, however,
    asserts that Iowa Code section 562A.27A, upon which Lewis relies, does
    not apply to any emergencies, but only to those relating to clearly illegal
    activities. According to the City, there is no section of the IURLTA that
    deals with a situation such as that presented in this case, and therefore,
    no conflict preemption is present.
    3. Analysis of implied conflict preemption. Lewis primarily argues
    the Dubuque ordinance is irreconcilable with Iowa Code section 562A.33.
    Section 562A.33 states:
    A landlord may not recover or take possession of the
    dwelling unit by action or otherwise, including willful
    diminution of services to the tenant by interrupting or
    causing the interruption of electric, gas, water or other
    essential service to the tenant, except in the case of
    abandonment, surrender, or as permitted by this chapter.
    Id. § 562A.33 (emphasis added).           Lewis asserts that because chapter
    562A does not permit a landlord to take possession of an apartment in
    order to correct or abate an emergency requiring immediate action, any
    ordinance permitting a landlord to do so is irreconcilable with section
    562A.33.
    While Lewis’s argument has some appeal, we find it ultimately
    unpersuasive.       The IURLTA generally defines the legal rights and
    obligations of a landlord and tenant.           See id. § 562A.2(2)(a).      Section
    5Jaeger  in his brief did not address the question of whether the ordinance was
    inconsistent with federal law.
    17
    562A.33 is a remedial provision confining the methods by which a
    landlord can take self-help measures.
    The ordinance in question, however, does not relate to the legal
    relationship of landlords and tenants. The ordinance is an enforcement
    mechanism of the Dubuque housing code which permits the City, not the
    landlord, to take certain actions to cure an emergency requiring
    immediate action.         Section 562A.33 in no way restricts the City’s
    authority to correct or abate emergencies. Instead, the City’s authority
    to adopt and enforce a housing code is controlled by Iowa Code section
    364.17.
    Iowa Code section 364.17 requires cities with a population of at
    least fifteen thousand to adopt a housing code. Id. § 364.17(1)–(2). The
    Code further requires cities to “adopt enforcement procedures” which
    “include but are not limited to” a number of enumerated enforcement
    mechanisms. Id. § 364.17(3)(a). The precise ordinance involved in this
    case, of course, is not specifically mandated, but it is clear that the
    general assembly expressly granted cities the authority to promulgate
    enforcement mechanisms of their respective housing codes. 6 The power
    to enforce housing codes relating to health and safety is traditionally
    among the core responsibilities of municipal government.                     We cannot
    easily conclude that the legislature intended to preempt this traditional
    local government responsibility through the IURLTA.
    Indeed, our caselaw suggests that the relationship between the
    city’s police power over health and safety matters related to housing and
    landlord/tenant law is symbiotic rather than antagonistic.                        In the
    seminal case of Mease v. Fox, 
    200 N.W.2d 791
    , 796–97 (Iowa 1972), we
    6For  a history of Iowa housing code legislation, see Russell E. Lovell II, The Iowa
    Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and the Iowa Mobile Home Parks
    Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 31 Drake L. Rev. 253, 256–61 (1981).
    18
    found that a residential lease contained an implied warranty of
    habitability in part in order to give “overdue recognition . . . for minimum
    housing standards” established by municipalities and to encourage
    municipal inspections and enforcement by providing tenants with the
    right to withhold rent when the implied warranty of habitability was
    breached. The passage of the IURLTA in 1978 was, in part, a codification
    of Mease. See Russell E. Lovell II, The Iowa Uniform Residential Landlord
    and Tenant Act and the Iowa Mobile Home Parks Residential Landlord and
    Tenant Act, 31 Drake L. Rev. 253, 263 (1981).
    Shortly after the passage of the IURLTA, we decided Wilson v.
    Nepstad, 
    282 N.W.2d 664
     (Iowa 1979). In Nepstad, we allowed a tenant
    to sue the city for negligent inspections related to fire safety. Nepstad,
    282 N.W.2d at 673–74. The new tort liability clearly provided incentive
    for more effective enforcement of Iowa housing codes. While Nepstad did
    not directly involve the relationship between landlords and tenants, it did
    emphasize the importance of effective enforcement of local housing codes
    related to health and safety. See id.
    Lewis correctly points out that, as construed, the City’s action
    resulted in Lewis being displaced from her apartment. An effect of this
    was that the landlord came into the possession of the apartment through
    means other than by abandonment, surrender, or as expressly provided
    under chapter 562A. Yet chapter 562A is not to be viewed in isolation.
    Iowa Code section 562A.3 states:
    Unless displaced by the provisions of this chapter, the
    principles of law and equity in this state, including the law
    relating to capacity to contract, mutuality of obligations,
    principal and agent, real property, public health, safety and
    fire prevention, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
    coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or
    invalidating cause, shall supplement its provisions.
    19
    Iowa Code § 562A.3 (emphasis added).              Housing codes, and their
    enforcement mechanisms, certainly relate to public health, safety, and
    fire prevention.     Thus, while chapter 562A does not allow a landlord,
    acting     alone,   to   take   possession   of   an    apartment   under   the
    circumstances presented here, chapter 562A does allow the city to take
    appropriate measures to correct or abate an emergency that requires
    immediate action, even if abatement has the derivative effect of
    displacing tenants. For example, the IURLTA would not prevent the City
    of Dubuque from ordering tenants removed from a building with an
    unsound structure that may crumble at any moment. Thus, the housing
    code and enforcement provisions found in city ordinances generally
    supplement the IURLTA.
    A narrower issue, however, is whether a city, which generally may
    exercise police powers without offending the IURLTA, may enforce its
    order through the owner of the property who also happens to be a
    landlord.    In other words, in order to avoid conflict with the IURLTA,
    must a city enforce its ordinance directly?            We think not.   It would
    elevate form over substance to suggest that a city may have its workers
    change the locks, but that a city lacks authority to direct the owner of
    property who happens to be a landlord to do so.                There is ample
    authority for the proposition that when a landlord takes action pursuant
    to an order of a public official, a breach of the covenant of quiet
    enjoyment does not occur. See, e.g., Zwerin v. Geiss, 
    237 N.Y.S.2d 280
    ,
    284 (Civ. Ct. 1963) (reentry of apartment by landlord required by public
    authorities does not subject landlord to action for disturbance or
    interference with leasehold interest); Dunn v. Mellon, 
    23 A. 210
    , 210 (Pa.
    1892) (landlord not liable to tenant for interference of possession of
    premises where city orders landlord to make building alterations);
    20
    Sunderman v. Warnken, 
    29 N.W.2d 496
    , 499 (Wis. 1947) (landlord entry
    to make repairs required by public officials not a breach of covenants);
    1 Herbert Thorndike Tiffany, A Treatise on the Law of Landlord and
    Tenant § 79(c)(4), at 526 (1912) (disturbance by acts of sovereign do not
    breach covenant of quiet enjoyment).              We think the same reasoning
    applies when a claim is made that the landlord violates provisions of the
    IURLTA when acting pursuant to an order by municipal authorities.
    Because we do not find an obvious or unavoidable conflict between the
    IURLTA and the ordinance as applied in this case, we reject Lewis’s
    implied conflict preemption claim. 7
    4.    Implied field preemption claim.          Lewis relies on Iowa Code
    section 562A.27A, which permits a landlord to recover possession of an
    apartment where the tenant “has created or maintained a threat
    constituting a clear and present danger to the health or safety of other
    tenants.” Iowa Code § 562A.27A(1). Lewis argues section 562A.27A(1)
    “exclusively addresses and occupies the field of eviction of tenants where
    the tenant allegedly has created a ‘clear and present danger to the health
    or safety of other tenants.’ ” 8 As noted above, however, the ordinance at
    issue does not involve legal remedies between landlords and tenants, but
    instead is part of Dubuque’s housing code enforcement scheme.                       The
    Iowa Code explicitly authorizes cities to breathe life into their housing
    codes through enforcement measures.                The IURLTA simply does not
    7We  come to the same conclusion for the same reasons regarding Lewis’s claim
    that Section 8 preempts the Iowa law. Nunn, 684 N.W.2d at 228. The applicable
    regulation cited by Lewis prohibits the “owner” from evicting a Section 8 tenant without
    notice and a hearing. 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(f). We have concluded, however, that
    Jaeger’s action in response to an order by a city official is not an eviction by him. The
    same reasoning applies with respect to Lewis’s Section 8 claim.
    8Lewis could also cite section 562A.27(1), which allows a landlord to recover
    possession of a dwelling for noncompliance with section 562A.17 “materially affecting
    health and safety.”
    21
    manifest a clear expression of the legislature’s intent to preempt the field
    of city housing codes and enforcement.                Indeed, Iowa Code section
    562A.3 suggests the opposite.                We therefore reject Lewis’s field
    preemption claim.
    B. Procedural Due Process Claim. Lewis argues the City violated
    the due process provisions of the Iowa and Federal Constitutions by
    issuing the lockout order without notice and an opportunity to be heard. 9
    The City responds by citing a number of cases that stand for the
    proposition that in emergency situations, property owners are not
    entitled to prior notice and hearing. 10
    Under procedural due process, notice and an opportunity to be
    heard are required when a person’s property interests are at stake. War
    Eagle Vill. Apartments v. Plummer, 
    775 N.W.2d 714
    , 719 (Iowa 2009); F.K.
    v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 
    630 N.W.2d 801
    , 808 (Iowa 2001). We employ a two-
    step analysis. First, we determine whether a person has been deprived of
    a protected liberty or property interest. War Eagle, 775 N.W.2d at 719;
    F.K., 630 N.W.2d at 808. If so, we address what process is due for the
    specific interest.    War Eagle, 775 N.W.2d at 719; F.K., 630 N.W.2d at
    808.
    9Lewis  does not claim that Boge’s order to Jaeger was not authorized by the
    ordinance, nor does Lewis claim that the City’s action in this case was inconsistent with
    state law. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 364.17(3)(g) (enforcement procedures shall be designed
    to improve housing conditions rather than displace persons from their homes).
    10The  parties have not claimed the due process provisions of the Iowa
    Constitution should be analyzed differently than the Due Process Clause of the Federal
    Constitution. Under these circumstances, we ordinarily treat the substantive standards
    under the Iowa Constitution the same as those developed under the Federal
    Constitution. Even though we ordinarily treat the substantive standards the same
    when the parties do not suggest a different approach, we reserve the right to apply the
    standards in a different fashion than the federal caselaw. See Simmons v. State Pub.
    Defender, 
    791 N.W.2d 69
    , 76 n.3 (Iowa 2010); War Eagle Vill. Apartments v. Plummer,
    
    775 N.W.2d 714
    , 719 (Iowa 2009); State v. Bruegger, 
    773 N.W.2d 862
    , 883 (Iowa 2009).
    22
    Lewis has been deprived of a property interest. In War Eagle, we
    held a tenant’s continued residence in his or her home implicates a
    significant property interest.   War Eagle, 775 N.W.2d at 719 (citing
    Greene v. Lindsey, 
    456 U.S. 444
    , 450–51, 
    102 S. Ct. 1874
    , 1878, 
    72 L. Ed. 2d 249
    , 256 (1982)). Although the defendants assert the lockout
    was not intended to be an eviction, the objective facts suggest otherwise.
    The City ordered Jaeger to change the locks of the apartment. Further,
    even if the lockout was intended to be temporary, Lewis was nevertheless
    deprived of a property interest. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 
    407 U.S. 67
    , 84–
    85, 
    92 S. Ct. 1983
    , 1996, 
    32 L. Ed. 2d 556
    , 572 (1972) (“But it is now
    well settled that a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is
    nonetheless a ‘deprivation’ in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see
    also Flatford v. City of Monroe, 
    17 F.3d 162
    , 167 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating
    due process requires notice and hearing prior to eviction).      Lewis was
    therefore entitled to due process protection.
    For more than a century the central meaning of
    procedural due process has been clear: Parties whose rights
    are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that
    they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.
    Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80, 92 S. Ct. at 1994, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 569 (citation
    and internal quotation marks omitted); see War Eagle, 775 N.W.2d at
    719 (“[W]hen an individual’s property interests are at stake, that person
    is entitled to adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to be
    heard.”); State v. Seering, 
    701 N.W.2d 655
    , 665–66 (Iowa 2005) (“At the
    very least, procedural due process requires notice and opportunity to be
    heard in a proceeding that is adequate to safeguard the right for which
    the constitutional protection is invoked.”) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted). While predeprivation notice and opportunity to be heard
    is ordinarily required before eviction, see, e.g., War Eagle, 775 N.W.2d at
    23
    720; Flatford, 17 F.3d at 167, postdeprivation notice and opportunity to
    be heard may be adequate in “extraordinary situations,” see Fuentes, 407
    U.S. at 90, 92 S. Ct. at 1999, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 575. As explained by the
    United States Supreme Court, postdeprivation notice is adequate when
    (1) “the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important
    governmental or general public interest”; (2) “there has been a special
    need for very prompt action”; and (3) “the State has kept strict control
    over its monopoly of legitimate force; the person initiating the seizure has
    been a government official responsible for determining . . . that it was
    necessary and justified in the particular instance.” Id. at 91, 92 S. Ct. at
    2000, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 576; see also Baker v. City of Iowa City, 
    260 N.W.2d 427
    , 431 (Iowa 1977) (applying Fuentes).
    Although the City provided notice to Jaeger, it is undisputed that
    the City failed to even attempt to provide notice to Lewis. Boge did not
    place a notice on the door of the apartment, did not mail the notice to
    Lewis, did not inquire of Jaeger how to contact Lewis, and did not
    instruct Jaeger to take any steps to ensure notice to Lewis. In short, the
    means employed by Boge—posttermination notice on Jaeger days after
    the fact—were not such that “one desirous of actually informing the
    absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish [notice].” War Eagle, 775
    N.W.2d at 720 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    The City and Jaeger nonetheless argue that “notice was not
    required in this case because the situation created by . . . Lewis was
    deemed to be an emergency by the city manager. Under Iowa law, due
    process requirements do not apply in such emergency circumstances.”
    The City cites State v. Strayer, 
    230 Iowa 1027
    , 
    299 N.W. 912
     (1941), and
    Walker v. Johnson County, 
    209 N.W.2d 137
     (Iowa 1973), in support of its
    argument.
    24
    Yet here the action of the City did more than abate the emergency
    situation. Once the lockout was achieved, the nuisance was abated. But
    the lockout also deprived Lewis of her leasehold interest in her
    apartment on an ongoing basis. In the event of emergencies, we regard
    the law as well established that summary administrative action is
    appropriate. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 
    452 U.S. 264
    , 299–301, 
    101 S. Ct. 2352
    , 2372–73, 
    69 L. Ed. 2d 1
    , 30–31 (1981);
    Gorra Realty, Inc. v. Jetmore, 
    510 A.2d 440
    , 446 (Conn. 1986). But this
    justifies only the imposition of the lockout and not the maintenance of
    the lockout on an ongoing basis. Because of the ongoing effects of the
    lockout on her property right, we believe Lewis is entitled to a
    postdeprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard.
    Before we find a due process violation based on lack of notice and
    hearing, however, we must consider the fact that Lewis elected to
    terminate her lease on October 9. While there was certainly a right to a
    prompt postdeprivation hearing, Lewis makes no claim that she was
    entitled to a postdeprivation hearing the day after her eviction as a
    matter of law.      Thus, even if she were entitled to a postdeprivation
    hearing, she abandoned that claim by terminating her property interest
    in the lease. Under these circumstances, we find the due process claim
    is moot. See Smith v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 
    891 P.2d 88
    , 92 (Wyo. 1995)
    (holding due process claim of terminated employee was moot where
    plaintiff voluntarily resigned position).
    C. Void for Vagueness.
    1.   Introduction.    Lewis also argues the ordinance violates due
    process because the term “emergency” is too vague. 11 Citing Grayned v.
    11As with procedural due process, this challenge is brought under both the Iowa
    and Federal Constitutions. Because Lewis does not suggest that the Iowa Constitution
    25
    City of Rockford, 
    408 U.S. 104
    , 
    92 S. Ct. 2294
    , 
    33 L. Ed. 2d 222
     (1972),
    Lewis asserts that no person of ordinary intelligence would be able to
    determine what conduct is lawful.            Further, according to Lewis, the
    ordinance, which states that whether an emergency is present rests in
    “the judgment of the city manager [or his delegate],” fails to provide
    sufficient guidelines to limit the discretion of the City in enforcing the
    ordinance.
    The City responds by asserting that a person challenging a statute
    as void for vagueness carries a heavy burden to overcome a presumption
    of constitutionality.    See State v. Bauer, 
    337 N.W.2d 209
    , 210 (Iowa
    1983). The City further asserts that vagueness of the ordinance can be
    avoided by reasonable construction. See State v. Duncan, 
    414 N.W.2d 91
    , 95 (Iowa 1987).
    In considering vagueness challenges, we have emphasized three
    theoretical underpinnings to the doctrine. State v. Nail, 
    743 N.W.2d 535
    ,
    539 (Iowa 2007). First, a statute cannot be so vague that a person of
    ordinary understanding would not know that their conduct is prohibited.
    Id. Second, the statute must not be so vague as to encourage arbitrary
    or discriminatory enforcement. Id. Finally, a statute cannot sweep so
    broadly as to prohibit substantial amounts of constitutionally protected
    speech. Id.; see also Formaro v. Polk Cnty., 
    773 N.W.2d 834
    , 840 (Iowa
    2009). Because free speech is not an issue in this case, we address the
    notice and arbitrary enforcement components of vagueness analysis.
    2.    Vagueness based on lack of notice.            We have had several
    occasions to address as-applied vagueness challenges to city ordinances
    _______________________
    should be interpreted differently, we assume the state and federal standards are
    similar. See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 883. Even so, we reserve the right to apply the
    standard under the Iowa Constitution in a more rigorous fashion than federal
    precedents. Id.; State v. Feregrino, 
    756 N.W.2d 700
    , 704 n.1 (Iowa 2008).
    26
    on grounds of lack of notice.          A city ordinance is unconstitutionally
    vague under the due process clause “when its language does not convey
    a sufficiently definite warning of the proscribed conduct.” Devault v. City
    of Council Bluffs, 
    671 N.W.2d 448
    , 451 (Iowa 2003). We articulated the
    legal test for notice required to overcome a vagueness challenge in Knight
    v. Iowa District Court, 
    269 N.W.2d 430
    , 432 (Iowa 1978), in which we
    stated: “If the statute’s meaning is fairly ascertainable by reliance on
    generally accepted and common meaning of words used, or by reference
    to the dictionary, related or similar statutes, the common law or previous
    judicial constructions, due process is satisfied.”           An ordinance is not
    unconstitutionally vague for lack of notice merely because a key word is
    undefined.       Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. Goettsch, 
    403 N.W.2d 772
    , 773
    (Iowa 1987).
    Given the factual findings of the district court, which are generally
    not challenged in this appeal, 12 we reject Lewis’s vagueness claim on
    notice grounds.         An “emergency” is defined as “an unforeseen
    combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for
    immediate action,” and “an urgent need for assistance or relief.” Merriam
    Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 377 (10th ed. 2002).               The emergency
    under the ordinance must relate to public safety in the context of
    housing.         A person of ordinary understanding would know that
    repeatedly leaving an ignited gas stove unattended for seven or eight
    hours at a time poses an imminent threat to the safety of the tenants in
    an apartment building.          The danger is exacerbated when a tenant
    demonstrates repeated unwillingness to abate the threat at the request of
    the landlord.       Further, the uncontroverted testimony of the housing
    12Lewis does challenge the factual finding that the withholding of the security
    deposit by Jaeger was not in bad faith.
    27
    inspector supports the proposition that leaving running water and a gas
    stove on unattended for several hours creates a fire hazard and a risk of
    carbon monoxide that endangers the lives of all those in the building.
    See People v. Plane, 
    78 Cal. Rptr. 528
    , 530 (Ct. App. 1969) (declaring it
    beyond argument that landlord, concerned and responsible for the safety
    of tenants, knowing that renter left apartment unexpectedly with
    reasonable possibility of an unattended lighted stove, may enter
    apartment to ensure safety).      Under these circumstances, we cannot
    conclude that a person of ordinary understanding would not know that
    Lewis’s conduct, as determined by the factual findings of the district
    court, created an emergency that required immediate action to protect
    public safety.   See State v. Doe, 
    231 P.3d 1016
    , 1030 (Idaho 2010)
    (“emergency errand or other legitimate business” not unconstitutionally
    vague).
    3. Vagueness based upon potential for arbitrary or discriminatory
    conduct.   There is, however, a second important prong of void for
    vagueness doctrine, namely, to prevent the vesting of virtually unlimited
    discretion in governmental officials.     Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108–09, 92
    S. Ct. at 2298–99, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 227–28. This second prong is more
    problematic in this case.
    The term “emergency” is potentially very broad.           On top of the
    elastic term “emergency,” the ordinance provides that an emergency
    exists according to “the judgment” of city officials. There are no criteria
    in the ordinance for the determination of emergency.            The ordinance
    explicitly states that there is no right of appeal. Further, the ordinance
    does not detail the enforcement remedies that might be available. Read
    literally, you could not fight city hall under the ordinance.
    28
    The fundamental question before us is whether we can, as the City
    suggests, save this ordinance through reasonable construction or
    whether the elastic terms render it fatally flawed. There are, of course,
    competing principles at stake here. On the one hand, as the City rightly
    observes, broadly framed statutes may be saved from constitutional
    defect through judicial construction. On the other hand, courts are not
    legislatures.   We are not in the business of rewriting statutes or
    ordinances.
    There are a few cases standing for the proposition that when a
    legislative enactment fails to establish any meaningful standards, courts
    should not blue pencil them into the law. For example, in United Nuclear
    Corp. v. Cannon, 
    553 F. Supp. 1220
    , 1233, 1235 (D.R.I. 1982), the court
    held that a state statute requiring the posting of a “Ten Million Dollar
    ($10 million) bond” to cover the cost of “decontamination” was hopelessly
    vague and could not be rescued by judicial construction. See also S. of
    Second Assocs. v. Georgetown, 
    580 P.2d 807
    , 811 (Colo. 1978) (historic
    preservation ordinance fails to provide sufficient standards to determine
    if location is within historic preservation area); Chronis v. State ex rel.
    Rodriguez, 
    670 P.2d 953
    , 957–58 (N.M. 1983) (clause which states that
    action may be taken when “public health, safety, and welfare requires
    emergency action” held vague under New Mexico Constitution).          As a
    general matter, however, we have embraced the notion that judicial
    construction may save an otherwise vague statute from constitutional
    infirmity. Nail, 743 N.W.2d at 540.
    In looking at the ordinance in question, there is good reason to use
    an elastic term such as “emergency.” In order to protect public safety,
    the ordinance must necessarily use language that is sufficiently flexible
    to cover a wide variety of factual situations that may arise. We do not
    29
    require a legislative body to define every term. The ordinary definition of
    a broad term like “emergency” is available to limit the reach of the
    ordinance. See People v. McKnight, 
    617 P.2d 1178
    , 1187–88 n.9 (Colo.
    1980) (citing Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary definition of
    “emergency” in rejecting due process attack on sentencing provision
    related to automobile statute); Doe, 231 P.3d at 1030 (using the
    definition of “emergency” in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
    as “an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state
    that calls for immediate action” to limit the scope of a statute). Further,
    the context of the ordinance demonstrates that the emergencies
    referenced are limited to those involving health and safety issues in
    housing.
    In addition, although a statute employing broad terms is obviously
    more susceptible to being applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory
    fashion than one containing detailed language, an ordinance may be
    narrowed through an implied term of objective reasonableness.          For
    example, in Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 
    980 S.W.2d 425
    ,
    438–39 (Tex. 1998), the court implied an objective reasonableness
    standard to narrow the scope of a disciplinary rule that prohibited an
    attorney from making comments “calculated . . . to harass or embarrass
    the juror or to influence his actions.”    The court explained that the
    objective reasonableness standard assuaged vagueness concerns and
    reduced the danger of arbitrary enforcement.      Benton, 980 S.W.2d at
    439.
    In the end, we believe that in light of the application of the
    commonly understood definition of emergency, the implied requirement
    that the judgment of the city manager or his delegate be exercised in an
    objectively reasonable fashion, and with the due process guarantee of
    30
    notice and an opportunity to be heard, the ordinance survives a void-for-
    vagueness due process challenge.
    D.    Unlawful Eviction by Jaeger.             Lewis next argues she was
    unlawfully evicted by Jaeger. Lewis argues Jaeger unlawfully evicted her
    because he failed to comply with Iowa Code section 562A.27A(1), which
    she says provides the exclusive means to evict a tenant posing a clear
    and present danger to other tenants. Lewis also asserts there was no
    emergency         situation   that    would    justify    eviction    under     section
    562A.27A(1).
    As discussed above, however, the ordinance permits the city
    manager, or his designee, to order an owner to correct or abate an
    emergency        that   requires     immediate    action.       Depending      on    the
    circumstances, the ordinance may require residents to be displaced from
    their homes while the emergency is resolved.                 In this case, the City
    ordered Jaeger to change the locks on Lewis’s apartment.                        Jaeger,
    whether he agreed or disagreed with the City’s decision, had no choice in
    the matter. 13 Jaeger therefore did not unlawfully evict Lewis by carrying
    out the City’s order. 14 See Zwerin, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 284; Dunn, 23 A. at
    210–11; Sunderman, 29 N.W.2d at 498.
    E. Unlawful Entry by Jaeger and Other Tenants. Lewis claims
    Jaeger and other tenants unlawfully entered the apartment on three
    13Jaeger testified that he would have locked Lewis out in any event, but the
    record shows that Jaeger first called the City, was orally ordered by Boge to lock Lewis
    out, and then proceeded to do so. Although he might well have locked her out in any
    event, he was acting pursuant to an order by Boge to do so.
    14Lewis  makes no allegation that the City erroneously concluded an emergency
    existed or otherwise exceeded its authority under the ordinance. Whether the City
    complied with the requirements of the ordinance, therefore, is not at issue. See Sell v.
    City of Columbus, 47 F. App’x 685, 697–98 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding city official exceeded
    scope of similar ordinance by ordering emergency eviction, in absence of hearing,
    without first determining whether postponing the eviction would jeopardize health and
    safety).
    31
    occasions. She cites the entry by Jaeger when he entered the apartment
    pursuant to the order of the City but also removed her belongings from
    the apartment and placed them outside the apartment building.        She
    also claims that on two occasions Jaeger allowed another renter, Ellen
    Johnson, to enter the apartment without her permission.      The district
    court concluded that there were no unlawful entries.
    Ordinarily, a lease vests in a tenant the right of exclusive
    possession, which precludes entry by the landlord except for limited
    purposes.   Milton R. Friedman, Friedman on Leases § 4:3.1, at 4–21
    (Patrick A. Randolph, Jr. ed., 5th ed. 2012).     Under the IURLTA, a
    “landlord may enter the dwelling unit without [the] consent of the tenant
    in case of emergency.” Iowa Code § 562A.19(2). The landlord, however,
    “shall not abuse the right of access or use it to harass the tenant.” Id.
    § 562A.19(3). Except in cases of emergency or when it is impractical, the
    landlord is directed to give the tenant twenty-four hour notice before
    entering. Id. Aside from the Code section, the landlord does not have
    another right of access “except by court order, and as permitted by
    sections 562A.28 and 562A.29, or if the tenant has abandoned or
    surrendered the premises.” Id. § 562A.19(4).
    The order from the City authorized Jaeger to lock Lewis out of her
    apartment. But there is nothing in the order that authorized Jaeger to
    enter the apartment for the purpose of seizing her belongings and
    removing them from the premises. We have upheld landlord entry under
    Iowa Code section 562A.29 for a limited purpose of assisting police in
    investigating a potential burglary. State v. Koop, 
    314 N.W.2d 384
    , 387
    (Iowa 1982). Even assuming that Jaeger’s actions in changing the lock
    on the apartment pursuant to an order by the City may not have given
    rise to a violation of the IURLTA, his entry into the apartment to gather
    32
    Lewis’s belongings and remove them from the premises amounts to
    action well beyond the scope of entries permitted by Iowa Code section
    562A.19 and the order of the City and constitutes an abuse of the right
    of entry. See Reichhold v. Sommarstrom Inv. Co., 
    256 P. 592
    , 593 (Cal.
    Ct. App. 1927) (landlord’s authority to enter premises and put it in safe
    condition did not authorize actions exceeding the scope of those ordered
    by city inspector); Kalmas v. Wagner, 
    943 P.2d 1369
    , 1373 (Wash. 1997)
    (stating a cause of action arises when property manager exceeds the
    scope of entrance permitted by statute); see also Stankiewicz v. Hawkes,
    
    369 A.2d 253
    , 253–54 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976) (where tenant absent
    from apartment to allow landlord to abate health hazard, landlord could
    not take tenant’s possessions and pile them in backyard, even though
    landlord considered the property rags and junk). 15                For this abusive
    entry, we conclude that based upon the undisputed facts, Lewis has
    established a violation of the IURLTA.             See Iowa Code § 562A.19(3).
    Under Iowa Code section 562A.35(2), Lewis is entitled to recovery of
    actual damages not less than an amount equal to one month’s rent and
    reasonable attorney fees.
    Next, Lewis claims that by allowing other tenants into her
    apartment, Jaeger violated section 562A.19. The record established that
    the only tenant other than Lewis to enter Lewis’s apartment was
    Johnson. Johnson testified she was in Lewis’s apartment twice without
    permission from Lewis.
    The defining characteristic of a leasehold interest is the tenant’s
    right to possession of the premises.             Nathan Lane Assocs., L.L.P. v.
    15We   do not address the issue of a landlord’s duty with respect to tenant
    property after a lawful eviction. Khan v. Heritage Prop. Mgmt., 
    584 N.W.2d 725
    , 729
    (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (finding that a landlord generally has no duty to store or maintain
    a tenant’s personal property after a tenant has been lawfully evicted).
    33
    Merchants Wholesale of Iowa, Inc., 
    698 N.W.2d 136
    , 139 (Iowa 2005). A
    tenant’s right to possession is generally exclusive, and the tenant, not
    the landlord, has legal control of the leased premises. Bernet v. Rogers,
    
    519 N.W.2d 808
    , 811 (Iowa 1994).
    Yet, Lewis has not brought a trespass case against Johnson.
    Instead, Lewis claims that by authorizing Johnson to enter Lewis’s
    apartment, an unlawful entry occurred under Iowa Code sections
    562A.19 and 562A.35. While Johnson testified that on one occasion she
    went with Jaeger to Lewis’s apartment after Jaeger had knocked on the
    door of Johnson’s apartment, Johnson later on cross-examination
    testified that she entered the apartment on her own without obtaining
    Jaeger’s permission. Although there is evidence in the record to support
    Lewis’s theory of unlawful entry with respect to one of the entries, we
    cannot say the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that
    the plaintiff failed to prove Jaeger authorized the entry of Johnson.
    Therefore, Jaeger is not liable for any claimed unlawful entry arising from
    Johnson’s intrusion into Lewis’s apartment. 16
    F. Bad Faith Retention of Security Deposit. It is undisputed
    that Jaeger failed to return Lewis’s rental deposit in the amount of $465.
    Iowa Code section 562A.12(3) requires a landlord to return a tenant’s
    rental deposit or provide a written statement showing the specific reason
    for withholding the deposit within thirty days of the receipt of the
    tenant’s mailing address or delivery instructions.           Iowa Code section
    562A.12(7) states:
    7. The bad faith retention of a deposit by a landlord,
    or any portion of the rental deposit, in violation of this
    16Nothing   in this opinion should be construed as preventing a landlord from
    reasonably permitting workers access to an apartment for the purpose of abating a
    potential hazard or for any other lawful purpose.
    34
    section shall subject the landlord to punitive damages not to
    exceed two hundred dollars in addition to actual damages.
    The burden is on the tenant to show the landlord held the security
    deposit in bad faith before punitive damages will be awarded. Roeder v.
    Nolan, 
    321 N.W.2d 1
    , 4 (Iowa 1982). Bad faith can be established by
    circumstantial or direct evidence. Id. at 5.
    The district court found that Jaeger owed the security deposit to
    Lewis, but did not act in bad faith in failing to pay it. The only basis
    Jaeger offered for failing to pay the security deposit at trial was lack of
    knowledge regarding where Lewis resided.
    We recognize that there is authority for the proposition that when a
    tenant does not leave a forwarding address and the landlord cannot find
    the tenant, there is no basis for an award of a penalty. Smith v. Callico,
    
    562 So. 2d 1102
    , 1105 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (failure of landlord to send
    accounting for repairs of premises justifying retention of security deposit
    was not willful violation of statute where lessee did not provide
    forwarding address); Alston v. Thomas, 
    391 A.2d 978
    , 980 (N.J. Essex
    County Ct. 1978) (where landlord does not know forwarding address and
    cannot find tenant in the exercise of reasonable diligence, statutory
    requirements to give notice to tenant related to security deposit are
    excused), overruled on other grounds by Reilly v. Weiss, 
    966 A.2d 500
    ,
    506 n.4 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
    On the other hand, the court in Prescott v. Makowski, 
    458 N.E.2d 1281
    , 1283 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983), held that, under a statute similar to
    Iowa Code section 562A.12, when a tenant does not provide a forwarding
    address, but the landlord has actual knowledge of the tenant’s
    subsequent residence, the landlord is required to refund the security
    deposit. According to the Prescott court, the state statutory requirement
    35
    that the tenant provide a forwarding address was solely designed to
    ensure that the landlord knew where to send the deposit. Prescott, 458
    N.E.2d at 1283. Further, in an unreported case, an Ohio appellate court
    has held that a current business address, known to the landlord, has
    been sufficient to require payment of the security deposit to the tenant at
    that address. Smitson v. Zeches, No. 92AP-1773, 
    1993 WL 317243
    , at
    **2–3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 17, 1993).
    In this case, Jaeger claimed he did not know where to send the
    security deposit as no address was given to him during the litigation. We
    accept that Jaeger did not know where Lewis was currently residing. It
    is undisputed, however, that Jaeger received a demand letter by Lewis’s
    legal counsel shortly after the eviction, on letterhead, setting a deadline
    for him to pay the security deposit to Lewis. The letter plainly amounts
    to “delivery instructions” with respect to the security deposit under Iowa
    Code section 562A.12(3).      Further, during the entire time when this
    matter was pending in Dubuque County, Jaeger was aware that Lewis
    was represented by counsel.
    Yet, Jaeger made no effort to pay the security deposit by providing
    it to Lewis’s attorney. He knew from events leading up to October 8 that
    Lewis needed the funds for a security deposit on a new apartment. He
    knew that, as a person receiving Section 8 assistance, Lewis was a
    person of limited means. He nevertheless withheld the security deposit.
    Instead of paying it, his lawyer tried to offer to confess what was plainly
    owed as a strategy to shift the costs of the litigation.
    Under these undisputed facts, we conclude that Jaeger knew he
    owed Lewis the money, knew that Lewis had a pressing need for the
    money, had no plausible reason for not paying it, and simply ignored the
    demand by Lewis’s counsel. While we recognize that the district court’s
    36
    factual finding on bad faith must be affirmed if supported by substantial
    evidence, we conclude that the undisputed facts require us to reverse the
    district court and find that the refusal to pay the security deposit was
    done in bad faith. See Tammen v. Page, 
    584 S.W.2d 914
    , 917 (Tex. Civ.
    App. 1979) (bad faith retention of security deposit under landlord and
    tenant statute found where attorney for tenant wrote demand letter that
    provided attorney’s address). As a result, Lewis, in addition to the return
    of the $465 security deposit ordered by the district court, is entitled to
    punitive damages not to exceed $200, any actual damages shown on the
    present record, and may be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney
    fees. Iowa Code § 562A.12(7)–(8).
    G. Conversion. Conversion is “the wrongful control or dominion
    over another’s property contrary to that person’s possessory right to the
    property. The wrongful control must amount to a serious interference
    with the other person’s right to control the property.” Condon Auto Sales
    & Serv., Inc. v. Crick, 
    604 N.W.2d 587
    , 593 (Iowa 1999) (citations
    omitted).   At trial, Lewis alleged Jaeger did not return some of her
    belongings after her eviction, including $450 earrings, a blanket, and a
    DVD player.    Jaeger testified, however, that he returned all Lewis’s
    possessions when he changed the locks to the apartment. Stating that
    Jaeger was more credible on the issue, the district court found that he
    did not convert any of Lewis’s possessions. After reviewing the record at
    trial, we find no reason to disturb the district court’s findings on the
    conversion issue.
    H.    Confession of Judgment.         During opening statements,
    Jaeger’s attorney made an oral offer to confess judgment in the amount
    of $500 for the rental deposit. Lewis’s attorney rejected the offer on the
    grounds that Jaeger owed an additional $200 for bad faith retention of
    37
    the security deposit.      In its decision, the district court awarded Lewis
    $465 for the rental deposit, but ordered Lewis to pay the court costs in
    light of Jaeger’s offer to confess judgment for $500. On appeal, Lewis
    asserts Jaeger’s offer to confess judgment was insufficient because
    section 677.7 of the Iowa Code requires the offer to be made in writing.
    See Iowa Code § 677.7.
    Iowa Code section 677.4, however, states, “After an action for the
    recovery of money is brought, the defendant may offer in court to confess
    judgment for part of the amount claimed, or part of the causes involved
    in the action.” A confession under section 677.4 must be made when the
    plaintiff is present. Lingo v. Belt, 
    198 Iowa 1276
    , 1278, 
    201 N.W. 5
    , 5
    (1924). Before opening statements, the court observed that Lewis was
    present with her attorney.       In any event, no issue has been made of
    Lewis’s presence during the offer. See Sheer Constr., Inc. v. W. Hodgman
    & Sons, Inc., 
    326 N.W.2d 328
    , 333 (Iowa 1982); see also Manning v. Irish,
    
    47 Iowa 650
    , 652 (1878) (courts may, in absence of evidence to the
    contrary, presume plaintiff’s presence).       While Jaeger may not have
    complied with section 677.7, Jaeger did make a sufficient offer to confess
    judgment under section 677.4.
    However, based on the conclusions in this opinion, it is clear that
    the offer to confess judgment in the amount of $500 was below the
    amount to which Lewis is entitled. Therefore, the offer to confess has no
    effect, and Lewis cannot be ordered to pay court costs as a result of the
    offer.
    IV. Conclusion.
    As indicated above, we affirm the district court’s ruling that the
    city ordinance is not preempted by the IURLTA and that there has been
    no violation of federal law in connection with the action of Jaeger or the
    38
    City. We further find that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague
    and that any procedural due process claim is moot.           We conclude,
    however, that Jaeger violated the IURLTA when he removed the
    belongings of Lewis from the apartment. We also conclude that Jaeger’s
    withholding of Lewis’s security deposit was a bad faith violation of the
    IURLTA. As a result, the judgment of the district court is affirmed in part
    and reversed in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings in
    order to determine actual damages not less than an amount equal to one
    month’s rent for the unlawful entry violation, to award bad faith damages
    on the withholding of the security deposit, and to address the question of
    an award of attorney fees and costs for the violations of the IURLTA.
    AFFIRMED      IN   PART,    REVERSED      IN   PART,    AND    CASE
    REMANDED.