Keith Allen Beckwith v. The State of Wyoming , 2023 WY 39 ( 2023 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
2023 WY 39APRIL TERM, A.D. 2023
April 27, 2023
KEITH ALLEN BECKWITH,
Appellant
(Defendant),
v. S-22-0227
THE STATE OF WYOMING,
Appellee
(Plaintiff).
Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County
The Honorable Catherine R. Rogers, Judge
Representing Appellant:
Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, Wyoming State Public
Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel.
Representing Appellee:
Bridget Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Kristen
R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Donovan Burton, Assistant
Attorney General.
Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
FOX, Chief Justice.
[¶1] Keith Allen Beckwith entered a conditional plea of guilty to felony possession of
methamphetamine. On appeal, he claims the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence obtained after law enforcement forced open a locked box during an
inventory search of his vehicle. We affirm.
ISSUE
[¶2] This appeal presents a single issue:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Beckwith’s
motion to suppress based on its conclusion that the state
trooper who forced opened the locked box during an
inventory search of Mr. Beckwith’s vehicle acted in
accordance with the Wyoming Highway Patrol’s inventory
policy?
FACTS
[¶3] On September 25, 2021, Wyoming Highway Trooper Caleb Pushcar was
patrolling I-25 near Cheyenne when he stopped a vehicle with a nonfunctional headlamp.
Mr. Beckwith was driving and had one passenger who identified himself as Leroy
Valdez. While Trooper Pushcar was confirming the identities of the vehicle’s occupants
and running a check on them, Trooper Joshua Gebauer arrived to assist. Dispatch advised
that both men had outstanding arrest warrants, and both were arrested and placed in
separate patrol vehicles.
[¶4] Because both occupants of the vehicle were arrested, and no other drivers were
available, the troopers impounded the vehicle. Pursuant to Wyoming Highway Patrol
(WHP) Policy and Procedure No. 09-24, troopers are authorized to conduct a vehicle
inventory without a warrant or probable cause when a “vehicle has been lawfully seized
or impounded pursuant to the arrest of the driver[.]” The policy defines the scope of the
inventory as follows:
The vehicle inventory may extend to all areas of the vehicle
in which personal property or hazardous materials may
reasonably be found, including but not limited to the
passenger compartment, trunk, and glove compartment. The
vehicle inventory will also include the inspection of closed
and sealed packages or containers.
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[¶5] In accordance with this policy, Troopers Gebauer and Pushcar performed their
inventory search of the vehicle. Trooper Gebauer began the inventory in the driver’s area.
In the center console he observed “a bunch” of small clear plastic bags, one of which
contained remnants of a crystalline substance. Trooper Pushcar then found “a little
metallic lockbox” on the floorboard toward the back of the driver’s seat and handed it to
Trooper Gebauer. Because the box was locked, Trooper Gebauer used “a small hammer”
and “a mini pry bar” to pop it open. Inside the box, they found several clear baggies with
suspected methamphetamine and heroin, cash, a meth pipe, and a small scale. The
suspected methamphetamine weighed 29.5 grams, and the suspected heroin weighed 0.6
grams.
[¶6] The State charged Mr. Beckwith with felony possession of methamphetamine and
misdemeanor possession of heroin. Mr. Beckwith filed a motion to suppress the evidence
obtained from the locked box. He contended that opening the box exceeded the scope of a
permissible inventory search under the WHP policy and therefore violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. The district court denied his motion, reasoning as follows:
Defendant attached the Wyoming Highway Patrol
Policy and Procedure 3.3, relating to inventory searches, to
his Motion, noting that it provides that “officers may inspect
closed and sealed packages or containers.” Defendant argues
that the term “closed” does not include locked containers. The
court disagrees. A plain language reading of the word
“closed” does not differentiate between locked and unlocked
containers. “Closed” simply means that a container is not
open. This accurately describes both a locked and an
unlocked closed container. Trooper Gebauer, an experienced
trooper who testified that he has conducted a large number of
inventory searches, testified that the inventory policy does not
make an exception for locked containers. Without such
differentiation in the policy, the term “closed” by its plain
language refers to all containers that are not open, whether
locked or unlocked.
[¶7] Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Beckwith entered a conditional guilty plea to
felony possession of methamphetamine. The district court accepted his plea, entered
judgment, and sentenced him to a prison term of eighteen to thirty-six months. Mr.
Beckwith timely appealed.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶8] Mr. Beckwith challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress under
the Fourth Amendment.
In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we
adopt the district court’s factual findings unless those findings
are clearly erroneous. Rodriguez v. State, 2018 WY 134, ¶ 15,
430 P.3d 766, 770 (Wyo. 2018) (citing Jennings v. State,
2016 WY 69, ¶ 8, 375 P.3d 788, 790 (Wyo. 2016)). We view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s
decision because the court conducted the hearing and had the
opportunity to “assess the witnesses’ credibility, weigh the
evidence and make the necessary inferences, deductions and
conclusions.” Kunselman v. State, 2008 WY 85, ¶ 9, 188 P.3d
567, 569 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Hembree v. State, 2006 WY
127 ¶ 7, 143 P.3d 905, 907 (Wyo. 2006)). “On those issues
where the district court has not made specific findings of fact,
this Court will uphold the general ruling of the court below if
supported by any reasonable view of the evidence.” Feeney v.
State, 2009 WY 67, ¶ 9, 208 P.3d 50, 53 (Wyo. 2009) (citing
Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Wyo. 1979)).
Hawken v. State, 2022 WY 77, ¶ 12, 511 P.3d 176, 180-81 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Pryce
v. State, 2020 WY 151, ¶ 16, 477 P.3d 90, 94-95 (Wyo. 2020)). “However, the
underlying question of whether the search and seizure was constitutional is a question of
law, which we review de novo.” Id. (citing Fuller v. State, 2021 WY 36, ¶ 8, 481 P.3d
1131, 1133 (Wyo. 2021)).
DISCUSSION
[¶9] “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits ‘unreasonable
searches and seizures.’” Barney v. State, 2022 WY 49, ¶ 27, 507 P.3d 459, 464 (Wyo.
2022) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). “Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless
searches and seizures are unreasonable absent a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement.” Phippen v. State, 2013 WY 30, ¶ 13, 297 P.3d 104, 108 (Wyo. 2013)
(citing Tucker v. State, 2009 WY 107, ¶ 22, 214 P.3d 236, 243 (Wyo. 2009)). Vehicle
inventories are a recognized exception. Hunnicutt-Carter v. State, 2013 WY 103, ¶ 16,
308 P.3d 847, 851 (Wyo. 2013) (citing Johnson v. State, 2006 WY 79, ¶ 13, 137 P.3d
903, 906 (Wyo. 2006)).
[¶10] “The inventory exception allows police officers to inventory the contents of a
vehicle in the possession of law enforcement if the inventory ‘is conducted pursuant to a
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standardized police procedure.’” Id. (quoting Vargas-Rocha v. State, 891 P.2d 763, 767
(Wyo. 1995)). “Probable cause is unnecessary to conduct an inventory, but the inventory
cannot be a bad faith pretext for general investigatory rummaging.” Id. at ¶ 17, 308 P.3d
at 851-52 (citing Johnson, 2006 WY 79, ¶ 13, 137 P.3d at 906). Rather than being
investigative, a vehicle inventory serves three administrative purposes:
[I]t protects the vehicle itself from theft or vandalism, it
protects the police and the towing company from danger, and
it protects the police and towing company from claims or
disputes over property claimed to have been lost or stolen
after law enforcement took control of the vehicle.
Id. (citing Johnson, 2006 WY 79, ¶ 14, 137 P.3d at 906); see also Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 371, 107 S.Ct. 738, 741, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987) (noting inventory searches
are administrative rather than investigative); United States v. Tueller, 349 F.3d 1239,
1243 (10th Cir. 2003) (inventory search not considered investigative where it serves
administrative purpose).
[¶11] “Consonant with the Fourth Amendment, the opening of closed containers during
an inventory search is permissible if conducted in good faith, pursuant to a standardized
police policy, and as long as the search is not a ruse for general rummaging for evidence
of a crime.” Johnson, 2006 WY 79, ¶ 24, 137 P.3d at 908-09 (citing Bertine, 479 U.S. at
374, 107 S.Ct. at 742). Mr. Beckwith does not claim Troopers Gebauer and Pushcar acted
in bad faith or that their inventory search was a ruse for general rummaging for evidence
of a crime. He claims only that the WHP inventory policy did not authorize the troopers
to open locked containers, and the opening of the locked box therefore ran afoul of the
Fourth Amendment.
[¶12] Mr. Beckwith’s argument requires that we interpret the WHP inventory policy,
which we do using our usual rules of statutory interpretation. Tayback v. Teton Cnty. Bd.
of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2017 WY 114, ¶ 25, 402 P.3d 984, 990 (Wyo. 2017) (“We interpret
administrative regulations as a matter of law using our well-known rules of statutory
construction.”); see also Bd. of Trs. of Lincoln Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. Two v. Earling, 2022
WY 23, ¶ 31, 503 P.3d 629, 638 (Wyo. 2022) (looking to face of policies and procedures
to determine whether they provided a clear standard of conduct). If we determine that the
language is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to its plain meaning. Tayback, 2017
WY 114, ¶ 25, 402 P.3d at 990 (citing Powder River Coal Co. v. Wyo. State Bd. of
Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 423, 426 (Wyo. 2002)).
[¶13] The WHP inventory policy specifies that “[t]he vehicle inventory will also include
the inspection of closed and sealed packages or containers.” A “closed” container is one
that is “not open.” Closed, Merriam-Webster https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/closed, (last visited Apr. 3, 2023). A “sealed” container is one
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with “a closure that must be broken to be opened[.]” Seal, Merriam-Webster
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seal, (last visited Apr. 3, 2023). These
terms are broad enough to include locked containers without the policy using that precise
language. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 915 F.3d 552, 556-57 (8th Cir. 2019) (policy
requiring inventory of entire vehicle broad enough to include opening of containers);
United States v. Matthews, 591 F.3d 230, 237 (4th Cir. 2009) (policy requiring “complete
inventory” sufficient to include closed containers); United States v. Wallace, 102 F.3d
346, 349 (8th Cir. 1996) (policy requiring inventory of contents of vehicle and any
containers therein broad enough to encompass locked trunks); United States v. Wilson,
938 F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 1991) (policy that required inventory of vehicle’s “contents”
but did not “use the buzz words ‘closed container’” broad enough to allow search of
closed containers).
[¶14] Additionally, nothing in the WHP policy suggests it intended to limit the inventory
to unlocked containers. The word “unlocked” was not used to modify the phrase “closed
and sealed packages or containers.” In contrast, in providing for the inventory of
abandoned vehicles, the policy distinguishes between those found locked and those found
unlocked. 1 This illustrates that the WHP knew how to distinguish between locked and
unlocked spaces, and had it intended to limit the search of containers to those that were
unlocked, it would have done so. See Matter of U.S. Currency Totaling $14,245.00, 2022
WY 15, ¶ 16, 503 P.3d 51, 56 (Wyo. 2022) (“When the legislature specifically uses a
word in one place, we will not interpret that word into other places where it was not
used.”) (quoting Wyo. State Hosp. v. Romine, 2021 WY 47, ¶ 29, 483 P.3d 840, 848
(Wyo. 2021)).
[¶15] This interpretation is also consistent with the policy’s stated purpose “to protect
motor vehicles and their contents while in police or tow operator’s custody; to protect the
agency against claims of lost, stolen or damaged property; and to protect agency
Members and the public against injury or damaged property due to hazardous materials
or substances that may be in the vehicle.” As we have previously recognized, “[a]n
inventory search that does not include all of the property within an impounded vehicle
undermines the purposes for the inventory.” Johnson, 2006 WY 79, ¶ 25, 137 P.3d at
1
Section 4 of the WHP inventory policy provides:
4.1 Members are not required to inventory a locked Abandoned
Motor Vehicle (AMV) utilizing a Vehicle Inventory Receipt (P-
22). Instead, a Member must inventory items the Member can
see from outside of the locked vehicle on the Abandoned Motor
Vehicle (MVAV-203) form under the “Contents” section.
4.2 An unlocked AMV will be inventoried and noted on the AMV
(MVAV-203) form under the “Contents” section.
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909; see also Bertine, 479 U.S. at 373, 107 S.Ct. at 742 (“Knowledge of the precise
nature of the property helped guard against claims of theft, vandalism, or negligence.
Such knowledge also helped to avert any danger to police or others that may have been
posed by the property.”) (footnote omitted); Matthews, 591 F.3d at 237-38 (“Only by
performing a full inventory of the car-which includes opening closed containers-could an
officer identify all the vehicle’s valuables and effectively secure them.”).
[¶16] Finally, we reject Mr. Beckwith’s argument that interpreting WHP’s policy to
allow troopers to open locked containers is nonsensical because it allows them to destroy
the property the inventory is intended to protect. “‘Excessive or unnecessary destruction
of property’ can render police conduct unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
Tueller, 349 F.3d at 1245 (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct.
992, 996, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998)). The record contains no evidence, however, that
Trooper Gebauer destroyed or even damaged the locked box when he pried it open, and
Mr. Beckwith directs us to no such evidence.
[¶17] Affirmed.
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