Lamont Antone Wyche v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bumgardner, Felton and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
LAMONT ANTONE WYCHE
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 3113-02-1 JUDGE WALTER S. FELTON, JR.
APRIL 6, 2004
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Marc Jacobson, Judge
S. Clark Daugherty, Public Defender (Office of the Public Defender,
on brief), for appellant.
Deana A. Malek, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Lamont Antone Wyche appeals his conviction for involuntary manslaughter of fellow
inmate Terry Taitano1 in the Norfolk City Jail. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction. We disagree and affirm the conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 3, 2002, Wyche and Taitano, both inmates of the Norfolk City Jail, argued
during a card game. Wyche testified that he was mad and upset with Taitano for calling him a
“punk.” He told Taitano to “strap up,” meaning to put on his shoes to fight. Wyche was first to pull
on his leather cowboy boots. While Taitano sat on his bunk lacing up his shoes, Wyche began
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1
For the purposes of this opinion, we use the spelling of the victim’s surname name as
“Taitano,” as it was spelled in the autopsy report and the indictment. The transcript and
appellant’s brief spell the victim’s name as “Tiantano.” The identity of the victim was not an
issue before the trial court nor before this Court on appeal.
assaulting him in the face and chest with his fists. Instead of hitting back, Taitano stood up and
attempted to restrain Wyche. When he tried to “break loose” from Wyche, Wyche hit him once in
the head and once in the chest, knocking him backwards. As Taitano fell, he struck his head on the
steel frame of a bunk bed. He immediately collapsed and appeared unconscious as he fell.
Witnesses described him as lying on his back, shaking and foaming at the mouth. While Taitano
was lying on the floor Wyche kicked him several times in the chest and at least once in his face.
The sharp edge of Wyche’s cowboy boots caused abrasions to Taitano’s left forehead and mid-chest
area. One witness described the kicks like “kicking a football,” while another testified that Wyche
kicked Taitano with enough force to cause him to roll from his side to his back. Taitano never
moved or attempted to get up after he collapsed on the floor. The other inmates called the guards
for assistance. Taitano was pronounced dead at the scene.
Assistant Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Leah Bush performed the autopsy of Taitano. She
reported that the cause of death was an “acute brain injury and acute coronary insufficiency due to
severe organic heart disease subsequent to an acute stress reaction due to an altercation and fight
with another person.” Dr. Bush testified that Taitano suffered from an enlarged heart, a pre-existing
organic heart disease, and had an abnormality of the main coronary artery. She explained that the
type of abnormality found in the victim has been associated with sudden death. She also testified
that the victim suffered acute brain injury. She testified that the injury to Taitano’s forehead
resulted in trauma to his brain, that the brain injury was caused by “an acute thrash” occurring on or
about the time of death, and was significant enough to cause the brain tissue to be disrupted and
torn. Dr. Bush explained that the fight caused an “acute stress reaction,” resulting in the heart attack
that was the immediate cause of Taitano’s death. She testified that the brain injury was also a
contributing factor in his death.
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Wyche was charged with second-degree murder in violation of Code § 18.2-32. On August
29, 2002, the trial court convicted him of the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter,
and sentenced him to ten years in prison, with eight years and six months suspended for a period of
ten years.
II. ANALYSIS
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below, granting to that evidence all
reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 255 Va. 516, 521,
499 S.E.2d 263, 265 (1998); see Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d
534, 537 (1975). “The judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same
weight as a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the
judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 4
Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987) (citations omitted). “We will not substitute our
judgment for that of the trier of fact, even were our opinion to differ.” Wactor v.
Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 375, 380, 564 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2002).
Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar standard gives full
play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve
conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.
Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257-58, 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) (quoting Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
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PROXIMATE CAUSE
Involuntary manslaughter is defined “as the accidental killing of a person, contrary to the
intention of the parties, during the prosecution of an unlawful, but not felonious, act, or during
the improper performance of some lawful act.” Gooden v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 565, 571,
311 S.E.2d 780, 784 (1984); Mundy v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 609, 615, 131 S.E. 242, 244
(1926); Banks v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 539, 546, 586 S.E.2d 876, 879 (2003); Darnell v.
Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 485, 489, 370 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1988). To convict Wyche of
involuntary manslaughter, the Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his
unlawful or “criminally negligent acts were a proximate cause of the victim’s death.” See
Gallimore v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 441, 446, 436 S.E.2d 421, 424 (1993); Banks, 41 Va. App.
at 546, 586 S.E.2d at 879.
Wyche contends that the trial court erred when it failed to find that his argument with
Taitano was the proximate cause of Taitano’s heart attack, and not the fight. He argues that,
“[w]here a fact is equally susceptible of two interpretations one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused, [the trier of fact] cannot arbitrarily adopt that interpretation which
incriminates [the accused].” Littlejohn v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 401, 411, 482 S.E.2d 853,
858 (1997) (citation omitted). He asserts that the Commonwealth’s medical expert presented two
alternating theories as to the cause of death, one of which was that the argument was sufficient to
bring on the heart attack. Thus, he reasons, the trial court erred when it failed to find that the
argument and not the fight was the proximate cause of Taitano’s death. We disagree.
In Spain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 385, 373 S.E.2d 728 (1988), this Court approved
the following jury instruction:
It is not necessary for a conviction of murder that the wounds,
injuries or trauma be the direct cause of death; it is sufficient if the
initial wound, injury or trauma causes death indirectly through a
chain of natural causes.
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Id. at 394, 373 S.E.2d at 733. In Spain, an elderly woman died as the direct result of a heart
attack suffered when she was assaulted during the course of a robbery. There, the medical
examiner testified that the victim “died from a heart attack induced by the stress of the traumatic
event,” specifically the defendant’s assault. Id. at 395, 373 S.E.2d at 733. This Court held that
the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder because “the initial
wounds or trauma cause[ed] death indirectly through a chain of natural causes.” Id.
Here, Wyche aggressively assaulted Taitano, striking him in the chest and chin with his
fists, causing Taitano to fall and to strike his head on a metal bed rail. He continued to kick
Taitano in the chest and head after he collapsed defenseless to the floor. Wyche could
reasonably foresee that his aggressive assault would likely cause serious injury or even death to
Taitano. Moreover, Wyche’s physical blows created the “acute stress reaction” that Dr. Bush
stated was the cause of his fatal heart attack. The fact that Taitano’s serious pre-existing heart
condition contributed to cause his death does not negate the chain of causal connection between
the assault and his death. Id.
Wyche’s contention that Taitano could have died from the argument ignores the
testimony of Dr. Bush as to the cause of his death. Moreover, eyewitnesses testified that Wyche
first struck Taitano while he was sitting on his bed defenseless tying his shoelaces. He also hit
Taitano with his fists at least twice before the victim collapsed on the floor. Further, the
evidence showed that Taitano did not collapse until after Wyche repeatedly struck him. While
he denied hitting the victim, Wyche admitted that he kicked him twice in the chest. The brain
injury, resulting in brain tissue being torn and disrupted, was consistent with a blow to the left
side forehead, where Taitano suffered abrasions caused by a hard linear surface such as the sole
of Wyche’s cowboy boots. Dr. Bush testified that the trauma to Taitano’s brain occurred either
immediately before or after the heart attack. Based on the evidence before it, the trial court
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reasonably concluded that, while the victim’s heart condition was a contributing cause of his
death, Wyche’s aggressive assault that left Taitano lying on the floor, suffering from a heart
attack and trauma to his brain, was also a proximate cause of Taitano’s death.
MENS REA
Involuntary manslaughter is “the accidental killing which, though unintended, is the
proximate result of negligence so gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard of
human life.” King v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 601, 607, 231 S.E.2d 718, 721 (1977). Wyche
contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of involuntary manslaughter because “he
could not be charged with knowledge that death or serious injury would be the probable result of
his actions.” In other words, Wyche contends that because he could not foresee that his conduct
would cause the death of Taitano, he lacked the criminal culpability required to convict him of
involuntary manslaughter. Here, there is no question that Wyche assaulted Taitano who was
sitting defenseless while tying his shoes preparing to fight Wyche. Wyche had challenged
Taitano to fight after Taitano called him a “punk.” Stated simply, Wyche was the aggressor who
physically assaulted Taitano, an unlawful act.
The Supreme Court has held:
To convict [a defendant] of involuntary manslaughter, the
Commonwealth [must] . . . prove that [the defendant] committed
“acts of commission or omission of a wanton or wilful nature,
showing a reckless or indifferent disregard of the rights of others,
under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury, or
which make it not improbable that injury will be occasioned, and
the offender knows, or is charged with the knowledge of, the
probable result of his acts.”
Gallimore, 246 Va. at 445-46, 436 S.E.2d at 424 (quoting Bell v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 597,
611-12, 195 S.E. 675, 681 (1938)). Our Courts have held that the conduct, which results in the
crime of involuntary manslaughter, “‘must be something more than mere inadvertence or
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misadventure. It is a recklessness or indifference incompatible with a proper regard for human
life.’” Banks, 41 Va. App. at 546, 586 S.E.2d at 879 (quoting Bell, 170 Va. at 611, 195 S.E. at
681). Judged by an objective standard, “‘the offender either knew or should have known the
probable results of his acts.’” Id. (quoting Conrad v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 113, 121-22,
521 S.E.2d 321, 325-26 (1999) (en banc)).
While Wyche may not have known of Taitano’s heart condition, he knew or should have
known, that his aggressive assault would likely result in serious injury or death. By his own
testimony, Wyche was angry and upset at Taitano for calling him a “punk.” Wyche hit Taitano
in the face and head while he was still seated tying his shoelaces. His subsequent blows caused
the victim to strike his head against the metal bed frame. He continued to aggressively kick
Taitano in the face and chest with his cowboy boots after he collapsed unconscious and
defenseless on the floor.
While the trial court found the evidence unclear as to whether Taitano died when he
collapsed or after Wyche kicked him on the floor, it found that Wyche’s conduct demonstrated a
careless, reckless and indifferent disregard for the life of the victim. We conclude that the trial court
did not err in finding that Wyche’s aggressive assault on Taitano, including his kicking him in the
head and chest after he collapsed defenseless on the floor, was a proximate cause of Taitano’s
death and that Wyche’s conduct was so wanton and willful that it showed utter disregard for the
safety and value of human life.
It was not necessary that Wyche foresee the specific manner in which Taitano’s death
occurred. It is sufficient that he reasonably should have foreseen that death or serious injury
could result from his assault and kicks to Taitano. See Blondel v. Hays, 241 Va. 467, 475, 403
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S.E.2d 340, 345 (1991). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that Taitano’s death
was caused by Wyche’s unlawful and criminally negligent conduct.
We affirm Wyche’s conviction of involuntary manslaughter.
Affirmed.
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