Ex parte Emiliano Rodriguez PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ( 2023 )

Rel: January 13, 2023
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
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Ex parte Emiliano Rodriguez
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Emiliano Rodriguez
v.
State of Alabama)
(Houston Circuit Court, CC-20-993;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-21-0141)
WISE, Justice.
WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.
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Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Parker, C.J., dissents, with opinion.
Bolin, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ., dissent.
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PARKER, Chief Justice (dissenting).
"[E]ven in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and
forgotten." Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. ___, ___,
141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2020). Indeed, it is in times of greatest crisis that the
rights in the Constitution require the most vigilant defense.
I therefore dissent from this Court's denial of certiorari review of
an important constitutional question: whether requiring criminal-trial
witnesses to wear masks covering their noses and mouths while
testifying violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. "We have a duty to defend the
Constitution, and even a public health emergency does not absolve us of
that responsibility." Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct.
2603, 2604 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
Emiliano Rodriguez argues, as a material question of first
impression under Rule 39(a)(1)(c), Ala. R. App. P., that his constitutional
right to confrontation was violated when the circuit court required
adverse witnesses to wear face masks while testifying during Rodriguez's
trial. Because I conclude that there is a reasonable probability of merit
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in Rodriguez's petition, I would grant the writ for our Court to further
examine this issue.
This criminal case was tried in the summer of 2021. A week before
trial, Rodriguez moved for an order requiring witnesses to wear clear face
shields, rather than masks, while testifying. The circuit court granted
the motion. The day before trial, however, the court sua sponte reversed
course and required all witnesses to wear masks, asserting that they
were necessary because of a then-spreading variant of the COVID-19
virus. The day of trial, Rodriguez again moved to require only face
shields, but the court denied that motion. Rodriguez was convicted. The
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed by a vote of 3 to 2, holding in an
unpublished memorandum that Rodriguez's constitutional right to
confront witnesses had not been violated. Rodriguez v. State, [No. CR-21-
0141, July 8, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2022). Judges McCool
and Minor each dissented with an opinion.
This issue is a question of first impression. The Court of Criminal
Appeals itself stated in its unpublished memorandum: "This Court is not
aware of any published Alabama cases resolving this precise issue." And
it is a material question. Masks were a ubiquitous reality in response to
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the COVID-19 virus. Moreover, they have since become more common in
our society generally, so this issue is likely to arise again, even in cases
unrelated to COVID-19. Most importantly, as I will explain, this issue of
mask-wearing by trial witnesses implicates a crucial constitutional right
of the accused.1
All constitutional analysis should begin with the constitutional
text. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to
be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
The Alabama Constitution also protects the right of the accused "to be
confronted by the witnesses against him." Art. I, § 6, Ala. Const. 2022.
Our Court has emphasized that "[t]his right of the accused to be
confronted in open court by the witnesses against him was a provision of
Magna Charta, and was also probably recognized by the ancient common
law." Wills v. State, 73 Ala. 362, 365 (1882). The Alabama Constitution
requires "the witnesses against the accused to be produced in open court,
so that he may see them face to face, and have the opportunity accorded
1Iexpress no opinion whether any Confrontation Clause error here
was harmless. The Court of Criminal Appeals did not analyze that issue.
And even if it had, that would not have prevented this Court from
reviewing the Confrontation Clause question independently of its
ultimate effect on the underlying criminal case.
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him to cross-examine them." Id. at 364-65 (emphasis added). Our Court
has a responsibility to "prioritize analyzing the meaning of [the Alabama]
Constitution," Young Americans for Liberty v. St. John, [Ms. 1210309,
Nov. 18, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2022) (Parker, C.J., concurring in
part and concurring in result). However, because Rodriguez's arguments
are based on the federal Confrontation Clause, I will focus only on it here.
As the United States Supreme Court has emphasized, in applying
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, we must ground our
understanding in how the right of confrontation was understood at the
time of the founding. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 366 (2008). The
right is a "reference to the right of confrontation at common law."
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).
The common-law right to confront one's accusers face to face goes
back to the Roman Empire and ancient Israel. Id. at 43. This aspect of
Roman law is mentioned in the Scriptures: Governor Festus stated that
"it was not the custom of the Romans to give up anyone before the accused
met the accusers face to face and had opportunity to make his defense
concerning the charge laid against him." Acts 25:16 (ESV) (emphasis
added). Likewise, the Old Testament law directed: "If a malicious witness
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arises to accuse a person of wrongdoing, then both parties to the dispute
shall appear before the Lord, before the priests and the judges who are
in office in those days." Deuteronomy 19:16-17 (ESV).
Sir William Blackstone, the leading authority on the English
common law, emphasized that the "open examination of witnesses viva
voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the
clearing up of truth." 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *373. He
noted that, "by this method of examination, and this only, the persons
who are to decide upon the evidence have an opportunity of observing the
quality, age, education, understanding, behavior, and inclinations of the
witness." Id. at *374. Sir Matthew Hale further explained: "[M]any times
the very manner of a witness's delivering his testimony will give a
probable indication whether he speaks truly or falsely." Matthew Hale,
The History of the Common Law of England 163 (Charles M. Gray, ed.,
Univ. of Chi. Press 1971). Thus, the English constitution required "that
the person shall see his accuser." Fenwick's Case, (H.C. 1696) as reported
in 13 T. B. Howell, A Complete Collection of State Trials 537, 592 (1812)
(statement by counsel for accused). In Fenwick's Case, a 17th-century
English lawyer emphasized: "Our law requires persons to appear and
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give their testimony 'viva voce'; and we see that their testimony appears
credible or not by their very countenances and the manner of their
delivery ...." Id.2 George Fox, founder of the Quakers, pleaded similarly
with the royal court:
"[W]e hope and desire that you, the King's Justices, for time
to come, when any informers shall come to any of you with an
information against any of us, will summon such as are
accused to appear before you, and hear us and our accusers
face to face; that none may suffer for what they are not guilty
of. … Doth the law of God, or did the Roman law, or doth the
law of the land judge any man before he and his accusers, and
they who witness against him, be heard, face to face?"
2 George Fox, A Journal or Historical Account of the Life, Travels,
Sufferings, etc., of George Fox 294 (Isaac Collins 1800). Thus, the
common-law right of confrontation encompassed a right of "examination,"
in which the jury has an opportunity to examine the witness's
countenance and behavior to weigh truthfulness.
2Although these statements in Fenwick's Case were by an attorney,
not a court, they were indicators of the common law. Cf. Crawford, 541
U.S. at 45-46 (quoting the first statement). "[T]he weighty and earnest
speeches in [the parliamentary] debate [in Fenwick's Case] must have
burned into the general consciousness the vital importance of the rule
securing the right of cross-examination, and made it impossible
thereafter to dispute the domination of that rule as a permanent element
in the law." 3 John Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1364,
at 22 (Little, Brown, and Co., 1923).
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After Independence was declared, John Adams drafted the
Massachusetts Constitution, which recognized the right of a citizen "to
meet the witnesses against him face to face." Art. XII, Mass. Const. 1780.
Likewise, the Delaware Constitution of 1792 emphasized that citizens
had the right "to meet the witnesses in their examination face to face."
Art. I, § 7, Del. Const. 1792. Thomas Cooley, a leading expositor of the
United States Constitution, explained that the Confrontation Clause
requires that "the prosecution procure the presence of their witnesses in
open court, where the jury may have opportunity to observe them."
Thomas Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the
United States of America 295 (1880). This right was specifically a
requirement to confront witnesses "face to face." Crawford, 541 U.S. at
43.
Although our primary authority is the history and text of the
Constitution itself, decisions of the United States Supreme Court also
provide guidance. In Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), the Court held
that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses
against him was violated when two child witnesses who accused the
defendant of abuse testified with a screen blocking the defendant's view
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of them. The physical presence of the witnesses was insufficient because
they were not visible to the defendant. The Court emphasized that "the
Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting
with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact." Id. at 1016 (emphasis
added).
The Court has also emphasized an intertwined and critical aspect
of the confrontation right: "observation of demeanor by the trier of fact,"
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990). The role of the
Confrontation Clause is to provide the accused the
"opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting
the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand
face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief."
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895) (emphasis added).
The Confrontation Clause makes "it possible for the tribunal before
whom the witness appears to judge from his demeanor the credibility of
his evidence." Government of Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 548
(3d Cir. 1967). The Confrontation Clause helps ensure a fair trial by
requiring a clear view of the witness for both the defendant and the jury.
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Upon this foundation, a Texas Court of Appeals has held that
testimony by a disguised witness is unconstitutional. Romero v. State,
136 S.W.3d 680, 690-91 (Tex. App. 2004). The Michigan Court of Appeals
has held unconstitutional the wearing of a full-face mask while testifying.
People v. Sammons, 191 Mich. App. 351, 478 N.W.2d 901 (1991). In
response to the COVID-19 virus, a federal district court required
witnesses to wear face shields rather than masks while testifying. United
States v. Thompson, 543 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1163-64 (D.N.M. 2021). That
court explained: "[A]n unimpeded opportunity to cross-examine adverse
witnesses face-to-face and in full view of the jury is core to the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation. " Id. at 1164.
Applying these same principles, Judge McCool in his dissent below
emphasized the importance of juries' observing the entirety of facial
demeanor to determine credibility: "Whether a trembling lip, an
involuntary tic of the cheek, or a snarky smile, it [is] imperative that the
jury be able to view the face of the witness while he or she [is] testifying."
Rodriguez, ___ So. 3d at ___ (McCool, J., dissenting). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has emphasized the same
principles of credibility:
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"Demeanor is of the utmost importance in the
determination of the credibility of a witness. The innumerable
telltale indications which fall from a witness during the
course of his examination are often much more of an
indication to judge or jury of his credibility and the reliability
of his evidence than is the literal meaning of his words."
Aquino, 378 F.2d at 548. Inescapably, a mask covering the nose and
mouth obscures the lower half of all facial expressions, when those
expressions would enable the trier of fact and the defendant to evaluate
the testimony's authenticity and sincerity.
Therefore, a holding that the Confrontation Clause was not
implicated in this case would need to be founded on a conclusion that the
masks had no effect on the jury's observation of the witnesses' demeanor.
But no one appears to be arguing that position. As Judge McCool
observed, even cases that have allowed masked testimony have
acknowledged that "the masks will eliminate two aspects of demeanor for
the jury to consider: movement of the nose and mouth," United States v.
Crittenden, No. 4:20-CR-7, (CDL) Aug. 21, 2020 (M.D. Ga. 2020) (not
reported in Federal Supplement). Other cases have acknowledged that to
a "slight extent masks impinge on [a defendant's] Confrontation Clause
right to see a witness's full facial expressions," United States v. Maynard
No. 2:21-cr-00065, Nov. 3, 2021 (S.D. W. Va. 2021) (not reported in
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Federal Supplement). In other words, even the cases relied on by the
Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to justify the rejection of the
Confrontation Clause challenge acknowledged that the Confrontation
Clause was implicated under these circumstances but argued that any
impingement was justified by COVID-19. Thus, some impingement on
the Confrontation Clause right is conceded by the decisions addressing
the issue; the real question is whether such an impingement can be
justified.
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded in its unpublished
memorandum that " 'requiring [masks] is justified by important public
policy interests to protect the health and safety of those in the courthouse
while allowing court functions to proceed during a pandemic.' " (Quoting
Maynard, supra.) There are two fundamental problems with that
rationale. First, the United States Supreme Court has held that an
infringement of the confrontation right is permissible only when the
"denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public
policy." Craig, 497 U.S. at 850. But under that strict-scrutiny framework,
"[t]he requisite finding of necessity must of course be a case-specific one:
The trial court must hear evidence and determine whether" the
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infringement is necessary. Id. at 855. Thus, before any exception to the
confrontation right is made, the burden is on the State to present
evidence that it is necessary, and the trial court must make a case-
specific finding of necessity based on that evidence. Nothing is taken for
granted, and the government must empirically demonstrate the necessity
of the infringement on the right. As Judge McCool explained, "the State
bore the burden of proving that any measures imposed were necessary to
further the public policy under consideration." Rodriguez, ___ So. 3d at
___ (McCool, J., dissenting). Here, however, "the trial court did not make
any individualized findings as to this public policy or the necessary
remedy in furtherance of that policy, and no evidence regarding this issue
was presented or considered by the trial court." Id. at ___. In fact, there
is no indication that the State even asked for this measure to be imposed;
the circuit court imposed it on its own initiative. As Judge Minor
highlighted, although our Court had declared a COVID-19 state of
emergency for the Judicial Branch of Alabama, that declaration had
ended three weeks before the trial in this case. Id. at ___ (Minor, J.,
dissenting). Because there was no individualized fact-finding, the circuit
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court's exception to the Confrontation Clause cannot be justified under
the strict-scrutiny framework articulated in Craig.
Second, as Judge Minor pointed out below, there is a strong
argument that the above-discussed method of strict scrutiny for
exceptions is no longer good law. See Rodriguez, ___ So. 3d at ___ (Minor,
J., dissenting); United States v. Cox, 871 F.3d 479, 492-93 (6th Cir. 2017)
(Sutton, J., concurring). After Craig, the Supreme Court declared in
Crawford that it was not willing to "replac[e] categorical constitutional
guarantees with open-ended balancing tests" based on "amorphous
notions of 'reliability.' " Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 67-68. That was because
"[t]he text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended
exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the
courts." Id. at 54. Rather, the Confrontation Clause is "most naturally
read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting
only those exceptions established at the time of the founding." Id. Thus,
the sole question to ask to determine whether a practice that implicates
the protections of the Confrontation Clause is permissible is whether an
exception existed at the time of the founding under the common law.
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I believe that this method, rather than judicially created tiers of
scrutiny, is the best mode of constitutional analysis. Like the scope of
rights under the Second Amendment, see New York State Rifle & Pistol
Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2130 (2022), or the
First Amendment, see Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. ___,
___, 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2428 (2022), the scope of the confrontation right
under the Sixth Amendment must be determined primarily by looking to
the history and tradition that define the content and contours of the right.
Our role is not to "balance" constitutional safeguards like mere
"interests," but to enforce them as definitive protections of concrete
rights. Here, none of the federal opinions permitting masked testimony
or the Court of Criminal Appeals' memorandum discusses any historical
support for such an exception.
In short, the Confrontation Clause protects a defendant's right to
have witnesses' faces visible to the defendant and the jury. The voices of
our common-law tradition, as well as decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, strongly support this conclusion. Witnesses' wearing of
masks that partly obscure the face inevitably impinges on that right, as
Judge McCool thoroughly explained. In order to countenance such an
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impingement, we ought to accept "only those exceptions established at
the time of the founding." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54. If we had granted
certiorari review, the State and Rodriguez would have had an
opportunity to provide evidence of such a historical exception.
Finally, I emphasize that this case is not about the guilt or
innocence of criminal defendants. It is about the right of every American
to be confronted by the witnesses against him face to face. And it is about
the right to have the jury see each witness's face and decide whether that
witness is telling the truth. Moreover, this case is not about the danger
of the COVID-19 virus or the best methods to mitigate it. Like the
Justices of the United States Supreme Court, the members of this Court
and our courts of appeals "are not public health experts, and we should
respect the judgment of those with special expertise and responsibility in
this area." Diocese of Brooklyn, 592 U.S. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 68. But we
have "one Confrontation Clause (the one the Framers adopted and
Crawford described)," Giles, 554 U.S. at 376. We do not have the original
Confrontation Clause for ordinary times and a "special, improvised,
Confrontation Clause," id., for times of crisis -- whether of heinous
crimes, political tumult, or public-health emergencies. In all cases -- all
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cases, even during a pandemic -- we are governed by the same
Constitution.
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