Advanced Property Tax Liens, Inc. v. Jorge Othon ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                                     IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION TWO
    ADVANCED PROPERTY TAX LIENS, INC.,
    AN ARIZONA CORPORATION,
    Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    JORGE OTHON AND SPOUSE OF JORGE OTHON,
    IF ANY IN SEPTEMBER 2017,
    Defendants/Appellees.
    No. 2 CA-CV 2021-0001
    Filed October 25, 2021
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Santa Cruz County
    No. S1200CV201900192
    The Honorable Denneen L. Peterson, Judge Pro Tempore
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Barry Becker P.C., Phoenix
    By Barry C. Becker
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Law Offices of Gregory L. Droeger, Nogales
    By Gregory L. Droeger
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
    ADVANCED PROP. TAX LIENS v. OTHON
    Opinion of the Court
    OPINION
    Judge Eckerstrom authored the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding
    Judge Espinosa and Vice Chief Judge Staring concurred.
    E C K E R S T R O M, Judge:
    ¶1           In this quiet title action, Advanced Property Tax Liens, Inc.
    (“APTL”) appeals from the trial court’s rulings in favor of Jorge Othon on
    cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we
    affirm.
    Factual and Procedural Background
    ¶2            On appeal from the entry of summary judgment, we view the
    facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary
    judgment was granted, here APTL. Delo v. GMAC Mortg., L.L.C., 
    232 Ariz. 133
    , ¶ 2 (App. 2013). The material facts in this matter are undisputed. At
    issue is a parcel of commercial warehouse property located in Nogales,
    Arizona (the “Property”), formerly owned by Victalina Carreon.
    ¶3           In late 2014 or early 2015, Othon entered into an oral
    agreement with Carreon to purchase the Property for $450,000, and began
    making payments toward that purchase. The agreement was never
    documented, and Othon paid Carreon with money on which he had
    avoided paying taxes. Both Carreon and Othon knew the Property was
    encumbered by delinquent property taxes. Because they mutually
    understood that payment of those taxes would eventually fall to Othon,
    they accounted for the encumbrance by deducting the outstanding taxes
    from the purchase price.
    ¶4           When Carreon and Othon entered into their agreement, the
    Property had been vacant. Immediately after Othon made his first
    payment, he occupied the Property. He rented the warehouse space to
    three companies that operated there, two owned by him and one owned by
    his brother. The Property was, at all relevant times, “a fully occupied
    commercial property” that was open during normal business hours.
    ¶5           In February 2015, APTL purchased a tax lien on the Property
    at a Santa Cruz County tax lien auction, paying the unpaid property taxes
    2
    ADVANCED PROP. TAX LIENS v. OTHON
    Opinion of the Court
    and accrued interest. At some point afterward, Othon attempted to
    purchase APTL’s tax lien.1 But APTL refused to sell the tax lien to him.
    ¶6            In September 2017, after the purchase price had been paid in
    full, Carreon executed a deed conveying the Property to Othon. The deed
    was properly notarized and manifested Carreon’s intent to convey the
    Property to Othon. However, Othon did not record the deed with the Santa
    Cruz County Recorder. Nor did he notify the Santa Cruz County Treasurer
    or Assessor of his ownership of the Property or provide an appropriate
    mailing address at which he could be reached with tax bills or valuation
    notices. When he received the deed, Othon knew the Property was
    encumbered by unpaid property taxes, but he did not pay them. By 2018,
    Othon was aware the Property remained in Carreon’s name and that the
    delinquent property taxes had not been paid.
    Prior Tax Lien Foreclosure Action
    ¶7             In January 2018, APTL mailed a notice of intent to foreclose
    via certified mail to two addresses it had identified as belonging to Carreon:
    a residential address in Nogales and the situs address for the Property.2 See
    A.R.S. § 42-18202(A)(1) (requiring tax lien purchaser to send notice of intent
    to file foreclosure action at least thirty days before doing so). But both
    envelopes were returned by the Postal Service and marked as follows:
    “Return to Sender, Unclaimed, Unable to Forward.” APTL made no further
    1Othon  testified that he sought to acquire APTL’s tax lien because he
    had not filed income tax returns and had not paid taxes on the funds used
    to purchase the Property from Carreon. He planned to purchase APTL’s
    tax lien, complete his purchase from Carreon, and then “foreclose on
    [him]self” in order to hide the fact that he had used untaxed funds to
    acquire the Property. Othon conceded under oath that his efforts to conceal
    his income from the Internal Revenue Service and “launder” the untaxed
    money were illegal.
    2According   to the trial court’s order, APTL’s counsel stated in an
    affidavit that he had attempted to locate “the residence and whereabouts”
    of Carreon for purposes of providing the pre-litigation notice “by checking
    the Santa Cruz County telephone directory, Peoplefinders computer
    program, Department of Motor Vehicle records, and Santa Cruz County
    probate records.” The affidavit in question is not included in the record.
    3
    ADVANCED PROP. TAX LIENS v. OTHON
    Opinion of the Court
    attempts to locate Carreon for purposes of sending the thirty-day notice to
    her.3
    ¶8            The records of the Santa Cruz County Recorder had shown
    since August 2017 that the residential address to which APTL sent the
    thirty-day notice in January 2018 no longer belonged to Carreon. That
    residence had been sold at public auction in July 2017. After both notices
    were returned unopened and unclaimed, APTL never approached
    personnel at the Property—the situs address—or at neighboring buildings
    to seek additional information regarding Carreon’s whereabouts.
    ¶9            In May 2018, more than three years after its purchase of the
    Property tax lien, APTL filed its foreclosure action in Santa Cruz County
    Superior Court, naming Carreon as a defendant. In June, APTL’s process
    server attempted to serve the summons and complaint on Carreon at the
    residential address of public record—which, as noted above, had been sold
    at public auction in 2017. He stated in his affidavit that Carreon no longer
    resided at that address, which he avowed was “a VACANT and EMPTY
    HOUSE.” The Postal Service indicated that Carreon had moved without
    providing a forwarding address. In September 2018, after some additional
    efforts to locate Carreon but no inquiries at the Property itself,4 APTL
    published the tax lien foreclosure documents in Nogales International, a
    newspaper of general circulation within Santa Cruz County.5
    ¶10          In December 2018, APTL filed an affidavit of default, alleging
    that Carreon had been properly served but had failed to answer. In
    February 2019, the superior court entered a judgment of default, foreclosing
    Carreon’s right to redeem. In March, the Santa Cruz County Treasurer
    3The  record before us does not reflect, and neither the parties nor the
    trial court have addressed, whether APTL also mailed the thirty-day notice
    to the Santa Cruz County Treasurer, as required under § 42-18202(A)(2).
    4In  particular, APTL’s process server unsuccessfully attempted
    service at an address in Mesa, Arizona, where the occupant did not know
    the name Carreon. APTL also conducted a search of Maricopa County
    probate and civil lawsuit records, as well as a search of the Maricopa
    County Assessor’s records.
    5APTL’s  affidavit in support of service by publication contained the
    unintentional misstatement, which the parties agree was incorrect, that the
    Property—as opposed to Carreon’s former residence—was empty at the
    time service was attempted. In fact, as noted above, the Property was at all
    relevant times a commercial warehouse occupied by three businesses.
    4
    ADVANCED PROP. TAX LIENS v. OTHON
    Opinion of the Court
    acknowledged the default judgment and issued a treasurer’s deed
    conveying the Property to APTL. APTL recorded the deed on March 12,
    2019.
    ¶11           In April 2019, Carreon moved to vacate the default judgment.
    She claimed APTL had inappropriately utilized service by publication,
    rendering the default judgment void. Rather than submitting an affidavit
    of her own in support of this motion to vacate, Carreon attached an affidavit
    from Othon. In that affidavit, Othon falsely stated that Carreon was still
    the landlord of the Property and that he was merely her agent and tenant.
    He further attested that service on Carreon was never attempted at the
    Property and that no inquiry was made there to ascertain Carreon’s
    whereabouts. However, on August 8, 2019, Carreon moved to withdraw
    her motion to vacate the default judgment. On August 28, the trial court
    granted that motion “with prejudice.”
    This Quiet Title Action
    ¶12           On August 21, 2019—seven days before the trial court in the
    tax lien foreclosure action granted Carreon’s motion to withdraw her
    motion to vacate the default judgment—APTL filed the underlying
    complaint in this action seeking to quiet title to the Property, naming Othon
    as a defendant. In October, Othon (represented by the same attorney who
    had represented Carreon in the tax lien foreclosure action) filed an answer
    and counterclaim, asking the court to deny APTL’s claim for quiet title, find
    the default judgment void, and declare title to the Property vested in him.
    The parties cross-moved for summary judgment.
    ¶13            After a hearing, the trial court granted Othon’s motion and
    denied APTL’s. In particular, it ruled that Othon, as a party with the right
    to redeem, had standing to challenge the default judgment in the
    foreclosure action as void for lack of jurisdiction due to insufficient service
    of notice and process on Carreon. It then ruled that APTL had failed to
    properly provide the statutorily required thirty-day notice to Carreon
    before filing the tax lien foreclosure action, or to properly serve her with the
    summons and complaint. The court thus concluded that the March 2018
    tax lien foreclosure judgment “is void” and “did not operate to foreclose
    Othon’s rights.” This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).
    5
    ADVANCED PROP. TAX LIENS v. OTHON
    Opinion of the Court
    Discussion
    Standard of Review
    ¶14           In reviewing a trial court’s rulings on cross-motions for
    summary judgment, we review questions of law de novo, construing the
    facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party
    against whom summary judgment was granted, here APTL. Nelson v. Phx.
    Resort Corp., 
    181 Ariz. 188
    , 191 (App. 1994). We will affirm the grant of
    summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
    prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P.
    56(a); Green Cross Med., Inc. v. Gally, 
    242 Ariz. 293
    , ¶ 5 (App. 2017).
    Othon’s Standing to Challenge Default Judgment as Void
    ¶15           APTL asks us to reverse the trial court’s ruling on the ground
    that “Othon does not have standing to contest the trial court’s prior order
    of default” because “issues of notice and service are personal to a defendant
    (Ms. Carreon), and cannot be validly asserted by a third party (Mr. Othon).”
    This is a question of law, and “we review the trial court’s standing
    determination de novo.” Aegis of Ariz., L.L.C. v. Town of Marana, 
    206 Ariz. 557
    , ¶ 16 (App. 2003).
    ¶16            Here, the trial court acknowledged that the “general rule” is
    that a claim of inadequate service is personal to the person upon whom
    service was to be made. But it concluded that Othon nonetheless had
    standing to attack the default judgment because his position as to Carreon
    “is similar” to that of an insurer, who has a “well-recognized right” to raise
    the issue of defective service as to its insured. APTL challenges this holding
    as “erroneous,” arguing “the analogy of an insurance company to its
    insured is not justified as it relates to Othon and Carreon.”
    ¶17             It is well established in Arizona that an insurer “has the right
    to set aside a default judgment against its insured, not only on behalf of the
    insured, but on its own behalf.” Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Hudson Oil Co., Inc.,
    
    131 Ariz. 285
    , 288 (1982). APTL contends this is only because of the
    insurer’s status as the insured’s legal representative, who bears a
    contractual duty to protect the insured. This argument, however, ignores a
    separate rationale for the rule allowing insurers to challenge service on their
    insureds. As our supreme court has explained, a default judgment creates
    not only a judgment against the insured, but also a debt under the insurance
    contract between the judgment debtor and the insurer, who should
    therefore have a right to defend against the default judgment. 
    Id.
     In other
    words, an insurer has “a definite and substantial interest” in the outcome
    of litigation involving an insured to whom it may ultimately be found liable
    6
    ADVANCED PROP. TAX LIENS v. OTHON
    Opinion of the Court
    for a judgment. Koven v. Saberdyne Sys., Inc., 
    128 Ariz. 318
    , 321 (App. 1980)
    (finding insurer to have standing based on definite, substantial interest
    even though insurer “had previously denied coverage”).
    ¶18            Likewise, Othon has “a definite and substantial interest” in
    the outcome of the tax lien foreclosure action. As the trial court explained,
    although Othon “should have recorded the deed given to him by Carreon,”
    that unrecorded deed was still valid between him and Carreon, pursuant to
    A.R.S. § 33-412(B). He was therefore entitled, until the entry of a valid
    judgment foreclosing redemption, to redeem the tax lien to protect his claim
    on the Property. See A.R.S. §§ 42-18151(A)(1), (4) (property’s owner and
    “[a]ny person who has a legal or equitable claim in the property, including
    a certificate of purchase of a different date,” is entitled to redeem tax lien
    on said property), 42-18206 (person entitled to redeem may do so “at any
    time before judgment is entered, notwithstanding that an action to foreclose
    has been commenced”). As the court noted, Othon’s failure to publicly
    record his deed did not eliminate his right of redemption, “because a real
    property tax lien may be redeemed at any time before judgment is entered
    by any person who has a legal or equitable claim in the property without
    regard as to the interest’s recordation.” See id. And, importantly here, that
    right may persist even after a tax lien foreclosure judgment has been
    entered if that judgment is flawed: a judgment that is void on its face due
    to lack of jurisdiction is “a legal nullity” that “cannot operate to foreclose a
    party’s right to redeem.” Sprang v. Peterson Lumber, 
    165 Ariz. 257
    , 264 (App.
    1990).
    ¶19            Thus, unlike Carreon—who had little reason to vigorously
    contest the validity of a default judgment regarding a Property she had
    already conveyed6—Othon has “a definite and substantial interest” in
    establishing that the underlying default judgment is void and, thus, did not
    foreclose his right to redeem. As we have explained, a void judgment “may
    be attacked either directly or collaterally at any time within a reasonable time
    after entry of judgment.” 
    Id. at 264
     (emphasis added); see also Cooper v.
    Commonwealth Title of Ariz., 
    15 Ariz. App. 560
    , 564 (1971) (judgment that is
    void on its face “may be attacked at any time, collaterally or otherwise”).
    6It does not follow, as APTL argues on appeal, that notice to Carreon
    “is irrelevant,” or that whether she “was properly served or received notice
    is moot as she had no interest in the Property to protect,” having conveyed
    it to Othon. It is undisputed that Carreon was the property owner of record
    when APTL filed its tax lien foreclosure action, and APTL was therefore
    legally required to provide her with notice prior to initiating the lawsuit
    and to serve her with adequate process.
    7
    ADVANCED PROP. TAX LIENS v. OTHON
    Opinion of the Court
    Here, having been named as a defendant in APTL’s quiet title action
    regarding the Property—an action that is premised on the deed that
    resulted from the default judgment in question—Othon has standing to
    defend himself and his right to redeem by collaterally attacking that
    judgment as void.7 Cf. Daystar Invs., L.L.C. v. Maricopa Cnty. Treasurer, 
    207 Ariz. 569
    , ¶¶ 15-16 (App. 2004) (finding non-party county treasurer had
    standing to challenge default judgment and resulting order to issue deed,
    based on “interest in determining his responsibilities under the
    circumstances”).
    ¶20           APTL also contends Othon lacks standing because he “does
    not have a cognizable interest in the Property as to [APTL]” due to his
    failure to record the deed he received from Carreon.8 APTL argues that,
    although Othon maintains a cognizable interest in the Property as against
    Carreon, he has no interest in it as against “the world,” including APTL.
    ¶21           APTL is correct that § 33-412(A) provides that all sales of real
    property are void as to “subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration
    without notice, unless they are acknowledged and recorded in the office of
    the county recorder as required by law.” But this and other recording
    statutes do not protect parties who obtain default judgments in tax lien
    foreclosure actions by failing to satisfy the required notice or service of
    process requirements (i.e., judgments that are void as a matter of law). The
    statutes presuppose valid judgments. See Sprang, 
    165 Ariz. at 263-64
    . Thus,
    APTL’s arguments based on the recording statutes beg the question raised
    by Othon and addressed by the trial court: Was the judgment obtained by
    APTL in the tax lien foreclosure action void due to a failure by APTL to
    provide the mandatory thirty-day notice or adequate service of process (or
    both) to Carreon—the undisputed property owner of record at the time? If
    so, APTL cannot be correct that it “takes the Property free and clear of
    7As explained above, this standing does not stem from any duty on
    Othon’s part to protect Carreon or any privity between them. We therefore
    need not address APTL’s argument that “Othon’s ability to challenge the
    prior judgment would only extend to the fullest possible extent Carreon
    could challenge the prior judgment.”
    8APTL   further contends that Othon’s submission of a misleading
    affidavit in the tax lien foreclosure action “precludes ownership interest
    under the sham affidavit doctrine.” But APTL did not raise this argument
    before the trial court, and we do not address it further. See Rigoli v. 44
    Monroe Mktg., LLC, 
    236 Ariz. 112
    , ¶ 28 (App. 2014) (arguments and theories
    raised for first time on appeal are untimely, waived, and impermissible
    basis for reversing entry of summary judgment).
    8
    ADVANCED PROP. TAX LIENS v. OTHON
    Opinion of the Court
    Othon’s claim” by having recorded a deed it obtained as the “successful
    plaintiff in its tax lien foreclosure action.” To the contrary, if the default
    judgment in that action—which led to the issuance of the deed—is void, the
    recording statutes do not favor APTL as against Othon or anyone else.
    See 
    id. at 262-63
     (treasurer’s deed based on void default judgment
    “convey[s] nothing” and “doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value does
    not apply” because “if one buys nothing, one is simply not a purchaser”).
    This is why the trial court, having found the underlying judgment void,
    concluded that APTL is not a bona fide purchaser for value.
    ¶22            APTL’s public policy arguments also fail. We do not hold
    here, as APTL asserts, that a purchaser of real estate “does not need to
    record his deed or abide by the recording statutes in order to have a
    protectable interest.”     As he conceded at oral argument on the
    cross-motions for summary judgment, Othon would surely “not have a
    case” as against a bona fide purchaser for value who had obtained a valid
    tax lien foreclosure judgment and then recorded the resulting deed.9 But,
    he must be permitted to defend himself in APTL’s quiet title action on the
    ground that the judgment and resulting deed APTL wields against him are
    legal nullities that “cannot operate to foreclose [his] right to redeem.”
    Sprang, 
    165 Ariz. at 262, 264
    .10
    9This was the situation in the unpublished and factually distinct case
    referenced by APTL, in which the tax lien investor “detailed what steps it
    took in giving notice of the foreclosure action,” only one of four notices was
    returned as undeliverable, and the challengers to the default judgment
    “conceded in the trial court that they had been properly served by
    publication.” Miller v. Russell, No. 1 CA-CV 09-0077, ¶¶ 5, 19 (Ariz. App.
    July 7, 2011) (mem. decision).
    10As   our supreme court has explained, “standing is not a
    constitutional jurisdictional requirement in the state courts of Arizona,”
    and “our reluctance to consider issues raised where there is no standing is
    solely a rule of judicial restraint.” State v. B Bar Enters., Inc., 
    133 Ariz. 99
    ,
    101 n.2 (1982). Courts may therefore exercise their discretion to consider
    the merits of a case “despite an apparent lack of standing.” 
    Id.
     It is true
    that we do so “only in exceptional circumstances, generally in cases
    involving issues of great public importance that are likely to recur.” Sears
    v. Hull, 
    192 Ariz. 65
    , ¶ 25 (1998). But assuming, arguendo, that Othon lacks
    standing to challenge the underlying default judgment as void due to
    inadequate service of notice and process on Carreon, this case presents a
    matter of general public importance. Tax lien investors must not be
    rewarded for failing to satisfy notice or service of process requirements
    9
    ADVANCED PROP. TAX LIENS v. OTHON
    Opinion of the Court
    Voidness of Default Judgment
    ¶23           As noted above, the trial court agreed with Othon that APTL
    failed to comply with the thirty-day pre-litigation notice requirement for a
    tax lien foreclosure action established at § 42-18202(A)(1), rendering the
    underlying default judgment void for lack of jurisdiction. APTL challenges
    that ruling on appeal, contending it satisfied the statutory notice
    requirement. We review de novo whether a default judgment is void. BYS
    Inc. v. Smoudi, 
    228 Ariz. 573
    , ¶ 18 (App. 2012).
    ¶24             The thirty-day pre-litigation notice required under § 42-18202
    for tax lien foreclosure actions is jurisdictional. If the purchaser of a tax lien
    “fails to send the notice required by this section,” the trial court is precluded
    by the statute from entering any action to foreclose the right to redeem until
    the required notice has been sent. § 42-18202(C); see also Advanced Prop. Tax
    Liens, Inc. v. Sherman, 
    227 Ariz. 528
    , ¶ 21 (App. 2011) (when notice
    inadequate, trial court not authorized to proceed with tax lien foreclosure
    action, and resulting default judgment void).
    ¶25            Section 42-18202(A)(1) provides two possible methods by
    which a tax lien holder intending to file an action to foreclose may provide
    the required notice before initiating litigation. First, notice may be sent via
    certified mail to “[t]he property owner of record according to the records of
    the county recorder in the county in which the property is located.” Or,
    under the second option, notice may be sent (still via certified mail) to “[t]he
    property owner according to the records of the county assessor in the
    county in which the property is located” and—if they are different—the
    situs address of the property and “[t]he tax bill mailing address according
    to the records of the county treasurer in the county in which the property is
    located.” § 42-18202(A)(1)(a)-(c). Under either alternative, the tax lien
    holder must also send the notice to the treasurer of the county where the
    property is located. § 42-18202(A)(2); see also Sherman, 
    227 Ariz. 528
    , ¶ 12.
    ¶26           In Sherman, we held that the first notice option under
    § 42-18202(A)(1) pinpoints the identity of the property owner, not a
    particular address to which notice must be sent. 
    227 Ariz. 528
    , ¶ 15. We
    observed that the statutory language “property owner of record” is
    immediately modified by the words “according to the records of the county
    recorder in the county in which the property is located.” 
    Id.
     The same is
    true of the second notice option under the statute: the term “property
    owner” is immediately modified by the phrase “according to the records of
    with default judgments that, though void, are nonetheless immune from
    collateral challenge by individuals with a right to redeem but who are not
    property owners of record entitled to such notice and service themselves.
    10
    ADVANCED PROP. TAX LIENS v. OTHON
    Opinion of the Court
    the county assessor in the county in which the property is located.”
    § 42-18202(A)(1)(a). And, as we have noted, the county assessor is required
    under A.R.S. § 42-13051 to determine the owners of properties subject to
    taxation, not to maintain current addresses for those owners. 4QTKIDZ,
    LLC v. HNT Holdings, LLC, Nos. 2 CA-CV 2019-0187, 2 CA-CV 2019-0188,
    2 CA-CV 2019-0190, n.4 (Ariz. App. Feb. 8, 2021) (consol. mem. decision)
    (extending Sherman’s reasoning to § 42-18202(A)(1)(a)-(c)).11 Thus, both
    notice provisions pinpoint the identity of the property owner, not particular
    addresses to which notice must be sent. They reflect a legislative intent that
    “the notice have a good chance of reaching the intended recipient,”
    Sherman, 
    227 Ariz. 528
    , ¶ 16—a “high probability that the notice of the lien
    holder’s intent to foreclose will reach the property owner,” id. ¶ 19.
    ¶27            Indeed, the broader statutory scheme governing tax lien
    foreclosure is designed to provide “the record owner of property and others
    who may claim a legal or equitable interest in the property an opportunity
    to avoid losing their interest in the property by paying the taxes and curing
    the delinquency.” Daystar Invs., 
    207 Ariz. 569
    , ¶ 16. A judgment obtained
    in violation of statutory requirements, including the notice requirement at
    issue here, “wrongfully interferes with these statutory protections.” Id.; see
    also Delo, 
    232 Ariz. 133
    , ¶ 12 (“Equity favors the right to redeem and will
    not deny the right except upon strict compliance with the steps necessary to
    divest it.” (emphasis added) (quoting Harbel Oil Co. v. Steele, 
    83 Ariz. 181
    ,
    185 (1957))).
    ¶28           In this case, APTL sent the pre-litigation notice to two
    addresses: a residential address in Nogales and the situs address. APTL
    advised the trial court that the residential address had been the one on file
    with the county recorder, county assessor, and county treasurer. This,
    together with APTL’s simultaneous mailing of the notice to the situs
    address of the Property, indicates an attempt to provide notice pursuant to
    both methods outlined in § 42-18202(A)(1). However, as noted above,
    APTL received both notices back unopened and marked “unclaimed.”
    ¶29            The residential address had not belonged to Carreon for a
    number of months prior to the attempted notice in late January 2018, having
    been sold at public auction in July 2017 (a fact that was reflected in the
    county recorder’s records as of early August 2017). According to the trial
    court, APTL “did not investigate at the Santa Cruz County Recorder’s
    Office” as to the residential address. APTL has never explained this failure,
    11Although    “not precedential,” we cite this prior memorandum
    decision for its persuasive value. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1)(C).
    11
    ADVANCED PROP. TAX LIENS v. OTHON
    Opinion of the Court
    which would have revealed the need for further investigation regarding
    Carreon’s whereabouts based on the sale of her residence in 2017.
    ¶30            Sherman, the leading case in this area, involved similar facts.
    There, the prospective plaintiff (also APTL) attempted to utilize only the
    first statutory notification method, sending the notice to an address for the
    property owners on file with the county recorder. 
    227 Ariz. 528
    , ¶ 13. As
    here, the notice was returned unopened and marked “unclaimed.” Id. ¶ 17.
    When APTL nonetheless initiated its lawsuit and attempted to serve the
    property owners with process, it learned that they had sold the address
    property five years earlier. Id. ¶¶ 4, 17. We ruled that, on those facts, APTL
    “did not send the notice of intent to foreclose to the [property owners of
    record] and therefore did not comply” with § 42-18202(A)(1). Id. ¶ 18. In
    particular, we concluded the statute “requires more than mailing the notice
    of intent to foreclose to an eight-year-old address that is no longer current,
    especially after learning the address was no longer current.” Id.
    ¶31           In this case, the trial court concluded that, “[a]s in Sherman,”
    APTL did not accomplish the requirement of sending notice to the property
    owner of record. Rather, APTL “sent the notice to an old address without
    learning whether it was sending [it] to the owner of record—Carreon,” and
    thus mailed the notice “to a vacant residence with which Carreon no longer
    had direct connection.” Moreover, having received the returned envelopes
    unopened and “unclaimed,” APTL “could not conclude that it had
    complied with the statutory requirement to send the notice to Carreon.”
    This analysis flows directly from Sherman, which compels us to reject
    APTL’s argument that mailing a notice to Carreon’s former personal
    residence was somehow a way of mailing notice to her as required under
    the statute.
    ¶32           In this case, APTL also mailed the notice to the situs address.
    But after that notice was returned unopened and marked “unclaimed,”
    APTL did nothing to investigate at the Property. As the trial court put it,
    APTL “made almost no efforts to attempt to locate and give notice to
    Carreon through the subject property.” In particular, “[n]o further
    investigation was done . . . such as inquiring of tenants, neighbors,
    knowledgeable persons or public records about current or former tenants,
    the whereabouts of the owner, etc.” This is a striking distinction between
    the present case and Sherman, in which a process server approached the
    address where notice had been attempted unsuccessfully, spoke to
    “someone from the business then occupying” the building, learned that the
    property had been sold, and obtained a current address for the prior
    property owners from a salesman at a nearby business. 
    227 Ariz. 528
    , ¶ 4.
    Here, in contrast, APTL made no efforts to inquire at the Property or nearby
    12
    ADVANCED PROP. TAX LIENS v. OTHON
    Opinion of the Court
    establishments regarding why the unclaimed notice had not reached
    Carreon or how she might be reached.
    ¶33            Was APTL required under § 42-18202(A)(1)(a)-(c) and
    Sherman to do so? APTL has taken the position, both before the trial court
    and on appeal, that nothing more was required. We disagree. APTL is
    correct that “[c]ompliance with § 42-18202(A) does not guarantee actual
    notice.” Sherman, 
    227 Ariz. 528
    , n.4. But our prior jurisprudence establishes
    that merely mailing notice letters to an address of record or the situs
    address may not be sufficient, particularly where those notices are returned
    unopened and unclaimed, providing the lien holder with actual knowledge
    that notice has not been received. See id. ¶¶ 16-18; 4QTKIDZ, Nos. 2 CA-CV
    2019-0187, 2 CA-CV 2019-0188 & 2 CA-CV 2019-1090, ¶¶ 16-17; see also Delo,
    
    232 Ariz. 133
    , ¶ 17 (“diligent search” and inquiry required “for purposes of
    giving proper notice of the tax-lien foreclosure lawsuit”). As the trial court
    put it, “The 30 day notice statute, the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, and
    Sherman mandate a genuine investigation into locating persons who have
    recorded and unrecorded interests in the property, not an incomplete or
    nominal attempt to locate.” Here, APTL “was on notice that its attempts to
    provide the 30 day notice to Carreon [were] deficient when it received
    envelopes back from the Post Office marked as undeliverable.” This is
    doubly true given that APTL—the tax lien holder involved in Sherman—
    had personally received “direction from the Sherman case that its conduct
    in this case did not satisfy its statutory obligations.”
    ¶34             APTL insists that accurate contact information for Carreon
    was “not ascertainable,” emphasizing that Othon has never submitted an
    affidavit stating that he or others at the Property could have provided such
    information if asked. We note, however, that APTL successfully obtained
    Carreon’s contact information for purposes of deposing her in the tax lien
    foreclosure action. The record before us also indicates that Carreon—in
    addition to having maintained a business relationship with Othon over a
    number of years and retaining the same legal counsel with regard to the
    Property—is the mother of Othon’s girlfriend. Therefore, an inquiry
    directed at Othon or others physically present at the Property could have
    yielded information sufficient to allow APTL to more effectively provide
    Carreon with the statutorily required pre-litigation notice. Instead, APTL
    took no additional steps, electing to file its tax lien foreclosure action with
    full knowledge that neither Carreon nor anyone else had received the notice
    of its intent to do so.
    ¶35          We therefore agree with the trial court that APTL “failed to
    comply with basic notice requirements for the 30 day notice of the intent to
    foreclose” and “did not act diligently as required by Arizona statute and
    13
    ADVANCED PROP. TAX LIENS v. OTHON
    Opinion of the Court
    Sherman.” Because notice under § 42-18202(A)(1) is required before a party
    may commence a tax lien foreclosure action, and failure to comply with the
    statute strips a trial court of jurisdiction to enter a foreclosure judgment,
    § 42-18202(C), the trial court correctly ruled that the default judgment in the
    prior tax lien foreclosure action is void as a matter of law.12 “[A]ll acts
    performed pursuant to [that void] judgment,” including the deed received
    and recorded by APTL, “are without legal effect.” Sprang, 
    165 Ariz. at 265
    .13
    Remedy
    ¶36            Finally, APTL contends the trial court erred by “crafti[ng] an
    improper remedy.” In particular, APTL argues that Othon “has been
    unjustly enriched by owning the Property but never redeeming the taxes”
    owed on it—which APTL paid—“or paying [APTL’s] fees and costs
    pursuant to A.R.S. § 42-18206.” This argument ignores the content and
    actual result of the ruling from which APTL has appealed.
    ¶37            In his cross-motion for summary judgment, Othon asked the
    trial court to find that the underlying tax lien foreclosure judgment is “a
    nullity” due to lack of jurisdiction, and that he—as the equitable owner of
    the Property—“be allowed to redeem.” (Emphasis added.) The court agreed
    that the judgment “is void and did not operate to foreclose Othon’s rights.”
    It then ordered only that Othon’s cross-motion for summary judgment “is
    GRANTED” and that the judgment in question “is void.” Thus, nothing in
    the ruling before us precludes Othon from redeeming the tax lien.
    ¶38          To date, APTL has obtained only a void default judgment
    regarding the Property and a resulting deed that conveyed nothing. In the
    action in which that result obtained, Othon (who was already an owner
    when the action began in May 2018) was not served personally or by
    12Both  parties have argued at length regarding their respective
    “unclean hands.” As the trial court correctly concluded, “equity gives way
    to law when rights are clearly established and defined by statute,” and “the
    statutory requirement[] for notice in tax lien foreclosure cases takes this
    matter out of equity.” In particular, when APTL failed to comply with the
    notice statute by “fail[ing] to diligently inquire as to the whereabouts of
    Carreon and any other possible interested parties, it lost its ability to claim
    equitable relief via unclean hands.”
    13Because we affirm the ruling of the trial court that the default
    judgment in the tax lien foreclosure action is void for lack of jurisdiction
    due to invalid notice, we need not address its additional ruling that the
    judgment is also void due to inadequately justified service of process by
    publication.
    14
    ADVANCED PROP. TAX LIENS v. OTHON
    Opinion of the Court
    publication and did not redeem. The fee and cost provision of § 42-18206 is
    therefore not triggered. See id. (attorney fees and costs only due to tax lien
    foreclosure plaintiff “if the person who redeems has been served personally
    or by publication in the action, or if the person became an owner after the
    action began and redeems after notice is recorded”).
    ¶39          For these reasons, we reject APTL’s request for fees and costs.
    Insofar as APTL has incurred fees and costs in this litigation, they are
    largely of APTL’s own making. An adequately “diligent search” by APTL
    for purposes of satisfying the mandatory notice requirement in the
    underlying tax lien foreclosure action would almost certainly have allowed
    Othon to redeem the tax lien prior to the entry of judgment, either because
    Carreon “could have forwarded” the notice to Othon, Delo, 
    232 Ariz. 133
    ,
    ¶ 17, or because inquiries at the Property aimed at providing notice to
    Carreon would have alerted Othon of APTL’s intent to foreclose.
    Disposition
    ¶40          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial
    court. As the prevailing party, Othon is entitled to recover his costs on
    appeal, A.R.S. § 12-341, upon his compliance with Rule 21(b), Ariz. R. Civ.
    App. P.
    15