United States v. Inabinette , 66 M.J. 320 ( 2008 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Justin A. INABINETTE, Sergeant
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 07-0787
Crim. App. No. 200602228
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued February 4, 2008
Decided May 22, 2008
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and ERDMANN, STUCKY, and RYAN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Commander Matthew T. Schelp, JAGC,
USNR (argued); Lieutenant Commander Thomas P. Belsky, JAGC, USNR
(on brief); Lieutenant Kathleen L. Kadlec, JAGC, USN.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Justin E. Dunlap, JAGC, USN (argued);
Major Brian K. Keller, USMC (on brief).
Military Judge: J. G. Meeks
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Inabinette, No. 07-0787/MC
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant was tried by a military judge sitting as a
special court-martial. Appellant pleaded guilty to disobeying a
general order and larceny, in violation of Articles 92 and 121,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 921
(2000). The military judge found Appellant guilty of the orders
offense, and with respect to the charged larceny, found
Appellant guilty of the lesser included offense of wrongful
appropriation. Appellant was sentenced to confinement for one
year, reduction to the lowest enlisted grade, and a bad-conduct
discharge. The findings and sentence were approved by the
convening authority, and affirmed by the United States Navy-
Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals. United States v.
Inabinette, No. NMCCA 200602228, 2007 CCA LEXIS 184, at *16,
2007 WL 1724913, at *6 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. June 12, 2007).
Appellant challenges the standard used by the lower court in
reviewing his plea.1
The lower court’s opinion raises several questions
regarding the standard of review of a military judge’s decision
to accept an accused’s plea of guilty. The questions arise, in
1
On Appellant’s petition we granted the following issue for
review:
WHETHER THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
REVIEWED FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, RATHER THAN DE NOVO,
THE MILITARY JUDGE’S LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT’S
PLEAS WERE PROVIDENT.
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part, because of the varied but related standards employed by
this Court in reviewing discrete factual and legal aspects of a
guilty plea. For the reasons stated below, we reiterate that
the standard for reviewing a military judge’s decision to accept
a plea of guilty is an abuse of discretion. A military judge
abuses his discretion if he accepts a guilty plea without an
adequate factual basis to support the plea. In contrast, the
military judge’s determinations of questions of law arising
during or after the plea inquiry are reviewed de novo. In this
case, the military judge obtained an adequate factual basis to
support the plea and correctly applied the law. As a result, we
affirm.
I.
During the period of the alleged offenses, Appellant served
under combat conditions at Camp Mahmudiyah, Iraq, where he
worked in the armory. According to Dr. Clark E. Smith, a board-
certified forensic psychiatrist who testified during sentencing
on behalf of the defense, Appellant experienced several stress-
related symptoms, including nightmares, depression, and
emotional withdrawal. On or about January 20, 2005, Appellant
attempted to mail a fragmentation grenade and a confiscated
pistol to his parents’ home. During the plea inquiry he claimed
to have no memory of committing the offense; however, Appellant
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remembered planning it, and hoping he would be caught and sent
home.
Dr. Smith stated that at the time of the offense, Appellant
suffered from Bipolar I Disorder with psychotic features. Upon
hearing this testimony, the military judge commented that Dr.
Smith’s testimony was at odds with Appellant’s guilty plea.
After being recalled to the stand, Dr. Smith testified that he
had no indication that Appellant did not appreciate the
wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the offense.
Following Dr. Smith’s testimony, the military judge determined
that Appellant’s pleas remained provident.
II.
During a guilty plea inquiry the military judge is charged
with determining whether there is an adequate basis in law and
fact to support the plea before accepting it. United States v.
Prater, 32 M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A. 1991). “A military judge’s
decision to accept a guilty plea is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Eberle, 44 M.J. 374, 375
(C.A.A.F. 1996); see also United States v. Shaw, 64 M.J. 460,
462 (C.A.A.F. 2007); United States v. Tippit, 65 M.J. 69, 81
(C.A.A.F. 2007); United States v. Thomas, 65 M.J. 132, 134
(C.A.A.F. 2007); United States v. Simmons, 63 M.J. 89, 92
(C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Phillippe, 63 M.J. 307, 309
(C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Erickson, 61 M.J. 230, 232
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(C.A.A.F. 2005). A military judge abuses this discretion if he
fails to obtain from the accused an adequate factual basis to
support the plea -- an area in which we afford significant
deference. United States v. Jordan, 57 M.J. 236, 238 (C.A.A.F.
2002). Additionally, any ruling based on an erroneous view of
the law also constitutes an abuse of discretion. United States
v. Griggs, 61 M.J. 402, 406 (C.A.A.F. 2005); United States v.
Wardle, 58 M.J. 156, 157 (C.A.A.F. 2003); United States v.
Sullivan, 42 M.J. 360, 363 (C.A.A.F. 1995).
There exist strong arguments in favor of giving broad
discretion to military judges in accepting pleas, not least
because facts are by definition undeveloped in such cases. See
Jordan, 57 M.J. at 238. Indeed, as stated in Jordan, an accused
might make a conscious choice to plead guilty in order to “limit
the nature of the information that would otherwise be disclosed
in an adversarial contest.” Id. at 238-39. As a result, in
reviewing a military judge’s acceptance of a plea for an abuse
of discretion appellate courts apply a substantial basis test:
Does the record as a whole show “‘a substantial basis’ in law
and fact for questioning the guilty plea.” United States v.
Prater, 32 M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A. 1991).
Traditionally, this test is presented in the conjunctive
(i.e., law and fact) as in Prater; however, the test is better
considered in the disjunctive (i.e., law or fact). That is
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because it is possible to have a factually supportable plea yet
still have a substantial basis in law for questioning it. This
might occur where an accused knowingly admits facts that meet
all the elements of an offense, but nonetheless is not advised
of an available defense or states matters inconsistent with the
plea that are not resolved by the military judge. At the same
time, where the factual predicate for a plea falls short, a
reviewing court would have no reason to inquire de novo into any
legal questions surrounding the plea.
Within this general framework, distinct questions may arise
for which an appellate court will review a plea using a de novo
standard of review, such as in those cases where the providence
of a plea raises pure questions of law. The court below
recognized this exception, noting our opinion in United States
v. Pena, 64 M.J. 259 (C.A.A.F. 2007), a case involving the
question of whether a military judge had an affirmative duty to
inquire into an accused’s understanding of the collateral
consequences of participation in an early release program.
United States v. Inabinette, 2007 CCA LEXIS 184, at *2, 2007 WL
1724913, at *1 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App., June 12, 2007)
(unpublished). Because that case dealt with the legal aspects
of the military judge’s duties during the plea inquiry, and not
with the adequacy of the factual inquiry, it was appropriate to
apply a de novo standard. Pena, 64 M.J. at 267. In United
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States v. Harris, 61 M.J. 391 (C.A.A.F. 2005), this Court
reviewed de novo the military judge’s legal conclusion that the
facts presented did not give rise to a defense of mental
responsibility. Id. at 398. As our review considered a mixed
question of law and fact, determined by the military judge after
a factfinding hearing, the standard was de novo. Id.In summary, we review a military judge’s decision to accept
a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion and questions of law
arising from the guilty plea de novo. In doing so, we apply the
substantial basis test, looking at whether there is something in
the record of trial, with regard to the factual basis or the
law, that would raise a substantial question regarding the
appellant’s guilty plea.
III.
This Court addressed the issue of evidence of bipolar
disorder raised during sentencing and post-trial procedures in
Harris and Shaw. In Harris, a pretrial examination conducted
pursuant to Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 706 determined that
the accused had been mentally responsible at the time of the
alleged offenses. 61 M.J. at 393. The accused was subsequently
convicted in accordance with his pleas. Id. at 392. After the
court-martial, a mental health official determined that Harris
suffered from a severe case of bipolar disorder, and was
unlikely to have appreciated the wrongfulness of his actions at
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the time of the offenses. Id. at 393. The military judge
conducted a post-trial Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 839(a)
(2000), session, and considered the contradicting pretrial and
post-trial medical testimony, ultimately finding that the
accused’s guilty plea remained provident. Id. Following the
Article 39(a), UCMJ, session, the convening authority ordered
another R.C.M. 706 examination, which determined that -- while
the accused suffered from a severe mental disease -- he had
understood the wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the
offenses. Id. at 394. This Court reviewed de novo the military
judge’s legal conclusion that Appellant’s pleas were provident
and reversed. Id. at 398-99. In doing so, we stated, “We do
not see how an accused can make an informed plea without
knowledge that he suffered a severe mental disease or defect at
the time of the offense. Nor is it possible for a military
judge to conduct the necessary Care inquiry into an accused’s
pleas without exploring the impact of any potential mental
health issues on those pleas.” Id. at 398.
In Shaw, the accused made an unsworn statement following
findings of guilty, stating that he had been diagnosed with a
bipolar disorder after suffering a severe brain injury. 64 M.J.
at 461. Beyond this unsworn statement and responses made to
defense counsel’s question, Shaw did not offer any further
evidence of his bipolar condition, nor did he assert that his
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condition implicated his mental responsibility for his offense.
Id. at 461, 464. In contrast to Harris, this Court held that
the military judge was not required to inquire further about the
effect of Shaw’s mental condition on his responsibility for his
actions because Shaw’s statement, without more, did not put his
mental responsibility at issue, but raised only the possibility
of a defense. Id. at 464. By extension, the military judge did
not abuse his discretion in accepting Shaw’s pleas of guilty.
Id.
In this case, the military judge heard potentially
contradictory testimony from Dr. Smith. Dr. Smith testified
that Appellant had Bipolar I Disorder with psychotic features.
Among other things, when asked whether Appellant could
understand the nature and quality of his actions, Dr. Smith
stated “there exists that question, yes.” However, in response
to the military judge’s further inquiry, Dr. Smith also
testified that Appellant told him he was aware of the
wrongfulness of his acts at the time, and that he, Dr. Smith,
did not “have evidence to the contrary.” In addition, the
military judge questioned Appellant, and had the results of two
R.C.M. 706 boards that found the likelihood that Appellant was
unable to appreciate the nature and wrongfulness of his behavior
“[s]tatistically improbable.” Thus, in contrast to Shaw, the
tension in Appellant’s plea rests on more than the unsworn
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testimony of the accused. Nonetheless, this case is more akin
to Shaw than to Harris. Here, the military judge inquired into
Appellant’s mental condition following Dr. Smith’s testimony,
and addressed the potential inconsistency in that testimony
regarding Appellant’s mental responsibility at the time of the
offenses. He did so by questioning Dr. Smith and Appellant
against a backdrop of consistent R.C.M. 706 board findings.
As a result, we conclude that the military judge correctly
applied the law by inquiring into Appellant’s mental
responsibility in light of the potentially contradictory
testimony offered after the acceptance of Appellant’s plea and
concluding that this new evidence did not undermine the adequacy
of the plea. The military judge, therefore, properly accepted
Appellant’s provident plea, and the Court of Criminal Appeals
properly reviewed the military judge’s decision for an abuse of
discretion.
DECISION
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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