United States v. Luke , 69 M.J. 309 ( 2011 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Ivor G. LUKE, Hospital Corpsman Second Class
U.S. Navy, Appellant
No. 05-0157
Crim. App. No. NMCCA 200000481
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 4, 2010
Decided January 25, 2011
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BAKER,
J., joined. RYAN, J., filed a separate concurring opinion.
STUCKY, J., filed a separate opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. EFFRON, C.J., filed a separate dissenting
opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Michael R. Torrisi, JAGC, USN
(argued); Lieutenant Brian D. Korn, JAGC, USN.
For Appellee: Captain Robert E. Eckert Jr., USMC (argued);
Brian K. Keller, Esq.
Military Judge: Charles A. Porter
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication.
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court.
A general court-martial composed of members convicted
Hospital Corpsman Second Class Ivor G. Luke, contrary to his
pleas, of two specifications of indecent assault upon Seaman
Recruit TN in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000).1 Luke was sentenced to
confinement for two years and a bad-conduct discharge. The
convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged and the
United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the findings and sentence. United States v. Luke, No.
NMCCA 200000481, 2004 CCA LEXIS 218, at *16, 2004 WL 2187577, at
*6 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2004).
Upon Luke’s appeal to this court in 2005, we initially
granted two evidentiary issues and later granted a supplemental
issue as to whether Luke’s conviction could be affirmed in light
of newly discovered evidence.2 Following two United States v.
1
Prior to trial the Government dismissed with prejudice three
specifications of indecent assault and three specifications of
indecent language involving other victims. Luke was found not
guilty of one specification of sodomy and two specifications of
indecent language involving Seaman Recruit TN.
2
Review was initially granted on the following issues:
I. Whether the lower court erred when it upheld the trial
judge’s exclusion, during cross-examination, of an
alleged victim’s abortion after it became relevant and
material rebuttal to the victim’s testimony.
II. Whether the lower court erred when it upheld the
Government’s failure to disclose evidence that it had
2
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
DuBay, 17 C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (1967), hearings and two
Court of Criminal Appeals decisions, the case is before this
court for the third time. We now review the following three
issues: whether newly discovered evidence would probably have
produced a substantially more favorable result; whether the
military judge erred when he held that the Government was not
required to disclose Prosecution Exhibit (PE) 17 to the defense
in pretrial discovery; and whether Luke’s due process rights
have been violated by the lengthy post-trial processing of his
appeal. We hold that the newly discovered evidence would
probably not have produced a substantially more favorable
result; if the military judge erred in holding that the
Government was not required to provide the defense with PE 17 in
pretrial discovery, it was harmless error; and Luke’s post-trial
prepared to use on re-direct examination of a
Government witness.
United States v. Luke, 61 M.J. 278 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (order
granting review).
The supplemental issue was:
Whether Appellant’s conviction can be affirmed by this
Court in light of the fact that evidence of fraudulent
testing of DNA has been newly discovered.
United States v. Luke (Luke I), 63 M.J. 60, 61 (C.A.A.F. 2006);
United States v. Luke, 62 M.J. 328 (C.A.A.F. 2005)
(interlocutory order granting motion to file a supplemental
issue).
3
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
due process rights were not violated. We therefore affirm the
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals.
DISCUSSION
As the three issues before the court present discrete legal
and factual matters, we will set forth the facts and procedural
background relevant to each in the discussion of the individual
issues.
I. Whether the newly discovered evidence of Mills’ misconduct
renders his conviction unreliable
Factual and Procedural Background:
The situation giving rise to Luke’s conviction took place
when he was serving as a hospital corpsman aboard the USS Port
Royal. Luke was accused of indecent assault upon a shipmate,
Seaman Recruit TN, when she sought a pelvic exam from him after
Luke diagnosed her boyfriend, Fireman RA, another shipmate, with
a sexually transmitted disease. Luke contested the charges and
maintained that he did not examine TN nor did he commit an
indecent assault upon her. At Luke’s court-martial TN and RA
both testified to a series of events which supported the
indecent assault specifications and which Luke denied.3 The
defense theory of the case was that TN and RA made up the
allegations against Luke in order to avoid the consequences of
3
The underlying facts were detailed in this court’s 2006
decision and need not be repeated here. Luke I, 63 M.J. at 61.
4
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
the command discovering their romantic relationship, which was
in violation of ship policy.
In addition to testimony from TN and RA, the Government
presented testimony from four Naval Criminal Investigative
Service (NCIS) investigators and two experts from the United
States Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL). The
USACIL witnesses testified about serological and DNA testing
performed on several items removed from the sleeping quarters of
the medical compartment on the USS Port Royal where TN alleged
the incident took place, as well as a bra and panties worn by TN
during the incident.
Phillip Mills, then a forensic chemist at USACIL, conducted
the serology4 analysis of the evidence in Luke’s case. Mills
examined a bedsheet, a bra, a pair of panties, and a pillowcase
for serological evidence. At Luke’s court-martial, Mills
testified about stains he found on the sheet and the bra which
revealed the presence of amylase and epithelial cells. Mills
did not find any stains of consequence on the pillowcase or the
panties.
4
Serology is “the branch of science dealing with the properties,
uses, and preparation of serums. A serum in this sense is a
body fluid containing substances useful in the diagnosis,
prevention, and treatment of disease.” 5 J. E. Schmidt,
Attorneys’ Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder S-119 (2010).
As used here, Mills explained that “serology” was the
examination of body fluid stains to determine the biochemical
makeup of the stain.
5
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
Mills testified that amylase is an enzyme that is found in
most body fluids in low concentrations but is found in high
concentrations in saliva. Epithelial cells are cells forming
epithelium, the lining of body cavities and the covering of the
skin and mucous membranes. 2 Schmidt, supra note 4, at E-164.
Mills explained that epithelial cells are found throughout the
body and contain DNA.
Mills testified that the amylase and the epithelial cells
on the bedsheet were consistent with saliva and vaginal
secretions. The amylase on the bra was found in a high enough
concentration that it was “indicative of saliva.” Mills further
testified that the epithelial cells found on the bra could have
come from TN simply wearing the bra. He sent those stains to
Marilyn Chase, another USACIL examiner, for DNA analysis.
Chase was qualified as an expert at Luke’s court-martial in
the forensic application of serological and DNA analysis. She
testified about the techniques used to conduct DNA analysis, the
quality control procedures in place at USACIL, as well as the
peer review process for DNA analysis at USACIL. Chase examined
TN’s bra, her panties, a cutting from the sheet, and a cutting
from a blanket. Chase testified that “[w]hen I analyzed the DNA
in the sheet, it was consistent -- or -- with a mixture -- what
you see in a mixture of the DNA profiles that were also seen in
the blood standards of Luke and [TN].” Regarding the sample
6
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
found on the bra worn by TN, Chase testified that her analysis
revealed DNA types from at least three people on the bra which
were consistent with the DNA profiles of TN, Luke, and RA.5
Defense counsel questioned Chase about the possibility of
contamination of the samples in testing and the possibility of
degradation of the specimens. Defense counsel also raised the
possibility of exacerbation of degradation of a mixed sample
when there are a number of different profiles in a specimen. On
redirect examination, trial counsel questioned Chase about the
specimens in Luke’s case and Chase stated “my controls worked
properly in this case. I saw no indication of contamination in
any of my reagents or any of the other controls in this case.”6
The testimony given by Mills and Chase as to the presence
of saliva on TN’s bra was relied upon by the Government to
support TN’s account of the incident (that Luke had sucked on
her breast during the examination). The Government relied on
the DNA on the bedsheet as proof that the encounter took place
5
Chase testified that the DNA analysis on the panties did not
reveal DNA profiles of anyone other than TN.
6
At the first DuBay hearing, when asked whether she could tell
whether the evidence provided by Mills had been contaminated,
Chase replied, “I couldn’t tell if it’d been contaminated when I
received the evidence and inventoried it, it didn’t look like
anything unusual. . . . I couldn’t tell unless there was
something actually physically wrong.”
7
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
as TN described, contradicting the defense’s position that any
evidence of saliva and Luke’s DNA on the sheet resulted because
he had masturbated and then sucked his thumb on the bed that
same day. Luke was subsequently found guilty of two
specifications of indecent assault in violation of Article 134,
UCMJ.
In 2005, six years after Luke’s court-martial and one month
prior to argument on the two issues originally granted by this
court, USACIL issued a memorandum to all staff judge advocates
informing them that disciplinary action had been taken against
Phillip Mills, the USACIL forensic examiner who had conducted
the serological examination in this case. The USACIL memorandum
noted that the disciplinary action was taken after it had been
discovered that Mills had cross-contaminated and/or switched
samples within and between several cases, made a false data
entry and altered documentary evidence, falsely stated the
results of an examination which he had not performed, and
misrepresented work he had performed.
In response to a defense motion, this court granted a
supplemental issue addressing the newly discovered evidence of
Mills’ misconduct and its possible impact on the case. Luke I,
63 M.J. at 61; Luke, 62 M.J. 328. We set aside the decision
and ordered further inquiry under DuBay, to determine “whether a
Government forensic examiner contaminated Appellant’s DNA sample
8
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
or otherwise falsified pertinent test results.” Luke I, 63 M.J.
at 61. A DuBay hearing was subsequently conducted on June 2 and
8, 2006.7 United States v. Luke, 64 M.J. 193, 194 (C.A.A.F.
2006) (interlocutory order, Appendix A).
Based on testimony and evidence presented at the hearing,
the DuBay military judge found that “Mr. [Mills] demonstrated a
pattern of mistakes in conducting DNA analysis” but “[n]o
evidence was presented that Mr. [Mills] ever altered any results
to falsely show the presence or absence of DNA in a sample, or
that his failure to follow proper procedures was an attempt to
improperly influence or alter the outcome of DNA analysis.” Id.
at 196. The DuBay military judge found “Mr. [Mills] was
proficient in performing serology analysis. He had a full
understanding of the standard procedures for conducting serology
casework.” Id. He also found that Mills only performed the
serology portion of the analysis in Luke’s case and Chase did
the DNA analysis on the samples that Mills prepared. Id. at
196-97. The DuBay military judge found that Mills did not
conduct the DNA analysis and therefore never had an opportunity
to falsify the results. Id. at 197. He also found that there
7
Following the discovery of Mills’ misconduct, the U.S. Army
Criminal Investigation Command began a remediation project to
review/retest 465 cases on which Mills had worked between 1995
and 2005. This investigation had not been concluded at the time
of the first DuBay hearing. The investigation also included two
independent DNA investigators who were to review Mills’ work and
USACIL’s procedures.
9
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
was no possibility of cross-contamination between the bedsheet
and the bra. Id.Pursuant to the remand order, the DuBay military judge’s
findings were returned directly to this court and after further
briefing on the supplemental issue, we remanded the case to the
Court of Criminal Appeals for further consideration. United
States v. Luke, 65 M.J. 5 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (summary disposition).
On May 27, 2008, the Court of Criminal Appeals ordered a second
DuBay hearing to determine the status of USACIL’s internal
investigation and to examine the two independent DNA experts as
to the possible impact of Mills’ misconduct on Luke’s case.
United States v. Luke, No. NMCCA 200000481, slip op. at 4 (N-M.
Ct. Crim. App. May 27, 2008). The second DuBay decision
reviewed a draft of the USACIL report and noted that the final
report was due on September 30, 2008. The second DuBay military
judge concluded that “[n]o prior facts established by the prior
Dubay [sic] hearing were modified or altered.”
Relying on the DuBay hearings as well as the USACIL final
report on Mills’ misconduct released on September 30, 2008, the
Court of Criminal Appeals issued an opinion affirming the
original findings and sentence on July 31, 2009. United States
v. Luke, No. NMCCA 200000481, 2009 CCA LEXIS 270, at *24, 2009
WL 2345124, at *8 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. July 31, 2009). The CCA
found:
10
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
The facts elicited both during the USACIL review of
Mr. Mills’ work and during the DuBay hearings
demonstrate that Mr. Mills’ DNA analysis while at
USACIL suffered from a number of errors.
Notwithstanding the seriousness of these errors, as
appropriately commented on by the military judge
during the second DuBay hearing, there is no evidence
that Mr. Mills had any involvement in the appellant’s
case beyond the serological analysis. . . . [T]he
evidence relating to deficiencies in Mr. Mills’ DNA
analysis would be of limited probative value in
assessing the accuracy of his serological examination
in the appellant’s case and, albeit potential
impeachment evidence, would not probably produce a
substantially more favorable result for the accused.
Id. at *14-*15, 2009 WL 2345124, at *5 (citation, footnote, and
quotation marks omitted).
Analysis:
Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1210(f)(2)8 sets forth the
8
Article 73 provides that the accused may petition the Judge
Advocate General for a new trial on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence within two years after the convening
authority approves the sentence. Article 73, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
873 (2006). In his separate opinion, Judge Stucky argues that
this time limit prohibits this court from exercising
jurisdiction as to Issue I. United States v. Luke, __ M.J. __
(5) (C.A.A.F. 2011) (Stucky, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Because this issue reached us on direct
review under Article 67, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2006), we
disagree. When the evidence of Mills’ misconduct was revealed
to the defense while Luke’s appeal was pending before this
court, Luke’s appellate defense counsel filed a motion for a
supplemental issue specifically noting that the procedure for
granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence “is to
petition the Judge Advocate General for a new trial ‘within 2
years after approval by the convening authority.’” Luke’s
appellate counsel explained, “[b]ecause the convening authority
approved Appellant’s sentence over two years ago, Appellant is
seeking relief from this court.” Indeed, in Luke I, this court
granted the supplemental issue to determine whether the results
of Luke’s court-martial were reliable in light of newly
discovered evidence. 63 M.J. at 61. Therefore this case is not
11
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
grounds for granting a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence, specifically:
(2) Newly discovered evidence. A new trial shall not
be granted on the grounds of newly discovered
evidence unless the petition shows that:
(A) The evidence was discovered after the trial;
(B) The evidence is not such that it would have
been discovered by the petitioner at the
time of trial in the exercise of due
diligence; and
(C) The newly discovered evidence, if considered
by a court-martial in the light of all other
pertinent evidence, would probably produce a
substantially more favorable result for the
accused.
“[T]he reviewing court must make a credibility
determination, insofar as it must determine whether the ‘newly
discovered evidence, if considered by a court-martial in the
light of all other pertinent evidence, would probably produce a
substantially more favorable result for the accused.’” United
States v. Brooks, 49 M.J. 64, 69 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (citation
omitted). “The reviewing court does not determine whether the
proffered evidence is true; nor does it determine historical
facts. It merely decides if the evidence is sufficiently
believable to make a more favorable result probable.” Id.before the court under a petition filed pursuant to Article 73,
UCMJ, and as both parties agree that the framework of R.C.M.
1210 should govern our analysis, we proceed under the grant of
the supplemental issue in Luke I.
12
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
The parties agree that subsections (A) and (B) of R.C.M.
1210(f)(2) are satisfied but disagree as to subsection (C).
Luke argues that the newly discovered evidence of Mills’
“misconduct, dishonesty and sloppiness” would probably produce a
more favorable result at a new trial. Luke urges this court to
set aside the findings and sentence because the newly discovered
evidence attacks the reliability of the Government’s scientific
analysis and raises questions about the “conclusions that formed
the bedrock of Appellant’s conviction.”
The Government counters that the impeachment evidence of
Mills’ misconduct is not an adequate basis to convene a new
court-martial because the new evidence does not refute an
essential element of the Government’s case. In light of all of
the other evidence presented at Luke’s court-martial, the
Government argues that it is unlikely that impeachment of Mills
would result in a more favorable outcome for Luke.
At the first DuBay hearing, six current and former
employees of the USACIL testified, including Mills and Chase.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the military
judge following the DuBay hearing contained a number of specific
findings as to the procedures Mills followed in conducting the
serological examination and included the following:
29. Mr. [Mills] demonstrated a pattern of mistakes in
conducting DNA analysis, and on at least one occasion,
he attempted to cover up his mistake by making a false
data entry.
13
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
30. No evidence was presented that Mr. [Mills] ever
altered any results to falsely show the presence or
absence of DNA in a sample. Or that this failure to
follow proper procedures was an attempt to
[im]properly influence or alter the outcome of the DNA
analysis in any of the cases.
31. It is evident, however, that Mr. [Mills] had
significant problems with the DNA analysis process,
which calls into question the forensic reliability of
the results of his DNA casework.
32. Mr. [Mills] disciplinary and proficiency problems
were all related to his performance of DNA analysis.
Mr. [Mills] had never demonstrated a lack of
proficiency in any of his other duties.
33. Mr. [Mills] was proficient in performing the
serological analysis. . . .
34. In Appellant’s case, Mr. [Mills] performed the
serology portion, but did not conduct any of the DNA
analysis.
35. Mr. [Mills] understood the standard procedure for
conducting serology analysis, and followed it in
Appellant’s case.
. . . .
43. The presence of Appellant’s DNA on the bra can be
explained in one of three ways: a) Appellant came
into contact with the bra sometime prior to it being
collected as evidence; b) the bra became contaminated
after it was collected as evidence by coming into
contact with Appellant’s DNA from another sample; or
c) the results were falsified.
44. With respect to Mr. [Mills], he did not conduct
the DNA analysis, so he did not have the opportunity
to falsify the results. Also, he had no motive to
falsify the results, such as the desire to cover up a
mistake, as in the documented case. Also, no evidence
was presented that Ms. [Chase] or anyone else ever
sought to falsify the results.
14
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
45. The panties could not have contaminated the bra
with Appellant’s DNA, because the Appellant’s DNA was
not present on, the panties.
46. Neither the bed sheet or any other item could
have contaminated the bra during the serology portion,
because the sample of the bra was cut and sealed in a
test tube before the other items were opened.
47. The bra was not contaminated with Appellant’s DNA
during the serology portion of the forensic analysis,
and the results of the DNA analysis were not
falsified.
Luke, 64 M.J. at 196-97. Based on the evidence presented at the
DuBay hearing, none of these findings could be found to have
been clearly erroneous. However, viewed in light of the details
which emerged in USACIL’s report on Mills’ misconduct which was
issued two years after the first DuBay hearing, Findings 32 and
33 of the first DuBay military judge, regarding Mills’
proficiency in serological analysis, are called into question.
There is support for Luke’s argument that, in affirming the
DuBay military judge, the CCA overlooked the evidence from the
USACIL investigation that Mills was engaged in misconduct during
the time period Luke’s evidence was examined by USACIL. The
primary focus of USACIL’s report on Mills’ misconduct was his
DNA analyses performed between 2000 and 2005 “because of the
increased potential for finding case samples still available for
retesting” and “[t]his was also the period in which Mr. Mills
15
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
performed a majority of his DNA casework.”9 The report did,
however, review Mills’ serology work from 1995 through 1999 and
revealed “thoroughness issues” with his serological analyses
during the time period when Luke’s sample was analyzed.
Mills conducted serological analyses for thirty-seven Navy
cases between 1995 and 1999. Of those thirty-seven cases,
investigators found fifteen cases in which a review of Mills’
analysis revealed “thoroughness issues.” The report explained:
This review identified a lack of thoroughness in the
work performed by Mr. Mills. Mr. Mills did not
examine all the biological swabs and smears submitted
for examination. This also resulted in him spending
less time on examinations. He was not properly
screening cases because of his lack of thoroughness
and the shorter times spent on examinations. . . .
[H]is screening techniques my [sic] have resulted in
some questionable negative results in these cases.
Despite these thoroughness issues and the report’s conclusion
that Mills’ screening techniques may have resulted in some
questionable negative results during this time, the report did
not contain any evidence of contamination or false reporting in
Mills’ serological analysis between 1995 and 1999. Notably, the
report indicated that Mills’ thoroughness issues may have
resulted in negative findings where there may have in fact been
forensic evidence present. “[Mills] had forty-nine negative
9
The report found that the first instance of Mills’ DNA false
documentation was in 2002, four years after Luke’s 1998 court-
martial. The report found no cases with “DNA issues” for the
time between 1995 and 1999.
16
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
cases in the period from 1995-2005. His examination of evidence
was incomplete, rushed and not properly screened. Consequently
it is doubtful that all forty-nine of these cases were
completely negative.”
Based on USACIL’s final report, the DuBay military judge’s
determination that Mills was proficient in serological analysis
is clearly erroneous. Mills’ “thoroughness issues” reflect that
he did mishandle evidence when he conducted serological analyses
during the period when Luke’s evidence was processed by the lab.
However, the other findings of the DuBay military judge as to
Mills’ handling of Luke’s sample and the lack of evidence of
contamination are not clearly erroneous and are therefore upheld
by this court.10
Luke argues that the testimony of Chase and Mills was at
the core of his conviction because it “assigned instant
credibility to [TN]’s story” which was a critical issue in an
“otherwise shaky” case. However, while the DNA evidence may
have corroborated TN’s story, it was not what Military Rule of
Evidence (M.R.E.) 608 defines as credibility evidence. See
M.R.E. 608(a) (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked or
10
The second DuBay military judge’s findings are also clearly
erroneous to the extent that he found that no prior fact
established by the prior DuBay hearing were modified or altered
as a result of the USACIL report.
17
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation. . .
.). Luke also alleges that the CCA incorrectly deemed the newly
discovered evidence “merely” impeachment evidence. However,
using evidence of Mills’ lack of thoroughness in his serological
examinations and his mishandling of evidence during his DNA
examinations to attack his credibility would indeed amount to
impeachment evidence. See United States v. Banker, 15 M.J. 207,
210 (C.M.A. 1983) (“Impeachment can be defined as an attack on
the credibility or believability of a witness. In general, it
is a process of explaining away a witness’ testimony as to the
existence of a fact at issue in a trial.”) (citations omitted).
Regardless of how the CCA may have classified the DNA evidence,
Luke is correct that Mills’ and Chase’s testimony supported the
Government’s theory of the case. However, Luke’s argument that
TN’s “credibility was intertwined with the credibility of the
DNA evidence” goes too far. This is not a case where the
evidence of newly discovered evidence would have “substantially
impeached the prosecutrix’ testimony on a material matter.”
United States v. Williams, 37 M.J. 352, 354 (C.M.A. 1993).
Luke also argues that there probably would be a different
result at a new trial because the members would have no
confidence that Mills had not contaminated the evidence, or,
more broadly, that his misconduct would render him such a
completely discredited witness that the members would not
18
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
believe him on any issue. While there is no evidence of any
alleged contamination during the serological examination, such
contamination could have only occurred in one of two ways: the
sheet and bra may have been cross-contaminated; or Mills took
blood from Luke’s sealed blood sample and contaminated the
evidence during his serological examination. However, the
military judge at the first DuBay hearing found that neither the
bedsheet nor the bra could have been contaminated by other items
because “the sample of the bra was cut and sealed in a test tube
before the other items were opened.” Luke, 64 M.J. at 197.
Luke has not established that this finding is clearly erroneous.
As to the possibility that Mills intentionally contaminated
the evidence with Luke’s DNA from Luke’s blood sample, there is
no evidence from either the DuBay hearing or the USACIL report
that Mills intentionally contaminated a sample in order to
support a prosecution.11 There is no need to open or examine an
individual’s blood sample during a serological examination of
body fluids so the chance of contamination caused by a lack of
11
Luke cites two state cases to support his argument that Mills’
misconduct would completely undermine the validity and
reliability of all of his forensic work. In re Investigation of
the West Virginia State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501 (W.
Va. 1993); State v. Gookins, 637 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 1994). In both
of those cases, however, the analyst/arresting officer
repeatedly falsified data resulting in more convictions. In re
W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d at 503; Gookins, 637
A.2d at 1257. No evidence of falsification of evidence based on
a motive to increase convictions has been established in this
case.
19
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
thoroughness is diminished. Nor is there any evidence that
Luke’s blood sample was ever examined or opened by Mills during
the serological examination. While it is clear that Mills had
“thoroughness” issues, those issues appear to have resulted from
sloppiness and undue haste, not intentional contamination.
Luke also analogizes this court’s decision in United States
v. Webb, 66 M.J. 89 (C.A.A.F. 2008), to Luke’s case because
“‘evidence that the observer, a link in the chain of custody,
had been punished for dishonesty’ may have raised questions
about the integrity of the appellant’s urinalysis.” Luke argues
that the analysis for Webb and Luke’s cases must be the same.
Webb, however, is distinguishable from the instant case. In
Webb, we held merely that a military judge did not abuse her
discretion in granting a defense motion for a new trial. Id. at
93. We did not hold that a new trial was actually required.
Luke also relies on our case law for the proposition that “[a]
petition for a new trial may rest upon newly discovered evidence
that would ‘substantially impeach[]’ critical prosecution
evidence ‘on a material matter.’” United States v. Sztuka, 43
M.J. 261, 268 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (quoting Williams, 37 M.J. at 354)
(alteration in original). While evidence of Mills’ misconduct
would certainly have provided impeachment evidence as to Mills’
competence, it was attenuated in time and relevance. Luke does
not dispute Chase’s analysis of the DNA on the sheet and TN’s
20
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
bra but rather argues that evidence of Mills’ misconduct in
other cases may have created a doubt in the members’ minds as to
Mills’ overall competency or convinced them that he
intentionally or negligently contaminated the evidence with
Luke’s DNA during the serological analysis. As noted, the
serological evidence was not the only evidence the Government
presented in Luke’s case. Seaman Recruit TN and Fireman RA both
testified for the Government contrary to Luke’s testimony. Our
task is to determine “whether the ‘newly discovered evidence, if
considered by a court-martial in the light of all other
pertinent evidence, would probably produce a substantially more
favorable result for the accused.’” Brooks, 49 M.J. at 69
(citation omitted).
The newly discovered evidence as it relates to this case
goes to the performance of the serology screening and not the
DNA tests. Unless Luke can show on appeal a probability of
contamination in the serology screening that would account for
his DNA being present on the bra and blanket, he is left with
the prospect of rebutting compelling DNA statistics12 based on a
defense that his prior masturbation and thumb-sucking resulted
in the presence of his DNA in TN’s bra. Viewing the entire
record of trial, to include the newly discovered evidence, the
12
Dr. Basten testified that it was 290,000 times more likely
that the DNA found on the bra was from TN, RA, and Luke than TN,
RA, and an unknown contributor.
21
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
DuBay military judge’s findings that are supported by the
evidence, and the relative weakness of Luke’s case,13 we hold
that the newly discovered evidence would probably not have
resulted in a substantially more favorable result for Luke.14
II. Whether the military judge erred when he found the
Government was not required to disclose PE 17 relating to
statistical probabilities discussed on redirect examination
Factual and Procedural Background:
Following the testimony of the USACIL witnesses at court-
martial, the Government called Dr. Christopher Basten, a
research associate statistician from North Carolina State
University, to testify as to the probability that Luke’s DNA was
13
Luke’s defense was that TN and RA fabricated the allegations
against him to avoid the consequences of the command discovering
their romantic relationship, which was in violation of ship
policy. This theory, however, is undermined by the fact that TN
and RA voluntarily informed the command of their relationship
when they reported the incident to the command. Luke also
testified that on the date of the alleged events he masturbated
on the bed in the hospital quarters using a lubricant called
Surgilube and then fell asleep sucking his thumb, thereby
accounting for the semen found on the linens and the possibility
that Surgilube might be found on a swab NCIS took from his
mouth.
14
In his dissent, the Chief Judge argues Mesarosh v. United
States, 352 U.S. 1, 12 (1956), dictates that “[b]ecause ‘the
original finder of fact’ was a court-martial panel, only a new
panel ‘can determine what it would do on a different body of
evidence.’” United States v. Luke, __ M.J. __ (9) (C.A.A.F.
2011) (Effron, C.J. dissenting). We are satisfied that the
procedures traditionally utilized by this court to review cases
presenting newly discovered evidence are appropriate in this
case. See, e.g., Williams, 37 M.J. at 356; United States v.
Johnson, 61 M.J. 195, 198 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
22
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
contained in the DNA mix found on the bra and the bedsheet
versus that of someone else. After being qualified as an expert
in statistical genetics, Dr. Basten testified as to the
likelihood of Luke being a contributor to the stain on the sheet
and bra under several different scenarios. During his testimony
Dr. Basten was assisted by a series of demonstrative exhibits
that set forth the numerical statistical likelihood that Luke
was a contributor under the different assumptions presented to
Dr. Basten.15
During the cross-examination of Dr. Basten, defense counsel
sought to discredit his explanation of the statistical findings
and raised the possibility that other unknown contributors’ DNA
could also be contained in the stain on the bra:
Q: But if you weren’t taking into account the
profiles of the two people -- let’s say that they were
unknown -- would that affect the way you do the
calculations?
A: That would affect it if we didn’t have any
information about the other individuals.
. . . .
Q: Now, whenever there’s doubt as to the number of
contributors to a mixed sample, there can be
15
Prosecution Exhibits 14, 15, 16, and 18 were handwritten
posters similar to PE 17 in format and all displayed the
statistical likelihood that Luke and TN were contributors to the
stains on the sheet and the bra in various combinations with
Fireman RA and other unknown contributors. The record evidence
of the exhibits includes the notation “PEs 14-18 . . . used as
demonstrative aid only.” None of these demonstrative exhibits
were offered into evidence.
23
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
considerable variation in the likelihood ratio; is
that correct?
A: There will be some variance, yes.
On redirect examination, trial counsel asked Dr. Basten to
address the possibility raised by the defense of at least two
unknown people contributing to the stains and referred him to PE
17, which had not been used in his direct examination:
Q: And Doctor, finally, in Prosecution Number 17,
this is the possibility that the defense just
addressed, two unknowns in the bra. Can you please
explain your findings with respect to two other
unknowns in the bra.
A: So another alternate explanation would be that it
was [TN] and two unknown individuals. And if we
compare that to the idea that it was Luke, [TN] and
[RA], it’s -- the evidence is 51 million times more
likely that it’s the three of them than [TN] and two
unknowns.
Shortly thereafter the defense counsel requested an Article
39(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (2000), session. During the
Article 39(a), UCMJ, session Luke’s attorney complained to the
military judge that the basis for the statistical analysis in PE
17 had never been provided to the defense during discovery.
Trial counsel responded that Dr. Basten had calculated the
figures used in PE 17 “recently.” He argued that it was
evidence in rebuttal and they were not required to provide
rebuttal evidence in response to pretrial discovery requests.
The military judge found that it was clearly rebuttal evidence
to which the defense was not entitled during discovery. Defense
24
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
counsel then argued that the probative value of the exhibit was
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The military judge held
the prejudicial impact was minimal, that there was some
probative value, and declined to strike the exhibit or provide a
limiting instruction.
Before this court Luke argues that the military judge erred
when he found that the Government was not required to disclose
PE 17 to the defense prior to trial. He asserts that the
defense never opened the door for the admission of this evidence
during cross-examination and the admission of this evidence was
not harmless because defense counsel was not prepared to
properly cross-examine the witness on this point.
In response, the Government argues that trial counsel did
not violate discovery obligations because the statistical ratio
at issue in PE 17 had been calculated “recently” and the
evidence was only presented in response to defense counsel’s
assertions about two unknown contributors to the DNA profiles on
the victim’s bra.
Rule for Courts-Martial 701(a)(2) provides:
After service of charges, upon request of the defense,
the Government shall permit the defense to inspect:
(A) Any books, papers, documents, photographs,
tangible objects, buildings, or places, or copies of
portions thereof, which are within the possession,
custody, or control of military authorities, and which
are material to the preparation of the defense or are
intended for use by the trial counsel as evidence in
25
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
the prosecution case-in-chief at trial, or were
obtained from or belong to the accused; and
(B) Any results or reports of physical or mental
examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments,
or copies thereof, which are within the possession,
custody, or control of military authorities, the
existence of which is known or by the exercise of due
diligence may become known to the trial counsel, and
which are material to the preparation of the defense
or are intended for use by the trial counsel as
evidence in the prosecution case-in-chief at trial.
“The military rules pertaining to discovery focus on equal
access to evidence to aid the preparation of the defense and
enhance the orderly administration of military justice.” United
States v. Roberts, 59 M.J. 323, 325 (C.A.A.F. 2004). “To this
end, the discovery practice is not focused solely upon evidence
known to be admissible at trial. . . . The parties to a court-
martial should evaluate pretrial discovery and disclosure issues
in light of this liberal mandate.” Id. (citation omitted).
Defense counsel’s discovery request sought “[a]ny
handwritten, computer-generated, typed, or recorded statements
by any witness for the government” as well as “[a]ny writing or
document, including notes, used by a witness to refresh his/her
memory for the purpose of testifying at trial, either while
testifying or before testifying.” However, it is impossible for
this court to address whether there was a discovery violation as
the record does not reflect when PE 17 was prepared. We cannot
know the meaning of trial counsel’s comment that PE 17 had only
been produced “recently.” The other demonstrative exhibits used
26
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
by Dr. Basten (PEs 14, 15, 16, and 18) were used during direct
examination and were in the same format as PE 17, which was used
in rebuttal. In addition, comments made by trial counsel during
the Article 39(a), UCMJ, session indicated that the Government
anticipated that defense counsel would ask the question that he
did during cross-examination, and that the Government was
prepared to rebut it with PE 17. If it was prepared pretrial,
it should have been provided to the defense in response to their
discovery request pursuant to R.C.M. 701(a)(2) regardless of
when the Government intended to use it. United States v.
Trimper, 28 M.J. 460, 468 (C.M.A. 1989). Indeed “[a]n accused’s
right to discovery is not limited to evidence that would be
known to be admissible at trial. It includes materials that
would assist the defense in formulating a defense strategy.”
Webb, 66 M.J. at 92. However, if PE 17 was produced mid-trial
in response to the cross-examination of Dr. Basten, then the
Government could not have provided it to the defense pretrial
because it did not exist.
Although we cannot resolve whether a discovery violation
occurred, “[a]n appellate court may resolve a discovery issue
without determining whether there has been a discovery violation
if the court concludes that the alleged error would not have
been prejudicial.” United States v. Santos, 59 M.J. 317, 321
(C.A.A.F. 2004).
27
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
On direct examination, trial counsel elicited from Dr.
Basten a full explanation of the statistics presenting the
likelihood that biological evidence in the case linked Luke to
the bra. Direct examination of Dr. Basten revealed information
about his analysis, including which databases and populations he
relied upon to generate the statistics presented. There was no
objection during the direct examination of Dr. Basten as to the
underlying calculations on the other demonstrative exhibits and
apparently the statistical basis for those exhibits was no
surprise to the defense. There is no indication that Dr. Basten
relied on a separate database or population for the calculations
in PE 17. It was simply a piece of demonstrative evidence that
did no more than reiterate the expert’s testimony on direct
examination. The defense therefore had all of the information
necessary to understand how the calculations in PE 17 and the
other demonstrative exhibits were derived. Further, given the
multiple statistical formulations presented on direct
examination, we cannot find that one additional calculation of
the odds that the physical evidence was attributable to Luke
tipped the scales against Luke in this case. Therefore, we find
that the admission of PE 17 was not prejudicial.
28
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
III. Whether Luke’s due process rights were violated by untimely
post-trial proceedings
The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed Luke’s claim that he
was denied speedy post-trial processing of his case. Luke, 2009
CCA LEXIS 270, at *21, 2009 WL 2345124, at *6. That court found
that any due process violation that may have occurred in Luke’s
case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at *22, 2009
WL 2345124, at *7.
Before this court Luke renews his argument that the eleven-
year delay between his conviction and the lower court decision
was unreasonable and is attributable to the Government. Luke
cites the numerous motions for enlargement of time made by both
his defense attorney and the Government before the lower court
and also faults the Government for the delayed investigation
into Mills’ misconduct. Luke claims he was prejudiced by the
post-trial delay because the Government destroyed the physical
evidence, making any review of the biological evidence
impossible, and because the United States has denied his
application for citizenship because of his court-martial
conviction.
The Government cites the lengthy, in-depth investigation
into Mills’ misconduct that was required to properly evaluate
all the cases Mills handled as reason for the post-trial delay.
Given these extraordinary circumstances, the Government argues
that the post-trial delay in Luke’s case was reasonable.
29
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
Further, the Government asserts that Luke’s arguments that he
suffered prejudice are weak and he has not presented any
concrete evidence as to why his application for citizenship was
denied.
This court’s methodology for reviewing issues of post-trial
and appellate delay was set out in United States v. Moreno, 63
M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 2006). We first determine whether the delay
is facially unreasonable and, if so, we examine the four factors
set forth by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
530 (1972). United States v. Young, 64 M.J. 404, 408-09
(C.A.A.F. 2007). The four factors are: (1) the length of the
delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the appellant’s
assertion of the right to timely review and appeal; and (4)
prejudice. Id. If this analysis leads us to conclude that the
appellant has been denied the due process right to speedy post-
trial review and appeal, we grant relief unless we are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional error is
harmless. Id. at 409 (citation omitted). “Issues of due
process and whether constitutional error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt are reviewed de novo.” Id. (citation omitted).
With a delay of over eleven years between the completion of
his court-martial and the issuance of the Court of Criminal
Appeals decision, there is no doubt that the length of delay is
facially unreasonable. However, we need not engage in a
30
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
separate analysis of each factor where we can assume error and
proceed directly to the conclusion that any error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Reviewing the totality of
circumstances in this case,16 including the fact that we have
found no merit in either of substantive issues appealed by Luke,
we conclude that any denial of his right to speedy post-trial
review and appeal was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.17 See
id.; United States v. Bush, 68 M.J. 96, 104 (C.A.A.F. 2009)
(holding denial of right to speedy post-trial review harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt).
DECISION
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
16
We acknowledge that the delay in this case was extreme and
take particular note of the second DuBay military judge’s
conclusion regarding the speed of the Government’s review:
There appeared to be no sense of urgency on the part
of the USACIL laboratory administration or their chain
of command to resolve the weighty issues associated
with the substantial allegations pending against them.
While I do not consider the investigation of Mr. Mills
and the subsequent analysis the model of dispatch, it
does appear to be thorough.
However, the majority of the delay was attributable to the
procedural back and forth among this court, the Court of
Criminal Appeals, and the DuBay proceedings.
17
We also note that there is no evidence in the record to
support Luke’s contention that his application for citizenship
was denied.
31
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
RYAN, Judge (concurring):
Appellant successfully petitioned this Court to grant
his supplemental issue pursuant to Article 67, Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2006), United
States v. Luke, __ M.J. __ (2) (C.A.A.F. 2011).
Nonetheless, with respect to the supplemental issue, I view
his claim as a petition for a new trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence, governed by Article 73, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 873 (2006), and Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.)
1210. Indeed, Appellant has consistently invoked the
statutory language of Article 73, UCMJ, and R.C.M. 1210,
and the Court’s opinion makes clear that “the framework of
R.C.M. 1210 should govern our analysis.” Luke, __ M.J. __
(12 n.8).
I concur in and join the opinion of the Court. I
write separately because as a matter of first impression I
would have found Appellant’s petition for a new trial based
on newly discovered evidence to be time-barred. Both
Article 73, UCMJ, and R.C.M. 1210(a) set forth a clear time
limit for petitioning for a new trial: “2 years after
approval by the convening authority of a court-martial
sentence.” This is so even if the petitioner did not
discover the evidence until after the two-year time period
has expired. See, e.g., United States v. Rashid, 375 F.
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
App’x 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a motion for a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence under Fed. R.
Crim. P. 33 was untimely when made outside the three-year
filing period and based on evidence discovered outside that
three-year filing period).
But when this Court considered the timeliness of
Appellant’s request, it ordered the CCA to conduct a DuBay
hearing in order to determine whether Appellant was
entitled to a new trial. United States v. Luke (Luke I),
63 M.J. 60, 63 (C.A.A.F. 2006). The Government has not
appealed this decision. Therefore, although I agree with
the reasoning of the dissent in Luke I, see id. at 64(Erdmann, J., dissenting), and am prepared to revisit the
issue in an appropriate case, I regard the decision in Luke
I as law of the case here. See United States v. Erickson,
65 M.J. 221, 224 n.1 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (holding that when a
ruling is not appealed, it “will normally be regarded as
law of the case and binding upon the parties”).1
1
While a jurisdictional error may not be waived, the filing
time limit set forth in Article 73, UCMJ, and R.C.M. 1210
is more akin to a statute of limitations. See John R.
Sands & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133
(2008) (noting that whereas some time limits are
jurisdictional, “[m]ost statutes of limitations” are not).
Whereas United States v. Rodriguez, 67 M.J. 110 (C.A.A.F.
2009), and Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007),
considered statutory language governing when courts are
permitted to take appeals, see Article 67(b), UCMJ; 28
2
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
U.S.C. § 2107(a), the language at issue here in Article 73,
UCMJ, and R.C.M. 1210, like the language of Fed. R. Crim.
P. 33, governs when a petitioner has the right to file.
Accord Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005)
(“[I]t is difficult to escape the conclusion that [time
limits for Fed. R. Crim. P.] 33 motions are . . .
nonjurisdictional” (citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443(2004))).
3
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
STUCKY, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
Because I believe that under recent precedents we have no
jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s request for a new trial, I
would vacate the grant of review on Issue I and dismiss the
petition with respect to that issue. I concur in the majority’s
disposition of Issues II and III.
I.
The convening authority acted on Appellant’s case on March
29, 2000. More than five years later, on August 31, 2005, after
this Court had already granted review of two issues, Appellant
submitted a motion to file a supplemental issue -- asking for a
new trial -- directly to this Court. We granted review of the
supplemental issue and remanded for an evidentiary hearing into
whether the evidence supporting his conviction had been
compromised or falsified. See United States v. Luke (Luke I),
63 M.J. 60, 63 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
The Government, relying on our decision in United States v.
Rodriguez, 67 M.J. 110 (C.A.A.F. 2009), now argues in its brief
that we do not have jurisdiction to consider whether to grant a
new trial in this case.1 While Appellant insists that our
1
In light of our opinion in Rodriguez, the Government raised the
jurisdictional issue before the United States Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA), but the CCA correctly noted
that it was “constrained to exercise jurisdiction to consider
the appellant’s petition by the remand of our superior court.”
United States v. Luke, No. NMCCA 200000481, 2009 CCA LEXIS 270,
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
assertion of jurisdiction in Luke I is controlling, and points
to the 2009 opinion of the court below as support for the
proposition, neither is convincing. See United States v. Luke,
No. NMCCA 200000481, 2009 CCA LEXIS 270, 2009 WL 2345124 (N-M.
Ct. Crim. App. July 31, 2009). The decision of a lower court
cannot, of course, control our independent assessment of our own
jurisdiction, an assessment we are required to make. Mansfield,
Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382
(1884).
In Rodriguez, decided after Luke I, a majority of this
Court held that the petition-filing deadline in Article 67(b),
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 867(b)
(2006), “is jurisdictional and mandatory” in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205(2007). 67 M.J. at 116. Bowles held generally that statutory
time limits on filings were jurisdictional:
Because Congress decides whether federal courts can
hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and
under what conditions, federal courts can hear them.
Put another way, the notion of “subject-matter”
jurisdiction obviously extends to “classes of
cases . . . falling within a court’s adjudicatory
authority,” but it is no less “jurisdictional” when
Congress prohibits federal courts from adjudicating an
otherwise legitimate “class of cases” after a certain
period has elapsed from final judgment.
at *11, 2009 WL 2345124, at *4 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. July 31,
2009) (unpublished).
2
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
551 U.S. at 212-13 (ellipsis in original) (citations and quote
marks omitted).
“Federal courts, including courts in the military justice
system established under Article I of the Constitution, are
courts of limited jurisdiction.” United States v. Wuterich, 67
M.J. 63, 70 (C.A.A.F. 2008). “Without jurisdiction the court
cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to
declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and
dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506, 514 (1868), quoted in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
The exercise of jurisdiction at one stage of a case does
not guarantee its continuance. Nor does it mean that we, as a
court of limited and purely statutory jurisdiction, may ignore
intervening events that affect that jurisdiction, whether
federal statutes or Supreme Court decisions. See McCardle, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514 (holding that Congress may, by statute,
divest the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction in a case
already before it).
II.
Article 73, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 873 (2006), provides:
At any time within two years after approval by the
convening authority of a court-martial sentence, the
accused may petition the Judge Advocate General for a
3
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence
or fraud on the court. If the accused’s case is
pending before a Court of Criminal Appeals or before
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the Judge
Advocate General shall refer the petition to the
appropriate court for action. Otherwise the Judge
Advocate General shall act upon the petition.
This statute contains precisely the same sort of limit on a
particular filing as the Title 28 statutory provisions examined
in Bowles and Article 67(b) as construed in Rodriguez. Although
the two-year time limit in Article 73 is not expressed in a
statute from which this Court’s jurisdiction is derived --
Article 67 -- “[t]he accepted fact is that some time limits are
jurisdictional even though expressed in a separate statutory
section from jurisdictional grants.” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal
Co., 537 U.S. 149, 159 n.6 (2003), quoted in Bowles, 551 U.S. at
210. Article 73 is such a statute.
Under the logic of Rodriguez, I believe that we cannot
exercise jurisdiction over the request for a new trial, which
was made long after the expiration of the two-year period
prescribed in Article 73. Accordingly, I would vacate the grant
of review on Issue I and dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.
III.
The majority insists that it is not reviewing a petition
for new trial under Article 73, but merely a “supplemental
issue” raised by Appellant “to determine whether the results of
Luke’s court-martial were reliable in light of newly discovered
4
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
evidence.” United States v. Luke, __ M.J. __ (11 n.8) (C.A.A.F.
2011). But as the author of today’s majority opinion noted in
his dissent in Luke I, considering the supplemental issue
outside the statutory scheme set forth in Article 73 represents
“a broad extension of the right to a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence” that is not supported by our jurisprudence.
See 63 M.J. at 64 (Erdmann, J., dissenting).
“Petitions for new trials are disfavored in the
law . . . .” United States v. Harris, 61 M.J. 391, 394
(C.A.A.F. 2005). Congress established strict ground rules
concerning petitions for new trial; they must be filed with the
Judge Advocate General within two years of the convening
authority’s approval of the sentence, and only on the grounds of
newly discovered evidence or fraud on the court. Article 73,
UCMJ. Such petitions are only referred to a military appellate
court if the case is pending at the court when the petition is
filed with the Judge Advocate General. Had Appellant filed a
petition with the Judge Advocate General, it would have been
denied as untimely and would not have been referred to this
Court.
To escape the inevitable denial of his petition for new
trial as being untimely filed, Appellant successfully
circumvented the procedures established by Congress for
petitions for new trials by calling this a supplemental issue.
5
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
The majority opinion tries to distinguish between the two but
then resolves the issue by employing the framework of Rule for
Court-Martial (R.C.M.) 1210(f)(2), which “sets forth the grounds
for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.”
Luke, __ M.J. at __ (11-12). But calling it a supplemental
issue, rather than a petition for new trial, doesn’t make it so.
If it looks like a petition for new trial and the Court employs
the President’s framework for reviewing petitions for new trial,
it probably is a petition for new trial.
By judicial fiat, we have enlarged our jurisdiction to
permit any accused to file a petition for new trial directly to
this Court while the case is on direct appeal. If Congress had
meant that result, it would have said so in Article 67 or
Article 73.
In her concurring opinion, Judge Ryan states that “the
filing time limit set forth in Article 73 and R.C.M. 1210 is
more akin to a statute of limitations” than a jurisdictional
filing deadline, and governs when a petitioner has a right to
file rather than when courts are permitted to take appeals.
United States v. Luke, __ M.J. __ (2 n.1) (Ryan, J., concurring)
(citing Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005);
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004)). I disagree. Unlike the
claims-processing rules in Eberhart (Fed. R. Crim. P. 33) and
Kontrick (Fed. R. Bank. P. 4004, 9006), Article 73 is a
6
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
statutory limitation much like those in Bowles and Rodriguez,
which were determined to be jurisdictional.
7
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
EFFRON, Chief Judge (dissenting):
Post-trial information concerning an expert forensic
witness for the prosecution at Appellant’s court-martial
revealed that the expert had been suspended from his Government
position as a forensic examiner. This suspension, which
ultimately led to the expert’s resignation, resulted from a
Government investigation conducted several years after
Appellant’s trial that demonstrated misconduct and deficiencies
in the performance of his forensic duties sufficient to warrant
disciplinary action. The case before us addresses the impact of
the post-trial information on the validity of Appellant’s
conviction.
1. Background
The Navy charged Appellant, a hospital corpsman, with
indecent assault of a patient, Seaman Recruit TN. The parties
agreed at trial as to the underlying circumstances leading up to
the charged offense. In the course of his duties, Appellant had
examined Fireman A, who was involved in a sexual relationship
with Seaman Recruit TN, to address the possibility that Fireman
A was afflicted with a sexually transmitted disease. The sexual
relationship between Seaman Recruit TN and Fireman A violated a
shipboard order prohibiting dating among shipmates. Following
the examination of Fireman A, Seaman Recruit TN visited the
medical facility as well.
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
2. The testimony of the complainant and Appellant
The parties at trial offered substantially different
versions as to what happened next. Seaman Recruit TN testified
that Appellant examined her to determine whether she had a
sexually transmitted disease, and sexually assaulted her during
the course of the examination. Appellant, who denied the
allegation, testified that Seaman Recruit TN visited the medical
spaces after his examination of Fireman A. He stated that she
was upset and agitated, and soon left the area. He also stated
that he did not conduct a medical examination of Seaman Recruit
TN and did not otherwise touch her in an inappropriate manner.
3. The opposing theories of the case
At trial, the two parties presented diametrically opposed
theories of the case. According to the prosecution, Appellant
took advantage of Seaman Recruit TN’s vulnerability and
manipulated the circumstances to transform a medical examination
into an opportunity for sexual gratification. According to the
defense, Seaman Recruit TN and her boyfriend, Fireman A, feared
that Appellant would disclose their prohibited relationship, and
concocted the charges to divert attention from their own
misconduct.
4. Expert testimony
The case did not involve any third party eyewitnesses to
the charged misconduct. Each party presented circumstantial
2
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
evidence supporting that party’s theory of the case, as well as
circumstantial evidence countering the theory of the opposing
party.
The prosecution offered expert testimony from two
Government employees on the results of DNA testing of both
bedding from the medical compartment and undergarments
identified by Seaman Recruit TN as those worn by her at the time
of the charged incident. Phillip Mills, a forensic chemist at
the United States Army Criminal Investigative Laboratory
(USACIL), testified about his serology examination of the
bedding and articles of clothing. His testimony described his
handling of the physical evidence, the nature of the tests he
performed, and his identification of stains indicating the
presence of bodily fluids.
Mills testified that he transmitted the stains to another
USACIL employee, Marilyn Chase, for DNA analysis. Chase
testified about her DNA examination, and expressed her
conclusion that the testing indicated that the stains
transmitted by Mills showed the presence of DNA consistent with
that of Appellant’s DNA.
5. The court-martial findings and initial review
The court-martial found Appellant guilty of the charged
indecent assaults. On February 22, 1999, the court-martial
3
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
adjudged a sentence that included confinement for two years and
a bad-conduct discharge.
The case was docketed at the Navy-Marine Corps Court of
Criminal Appeals on May 8, 2000. The Court of Criminal Appeals
completed its review on September 28, 2004, at which time it
affirmed the findings and sentence.
6. Forensic misconduct
Appellant subsequently filed an appeal with our Court.
While that appeal was pending, USACIL issued a memorandum on
August 25, 2005, alerting all staff judge advocates that a
USACIL DNA examiner had been suspended “after permitting
contamination in his testing process.”
In a subsequent memorandum, issued on October 17, 2005,
USACIL identified the examiner as Phillip Mills, and listed a
number of problems with his work, including incidents in which
he “cross-contaminated and/or switched samples,” “altered
documentary evidence,” “entered false data regarding a control
sample,” “admitted to making a false data entry and creating a
false document,” and “misrepresented he examined evidence when
he had not.” The reliability of the trial results in
Appellant’s court-martial, in light of the information about
Mills, has been addressed in subsequent factfinding and
appellate proceedings. See United States v. Luke, 63 M.J. 60,
63 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Luke, 65 M.J. 5 (C.A.A.F.
4
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
2007); United States v. Luke, No. NMCCA 200000481, 2009 CCA
LEXIS 270, 2009 WL 2345124 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. July 31, 2009)
(unpublished).
Following discovery of the deficiencies in the testing
process due to Mills’s misconduct, USACIL asked law enforcement
agencies to return the physical evidence in the cases he had
handled so that USACIL could conduct new testing. The Naval
Criminal Investigative Service reported that it had destroyed
the evidence in Appellant’s case prior to receiving the request
from USACIL. As a result, the physical evidence relied upon by
the court-martial to convict Appellant was not available for
retesting during the subsequent factfinding proceedings.
The evidence received in the factfinding proceedings
confirmed information about Mills’s misconduct as a forensic
examiner. The evidence confirmed that Mills, among other
things, allowed “samples to contaminate one another,” “did not
follow proper testing procedures,” on at least one occasion
“attempted to cover up his mistake by making a false data
entry,” and “had significant problems with the DNA analysis
process, which calls into question the forensic reliability of
the results of his DNA casework.” The evidence also
demonstrated that contamination of the physical evidence could
occur during the serology portion of the testing, thereby
undermining the validity of the subsequent DNA testing.
5
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
The factfinding hearings identified the period of Mills’s
most serious misconduct as taking place while he was a DNA
examiner, a period that occurred several years after his work in
Appellant’s case as a serology examiner. In that light, and in
view of the testimony about the physical evidence, testing
process, and lack of motive for falsification, the military
judge conducting the factfinding hearing concluded that there
had been no contamination or false testimony with respect to
Appellant’s DNA. The military judge noted, however, that the
physical evidence had been destroyed, and that contamination can
occur during the serology portion of the testing process.
7. Discussion
The majority affirms the findings of the court-martial,
relying on the standard set forth in United States v. Brooks, 49
M.J. 64, 69 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (requiring an evaluation of “whether
the newly discovered evidence, if considered by a court-martial
in light of all other pertinent evidence, would probably produce
a substantially more favorable result for the accused”)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). If Brooks provided the
sole governing principle, I would agree with the majority. In
the present case, however, we must also take into consideration
Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956), which applies when
post-trial information so discredits the credibility of a
6
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
principal government witness that it undermines the integrity of
the judicial process.
The Supreme Court distinguished the circumstances in
Mesarosh from the normal treatment of a new trial request
involving newly discovered evidence. Id. at 9. In Mesarosh,
the government identified information that impugned the
credibility of a witness in unrelated proceedings. The Supreme
Court concluded that in such a case the credibility of important
government witnesses implicates the “integrity of . . . criminal
trial[s] in the federal courts,” and held that the “dignity of
the United States Government will not permit the conviction of
any person on tainted testimony.” Id. at 3, 9.
During the proceedings before the Supreme Court in
Mesarosh, the government had suggested that the case should be
returned to the district court to assess whether the newly
discovered evidence in fact warranted a new trial. Id. at 8-9.
The Supreme Court rejected that approach, and instead set aside
the conviction. Id. at 9, 14. The Court concluded that because
“the original finder of fact was a jury,” only a “jury can
determine what it would do on a different body of evidence.”
Id. at 12. The principles promulgated by the Court in Mesarosh
have since been utilized in similar situations by other federal
courts. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 500 F.2d 105 (9th
7
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
Cir. 1974); United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.
1969).
In the case before us, Mills -- a Government employee --
was interjected into the case by the Government to participate
in its investigation. He played a vital role in the examination
of Appellant’s forensic evidence. Mills was the first USACIL
examiner to come into contact with the evidence at issue, and he
repeatedly interacted with the evidence during the course of his
serological examination. Specifically, Mills removed the
evidence for examination, visually inspected it for stains, cut
out the areas of suspected stain with scissors, placed these
materials in sterile test tubes for storage, and forwarded these
tubes to Chase for DNA analysis.
The Government’s investigation established Mills’s history
of cross-contamination, violation of laboratory protocols,
“incomplete and incompetent” analysis as a DNA examiner, and
“thoroughness issues” as a serology examiner, all of which
underscore the potential for contamination of Appellant’s
evidence in the present case. The Government subsequently
destroyed the physical evidence at issue, thereby precluding the
type of retesting that might have restored some level of
confidence in the process. In this context, the evidence of
Mills’s misconduct undermines the integrity of Appellant’s
verdict. Because “the original finder of fact” was a court-
8
United States v. Luke, No. 05-0157/NA
martial panel, only a new panel “can determine what it would do
on a different body of evidence.” Mesarosh, 352 U.S. at 12.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision
to affirm the findings and sentence.
9