United States v. Johnson , 61 M.J. 195 ( 2005 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Antoinette E. JOHNSON, Senior Airman
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 04-0611
Crim. App. No. 34889
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued March 1, 2005
Decided July 8, 2005
CRAWFORD, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
GIERKE, C.J., and BAKER and ERDMANN, JJ., joined. EFFRON, J.,
filed a separate dissenting opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Colonel Carlos L. McDade (argued); Major Terry
L. McElyea, Major James M. Winner, and Major Sandra K.
Whittington (on brief).
For Appellee: Major John C. Johnson (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Robert D. Combs and Lieutenant Colonel Gary F. Spencer
(on brief).
Military Judge: Rodger A. Drew Jr.
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Johnson, No. 04-0611/AF
Judge CRAWFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Contrary to her pleas, Appellant was convicted by a general
court-martial of officer and enlisted members of two
specifications of assault consummated by battery, one
specification of assault on a security forces member in the
execution of her duties, and two specifications of assault with
intent to commit voluntary manslaughter, in violation of
Articles 128 and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
10 U.S.C. §§ 128, 134 (2000), respectively. The convening
authority approved the adjudged sentence of confinement for
fourteen years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction
to E-1, and a dishonorable discharge.
The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals found
both the findings and sentence correct in law and fact, but
reduced the confinement to ten years. United States v. Johnson,
No. ACM 34889, 2004 CCA LEXIS 133, 2004 WL 1238955 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. May 21, 2004). On November 16, 2004, this Court
granted review of the following issue:
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT AND MILITARY JUDGE ERRED IN
DENYING THE DEFENSE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
For the reasons discussed below, we hold that neither the
military judge nor the Court of Criminal Appeals erred, and we
affirm.
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FACTS
We accept and incorporate the lengthy but critical factual
account of the court below:
The appellant was stationed at Spangdahlem Air
Base, Germany, and assigned to the 52d Equipment
Maintenance Squadron. She met Airman First Class
(A1C) Amy Wheeler, a security forces member, and they
began a lesbian relationship that lasted about one
year. The relationship was turbulent, resulting in
arguments and physical confrontations. When A1C
Wheeler tried to end the relationship in January 2000,
the appellant took an overdose of pills in an apparent
suicidal gesture. Thereafter, they resumed their
relationship.
A1C Wheeler served at a deployed location between
May and September 2000. Upon her return, A1C Wheeler
broke off the affair with the appellant. In late
September 2000, A1C Wheeler met Airman (Amn) Nichole
Wesolowski, another security forces member, and they
became friends. The appellant suspected that A1C
Wheeler was romantically involved with Amn Wesolowski,
and was jealous and angry. This led to the two
incidents that formed the basis for the charges in
this case.
The first incident occurred in A1C Wheeler’s
dormitory room in late September or early October
2000. The appellant was upset about A1C Wheeler’s
relationship with Amn Wesolowski. They argued and the
appellant choked A1C Wheeler. This incident formed
the basis for one specification of assault consummated
by a battery on A1C Wheeler.
The appellant made another suicidal gesture in
October 2000. A1C Wheeler found her when she returned
a vehicle to the appellant’s home and got medical
assistance. As a result, the appellant faced
administrative discharge from the Air Force.
The second incident occurred at the armory in the
early morning hours of 21 October 2000. Amn
Wesolowski was visiting A1C Wheeler, who was on duty
as the armorer for the security forces squadron,
responsible for safeguarding and issuing small arms.
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The appellant called A1C Wheeler and they argued. The
appellant went to the armory, and a physical
altercation ensued between the appellant, A1C Wheeler,
and Amn Wesolowski. The appellant attempted to take
A1C Wheeler’s handgun but was unsuccessful. She then
seized a handgun from the storage racks, inserted a
loaded magazine, chambered a round, and pointed the
weapon at A1C Wheeler and Amn Wesolowski. A1C Wheeler
aimed her service weapon at the appellant and warned
her repeatedly to drop the gun. The appellant did not
comply. A1C Wheeler shot the appellant in the leg,
incapacitating her.
. . . .
At the outset of the trial, it was apparent that
the relationships between the appellant, A1C Wheeler,
and Amn Wesolowski would be matters of concern. The
government acknowledged that the nature of the
relationship between A1C Wheeler and the appellant
would be relevant, but moved to keep out evidence of
specific acts, to which the defense agreed. The
government also moved to exclude evidence of the
relationship between A1C Wheeler and Amn Wesolowski.
The defense maintained that it was relevant and
necessary to show bias under Mil. R. Evid. 608(c).
The military judge agreed, and allowed the defense to
explore the nature of the relationship generally.
The evidence presented at trial included
testimony about these relationships. A1C Wheeler
testified about her lesbian relationship with the
appellant and the disputes between them. The cross-
examination of A1C Wheeler focused on her lesbian
affair with the appellant. The trial defense counsel
asked A1C Wheeler if she started dating Amn Wesolowski
“right after the incident at the armory,” but she
denied it. A1C Wheeler denied kissing Amn Wesolowski,
but explained that Amn Wesolowski tried to kiss her;
she demurred and Amn Wesolowski kissed her on the
cheek. She admitted that she and Amn Wesolowski had
changed dormitory rooms to share adjoining rooms after
the incident. Trial defense counsel’s cross-
examination challenged Amn Wheeler extensively about
false statements to investigators about her lesbian
relationship, and alleged inconsistencies in her prior
statements. The defense called as a witness A1C
Jessica Ackerman, a security forces investigator, who
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United States v. Johnson, No. 04-0611/AF
related that Amn Wesolowski said she had started
dating A1C Wheeler shortly after the armory incident.
Both parties rested on 4 May 2001. Due to
conflicting commitments, the trial judge recessed the
trial for three weeks. The proceeding resumed with
oral arguments on findings on 29 May 2001.
During the recess, Air Force investigators looked
into an allegation that A1C Wheeler had stolen a
television belonging to the appellant. During the
previous summer, the appellant agreed to purchase a
television from another airman for $200.00. Delivery
was an issue, because of conflicting leave and
deployment schedules. They worked out an arrangement
where the appellant mailed her check to the seller,
who cashed it. Just before deploying, the seller left
a note and his room key, inviting A1C Wheeler or the
appellant to get the television from his room. When
he returned in December, the television was gone and
the key was returned, so the seller assumed all was in
order. By then, the appellant was in pretrial
confinement resulting from the incident at the armory.
While making arrangements to store her property, the
appellant realized the television was missing, and
reported it stolen. On 10 May 2001, the investigators
questioned A1C Wheeler about the missing television.
She made a written statement denying any knowledge of
its location.
Trial resumed on 29 May 2001 with arguments on
findings. The court-martial found the appellant
guilty as noted above, and the sentencing hearing
followed. Both A1C Wheeler and Amn Wesolowski
testified during the sentencing case concerning the
impact of the offenses on them.
After trial, the investigators questioned Amn
Wesolowski about the television. She indicated she
helped A1C Wheeler move a television to a dormitory
room. In the same statement, Amn Wesolowski noted a
fact about the incident at the armory that she had
omitted. She reported that, before A1C Wheeler opened
the armory door, she drew her handgun “in fear of her
life,” Amn Wesolowski asked her what she was doing,
and A1C Wheeler re-holstered the weapon. Amn
Wesolowski said she did not know why she had not
mentioned that before, other than she thought it was
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United States v. Johnson, No. 04-0611/AF
not relevant.
On 25 July 2001, the investigators re-interviewed
A1C Wheeler about the television. She indicated that
when she returned from the deployment, she found the
note inviting her to pick up the television, and she
did so. Apparently the television fell and may have
been damaged while in A1C Wheeler’s possession. A1C
Wheeler admitted that she made a false official
statement to investigators when she denied knowledge
of the location of the television. She said she did
it because the appellant’s lawyers “would have used it
against me,” and that, “they would have tried to say I
wasn’t a credible witness and I would have lost my
case.”
There was one other incident post-trial that came
to the attention of the defense counsel. On 3 August
2001, Ms. Erica Shipp walked into the lobby of the
base Finance office, and saw two women, in uniform,
kissing. She reported it to a clerk on duty. He
checked the sign-in roster, and one of the names was
“Wesolowski.”
The defense counsel moved for a new trial under
R.C.M. 1210. They based the request on “newly
discovered evidence,” specifically Amn Wesolowski’s
report that A1C Wheeler drew and re-holstered her
weapon before opening the door, and A1C Wheeler’s
false official statement about knowing the location of
the missing television. The defense counsel also
asked the military judge to consider additional
statements from their previous witness, A1C Ackerman,
about specific conduct between A1C Wheeler and Amn
Wesolowski, arguing that A1C Ackerman had just
remembered the details. The defense also asserted
that A1C Wheeler and Amn Wesolowski committed fraud on
the court by concealing the extent of their personal
relationship.
The military judge reconvened the court-martial
for a post-trial session and took statements and
evidence on the motion. See United States v. Scaff,
29 M.J. 60, 65 (C.M.A. 1989). A1C Wheeler and Amn
Wesolowski asserted their right to remain silent. The
convening authority denied the defense request for
testimonial immunity for these witnesses. The
military judge entered extensive findings of fact and
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United States v. Johnson, No. 04-0611/AF
conclusions of law, and denied the motion. Applying
the criteria in R.C.M. 1210, the military judge found
that the false official statement about the television
and the report of drawing and re-holstering the weapon
was discovered after trial, and was not such that it
would have been discovered before trial in the
exercise of due diligence. However, he concluded that
the new evidence probably would not have resulted in a
substantially more favorable result for the accused.
The military judge also concluded that, in light of
the evidence admitted at trial about the relationship
between A1C Wheeler and Amn Wesolowski, the additional
evidence would not have had a substantial contributing
effect on the findings of guilty or the sentence. He
declined to consider the additional evidence A1C
Ackerman remembered after trial.
Johnson, 2004 CCA LEXIS, at *2-*4, *15-*21, 2004 WL
1238955, at *1-*2, *6-*8.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the newly discovered evidence
affecting the credibility of Airman First Class (A1C) Amy J.
Wheeler and A1C∗ Nichole L. Wesolowski would probably produce a
substantially more favorable result for Appellant at a new trial
and that the fraud on the court allegedly perpetrated by A1C
Wheeler (and to a lesser degree by A1C Wesolowski) had a
substantial contributing effect on the findings of guilty and
the sentence. The Government invites us to conclude that the
new evidence is largely cumulative and that neither the military
*
Although referred to as “Airman” in the charge sheet and the
opinion of the court below, Wesolowski was apparently an “Airman
First Class” at the time of trial and is referred to as such in
this opinion.
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judge nor the court below erred in denying Appellant’s request
for new trial. We agree with the Government.
Article 73, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 873 (2000), allows petitions
for new trials “on the grounds of newly discovered evidence or
fraud on the court.” Implementing this UCMJ provision, Rule for
Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1210(f)(2), (3) provide that:
(2) Newly discovered evidence. A new trial shall not
be granted on the grounds of newly discovered evidence
unless the petition shows that:
(A) The evidence was discovered after the trial;
(B) The evidence is not such that it would have been
discovered by the petitioner at the time of trial in
the exercise of due diligence; and
(C) The newly discovered evidence, if considered by a
court-martial in the light of all other pertinent
evidence, would probably produce a substantially more
favorable result for the accused.
(3) Fraud on court-martial. No fraud on the court-
martial warrants a new trial unless it had a
substantial contributing effect on a finding of guilty
or the sentence adjudged.
Although Appellant’s motion was made under R.C.M. 1102,
which governs post-trial sessions, the military judge correctly
applied the standards in R.C.M. 1210, as discussed in United
States v. Scaff:
If evidence is discovered after trial which would
constitute grounds for a new trial under RCM 1210(f),
this might be considered a “matter which arises after
trial and which substantially affects the legal
sufficiency of any findings of guilty or the
sentence” within the meaning of RCM 1102(b)(2).
However, even if the drafters of the Manual did not
intend such an interpretation of this Rule, we still
are persuaded that Article 39(a) of the Code empowers
the military judge to convene a post-trial session to
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consider newly discovered evidence and to take
whatever remedial action is appropriate.
29 M.J. 60, 65-66 (C.M.A. 1989).
“This Court has opined that requests for a new trial, and
thus rehearings and reopenings of trial proceedings, are
generally disfavored. Relief is granted only if a manifest
injustice would result absent a new trial, rehearing, or
reopening based on proferred newly discovered evidence.” United
States v. Williams, 37 M.J. 352, 356 (C.M.A. 1993). In United
States v. Brooks, this Court held that
[w]hen presented with a petition for new trial, the
reviewing court must make a credibility determination,
insofar as it must determine whether the “newly
discovered evidence, if considered by a court-martial
in the light of all other pertinent evidence, would
probably produce a substantially more favorable result
for the accused.” RCM 1210(f)(2)(C). The reviewing
court does not determine whether the proferred
evidence is true; nor does it determine the historical
facts. It merely decides if the evidence is
sufficiently believable to make a more favorable
result probable.
49 M.J. 64, 69 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
“We review a military judge’s ruling on a petition for a
new trial for abuse of . . . discretion.” United States v.
Humpherys, 57 M.J. 83, 96 (C.A.A.F. 2002). An abuse of
discretion occurs “if the findings of fact upon which he
predicates his ruling are not supported by evidence of record;
if incorrect legal principles were used by him in deciding this
motion; or if his application of the correct legal principles to
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United States v. Johnson, No. 04-0611/AF
the facts of a particular case is clearly unreasonable.” United
States v. Williams, 37 M.J. 352, 356 (C.M.A. 1993).
In denying Appellant’s new trial request, the military
judge analyzed the new evidence and weighed it against the other
evidence at trial. The military judge’s conclusions of law
properly apply the tests of both R.C.M. 1210(f)(2) and R.C.M.
1210(f)(3). He concluded that the new evidence, considered
together with all other evidence, would not “probably produce a
substantially more favorable result” for Appellant. He also
concluded that, even if the members were convinced by the
additional evidence of perjury by A1C Wheeler and A1C Wesolowski
that there had been a fraud on the court, that perjured evidence
had not had “a substantial contributing effect on any finding of
guilty or the sentence adjudged.”
In the context of Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 412,
we have indicated that in determining whether evidence is
material, the military judge looks at: “‘the importance of the
issue for which the evidence was offered in relation to the
other issues in this case; the extent to which this issue is in
dispute; and the nature of other evidence in the case pertaining
to this issue.’” United States v. Colon-Angueira, 16 M.J. 20,
26 (C.M.A. 1983)(quoting United States v. Dorsey, 16 M.J. 1, 6
(C.M.A. 1983)). We believe this test is useful as well in the
context of a petition for a new trial under R.C.M. 1210.
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United States v. Johnson, No. 04-0611/AF
In determining that the new evidence would not produce a
substantially more favorable result for Appellant, the court
below correctly noted that:
[w]hen petitions for a new trial are submitted to this
Court, we have the “‘prerogative’ of weighing
‘testimony at trial against the’ post-trial evidence
‘to determine which is credible.’” United States v.
Bacon, 12 M.J. 489, 492 (C.M.A. 1982) (quoting United
States v. Brozauskis, 46 C.M.R. 743, 751 (N.C.M.R.
1972)). Consistent with federal civilian practice, we
may review the evidence “both in terms ‘of credibility
as well as of materiality.’” Id. (quoting Jones v.
United States, 279 F.2d 433, 436 (4th Cir. 1960)).
Johnson, 2004 CCA LEXIS 133, at *22-*23, 2004 WL 1238955, at *9.
Appellant’s new evidence raises several possibilities: (1)
a fact-finder could conclude from this new evidence that the
security policewomen, who were the putative victims of
Appellant’s crimes, had engaged in carefully crafted lies; (2)
the new evidence could strengthen the motive to lie of the two
“victims,” one of whom shot Appellant during the melee; (3) A1C
Wheeler’s falsely sworn statement to the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations (OSI) was admittedly made for the purpose
of protecting her credibility at Appellant’s trial and evinces
the degree to which A1C Wheeler had sacrificed her integrity as
a law enforcement officer in favor of her own interests; and (4)
the new evidence could be important during the sentencing, as
well as in the making of the findings, because both A1C Wheeler
and A1C Wesolowski gave “victim impact” testimony. See R.C.M.
1001(b)(4).
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United States v. Johnson, No. 04-0611/AF
On the other hand, as the military judge and the court
below correctly noted, this new evidence must be weighed against
the other evidence at trial. In this regard, and in addition to
the testimony of both A1C Wheeler and A1C Wesolowski,
Appellant’s oral statements and e-mails are compelling evidence
not only of her guilt and her own poor credibility, but also of
the extent to which the relationship between A1C Wheeler and A1C
Wesolowski was already before the members.
In Appellant’s oral statement to the OSI, she first
maintained that she remembered nothing of the armory incident.
When confronted with evidence of her fingerprints on A1C
Wheeler’s pistol, Appellant then admitted that she had attempted
to draw A1C Wheeler’s weapon only after A1C Wheeler and A1C
Wesolowski had her pinned to the floor of the armory. Appellant
then admitted that she took a 9mm gun from the rack, got a
magazine, which she loaded into the gun, and then chambered a
round (while leaving the safety on). Finally, Appellant
admitted that she pointed the weapon at both A1C Wheeler and A1C
Wesolowski, but denied any intent to harm either.
In the e-mail from Appellant to a third party, dated the
day before the armory incident and erroneously delivered to A1C
Wheeler, Appellant stated:
I’ve been an a[******] ever since she broke up with
me. I try not to be, but I just don’t understand. I
know she’s tired of talking about it so I’m not gonna
bring it up anymore either. I know I make her sound
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United States v. Johnson, No. 04-0611/AF
bad, but it really isn’t all her fault. I’ve done
some pretty f[*****] up stuff to her too. We had a
fight a couple of weeks ago and I choked her. I hurt
her pretty bad . . . . I’d give anything to be
[Wesolowski] right now. I hope she knows how lucky
she is. She better treat her right too. I’ll
f[******] kill that b[****] with my bare hands.
Although Appellant’s new evidence is, on the surface,
similar in nature to that examined by this Court in United
States v. Sztuka, 43 M.J. 261, 268 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (“[A]
petition for new trial may rest upon newly discovered evidence
that would ‘substantially impeach[]’ critical prosecution
evidence ‘on a material matter.’”) (involving purported
admission by husband that he put marijuana in appellant’s food),
as well as both United States v. Singleton, 41 M.J. 200, 204-07
(C.A.A.F. 1994) (ordering a new trial on multiple source
evidence of alternate perpetrator of threat and rape), and
United States v. Niles, 45 M.J. 455, 459-60 (C.A.A.F. 1996)
(ordering new trial on evidence of conflicting factual accounts
by prosecutrix in rape case), it is distinguishable.
First, the new evidence here does not relate directly to
the assaults of which Appellant was convicted, i.e., the
evidence does not offer some new version of the facts presented
at trial. The trial was not a one-on-one testimonial battle:
all three women testified; Appellant’s oral admissions were
recounted by an OSI agent; and an incriminating e-mail from
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United States v. Johnson, No. 04-0611/AF
Appellant, expressing jealousy and rage, and admitting to one of
the assaults, was received in evidence.
Second, while credibility of witnesses certainly was an
issue, the record is strewn with indicia of dishonesty
pertaining to all three airmen. A reasonable fact-finder could
have concluded that all three women were lying, in varying
degrees. Given Appellant’s admissions and her e-mail, it was
not an abuse of discretion for the military judge and the court
below to determine that even substantial additional impeachment
material or potential perjury would not meet the requirements of
R.C.M. 1210(f)(2), (3).
Third, A1C Wesolowski’s “forgotten” observation of A1C
Wheeler having drawn, and then reholstered, her weapon before
A1C Wheeler opened the armory door to Appellant, is of ambiguous
effect. While it further impeaches A1C Wesolowski’s
credibility, it also serves to establish that A1C Wheeler was
very afraid of Appellant, bolstering the evidence of prior
assaults of which Appellant was convicted.
Finally, evidence that A1C Wheeler and A1C Wesolowski had
been kissing in the finance office while in uniform was largely
cumulative. There was already significant evidence from which
the members could conclude that A1C Wheeler and A1C Wesolowski
were romantically involved, so as to support Appellant’s claim
of bias and motive to lie.
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CONCLUSION
Reviewing the military judge’s ruling and the holding of
the court below, in the context of the standard of review for a
new trial, we hold that the denial of Appellant’s request for a
new trial was not an abuse of discretion.
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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EFFRON, Judge (dissenting):
Appellant was charged with assaulting Airman First Class
(A1C) Wheeler and A1C Wesolowski in two separate incidents. As
described in detail in both the majority opinion and in the
opinion of the lower court, both incidents involved fights that
ensued after angry words, strained relationships, and suicide
attempts by Appellant. In the first incident, A1C Wheeler
testified that Appellant was the aggressor. Appellant denied
striking A1C Wheeler on that occasion, and testified that she
had engaged in a fight with A1C Wheeler during the same period,
which had been instigated by A1C Wheeler. In the second
incident, A1C Wheeler and A1C Wesolowski each testified that
Appellant was the aggressor and Appellant had threatened them
with a weapon. Appellant testified that A1C Wheeler was the
aggressor, and that she had threatened to kill herself, not the
other airmen, with the weapon.
The prosecution’s primary evidence consisted of the
testimony from A1C Wheeler and A1C Wesolowski. As noted in the
majority opinion, the prosecution presented other evidence,
including pretrial statements made by Appellant concerning her
physical encounters with A1C Wheeler and her animosity for A1C
Wesolowski. These statements, while significant, reflected the
tumultuous interaction among the parties to the two incidents,
United States v. Johnson, No. 04-0611/AF
and did not amount to an admission of the elements of the
charged offenses.
The defense position at trial was that Appellant did not
initiate the physical attacks, but instead responded to physical
attacks initiated by A1C Wheeler. In that context, the
testimony of a third party -– A1C Wesolowski -- was a key
component of the prosecution’s case, particularly on the charges
growing out of the second incident, including the charge of
assault with intent to commit murder. The defense sought to
undermine the credibility of A1C Wesolowski by showing that the
intensity of her relationship with A1C Wheeler provided a motive
to lie.
At the outset of trial, the prosecution sought through a
motion in limine to exclude any evidence regarding the
relationship between A1C Wheeler and A1C Wesolowski. The
military judge denied the motion and allowed the defense to
explore the relationship for the purposes of demonstrating bias
under Military Rule of Evidence 608(c). At trial, A1C Wheeler
and A1C Wesolowski sought to minimize their relationship,
denying that there was any sexual intimacy or an ongoing
homosexual relationship prior to the two charged incidents. The
defense challenged this testimony through cross-examination and
the introduction of contradictory prior statements. At best,
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United States v. Johnson, No. 04-0611/AF
the evidence at trial about the nature of their relationship was
inconclusive.
At a post-trial session under Article 39(a), Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 839 (2000), the defense
moved for a new trial on a variety of grounds, including fraud
on the court committed by the two primary witnesses against
Appellant -– A1C Wheeler and A1C Wesolowski. In the motion, the
defense cited newly discovered evidence of witnesses who saw the
two airmen at various times sleeping in the same bed; kissing on
the lips; and engaging in other displays of affection. The
defense also relied upon post-trial evidence confirming
Appellant’s pretrial allegation that A1C Wheeler had stolen her
television set. The post-trial evidence indicated that A1C
Wheeler and A1C Wesolowski had taken the television and
attempted to hide it in the rooms of other airmen. In addition,
A1C Wheeler made a post-trial statement in which she
acknowledged lying to defense counsel about the television set
prior to trial because she was concerned that defense counsel
would have used the incident against her and she did not want to
lose what she viewed as her case against Appellant.
As noted in the majority opinion, motions for a new trial
generally are disfavored. 61 M.J. at ___ (9-10). A new trial
is authorized under Article 73, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 873 (2000),
based upon “newly discovered evidence or fraud on the court.”
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Under Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1210(f)(2)(C), the
defense must show that any newly discovered evidence “if
considered . . . in light of all other pertinent evidence, would
probably produce a substantially more favorable result for the
accused.” With respect to evidence of a fraud on the court-
martial, the defense must show that the fraud “had a substantial
contributing effect on a finding of guilty or the sentence
adjudged.” R.C.M. 1210(f)(3).
The military judge determined that the new evidence and
evidence of fraud did not meet these standards, and the majority
concludes that the military judge did not err. 61 M.J. ___ (11-
15). I respectfully disagree.
Current military policy provides a powerful incentive to
conceal or minimize a homosexual relationship. By law, a
servicemember who engages in homosexual conduct or who states
that he or she is a homosexual, is subject to mandatory
discharge, with very limited exceptions. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)
(2000). This policy is based upon congressional findings that
“[t]he presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create
an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order
and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of
military capability.” 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15). A person who
faces mandatory discharge may be retained only if he or she
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United States v. Johnson, No. 04-0611/AF
establishes in an administrative process that the conduct was
atypical under a stringent test. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b).
Regardless of what decisions might be made in the future with
respect to the constitutionality of that policy and related
matters, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); United
States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004), the statute
reflected well-established military policy at the time of
Appellant’s trial. See, e.g., Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256,
258-61 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 919-25
(4th Cir. 1996); Able v. United States, 44 F.3d 128, 130-32 (2d
Circuit 1995); Thorne v. United States, 916 F. Supp 1358, 1364-
67 (E.D. Va. 1996); Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1407-10
(W.D. Wa. 1996).
Under these circumstances, both A1C Wheeler and A1C
Wesolowski had a substantial stake in minimizing the intensity
of their relationship. To the extent that they did so, their
testimony perpetrated a fraud on the court. Such a fraud
deprived the court-martial of critical testimony on the issue of
bias.
In concluding that any such fraud did not have a
substantial contributing effect on the finding of guilty or the
sentence adjudged under R.C.M. 1210(f)(3), the majority opinion
relies on evidence of incriminating pretrial statements by
Appellant. 61 M.J. ___ (13-14). These statements, however, did
5
United States v. Johnson, No. 04-0611/AF
not constitute admissions by Appellant that she engaged in the
offenses growing out of the second incident, including the
charges of assault with intent to commit murder.
After noting that there were credibility issues concerning
all three airmen, the majority opinion states that a “reasonable
fact-finder could have concluded that all three women were
lying, in varying degrees.” 61 M.J. ___ (14). The mere
possibility that the members could have reached such a
conclusion, however, does not mean that they did so. The
members necessarily concluded that A1C Wheeler and A1C
Wesolowski were not lying on the basis of the evidence presented
at trial, at least as to the details of the charged offenses --
a conclusion that was reached without the benefit of the
evidence obtained after trial. In light of the verdict, we are
not in a position to conclude that the members rejected any
aspect of the testimony by A1C Wheeler and A1C Wesolowski,
including their relatively benign description of their
relationship. The post-trial evidence of their romantic
involvement was not simply “cumulative” as suggested by the
majority, but instead constituted qualitatively different
information that would have substantially impeached the
testimony of these witnesses on a material matter, particularly
in terms of demonstrating the intensity of A1C Wesolowski’s bias
to lie on behalf of A1C Wheeler. See United States v. Sztuka,
6
United States v. Johnson, No. 04-0611/AF
43 M.J. 261, 268 (C.A.A.F. 1995). The impact of bias is
directly linked to the nature of a relationship. Here, the
prosecution’s presentation of evidence concerning A1C Wheeler
and A1C Wesolowski portrayed a friendship with mild sexual
overtones, a situation involving a considerably diminished
motive to lie, as compared to a sexual relationship,
particularly a homosexual relationship in the armed forces. In
the absence of critical information on the intensity of the
relationship, the members received a distorted presentation of
evidence at trial on the question of bias by witnesses central
to the prosecution. Under these circumstances, Appellant should
have been granted the opportunity to present the new evidence of
bias at a new trial.
7