United States v. Bartlett , 66 M.J. 426 ( 2008 )

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
David P. BARTLETT Jr., Lieutenant Colonel
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 07-0636
Crim. App. No. 20021244
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued May 6, 2008
Decided July 7, 2008
STUCKY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON,
C.J., and BAKER and RYAN, JJ., joined. ERDMANN, J., filed a
separate concurring opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Candace N. White Halverson (argued);
Colonel Christopher J. O’Brien and Major Sean F. Mangan (on
brief); Lieutenant Colonel Steven C. Henricks, Captain Tyesha
Elizabeth Lowrey, and Captain Kathleena R. Scarpato.
For Appellee: Captain Sarah J. Rykowski (argued); Colonel John
W. Miller II, Major Elizabeth G. Marotta, and Captain Michael C.
Friess (on brief); Captain Trevor B. A. Nelson.
Military Judge: Ronald W. White
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Bartlett, No. 07-0636/AR
Judge STUCKY delivered the opinion of the Court.
A military judge sitting as a general court-martial
convicted Appellant, Lieutenant Colonel David P. Bartlett Jr.,
pursuant to his pleas, of unpremeditated murder, in violation of
Article 118, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§ 918 (2000). A panel of members sentenced him to a dismissal
and confinement for twenty-five years. In accordance with a
pretrial agreement, the convening authority deferred automatic
forfeitures until his action, waived them thereafter for six
months, and otherwise approved the findings and sentence. The
United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
findings and sentence. United States v. Bartlett, 64 M.J. 641,
649 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2007).
We granted review of the following issue:
WHETHER THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY’S DECISION TO EXEMPT
FROM COURT-MARTIAL SERVICE OFFICERS OF THE SPECIAL
BRANCHES NAMED IN AR 27-10 CONTRADICTS ARTICLE
25(d)(2), UCMJ, WHICH REQUIRES A CONVENING AUTHORITY
TO SELECT COURT-MARTIAL MEMBERS BASED UPON AGE,
EDUCATION, TRAINING, EXPERIENCE, LENGTH OF SERVICE,
AND JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT.
We hold that the Secretary of the Army impermissibly
contravened the provisions of Article 25, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825(2000). However, we conclude that on these facts, the error was
harmless. We therefore affirm.
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I.
Prior to trial, on July 18, 2002, the garrison staff judge
advocate for Fort Meade, Maryland, sent a memorandum to the
garrison commander, who was the general court-martial convening
authority (GCMCA) for the present case. The memorandum dealt
with the selection of court members for Appellant’s trial. It
recited, inter alia, that the GCMCA could not “detail officers
assigned to the Medical Corps, Medical Specialist Corps, Army
Nurse Corps, Dental Corps, Chaplain Corps, Veterinary Corps, nor
those detailed to Inspector General duties as courts-martial
panel members.” The authority for this statement was given as
“AR 27-10, Chapter 7.” The parties stipulated that the GCMCA
acted in accordance with this advice and did not detail any
officer to the court-martial who fell within one of the
prohibited classes. The parties further stipulated that the
GCMCA had, at the time of selecting the panel, eleven officers
within his general court-martial convening authority who were
senior in grade or rank to Appellant but who fell within one of
the prohibited classes.
At trial, the defense moved for a new court-martial panel,
arguing that the Secretary of the Army exceeded his authority in
exempting officers of the branches, set out in Dep’t of the Army
Reg. (AR) 27-10, Military Justice (Aug. 20, 1999), from service
on courts-martial. The military judge made extensive findings
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of fact and law and denied the motion. The Army Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed, citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
and the analysis therein. Bartlett, 64 M.J. at 645-49.
II.
We review claims of error in the selection of members of
courts-martial de novo as questions of law. United States v.
Dowty, 60 M.J. 163, 171 (C.A.A.F. 2004); United States v.
Kirkland, 53 M.J. 22, 24 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
At the outset, we are constrained to point out that
although relied on by both sides, Chevron is inapposite to this
case. Chevron deals with the deference given to an
administrative agency’s interpretation of a regulatory statute,
the administration of which has been committed to it by
Congress. 467 U.S. at 839. That is not this case. Instead,
here Congress has enacted a detailed statute -- Article 25, UCMJ
-- which deals explicitly with the question of who may serve on
courts-martial. Congress has further, in Article 36, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 836 (2000), delegated to the President the authority to
prescribe by regulation procedures for the trial of courts-
martial, insofar as such regulations are not inconsistent with
the UCMJ. United States v. Jenkins, 7 C.M.A. 261, 262-63, 22
C.M.R. 51, 52-53 (1956). Such regulations are also to be
“uniform insofar as practicable.” Article 36(b), UCMJ.
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A general and wholly separate statute, 10 U.S.C. § 3013(2000), establishes the position of Secretary of the Army and
grants the Secretary broad general powers over the Department of
the Army. Subsection (g), in pertinent part, states:
(g) The Secretary of the Army may --
(1) assign, detail, and prescribe the duties of
members of the Army and civilian personnel of the
Department of the Army;
. . . .
(3) prescribe regulations to carry out his functions,
powers, and duties under this title.
It appears clear that the Secretary issued the underlying
personnel management regulations collected in AR 27-10 pursuant
to his authority to “prescribe the duties of members of the
Army.”1 Id. We, therefore, are faced with a situation in which
Congress has enacted detailed and specific legislation dealing
with a subject common to all the armed forces, while a service
1
While the authority cited for the exclusions is AR 27-10,
Chapter 7, Court Membership and Other Related Military Justice
Duties by Non-JAGC Personnel, it is clear from the text of that
regulation that it is a collection of substantive prohibitions
applicable to particular branches and duties and contained in
individual personnel management regulations. E.g., AR 165-1,
Chaplain Activities in the United States Army, ch. 4, para.
4-3.e.(2) (Mar. 25, 2004); AR 40-1, Medical Services,
Composition, Missions and Functions of the Army Medical
Department, ch. 2 (July 1, 1983) (medical, dental, nurse,
veterinary, and medical service corps, medical specialist
corps); AR 20-1, Inspector General Activities and Procedures,
ch. 2, para. 2-6 (Feb. 1, 2007).
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secretary, pursuant to a separate general statute, has issued
regulations2 dealing with the same subject.
In addressing the apparent tension between Article 25,
UCMJ, and the Secretary’s implementation of his enabling
authority, we apply standard principles of statutory
construction. See United States v. Lopez, 35 M.J. 35, 39
(C.M.A. 1992); United States v. Baker, 18 C.M.A. 504, 507, 40
C.M.R. 216, 219 (1969). While statutes covering the same
subject matter should be construed to harmonize them if
possible, this does not empower courts to undercut the clearly
expressed intent of Congress in enacting a particular statute.
United States v. Johnson, 3 M.J. 361, 363 (C.M.A. 1977); United
States v. Walker, 7 C.M.A. 669, 674, 23 C.M.R. 133, 138 (1957);
United States v. Lucas, 1 C.M.A. 19, 22, 1 C.M.R. 19, 22 (1951).
Congress did not see fit to include in Article 25, UCMJ,
any limitations on court-martial service by any branch, corps,
or occupational specialty among commissioned officers of the
2
It appears that only the Army exempts medical and related
personnel and inspectors general from court-martial duty by
regulation. The services appear to have a uniform policy of
exempting chaplains. Air Force Instr. 52-101, Chaplain,
Planning and Organizing, para. 2.1.7. (May 10, 2005); Secretary
of the Navy Instr. 1730-7B, Religious Ministry Support Within
the Department of the Navy, para. 4.a. (Oct. 12, 2000). Navy
chaplains serve the needs of the Coast Guard and are not to be
assigned collateral duties which involve serving as a member of
a court-martial. Coast Guard Chaplains Orientation Manual, ch.
3, para. B.7.(5), at 63, available at http://www.uscg.mil/comdt/
cocg/docs/orientationmanual.pdf (last visited June 25, 2008).
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armed forces. Rather, it cast the eligibility of such officers
to serve in broad and inclusive terms in Article 25(a), UCMJ
(emphasis added): “Any commissioned officer on active duty is
eligible to serve on all courts-martial for the trial of any
person who may lawfully be brought before such courts for
trial.” Within that broad class, the convening authority of a
court-martial is to detail those members who, “in his opinion,
are best qualified for the duty by reason of age, education,
training, experience, length of service, and judicial
temperament.” Article 25(d)(2), UCMJ.
Equally as important, Congress limited the broad and
inclusive terms of Article 25, UCMJ, by prohibiting only certain
members of the armed forces from acting as members of courts-
martial. For example, a member who is the accuser or a witness
for the prosecution, or who has acted as investigating officer
or counsel in a case, may not sit on that case. Article
25(d)(2), UCMJ. Nor may a warrant officer or enlisted person
sit as a member in a case involving a commissioned officer, like
this one. Article 25(b), 25(c)(1), UCMJ. Unless it is
unavoidable, no member of the armed forces junior in rank or
grade to the accused member may sit on that member’s court-
martial. Article 25(d)(1), UCMJ.
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The President, to whom regulatory authority is committed
by Article 36, UCMJ, has similarly seen fit to take a
nonrestrictive view of court-martial service. Rule for Courts-
Martial (R.C.M.) 502(a), which sets out the basic qualifications
of members of courts-martial, adds nothing to the statutory
language. R.C.M. 912(f), which does deal with disqualification
for service, is cast not in terms of prohibition from detail to
court-martial service, but in terms of allowable challenges for
cause. The disqualifying factors in the Rules for Courts-
Martial, as in Article 25, UCMJ, are limited to two: (1) actual
involvement in the case (as, for example, an investigating
officer); and (2) formal distinctions of grade or rank (as in,
for example, the prohibition of a warrant officer’s sitting on a
commissioned officer’s court-martial). The implication is
clear: Congress and the President crafted few prohibitions on
court-martial service to ensure maximum discretion to the
convening authority in the selection process, while maintaining
the basic fairness of the military justice system.
It is inescapable, then, that the Army regulations limiting
detail of commissioned officers to court-martial duty, collected
in AR 27-10, directly conflict with the provisions of Article
25, UCMJ, on the same subject. Congress did not simply set out
broad criteria in that article and leave it to administrative
implementation; rather, it set out detailed requirements,
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disqualifications, and prohibitions for courts-martial of
varying classes of members of the armed forces. As such, the
Army regulations must yield to the clear language of Article 25,
UCMJ. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 10 C.M.A. 229, 232,
27 C.M.R. 303, 306 (1959).3
Moreover, the Secretary’s application of 10 U.S.C. §
3013(g) (2000) runs afoul of the accepted principle of statutory
construction that in cases of direct conflict, a specific
statute overrides a general one, regardless of their dates of
enactment. 2B Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 51.02, at 187 (7th ed. 2000); Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974); Bulova Watch Co. v. United States,
365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961); United States v. Mitchell, 44 C.M.R.
649, 651 (A.C.M.R. 1971). The general grant of authority to the
Secretary to run the Army, broad and necessary as it is, cannot
trump Article 25, UCMJ, which is narrowly tailored legislation
dealing with the precise question in issue. We are left, then,
with a clear explication of the convening authority’s broad
power to detail any officer to a panel as long as the
requirements of Article 25, UCMJ, are met.
3
In Simpson, we held that a Manual provision concerning
automatic reduction in grade contravened the statutory
prohibition against increasing the severity of an adjudged
sentence. 10 C.M.A. at 232, 27 C.M.R. at 306. Congress
responded by amending the UCMJ to insert the present Article
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III.
This does not, however, end our inquiry. Having found
error, we must determine what, if any, relief to grant
Appellant. As Appellant pled guilty before the military judge,
he has asked only for a new sentencing hearing. We may not find
the sentence incorrect in law “unless the error materially
prejudice[d] the substantial rights to the accused.” Article
59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a) (2000).
Citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991), and
United States v. Greene, 20 C.M.A. 232, 239, 43 C.M.R. 72, 79
(1970), Appellant asserts that the error was structural, thus
obviating the need to show prejudice. Alternatively, he argues
that he was prejudiced because his panel lacked the benefit of
the special skills and education of the special branch officers.
Both arguments fail.
A.
There is a strong presumption that an error is not
structural. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986), overruled
on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637
(1993). In Fulminante, the Supreme Court noted that certain
constitutional errors, such as “the unlawful exclusion of
members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury,” were
58a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 858a (2000), giving legislative sanction
to the practice. Pub. L. No. 86-633, 74 Stat. 468 (1960).
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structural defects in the trial mechanism which defied analysis
for harmless error. 499 U.S. at 309-10 (citing Vasquez v.
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)). Appellant’s case, however, deals
with a statutory rather than constitutional error.
Both before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Fulminante, this Court has employed a case-specific rather than
a structural-error analysis in deciding issues of improper court
member selection. See, e.g., Greene, 20 C.M.A. at 238, 43
C.M.R. at 78 (reversing after concluding that the record raised
a reasonable doubt as to whether the proper standard for
selecting members had been used); United States v. McClain, 22
M.J. 124, 132 (C.M.A. 1986) (holding that the government failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that members were not
selected for the improper purpose of avoiding lenient
sentences); United States v. Hilow, 32 M.J. 439, 440-42 (C.M.A.
1991) (concluding that the government failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that members were not selected for the improper
purpose of limiting the panel to “‘supporters of a command
policy of hard discipline’”); United States v. Upshaw, 49 M.J.
111, 113 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (finding that the appellant did not
demonstrate prejudice from an administrative error that resulted
in an improper limitation on the pool of potential members).
Appellant has not shown that a structural error approach is
warranted under the circumstances of this case.
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The burden of demonstrating prejudice, or the lack thereof,
from nonconstitutional error in the detailing of court members
depends on the manner in which the error occurred. In those
cases where we have concluded that the error resulted from
unlawful command influence -- attempts to affect the outcome of
the trial through the selection of particular members -- we have
not affirmed unless the government established beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. See Hilow,
32 M.J. at 442; McClain, 22 M.J. at 132. Where a convening
authority has intentionally included or excluded certain classes
of individuals from membership, in an attempt to comply with the
requirements of Article 25, UCMJ -- such as exclusion of junior
officers and enlisted members because senior officers possess
better maturity and judgment -- we have placed the burden on the
government to demonstrate lack of harm. See Dowty, 60 M.J. at
173-75 (holding that the government established lack of
prejudice where convening authority’s legal staff employed novel
selection process -- from volunteers). On the other hand, when
there is a simple administrative error, the burden is on the
appellant to show prejudice. Upshaw, 49 M.J. at 113 (concluding
that the burden was on the appellant to show prejudice when the
staff judge advocate improperly limited the pool of eligible
court members because he thought the accused was an E-6, when he
was an E-5).
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B.
This case represents a novel question in that the source of
the error is the Army regulation that required the convening
authority to exclude certain classes of officers from
consideration. Nevertheless, as this error was not a simple
administrative mistake, we conclude the Government has the
burden of showing the error was harmless.4
In Appellant’s case (1) there is no evidence that the
Secretary of the Army enacted the regulation with an improper
motive; (2) there is no evidence that the convening authority’s
motivation in detailing the members he assigned to Appellant’s
court-martial was anything but benign -- the desire to comply
with a facially valid Army regulation; (3) the convening
authority who referred Appellant’s case to trial was a person
authorized to convene a general court-martial; (4) Appellant was
sentenced by court members personally chosen by the convening
authority from a pool of eligible officers; (5) the court
members all met the criteria in Article 25, UCMJ; and, (6) as
4
Although the burden is on the Government to show there was no
prejudice, Appellant has alleged that he was prejudiced because
his panel lacked the benefit of the special skills and education
of the special branch officers. Appellant offers nothing more
than supposition that the special branch officers would bring
skills unique to their occupations -- “critical thinking”
(doctors and nurses), “compassion” (chaplains), and “neutrality”
(inspectors general). While such prejudice is speculative at
best, we considered this allegation of prejudice in determining
whether the Government had met its burden.
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the military judge found, the panel was “well-balanced across
gender, racial, staff, command, and branch lines.” Under these
circumstances, we are convinced the error in this case was
harmless.
IV.
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed.
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ERDMANN, Judge (concurring):
I agree with the majority’s holding that the Secretary of
the Army impermissibly contravened the provisions of Article 25,
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (2000), and
with the conclusion that on the facts of this case, the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. While I also agree that
a structural-error analysis is not warranted in this case, I
write separately to emphasize that the issue as to whether a
structural-error approach could ever be the appropriate
framework for considering alleged errors in the selection of
courts-martial members was neither briefed nor argued by the
parties and is not an issue that is necessary to the resolution
of this case. The majority opinion states, “Both before and
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Fulminante, this Court has
employed a case-specific rather than a structural-error analysis
in deciding issues of improper court member selection.” United
States v. Bartlett, M.J. (11) (C.A.A.F. 2008). I do not
believe that language should be read to foreclose the possible
application of structural-error analysis to other member-
selection cases.